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CHAPTER
THE RADICALS AND

Tl-iE

I

RAILROADS

t

AN OVERVIEW

"El Fartido Radical,,, ha
llegado al poder sin im

Ha
pro grama concrete*
habido algo de utopfa en
los suenos de Yrigoyen,"
GSlvez, Vida de^ Hi 1:611 to
Yrigoye n, p« 2^1

—

The accession of Hip6lito Yrigoyen to the office of

President of the Argentine Republic on 12 October I916 was
the long-awaited climax to a quest for political power that

had begun twenty-five years earlier with the founding of the
Uni6n Civica Radical.

Since I89I the UCR or Radical Party,

as it is usually called, had been condemned to the status

of an opposition party, its leaders waiting impatiently for

their chance to uproot completely what they deemed the cor-

ruption and mismanagement of the regimen, their perforative
dominated
term for the conservative establishment that had

Argentine political life for decades.
than with
A party which dealt more with the abstract

defined prospecific policies, the Radical's only clearly
reform; but this
gram had been their demand for electoral
administration
goal had been realized by the Conservative
Now there was only
of Presid3nt Roque SSenz-Pena in 1912.

confused amalgam of ideas
a nebulous mass of doctrine, a
the future,
of the past ^d full of hope for

highly critical

UCR doctrine see Jos5
^For one work representative of

2

Nevertheless, as one of Argentina's better-knovm novelists
noted, many thousands of modest party members appreciated
the content of these ideas, in spite of their lack of "cul-

ture".

Radicals spoke of obrerismo

,

which they equated

with the "practical socialism" pursued by the English Labour
Party, and of argentinismo

believed by UCR affiliates to

.

be superior to nationalism and defined by them as a "dis-

tinct orientation" embracing enthusiasm and sentimentality

among other things.

Anti- cap italismo and ariti- imperial ismo

also figured prominently in the idealistic schema of the

Radical Party.

Other themes which reveal the complexity

and impracticality of Radicalism included pacifism, his-

panoamericanism, spiritualism, anti-intellectualism and
even anti-liberalism.

2

The Radical Party, moreover, was a heterogeneous or-

ganization and once the presidency was attained, once the
Radicals found themselves in command, their cohesiveness
was threatened.

Victory at the polls in I9I6 neither con-

quered the Conservative oligarchy nor removed it totally
Indeed, many men with intimate

from control of the State.

of the
ties to the agricultural and livestock interests
See also
Bianco. La doctrina radic al (Buenos Aires 192?).
los partidos (Buenos Aires,
Alfredi GillFtliria .Dol ftica
1961), p. 37.
t

Vida de ^ii^^i^^ -^^^^^^
GSlvez.
See also Felix
del m3sterio (Buenos Aires 1939TrpT^2.
Ubertad (Buenos Aires.
I^na. YTI^ven. El templ.ario de la
1956), pp. "W- 2^.
^I-^anuel

t

3

country

v/ere

dical.

As

they

v/ou.ld

enrolled in the ranks of the Uni6n Civica Ra-

"true representativec of their class interests"

inevitably "temper the economic and social ac-

tion of the new government.

"

The mixture of diverse ele-

ments v/ithin the governing party contributed to the indecision and contradiction which

v/ere

years of Radical administration.

to characterize the

3

Leading the quest for justice and "political reparation" was Hip6lito Yrigoyen, a man v/hose personality defies easy analysis.
v/ho

Virtually every author or biographer

has taken upon himself the task of explaining the na-

ture of Yripoyen's personality ultimately resorts to the

term "enig;matic"

beyond doubt.

.

That he was a remarkable character lies

Over the masses he exercised en extraordin-

ary fascination and displayed a curious charisma despite
his poorly developed oratorical abilities.

Over his party
Yet he was

he wielded an iron-fisted autocratic authority.

also modest, simple in his habits, shy of publicity, some-

what provincial, and nationalistic.
Hip6lito was the annointed one.^

To his followers Don

To his enemies we was

^Jos^ Luis Romero, A History of Argentiiie. FoliUcal
Thou^^ht, trains, by Thomas F. LlcGann (Starifordi I963), PP.
219 ,""22^.
^Clarence H. Haring, Arg entina pnl the ]Jnite6_ States
(tangle(Boston 19ia), p. 12i Arthur P. Whitaker, Argeiitma
wood Cliffs, N.J.i 196^0, p. ^7.
I

H^6m£

^For exampDe see Horacio Oyhcmarte El Hojribiiiei
Aires 19'+3;.
Yrigoy en, ap6stol do In. dcmoc rac.ia (Buenos
,

1

4

anathema,

Lisandro de la Torre, one-time Radical and the founder
of the Progressive Democratic Tarty, smaller than
to the UCR,

considered Yrif^oyen a clandestine

To Ricardo SScnz-lfayos

,

rival

ajid

intrif>;uer.

a frequent contributor to La fTcnsa,

the Radical president appefired ambitious, mysterious and

ridiculous, and one member' of Congress avowed that "el

Kenor Iri^royen no es ni loco ni perverse
mitive, poco evolucionado

.

j

sine en ncr pri-

Neutral observers jotted down

Frederic Jesup Stimson, United

other characteristics,

States Ambassador to Argentina until 1920, equated

t]ie

qual-

ities of Yrif'oyen with those revealed by William Jennings

Bryan

— "sentimental,

unpractical, pnd wholly ignorant of
7

the great world, economics, or finance."

The German Am-

Wipert von Bltlcher,

bassador to Argentina in the mid-1920

's,

was baffled by the Chief Executive,

In his memoirs von

Bleacher compared the opinions of Yrigoyen's detractors, who

portrayed the president as a demagogue, with those of his
sycophants, such as Undersecretary of State Lucio M, Moreno
Quintans, who held him in "boundless admiration, seeing in

^Lisandro de la Torre, "Una p^igina de Historia. HiLl-.^clro de_ la
T)6l\to Yrigoyen," 24 June 1919, in Obras
Torre (6 vols.; Buenos Airesi 1952), I, 20; Ricardo S^en-Ay. IsL
H^s. Rr,in6n J. C5rcnno Fn las letHS^.. ^el gobierno, Benjamin
diplomaFiirri"B60^"M"rK^^nos Aires, 19601, p. 31^1
Vll]TfaneT Iri"-^"o"ven el ultimo dict ador (Buenos Aires 1922},

^

i

.

p.

»

132.

^Frederic Jesup Stimson, By United Statr^ (New York.
1931). p. 361.

5

Irigoyen the type of great figure who from time to time
appears in the history of nations charged by Providence

with a high mission,"

The German diplomat weakly con-

fessed that the Argentine president

v/as

"one of the most

interesting and enigmatic men in Argentine history,"

8

Perhaps one of the most provocative interpretations
ever offered in explanation of Yrigoyen's personality

that presented by Manuel GSlvez.

archetypes developed by Carl

G,

v/as

Employing psychological
Jung, G^lvez contended that

the key to understanding Yrigoyen lay in his introversion.
The Argentine president preferred to work behind the scenes

and imposed his decisions on the Radical Party and the
State through his subordinates.

tortuously

slov/ to act,

Moreover, Yrigoyen was

determining policy only after long

and painful deliberation.

Such decisions were often post-

poned for weeks, and in some cases months or even years;
9

vacillation was alv/ays in evidence.
In some cases the introvert tends to don a m.ask to

hide his "psychic imderdevelopment"

Hip6lito Yrigoyen wore such a mask.

'

,

i.e., introversion.
It consisted of his

taciturnity, the air of mystery surrounding him, and the
suits of somber shades in which he always dressed,

^t

^Wipert von Bltlcher, Am Rande d_er Weltgeschichte
170.
rokko Schweden Argentinien Twlesbadeni 1958), pp. 167,
t

t

"

:

,

,

Ro^Galvez, Vida de Hipp lit o Yri£oven, pp. 210, 230?
Thought, p. 217.
mero, A History of Arp-entin e Political

6

Yrir.^oycn

was more complicated, for he exhibited flaslies of

extraversion as well.

When in thin mental state the leader

of the Radical Party oftentimes clouded the object of his

attention with a magic significance.
Don Quixote, a

mari v/ith a

Don Hip6lito became

mission to save the country, to

lift up the oppressed} a man who spoke of cause and not of
party, a man v/hose mind transformed the men of the oligar-

chy into monsters and traitors, capable of the most "sinister conjurations.""^^

The regimen was

)iis

target and all

who had been associated with its fraudulent reign were
suspect.

He went so far as to demand that his friends

refuse positions as lav;yers or directors of foreign com-

panies in Argentina, telling

them.

i

"No incurramos in las

corruptelas del Regimen, ...
V/ith

this mentality it is not surprising that the re-

lations between Yrigoyen's administration and the BritishLong years

owned railroads should be marked by suspicion.

of initmate association witli the oligarchy had tainted the

companies in Radical eyes.

As early as I905 Yrigoyen cri-

^^See Gdlvez, Vida de Hip6lito Yrig oyen,

p.

?.17.

For more information on Jung's
^^^n Ibid, p. ?73.
archetypes see "A Psychological Theory of Types" in his
Jung's
H'lodern Man in Search of a Soul (New Yorkt 1933) and
A succDnct^
3la ssTc"Tg y c h o 1 0 p.i c al Types (New Yorki 1923).
presentation 'of this theory may be found in Jolondc Jacobi,
New Haveni 1968), pp.
The Psvcholory of C. G. Jun g (7th ed.
1^23'r~T''or'rece^t "support of Jung's psycliology see David
.TItc.
Elkind, "Freud, Jung and the Collective Unconscious,
seg..
New York Times Map azine (4 October 1970), pp. 23 et
j

ticized foreigji capital for ignoring the national sovereignty of Argentina in its efforts to make profits.
Later, in 1913

•

12

UCR Deputy Rogelio Araya expressed in Con-

gress his fear of monopolies in general and the railroad

monopoly

m

particular.

13

He contended that the British

compD.nies were capable of exerting a destructive influence

on the country, political activity and governinent.

Because

the railroads ov/ed their existence to great concentra-

tions of capital, he assumed that they exerted immoderate

force in all aspects of public life.
The railroad, which ov/es its origin to a privilege of
the State, is inclined naturally to seek the favor of
the government, and v/hen the men in power do not react
spontaneously they try to corrupt them, to bring them
around to their way of thinking.
The excess of m.oney allows them to purchase the most
,1^
high-priced consciences,

Araya complained further that the legal representatives of
the railroads lived in close contact,

with Government ministers.

"frequent and friendly

In the very halls of Congress

these men "walked behind the deputies", and used subtle ar-

tifices and powerful persuasion to the end of gaining favorable votes, at times in the face of the public interest, the

l^Gabriel del Mazo, comp.
Yri^oye n (Buenos Aires 19^5 ;
t

t

El Pensamiento Escrito de

,

p.

93.

•^^Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, CSmara de
DiDiputados, Diario de Sesiones, l^U (hereafter cited as
putados, Sesiones )TBuenos Aires 1913). H^t ^^1.
i

-^^Rogelio Arava, Tarifa_s Ferrovi arias (2 vols.;
Buenos Aires 1923)» li 31.
i

2nd ed.

8

Constitution and the laws of the Nation.
his estimation, had to be endedi

Such activity, in

"the railroads should be

for the general good and not an oppressor in the hands of
ambitious plutocrats,

""^^

Araya's accusations, although passionate, were not de-

void of foujidation, for the cornpanies had forged strong
links with governing circles during the period of Conser-

vative hegemony.

Oftentimes company lawyers successfully

hastened Government action on some railroad matter by presenting the appropriate minister

v/ith the

draft of a needed

decree requiring only the date and that official's signa16
This was precisely the kind of relationship against
ture.

which the Radicals railed.
Many Argentines, especially those' harboring nationalist
or socialist sentiments, believed the companies to be guilty

of other abuses.

They

v/ere

convinced that the railroads

concealed their real profits by publishing balances which
failed to reflect the true results of exploitation; and that
costs of materials purchased in England were inflated

through the device of interlocking equipment companies.

In

addition, they suspected that a large percentage of the de17
"water".
of
consisted
clared capital of the railroads
^^Araya, Tarifas Ferroviarias

,

I,

31.

'^William Henry Taylor, private interview. Villa Carlos
See Appendix I for biographical
Faz, Cordoba, 11 June 1970.
sketches of Taylor and other officials interviewed.
l^see Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, His tori a de los ferro-

.

9

The Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles (Mational Rail-

road Board) provided the newly-elected Radical Government

with the mean?; necessary to investigate the alleged or actual breaches of contracts and railroad law by the British-

owned lines.

An appendage of the Ministerio de Obras lubli-

cas (Ministry of Fublic Works), the Direcci5n General in

theory exercised direct and constant control over the companies.

All railroads were subject to frequent inspection

by its teams of investigators who examined equipment, per-

manent way and storage facilities, checked arrival and departure times of freight and passenger trains against printed schedules, and interviewed shippers to assure that the

companies accorded equal treatment to all.

Its function-

aries also had unrestricted access to company books.

If

infractions were disclosed by the inspectors the Direcci6n
General had the power to assess appropriate fines and

penalties
The Railroad Board also regulated all construction un~

Buenos Airesi 1964), for the
carriles argentino s (4th ed.
companies.
Jiii^Thi^ted and least illuminating attack on the
Socialist complaints and charges received frequent airing
Inter,
Vanpuardia.
in the columns of the party newspaper. La
Clarence H.
locking equipment companies were mentioned^by
Fgrei^ji^ AfHaring. "Depression and Recovery in Argentina,'
For a speech discounting
fairs,^ XIV (April 1936), p. 518.
of
thc~llegation5 of wrongdoing given by a^ General Managei
Algunas
Iturbe,
the Central Argentine Railway see Atanasio
de LjLonpmla Arleyendas sobre los ferrocarriles," Revista
Manuel F
£eo
gentina, XXII (January 1929). PP- 558 et
from 1928-1932,
fetm'i, Director General de Ferrocarriles
socialist char^^^
di^cointed many of the nationalist and
to the author,
against the companies in a personal letter
Buenos Aires, 12 April 1971.
;

10

dertaken by the companies by requiring that its approval be

secured prior to actual building.

To this end the companies

submitted detailed plans and estimated costs which were

examined thoroughly by Government civil engineers and accountants.

Once satisfied that the costs involved were reason-

able, the projects were given official approval and the

Direcci6n General authorized the company to charge the expenses to the appropriate account

— capital,

renewal, or ex-

ploitation.
Theoretically, the Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles

should have been able to perform efficiently the tasks required of it; in practice its efficiency reflected not only
the ability of the men in charge and the inspectors in the

field, but also the degree of autonomy allowed the depart-

ment by the Chief Executive,

Under the excellent manage-

ment of men like Fablo Nogu^s or

^'^anuel F.

Castello the

Direcci6n General generally held a tight reign over the companies, while this control slackened under an incompetent

chief such as Herminio Capdevila."^^

The quality and dedi-

^ Dante Ardigo, private interview, Buenos Aires, 1
See also Iturbe, "Algunas leyendas sobre los
June 1970.
Ferrocarriles," Revista de Economia Argentina, XXII (Jan-^
The capital account, of course, consisuary 1929), p. 558.
was
ted of thJ companies' fixed assets; the renewal account
capital set aside for repairs or renovations; the workmg or
exploitation account was liquid capital used to buy materials,
pay wages, etc,

^^Nogu€s was Director General from 1911-1918, Capdeyila
Gio~
from 1922-1928, and Castello from 1928-1932. Arioaance
vacchini was interim Director from 1918-1922,

11

cation of the department's inspectors varied greatly. John
M.

Jared, a former traffic manager with the Great Southem

Railway, noted that they "were not overly zealous in their

posts,"

On occasion they recommended "small fines... to let

the people in higher posts think that they were fulfilling

their appointed tasks."

20

Another ex-railroad official re-

ferred to the Direccion General as a "damned nuisance."
He said that Government inspectors

"constantly checked the

company", which "was fine by me", but, he complained,

"they

didn't know anything; they had no practical experience in

running a railv/ay.

Yes, the Direccion General humbugged us
21
heart's
their
content."
Atanasio Iturbe, legal repreto

sentative and later General Manager of the Central Argentine,

characterized as stringent the control of the Na-

tional Railroad Board over the companies.
As suggested,

22

the degree of freedom allowed the Di-

recci5n General by the Executive often affected its efficiency.

Usually policy decisions initiated at the presiden-

tial level were transmitted to the companies via the Ministry of Public V/orks and the National Railroad Board.

By

operating through a bureaucratic chain-of- command these de20jo>in H,

Jared, private interview, Buenos Aires, 2?

May 1970.
^"•Ormond Steven, private interview, .Buenos Aires,

8

June 1970.

^^Iturbe, "Al^runas leyendas sobre Ferrocarriles " Revista de Economla Argentina, XXII (January 1929 )• p. 558.
,

12

cisions were refined by the subordinate bodies, and, per-

haps more importantly, the Direcci6n General was given the

opportunity to co-ordinate its thinking with that of the

Ministry and the President,

But during Yrigoyen's adminis-

tration both the Ministry of Public Works and the Railroad

Board gradually lost all vestiges of autonomy and were

brought under the President's direct control.

Oftentimes

Yrigoyen simply ignored the existence of the lower branches
of his CJovernment, and arrogated to himself their powers

and functions.

As a result of Yrigoyen's centralization of

power. Government railroad policy, issuing from two sources,

came to be characterized by contradiction and confusion.

According to Manuel F. Castello, Yrigoyen's high-handed actions also generated a good deal of friction between the

Direccion General and the Executive,

23

With the election in 1922 of Marcelo

T,

de Alvear the

normal relationships among the various areas of government
Alvear represented the conservative wing of

were restored.

Yrigoyen
the Radical Party and, even though hand-picked by
the extraas his successor, he was not disposed to tolerate

constitutional methods of his predecessor.

Alvear acted in

powers and
strict accordance with the law and respected the

duties of the component parts of his Government.

^^Manuel
9 June 1970.

F,

The

Castello, private interview, Buenos Aires,

Thought, p.
^^Romero, A History of Argentine Political
224.

.

13

change had a salutary effect within the Direcci6n General,

which conducted its operations quietly, if not brilliantly,
from 1922 until 192?

,

when politics again intruded into its

sphere of activity.

General Managers as well as Chief Officers in charge of
traffic, traction, stores, accounting, rates and staff on

all railroads, be they British, French, or State-owned,
t

maintained close contact with their opposite numbers within
25

the Direcci5n General.

Problems of an ordinary nature be-

tween the companies and the authorities were usually settled tlirough these channels.

For matters of a greater mag-

nitude the legal representatives of the railv/ays took the
issues under advisement and then worked at the ministerial

level or treated directly with the President.

26

But until

Yrigoyen's election in I9I6 the railroads seldom acted of
one accord in their dealings with the Direcci6n General, in

spite of Radical declamations v;hich charged the companies

with overbearing influence in Government circles.
to the Radical victory, with few exceptions,
v/ent his ov/n

Prior

"each manager

sweet way, he settled his own domestic prob-

lems... and he tried to show

^is

London Board/ that his

^^French capital controlled three smaller^railroads
in Argentina, the Frovincia de Santa Fe, Companfa General
de Ferrocarriles de Buenos Aires, and Rosario a lucrto Belgrano
^^Oliver Ramoni, private interview, Buenos Aires, 29
May 1970.

1^

railway was much better conducted thsn the others ....

"^"^

Prior to I9I8 only each company's attornies met in
joint regular sessions.

28

These members of the Junta Con-

sultiva de Abogados de los Ferrocarriles (Consultative Assembly of Railroad Lav;yers), all native Argentines with deep
roots in the conservative oligarchy, provided Radicals with

obvious evidence of the connection betv/een the companies
and the regimen, a tie which

v/as

maintained by the rail-

roads long after the Conservatives were voted out of power,

Kanuel Koyano, Minister of Public V/orks from I910 to I916,
was also a lawyer for the Great Southern until I909,

cind

served the Buenos Aires Midland Railway in the same capacity in 1921,

Alvear's Minister of Public Works and a fu-

ture President, Roberto M, Ortiz, had represented the Bue-

nos Aires Western until 191^, and Federal Judge Clodomiro
ZavalTa, who presided in La Plata from 1915-192^- and in
the Federal Capital from 192^-1925, watched over the in-

terests of the French Companfa General in I926,

An eminent

author, expert in public law, and one-time National Deputy,

Juan Antonio Gonzalez Calderon joined the legal staff of the

Great Southern in I925,

Angel Sanchez Elia, elected to the

Chamber of Deputies for the Province of Buenos Aires for the
^"^Taylor interview,

^^The Junta Consultiva de Abogados de los Ferrocarriles
held its first meeting on 1^ August I908 and convened once
a month from that time forward.

15

term 1922-1926, later represented the Entre Rlos Railways.

Other noted members of the Junta Consultiva included

Eduardo Bidau, Emilio

Mi^el

M.

F.

Padilla, Ram6n

Cardenas,
T.

Guillermo E, Lefuizam6n,

Nl^ndez and Osvaldo Rocha.

29

Conscious homogenization of the policies of the Bri-

tish-owned railroads did not begin at the administrative
level until 1918, when, for the first time, the General

J^nagers of the wide, one meter and stcindard gauge lines

organized regular monthly sessions.
TAB.I.E

30

Three years later

I

Gauges of British-owned Railroads in
Argentina
Wide gauge (5 '6")

Standard gauge (^'81")

Buenos Aires and Pacific
System

Entre RJos Railways
Argentine North-Eastern

Buenos Aires Great
Southern System

One Meter gauge (3 '3")

Central Argentine

Central C6rdoba

Buenos Aires Y/estern

Transandine

the Chairmen of the Buenos Aires Boards of Directors initi-

ated scheduled common meetings with their respective legal
stafi"s.

This newly-created Junta de Representantes y Geren-

tes de los Ferrocarriles

(Committee of Legal Representatives

29compiled from the Actas de la Junta Consultiva de
Abogados de los Ferrocarriles, Actas 1-181 (1908-193^0.
of
^^Sec Ordinary Monthly Meetings of General Managers
in the ArBritish Railways (hereafter cited as OKGM) found
(hereafter cited as
chive of the Buenos Aires and Pacific
ABAP).
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and Railroad Directors), as it

v/as

called,

concentrated its

attention on particularly delicate problems which existed

between the companies and the Government,
ti'ne

For the first

the companies had the mechanism to present a united

front to the authorities.

The Junta worked at all levels

of government, from the Direcci6n General to the President.

Growing co-operation among the railroads was more in
evidence during President Alvear's years in office.

Mana-

gers of the Argentine lines realized that v/orking together
in comiTion committees, a long-established practice among

railways in Great Britain, could also be usefully applied
to the Argentine situation.

To this end,

a Labor Advisory

Committee was formed in 1926, followed quickly by the in-

stitution of a Rates Committee.

By 1928 the chief mechani-

cal engineers of traction, senior accountants and superin-

tendants of stores of the British com.panies held regular
joint sessions devoted to their specialties a week to ten
days before the monthly meetings of the General Managers,

Apprised of the results of each group's labors, the General Managers were then able to discuss plans from the basis of up-to-date data.

The entire policy making process

was streamlined and co-ordinated with the creation of the
committee system.

As a consequence,

the General Managers

had more time for inspection trips, an important part of
their job,

^^Taylor interview.

For further information on Bri-
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The foreign railroad companies had directorates both in

London and Buenos Aires,

In the case of the British

lines, th3 London boards customarily gave their -Qeneral

Managers in Argentina a free hand on matters of local importance.

33

In addition,

they were accorded complete control

over the working account.

Only when the capital account

came into play did London insist on advising the best course

of action.

Once,

during the closing years of Alvear's ad-

ministration, the Buenos Aires boards conducted their own

study of the capital of their respective companies.

While

the completed analysis was undergoing the scrutiny of the

General I'anagers at one of their monthly meetings, V/illiam

Henry Taylor, secretary of the sessions, suggested that the

report be forv/arded to London,

^t

John Montague Eddy,

General Manager of the Great Southern, gasped

i

"Oh,

I

don't

want them to get the idea that we're intervening in this
question...*', and the issue was dropped.

London was always

super-sensitive in matters pertaining to capital.
The mechanics of administration of both the Government

tish practices see Philip S, Ba^ell, The Railway Clearing
Hous e in the British Economy 18^2 -1 9 2FTLon don 19o8T^
passim .
,

t

32Exoept for the Entre Rios a,id Argentine North-Eastern
Railways whose Argentine boards met in Concordia, Entre R£os.

^^Several General Managers, such as Saj^tiago G. O'Farrell of the Pacific and Ezequiel Ramos Mexfa of the Entre
Rios were native-born Argentines,
Taylor interviev/.
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and the companies was hovnd up inextricably with Argentine

railroad law.

Anticipating the birth and growth of a rail-

road network, the drafters of Argentina's Constitution of
1853 imparted to Congress in Article 6? the "power to pro-

vide that which is conducive to the prosperity of the country.

."

and to dictate plans for railroad construction and

the introduction of foreign capital.

The same article

charged Congress with making laws for the promotion of
railroads and foreign capital once they were established in
the country.

35

The first law to be devoted exclusavely to railroads

was that enacted by the Legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires on 12 January 1854.

Authorizing the first con-

cession made to private railroad capital, this law became
the model for later Argentine railroad legislation and cer-

tain of its provisions, such as the exemption of materials

from customs duties, were systematically incorporated into

subsequent laws,-^

On 2^ November I89I the National Congress

adopted a general railroad act (Law 2873)

1

which from that

^^Constitution of 1853, text in Anales de legisla cion
argentina, 1852- 1964 (5 vols.; Buenos Aires 19^-2-19^571
Hereafter all laws will be cited by
vol. for 1852-1880.
number and date of issuance and can be found in the appropriate volume of the chronologically arranged Anales.
1

^^For the text see United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Railways
of Soiith Am erica Part I, Ar£entina, by George S» Brady,
Trade "Troiiiot ion Series No. 32 TWashington, D. C. 1926),
pp. 15-16.
,

;
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time forward has constituted the main body

railroad legislation.

oif

Argentine

This enactment defined the functions

of the Direcci5n General de Ferrocarriles and set forth

general regulations concerning personnel, dispatching of
trains, right of way, crossovers, i.e., the switching of

trains from the lines of one company to those of another,
free transportation of mail, militarization of the lines in
the event of an emergency, transportation of passengers

sjid

freight, fixing of tariffs, telegraph reg-ulation, aco^uisition of new equipment and extension of lines,

tory decree of 10 September
and operation of the law.

189^-

detailed

tlie

A regula-

requirements

37

But the provisions of the General Railroad Law were
to be compromised by a plethora of national and provincial

laws relative to the granting of concessions to private
capital.

Indeed, by 190? the rights and duties of both

the companies and the authorities were hopelessly confused,

Carlos Saavedra Lamas, a specialist in international law,

noted that with respect to tariffs alone, prior to 190?
there existed twelve laws wl.ich provided for Executive ap-

proval for establishing rates, thirteen which failed to

mention any such requisite, one which expressly denied Go-

vernment intervention in tariff formation and others which
referred in vague terms to the authority of the General
Railroad Law of I89I or the jurisdiction of provincial
Law 2873 (1891), Anales, vol. for 1889-1919.
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governments.-^^

Cognizant of the anomalies present in Argentine railroad legislation, Congress acted to rationalize the regulations in force with the passage of Law 5315 in 190? ,

The

Mitre Law, as it was called after its author, was designed
to clarify but not replace the General Railroad Law of
39
In effect, it made Law 2873 applicable to all com1891,

panies and gave the authorities increasingly tighter control over all phases of railroad operation,

^he incentives

which had been offered to companies to encourage expansion
of their networks were altered as the old system of a guar-

anteed return on invested capital, which in some cases ap-

proached

IZfof

was abolished.

In place of the old incentives,

Article 9 of the Kitre Law sanctioned Government intervention in rate fixing only when the gross receipts of the com-

pany for three consecutive years exceeded 17^ of the capitalization accepted by the authorities.

Article

8

of the same

law made provision for a single annual payment of

3/^»

asses-

sed on net receipts, in lieu of all other national, provincial or municipal ta:xes.

The same article allowed the com-

panies to import free of customs duty all supplies desSaavedra Lamas, Los 1 errocarriles ajite la
legislacion posi tiva argentina (Buenos Aires 193^8)7 p. 3^6.
See also Jos^ "Beltrame, La crisis de los f errocarriles argen t inos (Buenos Aires 19^^^")
PP. 39-^».
•^^ Carlos

t

1

t

called the Mitre Law after its author Emilio
Emilio Mitre (1853Mitre, v/as landmark railroad legislation,
1909) was the son of General Bartolom^ Mitre.
-^^Law 5315,
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tined for railroad exploitation and construction.^^
A decree regulating Law 5315 was dictated by the Executive on 30 April I908, and further defined the bonds exist-

ing betv/een the companies and the Argentine Government.
The President was given the power to approve the content of

the clauses of new contracts as well as the authority to

expropriate lands required for rights of way.

portantly

But more im-

Article 4 announced the intention of the Govern-

ment to establish the exact amount of the capital accounts
of the railroads and declared that capital could not be

augmented without Executive approval.

Moreover, all emis-

sions of stock not corresponding to sums invested in actual

construction and exploitation would be disallowed.
article
the

v;as

This

a logical consequence of the Mitre Law, for

single tax could not be determined unless the Govern.

Jfo

had precise data vis a vis the capital accounts of the
^1
companies.

Tnent

.

The Mitre

Lav/

had been tailored carefully to protect

not only the interests of the Government but those of the

companies as well.

Official intervention in tariff forma-

Govcrnmcnt intervention also was justified when the
companies earned more thcin 6.8^ on net receipts for three
consecutive years, with working exponses arbitrarily calculated at 60fo of the gross income. Law 5315 (I907), Anales
vol. for 1881-1919.
,

complete text of the decree is printed in Alejandro E. Bunge, Fer rocarriles Arf^entinos Contribucj.on al
estudio del patrimonio na'cional (Buenos Aires I9I8), pp.
^'''"The

i

1

81-887
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I

tlon, dtemod oBsential by the National ConfTonn,

lanced noatly by the

caniiot bo

ba-

single tax and customu privilt

provlnionn attractive to the lines Z*"^
were BatiBficd

war,

v/M,h thn

That

/

*

;.

coinpnu n

tlio

leglelation, as thoy interpreted it,

Now ca})itnl in ovor-incrot-iBinf: amounts

(]<>nlo(l.

was directed Into Arfrontine railroad conntruction after
IVo years before the

1907.
Borne

roads

])roiiiul r;i

!

'

on of the Mitre Law

$ 627, ^30, 616 o/p had becji InvcMited in Arf'enl.ino railf

by 1915

tliis

fiuiii

rrown to $ 1 331 219

liad

,

,

,

10/^

o/n.

Similarly, Arc-jontina could booBt of only 19,79'l kilomotera
of track in 1905»

^Ithin

a

d-

(

.ide

the total kiloiiiotrage
'+3

juini)rd

to 33 710,
1

an increase of 70;5,

But Iho intOT-protation accordod the Mitro Law from
the date of itn inception by

tlie

Br.i t

j

nh-owned

coini-aniefl

wan not always in a^'recinont with the definition of n;ilional,

provincial or nnmicipal aulhoritien,
ting; confu'Jion,

Law 5315 itselJ" bocamo a wollfipring of dif-

ficultioo and would plaguo
until

thf>

Inotoad of elimina-

coiii])any-Govor]iiiient

relations

eventual nationalization of the linen.

The con-

troverny bocamo particularly hoatod diu'inr the rdminintrations of Yrifoyen and Alvear, when f^roat verbal hattlen

Ezequiel Ramoc Mex.fa, Miri IIirJlL^jJJLLL. Iiilii-i2li
(2nd od.i nuonon Aii^es
193^'Or Pp. 313-31^>«
^''^Seo

1

^^^D-inlc Ardjr.Ot "Lon f errocarvi loo y la econoni-ta arfiiGntina en el i.orlodo 1005-19^^^." h^. Ln^CS^JlkHl'IJl (Bucnon AU'ea),
^^i*^
r^l'' Ih-'^Jo
afio XLIX, no. B[^l (Ge].tember 19^!5)» p. 7?iy.
ycara 1905(o/r.) war. worth approximatoly U;jJS l.O^f for the

1915.
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were waged over the State's power to intervene in the
for-

mation of railroad tariffs and the determination of which
were to be included and which excluded from capital

BurnG

accounts.
In addition to differing interpretations of Argentine

railroad legislation, social changes, too, had a profound
effect in shaping the nature of the relations between the
companies and the Government,

Ever since the closing de-

cades of the nineteenth century, the laborin^^^ class in the

River Plate Republic had been growing in size, a direct result of nascent industrialization and tho tremendous

immigrants from Europe.

flov/

of

The introduction of refrigerator

ships gave an extraordinary boost to Argentina's beef in-

dustry and coincided with tho expansion of railroads as
as manufacturing, mining and construction.

v/ell

These newly-

developed sectors of the economy demanded manpov/er which

v/as

for the most part provided by millions of immigrants from
Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree from other parts of

Europe,

^^On the growth of the meat industry see Feter H. Smith,
Politics an_d BeeX in Argentina Fatte_rns o_f Conflict and
'^^^ ^rise of labor is
Chajnge rNew'Yorki 19^9 )"i PP. 32- 3^^.
treated succinctly in Moisds Poblete Troncoso and Ben G.
Burnett, The Rise qX tti_e Latin Amer ican Labor Movement (New
Net immigration to Argentina was
York 1960 )
pp. ^1-2-^-8.
In the period I869-I909 Argentina added more than
immense.
See James R. Scobie, Revolution on
2,6 million residents.
A Social History o_f Ar£en_llnfL .Viliaslt l§P.^rl21.Q.
the Pampas
TXustin, Texas 19<^'^)\ p. 1^9. '^ee also Carlos F, Diaz
Alejandro, Kssays on the Econoniiii History o_f the Ar£eivl^;uie
Republic (New Haven 7 r970T7~Chaptcr I.
i

I

,

t

t
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aware of their potential strength, began

V/orkers,

forming organizations devoted to improving their way of
life.

In 1887 railroad engineers and firemen founded La

Frate r nidad and patterned the union along the lines of the

railroad brotherhoods in the United States, but without the
masonic overtones.

At the turn of the century the first

nationally based trades union federation was established,
"^^^

Federaci6n

O brera

Regional Argentina (FORA),

Influ-

enced by anarchist doctrines introduced by immigraxits from
Boutliern Europe,

the FORA urged destruction of existing

bourgeois government through the use of the partial strike,
boycott, sabotage and, as a last resort, the general
strike.

But FORA was torn by chronic factionalism and in

1915 divided into two mutually antagonistic sections, FORA
of the IX Congress v/hich was syndicalist and socialist in
outlook, and FORA of the V Congress, devoted to anarchism.

Both sections professed to be organized along purely economic lines and shunned "bourgeois" political parties and
46
their labor policies.
.

M

.

^^Am^rico S, Balino, El Sol (Montevideo), reprinted in
Vanguard ia 29 June 1922, p. 5.
,

^^Samuel Baily, Labor, Nationalism., and FoUjti-CJ. In
Argenti na (New Brunswick, N.J. 1967), passim; Poblete Tron-.
^^-'1-^6.
coso, Ris'e of the Latin American Labor jpveme nt, pp.
For aniuaarcho- syndicalist interpretation of the rise of
Ideolo£la
FORA see Diego Abad de Santillan, La F. 0. R. A.
en la
v a^:avector:a del Movi mien to O brero RevojAicionario
aii_arAri^HtIHi~n3^enos" AiFe"s 19337. and his El moviiniiatg.
mlistaTn }a Argentina! Desde sub comienzos h^fja 1£10._ U^^ue1

r

1

,

imi_cnto
n3F~MresrT930)T'~^e"' also Sebastifin Marotta, El moy
"
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*

•

•

The Socialist Party was also active in
recruiting the

support of labor,

A second major trades union, the Uni6n

P^^^rel de T raba jo (UGT), was instituted in I902 and advo.

cated essentially socialist policies.

The UGT maintained

that the condition of the laboring man could be bettered
by working peacefully through the system, by pursuing a

policy of evolution and not revolution.

The activities of

the UGT were identified with the beliefs of two of Argentina'

great Socialist leaders, Juan

B.

Justo and Alfredo Falacios.^

Wany working men were drav;n also to the Radical Party during
this formative period in the history of organized labor.
Its vague ideals and emotion "attracted the largest number

of Creole- immigrant supporters, whose interests and aspira^8
tions it eminently represented.*'
The years from I90O to I9IO were difficult for all sec-

tors of the labor movement and were typified by "hard luck,

tough going and violence."

V/orkers pressed the Government

for an eight-hour day and management for larger wages and
salaries,

job security and recognition of their unions.

But the "clase patronal" remained deaf and blind to their

complaints,

\ihen

si ndical arge ntine

Aires

I

workers resorted to the strike, manage-

i

Sii

genesis ^ desgrpllo (3 vols.; Buenos

I96C-I970 ) .

^"^See Jacinto Oddone,

su origin, su desarrollo

^^Romero, A Histo ry,
216.

,

Gremialismo Proletario Argentinot
sus' errore s (Buenos Aires 19^9").
1

of;

Argentine Politic al Thought, p,

ment was able to recruit the support of the Government

which provided the bayonets of conscripts to crush the outburst.

Railroad workers generally belonged to one of

tv/o

unions, La Fratemidad, the organization of the footplate
staff, or the Federac i6n Obrera Ferroviaria (FOF),

The

latter was founded just prior to the great railroad strike

of 1912.

Whereas La Fraternidad advocated a moderate

course of action to realize its goals and sought change

through established institutions, the Federaci6n mirrored
the tumult endemic to the FORA, its parent organization.

Occasionally, the FOF seemed content to follow the calmer
course urged by the adherents of FORA IX, but many rail-

road v/orkers believed in the anarchic approach to the solution of social problems offered by FORA V and demanded direct action to improve their standard of living, even to
the extent of employing violence.

It appeared improbable

to observers of the Argentine labor scene that La Frater-

nidad and the FOF ever could manage to present a united
front to the Government or management.

But surprisingly,

on 7 August 1916 the two unions succeeded in burying their

ideological differences and signed a solidarity pact.

Its

true strength remained to be tested but for the moment it

spread an atmosphere of ebullience among railwaymen of all
^^Enrique Dickmann, Re cue r do s de un mil itante socialista (Buenos Aires 19^9)1 P» 131.
j

2?

persuasions.

This mood
50
ensuing months.

v/as

to prove significant in the

Labor, which identified itself with the professed as-

pirations if not the politics of the UCR, expected rapid
and sweeping changes at the expense of the "clase patronal"
once the Radicals assumed office.

Coincident with the elec-

tion of President Yrigoyen, labor agitation entered a new
and intense phase.

Strikes and strife were two charac-

teristics of the years from 191? to 1920,

The outbursts

directed against the railroad companies in 1917 and I9I8
were serious and resulted in loss of life and destruction
of property.

But they were only harbingers of more violent

confrontations between labor and the authorities, culmina-

ting in "la semana trSgica"

— the

tragic week

— of

January

1919, during which hundreds of workers were wounded or

killed in the streets around the Vasena metalurgical factory police and troops.

Admittedly, the movements initi-

ated by the railroad unions constituted only a portion of
the labor question, but they were among the first to "put
to the test the social convictions of the Radical Govern-

^^Juan B. Chiti and Francisco Agnelli, Cincucnt enario_
Fundacign desarrollo, obra, I887-I5LIZ
de "La Fr aternidad "
TKereafter cited as La Fraternidad MBuenos Aires 1937 )»
pp. 398-399.
1

,

t

^^Departamento Nacional del Trabajo f i^<ures noted no
railroad strikes from 1913-1916. but there were 15 outand 56.273
breaks in 1917 and 3I in 1918, effecting 79. 1?1 del. Pe^j^omen respectively. See William Rdgind, Historia
carril Sud, 1861- 1936 (Buenos Aires 1937). P« 5^-^'
.

t
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ment."

The decisions reached vis a vis labor by the

Radicals as a result of the railroad strikes had important repercussions on the relationslap between the com-

panies

ajid

the Government,

Railroad labor entered a quiescent period corresponAfter the exhausting

ding to the administration of Alvear.

struggles of IQl? and I9I8 the unions needed time both to

recoup their strength and to analyze the successes and failures of the strikes.

By 1922 the Federacion had disappeared

from the labor scene, its violence-prone leadership discredited by the rank and file members who opted for
derate officers.

m.ore

mo-

The change in emphasis was sym.bolized by

the creation of the Unign Ferroviaria

FOF in October 1922.

,

which replaced the

The Uni6n Ferroviaria, like La Fra-

ternidad, was repelled by violence in all forms and devel-

oped other tactics, such as
interests of labor.

v/ork

slowdowns, to further the

Under the capable leadership of men

like Antonio Tramonti, Bernardo Becerra and Jos^ Domenech
list.
the Uni6n Ferroviaria rapidly expanded its membership

Claiming fewer than 5,000 workers in 1923, the number of

affiliates increased to over 75.000 by 1930.
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The union

importance, if
quickly surpassed La Fraternidad in size and

^^Romero, A History of Arfrenti ne
p.

FoUUcal ThoufM.

22^.

M

Union Fe^irj) viarla
^^Kanuel F, Fernandez,
^
Veinticinco anos al servicio de un ideal.,
de] tiempo
19^7), P. ^70,
1Q^7' 7 Buenos Aires
I

t

1^-
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not seniority, and by I926 was clamoring for
official recognition by the companies.
During 192? the unions were once again preparing
to
seek improved working conditions and higher wages
for their
men.

In contrast to the strikes of I917 aiid
I9I8 the unions

now relied on the work slowdov/n, although the strike was
not discarded from labor's arsenal.
Labor problems not only absorbed much of the time and
energies of the railroad companies, but also were oftentimes responsible for strained relations between the lines

and the Government.

Indeed, in I917 the Government's role

in labor disputes was openly challenged by the railroads on

the grounds that the authorities had no right to inter\^ene
in matters which v/ere within the purview of the companies'

internal administration.

Tempers had cooled by the time

Yrigoyen stepped down as President and Alvear entered the
Casa Rosada,

Conciliation and compromise characterized ne-

gotiations among labor, the railroad companies and the Go-

vernment and continued to be the rule throughout Yrigoyen
second administration.

's

Gradually management m.odified its

mental set and moved slowly from a position of stubborn
opposition to the unions to reluctant acceptance of La Fraternidad and the Uni5n Ferroviaria as legitimate bargaining
agents for the workers.

The establishment of the Labor Ad-

^^'Fernandez, La Union F erroviaria

,

pp.

236-238,
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viGory Committee by
thip.

t)io

coinpanioK in I926 was indicative of

fJhift in mood,

^

m

Reminiscing about the dnyn ho had scr-ved on the Buenos
Aires and lacific, Willifun henry Taylor observed
}iip6lito Yriif-oyen's eloction in I916,

tliat

with

"one epoch in the his-

tory of the BritiL-.h-ownod railroads in Ar^;entina had ended
aiid

ajiothcr opened, which proved to be full of vexations, "^^

Tlio

period of Radical hor^emony was indeed full of troubles

for the companies and, initially, the railroads were confused and often unsure of the proper course of action.

vernment policy under both

Yri{';oyen

Go-

and Alvear compelled

the lines to modify their thinking and adjust their policies
to chan{;in{^: times.

and comiDromise,

London realized

They were forced to learn how to bend

Slov/ly,
tliat

the boards in botli Buenos Aires and

their inviolable

ri£',hts

under Ar£:en-

tine law as they construed tlicm were not sacrosanct and

could be altered if considerations of the general woll-bein^^
The process wao painful, and

of the Nation so warranted.

Taylor, witli characteristic British understatement, remarked

that

tJie

experience of the British companies
56

cal Party was "unpleasant".

-^-^Taylor

interview.

witli

the Radi-

.

CHAPTER
TKE AIN'XIOUS MONTHS

I

II

OCTOBER I916- AUGUST I917
"It really will arouse very
serious questions if the present Executive continues to
take the view that they have

no responsibility for past
decisions." F. Sanders, London Secretary of the Pacific
Railv/ay, 28 June 191?

—

To the throngs crowding the Plaza de

i'layo

on inaugura-

tion day 1916, Hip6lito Yrigoyen's assumption of the presi-

dencial office promised the end of the systematic fraud and

corruption of the regimen and the beginning of popular government.

Tired of the old formulas and arrangements, the

masses expected fresh approaches and
Radical Party,

nev/

policies from the

The railroad corapanies, cognizant of UCR

antipathy toward them because of their close ties with conservative circles, should have expected stiffened relations

from the newly constituted Government.

However, President

Yrigoyen did not have a clearly formulated railroad policy
to impose on the companies when he took office and for se-

veral months he

v;as

content to leave matters affecting the

railroads in the hands of the Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles,
Pablo Nogu^s, Director General since 1911f

v/as

kept at

his post by Yrigoyen, a step which offered some hope for
the continuation of railroad policies developed over the

years of oligarchic control.

Capable, intelligent and

32

I

thorough in his work, Nogu^s dealt expertly with technical
and legal questions.

Concurrently with his duties as Di-

rector General, he taught courses in technology and railroads in the Facultud de Ciencias Exactas, FIsicas y Naturales at the University of Buenos Aires,

was strong-willed,

William Henry Taylor remembered him as

the kind of man who told his superiors
do the

job and

I

Moreover, Nogu^s

i

"You appointed me to

don't v/ant you people interfering.'"

2

The

independent character of the Director General set him apart
from the majority of Yrigoyen 's officials, whom an American

diplomat termed "men of third and fourth rate intelligence"
and "completely dominated" by the President,

3

Pablo Nogu^s

seemed destined to clash with a man as egocentric as Hip5lito Yrigoyen,
In spite of their familiarity with the Director Gen-

eral, the companies felt apprehensive, not because of the

stated aims of the Radical Party but rather because the new
Government had not set forth its future railroad policy.
One pro- British English- language weekly commented on 3 No-

^Ardigo interview,

Taylor interview.
^Brief entitled "Argentina", dated February 1923 and
initialed F. W. ^F^^ancis White/, Charg^ d'Affaires ad interim, in United States, Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910-1929 (hereafter cited as USDS, RIAA), National Archives microcopy 51^f
See also Galvez, Vida de Hi rolito Yri^^oyen, pp.
835.00/326.
199-200 and Villafane, Irigoyen pp. 58-59.
,

,

33

vember I916 that "a frank statement on this subject would
k
do much to clerir the air of uncertainty and uneasiness,"
The anxieties of the compajiies v/ers somewhat eas.ed within
the week by the first decision taken by the new Governm.ent
to affect the railroads,

A committee of the Liga Agraria,

an interest group representing cattle and agriculture, had

been seeking rebates on the transportation of national produce and had requested Government intercession.

But Pablo

Torello, the new Minister of Public V/orks, informed the

group that "the tariffs at present applied by the companies
were strictly legal and in accordance with the legislation

regulating the relations betv/een the Government and the companies,"^
rello

's

La Nacion

.

a conservative daily, welcomed To-

stand "as a significant and highly satisfactory

indication of what the new Government's attitude towards
foreign capital in general and railroad capital in partiEvents, however, would soon belie

cular is going to be."^
the progriostication.

As the railroad policy of the Yrigoyen Government un-

folded it was marked initially by a curious contradiction.
esAt times the decisions appeared reasonable and based on

tablished practice; but in other instances the Government's
as KR?)
^jhe Review of the River nate (hereafter cited
XLVI (3 November 191^77 P« 995.

^Reported in Ibid.
^In Ibid.

.

(10 November I916),

p.

1051.

3^

actions seemed precipitous.

The dual nature of policy for-

mulation became evident during the first six months of I917
in relation to the issue of capital recognition.

Since 190? the question of Government recognition of
the capital account of each railroad company had been unre-

solved,

Fablo Nogui^s had devoted much time and effort to

this m.atter and summarized his conclusions in a lengthy

memorandum circulated within official circles in I916.
Briefly, the Director General held that the Government

should exclude from recognized capitalization those sums of

money deposited by the railroads in funds or banks, material in storage or en route, capital invested in subsidiary

or auxiliary companies, costs involved in the original
grants of concession, expenses incurred in stock emissions,

administration outlays charged to the London offices and
capital v/hich, in the opinion of the National Railroad
Board, was watered.

7

The problem was further complicated by the fact. that

the Government had authorized the capital accounts of the

railroads only down through 1907 or in a few instances to
1910.

The huge sums invested by the British after the pro-

mulgation of the Mitre Law had been given only provisional
acceptance.^

The relationship between the companies and

"Bo7Pablo Nogu^s, "Capital y tarifas en la ley 5315.
250-26«.
lettn de Obras Fublicas XV (December I9I6), pp.
.

capital see San
^On the provisional status of invested
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the Argentine Government in matters
of capitalization had

always been confused and lacked precision.

Nogues had

attempted to solve the question in I915 by
bringing m.atters
to a head.

With the legal support of Julio Botet, the
At-

torney General, Moguls informed the companies that
until
they reached accord with the Government as to the
precise
sums which corresponded to capital accounts, the
Direcci6n

General would refuse to condone further rate increases of
a general nature.

But the companies, needing more revenue

to offset higher fuel and material costs occasioned by

tlie

war in Europe, managed to neutralize the position of the
Director General by negotiating with the authorities at a

ministerial level.
which

In return for a 10?^ increase in tariffs,

was sanctioned by the Government in October I915,

the railroads made

"concessions as to time and by excepting

certain very important items from

tJie

increase."^

Even though he had been undercut by the compromises

engineered in higher Government echelons in 1915

»

Nogues

chose to adopt the same policy in 1917 when the companies

were compelled by economic difficulties to press once again

for higher rates.

By that year the price of Cardiff coal

tiago G, O'Farrell, President of the Local Board of the Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway, to F. Sanders, London Secretary, Buenos Aires, 26 April 191?, Archive, Ferrocarril Buenos Aires al Paclfico, Departamento Administrative (hereafter
cited as ABAP/DA), GA 3312/1.

^O'Farrell to Sanders, Buenos Aires, 26 April 1917.
ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1,

1
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had been driven to extraordinary heights by the

v/ar,

and

the railroads were forced either to purchase high-priced

American fuel or to supplement dwindling coal supplies with

firewood and in some cases maize.

Moreover, stocks of steel

plate and rails had been exhausted and the companies had to

substitute steel and iron reclaimed from Argentine scrapheaps.

Clearly,

the railroad companies were in difficult

economic straits and required another upward adjustment of
their tariff schedules.
In exploratory talks with Nogu^s,

company officials

discovered that the Director^ General had not altered his
stance of 1915.

Santiago

G.

O'Farrell, President of the

Local Board of the Buenos Aires and Pacific, wrote London
that!

are very anxious to have the way as well prepared
as possible to obtain the increases of tariffs that
In different conthe London boards so justly demand.
versations held with Senor Moguls he has constantly
dwelled on the necessity of the Companies fixing their
Capital Accounts definitely.,.. The Executive Power
must not countenance any further change in the tariffs
Such appear the ideas
until that point is cleared up.
predominating in the Government House,- 11
V/e

Taylor interviev/. For statistical data see Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Direccion
General de Ferrocarriles (hereafter cited as RA/MOP/DG),
EstadXstica Grafica de Iqs, Ferrocar rile_s en Explotaci6n.
1857- 193^ CBuenos Aires7l937), graphs nos. 3, 40-^J-2, 66
and 87,
^'•O'Farrell to Sanders, Buenos Aires, 26 April 1917
See also Buenos Ayres Great Southern
ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1,
Railway, ReDort of Proceedin.gs at the Ordinaol General lileeting of Prol^itors.'l912 [hereafter cited as Proceeding)

{London

J

191? T.
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President Yrigoyen, despite his penchant for interfering in
all aspects of Government policy formulation, apparently

allowed No^^s a free hand in the negotiations over capital
accounts.
sue,

Perhaps the Chief Executive realized that the is-

technically and legally complex, demanded the uncommon

expertise possessed by the Director General,
Concurrently, however, Yrigoyen initiated a parallel

railroad policy that by-passed the Direccion General de
ferrocarriles

,

an action sure to antagonize Nogu^s.

A

presidential decree dated 23 March I9I? rudely shattered the

hesitant optimism into which the railroad managers had
slowly slipped since Yrigoyen 's election.

Calculated to show

the companies that abuses, alleged or real, would no longer
be tolerated by the Argentine Government, the measure pro-

vided the General Railroad Law of I89I with an extra set of
teeth and stiffened articles 92 and 9^, v/hich pertained to
fines and penalties for infractions committed by the lines,

Yrigoyen gave the articles more force, asserting that specific fines v/ould be appUad automatically without prior v/arnMoreover, article 3 of the decree stipulated that a
12
per day would be applied for any
penalty of $ 2,000 m/n
ing.

delay on the part of the companies in providing rolling
stock requested by the National Railroad Board or the Execu-

I'^'The

.^6.

paper peso (m/n) was worth approximately U$S

•
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tive for the transportation of the harvests.'''^

Caught off guard, the railroads made knov/n their dis-

pleasure with the decree.

After careful study by the Junta

Consultiva de Abogados Ferroviarios

,

under the chairman-

ship of Guillermo E. Leguizam5n, the companies sent a joint
note of protest to Torello on

?

June.

They argued that

article 1 was

based on an erroneous concept, that being that for
every infraction of the General Railroad Law the perpetrator should be punished.
This is not fair in all
cases.
The regulation of a law ought to have as its
raxson d'etre individual and social utility, end the
application of a fine for each case is not a desideratum nor does it correspond to useful ends.... /^he/
new regulation appears superfluous, or in another
l4
sense destined to incite the imposition of penalties.

Particularly galling to the companies was the provision relative to the supply of freight cars.

The rail-

roads maintained that this was one question which the lines

themselves could best handle, and in any case they noted
that Law 2873 already established that all controversies

relative to rolling stock be submitted to technical arbitration.

In the words of the Junta Consultiva,

"there is

no reason which justifies compulsion vis a vis the rolling

^The

decree of 23 March and all associated documents
and correspondence may be found in the Archive del Ministerio de Transportes, Ministerio de Obras Fublicas, Di~
reccion General de Ferrocarriles (hereafter cited as AL'T/
MOP/DG), Expediente 4731-F-917.
"^^Legal Representatives to Pablo Torello, Buenos Aires,
7 June 1917, ABAP/Actas de la Junta Consultiva de Abogados
de los Ferrocarriles, Acta 68, 7 June 1917
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stock."

15

The railroads, pressing their case, informed the Min-

ister of Public Works that the companies had never acted
in bad faith and called to his attention that despite the
v/artirne

rupted,

situation normal rail service had not been interYrigoyen's decree "dictated in these circumstances

has left a most painful impression.

""^^

But the companies'

pleas for the withdrawal of the decree fell on deaf ears

and the meticulously prepared protest

v/as

refuted by the

Government,*'"''''

Perhaps at this time the railroads should have sensed
the changing direction of the wind and trimmed their sails

accordingly; but they chose to plow on, convinced of the

sanctity and security of their rights.

Although the poli-

tical climate had shifted, the local boards found them-

selves unable or unwilling to adjust their thinking to a
nev;

set or circumstances.

Admittedly, the legal represen-

tatives and local directors were able men, but they were of
the oligarchy and it was difficult if not impossible for

them to compromise their "inalterable principles" with the
Representatives to Torello, Buenos Aires, ?
June 1917, ABAP/Actas de la Junta Consultiva de Abogados
1917.
de los Ferrocarrlles, Acta 68, 7
•'--''Legal

^^Ibid.
17 Inspecci5n General de Ferrocarrlles to the Railroad
General Managers, Buenos Aires, 2k July 1917, AMT/MOf/DG,
Expediente ^731-?- 917.

4o
•

•

*

Radical Government, 18

•

Instead of accepting Yrigoyen's de-

cisions with resei-vations or suggesting points of arbitration, the companies chose the path of confrontation, thus

giving rise to a situation in which both sides would become convinced of the inviolability of their respective

positions,

Yrigoyen's decree of 23

within the Government.

Ivlarch

also had repercussions

Pablo Nogu6s was infuriated by the

Executive's action and regarded it as an unv/arranted intrusion into matters properly with in the province of the

National Railroad Board,
to mollify Nogu^s

'

'i'he

President, in a hasty effort

feelings and avoid a further deteriora-

tion of the relations between the Executive and the Direccion
General, cited precedents for his decision.

He noted that

Vicente L6pez, Procurador de Tesoro (Treasurer General), in
an opinion given on k October I916, thought that the Presi-

dent had the power to exercise his over-riding approval in
all matters relative to the regulation of fines for infractions of the General Railroad Law,

Similarly, the Attorney

General, Julio Botet, observed on l4 October I916 that un-

der the Constitution the Executive Power had the indisputable right to dictate the regulations projected by the Di-

recci6n General de Ferrocarriles

^-^

Neither opinion sanc-

Taylor interview,

••^Republica Argentina,
Aires 1917), H, 685-686.
I

, "'•^

BolctTn Oficia l.

(Buenos

^1

tioned the unilateral action of the President, however.
The point was not lost on Nogu^s,

and"

during April rumors of

his threatened resignation gained currency in Buenos Aires.

20

But the Director General, albeit dissatisfied with Yrigoyen's

explanation, remained at his post.

There was much unfin-

ished business and the negotiations with the companies over

recognition of capital accounts were about to enter a crucial stage.
The President took a second step against the companies

early in Kay, invoking penalty clauses.

Because of the war

the railroads had ceased construction on virtually all lines.

Pleading force ma.jeur

.

they had requested and received pro-

rogations of the terms of existing concessions from the
21

Government of Victorino de la Plaza (191^-1916).

reversed this position in a decree dictated on

2

Yrigoyen

May which

declared forfeit the concessions extended by the previous
administration.

The Chief Executive noted in the preamble

of the decree that on some lines there had been no construction activity for many years, on others trains were never
the
run and still others had been built to the detriment of

State-owned railroads,

In all,

concessions for nearly

and
10,000 kilometers of track, built or outstanding,
^QrrP, XLVII (27 April 191?). p. 939.

^"^M Prensa, editorial,

7

-^pril 1917,

p.

^^Republica Argentina, Boletln Oficial,
la Epoca editorial, 2 May 1~917, p. 3.
,

5.
l?!?,.

99l
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amounting to

of the existing rail network were voided.

28f.

M M^^t

A Buenos ^ires afternoon paper free of poli-

tical affiliation and unusually objective in

its-

reporting,

noted that Yrigoyen's decree represented a fundamental modification of the railroad policy of the past and trusted
that the initiative would be maintained. 24

La Epoca , the

Government organ, on the same day asserted that the decree

opened "a new era of railroad policy in Argentina" and sig-

nalled an end to the vacillation and uncertainty characteristic of the oligarchy.

The same paper paraded in its col-

umns what it flatly labled as the errors of the r(?gimen;
the reduJidancy of railroad lines in certain areas of the

country, specifically Buenos Aires Province,

ajid

the lack of

service in others; the grajits that resulted in the construction of parallel lines; and speculation without either tech-

nical or financial responsibility.

Yrigoyen was presented

as a public benefactor pledged to institute a railroad pol-

icy which v/ould rectify the irresponsible decisions of ear25

lier administrations.

Reacting to the presidential decree, one newspaper
friendly to the companies charged that the Government in
^^"Sfiitesis de la gestidn desarrollada por el actual
gobiorno en materia de Obras Fublicast 1916-1922," Primera
Parte Ferrocarriles BoletTn de O bras Publicas e Industri as (Buenos Aires
I922"), p. 36.
,

I

j

24

La Razon, editorial, 3 Way 1917.

p.

3.

^^La Epgca, editorial, 3 Way 1917,

p.

3.

i

^3

effect had launched an attack against foreign capital and

implied that the State, "as a railroad company", was taking
26

unfair advantage of the private lines.
River Plate

,

The Review of the

while not challenging the legality of the de-

cree, questioned whether or not it was opportune.
"''he

Moreover,

Revie w contended
the Government ... appear to have gone unnecessarily out
of their way to attribute irregular motives to the applicants for certain of the concessions now declared
forfeited.
The decree affirms that some of the concessions accorded v/ere asked for speculative or monopWe think it is to be regretted that such
olistic ends.
vague recriminatory charges should be incorporated in
Government decrees, 2?

Meeting the charges head on, the Government press obseirved
that such opinions were absurd, that the concessions in

question had lapsed under law since the concessionaires had
failed to live up to the conditions set forbh in their contracts.

The Government conceded that some lines were de-

clared forfeit "in the public interest" because they were
defensive in nature, i.e., built to prevent competition by
28

the State lines.

La Epoca insisted that President Yri-

^^La Epoca, editorial in answer to charges made in La
Naci6n, 7 May 1917f p. 1.
27rrp, XLVII (11 May 1917), P. 1029.
The accusa^^La Epoca, editorial, 7 May 1917, p. 3.
tion -vis a vis defensive lines was not without foundation.
auIn January 3 917 the Pacific planned to ask provincial
thorities in San Juan to suspend the terms fixed for the
construction of "the Santa Lucia Circuit" and its prolongathe Altion and to prorogue for two years construction on
The action was planned because^ it is
bardon-Caucete line.
of mdefm
not advisable to officially declare the intention

,

goyen "had profound respect for private capital" and the
decree "merely put things in their proper place and brought

order from chaos,"

No lonf^er would

tlie

able to ride rough-shod" over Argentina.

great companies "be
29

For all of the complaints, the implementation of the
decree did the companies no great harm.

Indeed, as the pro-

British Reviev/ of the River Plate conceded:
As to the decree itself,

imagine that it will not
cause too much lamentation amongst the Directors of
the established railway companies concerned.
The
times are out of joint.
There is no money available
today for new constructions, and even if there were,
traffic prospects and the undefined railway policy of
the Argentine Government would not afford much encouragement,
30
v/e

The Great Southern greeted the decree with a guarded sigh

of relief and informed its stockholders that the cancel-

lation of concessions freed the company "from any extension

obligations of any kind,"

Until the conflagration in Eu^1

rope

v/as

over there would be little money for laying track.

Still, the decree piqued the companies in the sense that

they once again felt their rights threatened by the Govern-

itely postponine: the construction of the latter and thus
give the Argentine del Norte /State-owned/ an arpriment to
push forward their scheme of running through that zone...."
Letter extract, Buenos Aires, 22 January 1917, ABAF/DA,
GA 69Vl«

^^k% Epoca, editorial, 20 Kay 1917,

P.

1.

^^RRF. XLVII (11 May 1917), P. 1029.

^-Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Froceedinigs
1211'
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ment.
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As a matter of principle the local directors ajid

legal representatives decided to exert their influence in

congressional circles to the end of overturning the decree
of 2 May.

The move was logical, for the Legislature had

sanctioned the original laws of concession and, in I916,
allowed their prorogation after having accepted company arguments of force ma.jeur.

Gabriel del Mazo, a Radical his-

torian, asserted that the companies "moved heaven and earth"
in their efforts to enlist the support of representatives.

33

Evidence suggests that the pressure applied by the companies produced positive results if only because of the Chief

Executive's response to the railroads' maneuvers.
v;as

Yrigoyen

upset by the actions of the capitalists who, in his

m.ind,

must have seemed intent on resuscitating the abuses

of the regimen.
In his message opening Congress for the 1917 session^

Yrigoyen devoted substantial attention to the cancellation
of railroad concessions.

He stressed that the lines had

been brought within the scope of the law, an act which was
3^

to the benefit of the general welfare of the country.

^^For example seei Buenos Ayres Western Railway, Proceedings at the Twent y-ei ghth Ordinary Meet ing of the Company 191? (hereafter cited as Proceedings ) (London 1917).
1

,

his^^ Gabriel del Mazo, El Radicalis moi Ensayo sobre su.
toria y: doctrina (3 vols.; Buenos Aires 1957). Ii 189-190.
t

^^Hip5lito Yrigoyen, Pueblo n goMerno (12 vols.; BueCongreso de
nos Aires: 1956), IV, "Mensajes inaugurales del
la Naci6n," pp. II6-II8.
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In a second message sent to Congress on 20 June,

the Chief

Executive announced that his Government had developed a new

railroad policy to correct the errors of the past, and impressed upon the assembled representatives the anomalous

situation which v^ould be created if the concessions voided
by the Executive Power v;ere prorogued by the Legislature. 35

Yrigoyen carried his point for Congress did nothing

further in the matter of the forfeited concessions-.

But

some congressmen were disturbed by the invasion of the Exec-

Senators Benito Villa-

utive into their sphere of action.

nueva and Bjnilio Civit of Mendoza complained that Yrigoyen

's

edict infringed upon faculties "properly and exclu-

sively within the realm of Congress" and Civit claimed that
the President was so jealous of his own prerogatives that

"through error or through ignorance" he stepped on those of
Convinced of the rectitude of his poli-

the law-makers.

cies, Yrigoyen pushed on, heedless of the outraged cries of

Congress.

La Epoca implied in its columns that the Presi-

dent had exceeded his Constitutional powers', but supported

Yrigoyen

's

stand on the concessions, a question "which ought

not be bound exclusively by legal reasons."
^^Diputados, Sesiones

.

1917

.

Hi

37

Yrigoyen

136.

^^Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, CSmara de
Senadores, D iario de Se siones 19)^ (hereafter cited as
Senadores, Sesiones j (Buenos Aires I9I8), I, 179.
.

»

^'''la

Epoca

,

editorial, 7 May 1917,

p.

1.

4?
*

•

-

often skirted

lav;

-

and precedent .and frequently usurped

powers properly within the purview of other branches of
government.

He justified his actions in the name of what

was good for the public interest? Yrigoyen had a mandate and
"could not submit to certain limitations of the laws."^^

Capital recognition, and, by extension tariffs, despite

their significance, had been underplayed in Yrigoyen's 11

May message to Congress.

However, the President did inform

the combined chambers that he would shortly dictate a de-

cree establishing clearly the norms for recognizing capital

accounts.

Once these amounts were determined, the Govern-

ment could then treat tariff intervention in more precise
fashion.

39

Although the promised decree did not appear, Pablo
Nogu€s was in fact v/orking behind the scenes on the intricate problem of capital recognition.

La Epoca in its 10

May issue indicated the line the Government v/ould take by

insisting that costs extraneous to those actually incurred
in"

construction and exploitation should not be authorized.

Allowing such costs would enable the companies to postpone
indefinitely State intervention in the fixing of rates "with
subsequent harm to national production.

"

A solution was pro

mised within the dictates of the Mitre Law.

The statements

^^GSlvez, Vida de Hip6lito. Yrigoyen, p. 259.
-^^Yrigoyen,

Pueblo

y;

gobierno

,

IV,

118,

j

made in La E^oca were consistent vdth the opinions of the

Director General,
Such broad statements published in the semi-official

organ alarmed company officials.

Voicing the concerns of

the railroad companies with the apparent trend of events,
the Review of the River Plate insisted on the Government's

obligation to respect existing rights
Evidently the Government contemplate a radical (say
Radical) change in the railway policy of the Republic
and a decree is promised at an early date which shall
establish clearly the conditions under which the capital expenditure of railv/ay compa?iies is to be recognized for the effects of State intervention in the
fixing of freight rates. We are glad to observe that
"the greatest respect is to be paid to accorded rights,
which ought not to be curtailed if it is not desired
to inspire distrust in the good faith of the country,"
Precisely, kl
In company eyes the Government seemed to be denying

these "accorded rights" in so far as recognition of capital
was concerned.

The anxiety of the railroads reflected it-

self in an intensification of correspondence between the
local directorates and the London offices,

F,

Sanders, the

London secretary of the Pacific, cabled on 20 June 191? and

asked whether the present Government attitude implied a refusal to recognize past figures already approved.

"We re-

fer especially to decree 23rd /sicjj November I906 approving

La Epoca. editorial, 10 May 1917, p. 1. See also
above, p, yT,
The interior
^^RRP. XLVIII (13 July 1917), p. 71.
quotes are from Yrigoyen's message of 11 May,
^

t

•

^9

Great Western capital, including discounts "^^
.

The iacific

was concerned that financial costs authorized for
inclusion
in its capital account might now be disavowed despite
prior

Executive approval.
The reply of the Buenos Aires board must have raised

the hair on the backs of the London directorate's respec-

tive necks

I

"Cannot foretell Government attitude.

Attorney,

Treasury and Director General appear to understand that

Government ought revise all."

This startling news prompted

a blistering response from London which drew the lines of

battle for all the British-ovmed companies.
Sanders

In the words of

I

It really will arouse very serious questions if the
•present Executive continues to take the view that they
have no responsibility for past decisions. We realize
that this is the tendency of Sr. Iripoyen's Government,
and imagine that this ingenuous idea v/ill tend to extend itself generally to all Governmental action.
The
will of the people, as voiced by its representatives,
is the supreme law.
That is to say it is the supreme
decision for the moment? one can hardly use the word
law in connection with such ideas..,,
V/e are seeing in Russia at this moment whether democratic Government unbridled by law, usage, or precedent,
We do not believe Argentina is going along
may lead.
the same road, but you must be having misgivings k^
.

^"^Sanders to the Local Board, London, 20 June 1917,
In 1906 the Argentine Great Western,
ABAI-/DA, GA 3312/1,
which became part of the Pacific system in 190?, protested a Government decree recognizing its capital to 30 June
1905 because certain figures, especially those relative to
expenses of issue, were rejected. On 28 Movember I906 a
new decree accepted the company's views. See "Precis made
out in London for the Chairman" (September 1919), in Ibid.

^^O'Farrell to Sanders, Buenos Aires, 23 June 1917,
ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1
June
^^"•"Sanders to the Buenos Aires Board, London, 28
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The letter noted further that the Government
could expect

nothing but discredit and distrust if earlier presidential
decisions were impugned.

Nobody here could dispute the right of the Executive
to say "We do not agree with this or that principle
hitherto applied and for the future we must discuss
what should be done." But it is a very different matter when an Executive says "my predecessors were all
wrong and their principles all false and I must upset
all they did and reverse all their acts from the date
they did them. " Especially is this unfair and discreditable when of the faith of previous decisions
much capital has been invested, V/e feel sure Capitalists anyv/here will apply an ugly name to such procedure.
But we are hoping that the Government will be wise
in time.
There are many indications however that you and we
are in for a difficult time till the new men learn old
manners. 45
In the midst of the struggle over recognition of capi-

tal accounts, the Government opened a second front against
the companies.

Under the Mitre

Lav/

the railroads were re-

quired to serve one month's notice to the Direcci6n General
de Ferrocarriles before any rate increases were to take

effect.

Yrigoyen modified the procedure in a decree issued

on 23 June and extended the mandatory grace period to five

Once again a tactical decision faced the companies.

months.

They could have acquiesced in the Government decision, not

having suffered any real damage, but as before they chose to
1917, ABAP/DA,
^5
Ibid.

GA 3312/1.

.

^^See RRP, XLVIII (6 July 1917), p. 39.

»
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make this a matter of principle and to stand on their

ever more elusive "rights".
The rr.ilroad lawyers argued thrt the time limit fixed

by the Executive decree did not appear to be legal, for
"the administrations of the railways are the only ones ca-

pable of knowing whether or not the limit of four months

more is convenient.,.", and the power of approving the
tariffs,

"which is incidentally attributed to the Executive

Fewer in the cited decree, reveals a lack of knowledge of

company rights to establish tariffs within the limits fixed
in their contracts or laws of concession,"

The directors

adamantly maintained that under the Mitre Law they had the
right to fix their rates v/ithout intervention of any kind,
so long as the average gross receipts of the line for three

consecutive years did not exceed

1'}'%

of the capital in

stocks and debentures recognized by the Government,
While negotiations continued between the attornies and
the Government over the 23 June decree, the companies, ac-

ceded in practice to the time clauses of Yrigoyen's edict.
On 1^ July the railroads, citing as the reason higher oper-

ating costs, gave the National Railroad Board five month's
notice of their intention, as of 15 December 1917, to raise
^^'^ABAF/Actas de la Junta Consultiva de Abogados de los
Ferrocarriles, Acta 70, 2 August 1917.

^^See O'Farrell to Sanders, Buenos Aires, 26 April 1917
ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1.
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all ordinary and special tariffs on passengers,
excess baggage, parcels, general cargo and livestock
by 22?$.^^

NoguCs, reacting quickly, informed the railroads
on
17 July that any increases would be contingent upon the

ability of national production to support

tliem.

This meant

thorough investigation of the ovcrnll economic condition
of
the country would be necessary before the Director
General

would sanction any rate hikes.

Furthermore, Nogu<$s made it

clear to the companies thnt he would not allow tariff in-

creases until thoy provided the Direcci6n General with de-

tailed teclmical data in support of their contentions that

working expenses had risen to proliibitive levels. '^^
La Kpoc a condemned the requests for higher rates, find-

ing it lamentable

tliat

the railroads could consider such

action at a time when dividends paid to stockholders ad-

versely affected the Argentine economy.

It was the duty of

the Governinent "to avoid such pernicious results by refusing

unjustified tariff increases,"^"''

'J^'hc

attack against the

proposed rate hikes spread to the Chamber of Deputies where
a Socialist representative from the Federal Capital, Antonio

^For a representative note see J. M. Eddy, Acting i'^anager, Great Southern Railway, to Nogu6s, I'J- July 1917» in
Ferrocarril Sud, Aumn nto de sus_ T arlfas de Trans ;»orto 1917
(Buenos Aires I917
p. 3.
.

i

) ,

^^Nogu(^s to the Railway Managers, 17 July 1917
Ibid .
pp. ^(--5,
.

^'La Kpoca, editorial, 18 July 1917,

p.

1.

1

in
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Zaccar:nini.

introduced a minuto

seekiiu;-

mor. i.^rormation

from the Exocutivo about tho
railroad action.
obGorved that Conprosn was in tho

Zaccae^iini

dark as to tho naturo of

the Govornmonfe: new railroad
policy mid that hi^ minute

provided Yrir;oyon with
boration of

hir,

a

viewo.

strrlinr:;

opportunity for tho ela-

Tho Socialist dcimty then turned

hin attention to tho companies m\6
blasted thoir "abnurd"

request for increased rateo, hintinfc at tho
ill effects of
such an eventuality on the economy of tho country.
Tho

"exagrio rated protenaiono

W

of tho railroad?^ had to
52

"

nrl

and countered by the GovoTniuont,
In aecordanco with Noc:u6n

•

dictum most of

submitted tho nocoarnry technical material to

tlio

the

fhmncial crisis conf j-ontinf;

tho comi'nnit^:;

Notional

tlio

Railroad Ponrd during, tho firat week of August.

compruiies

Bacically,
wnr;

one of

increased costs and reduced revenues, as seen in Table

11.

TABIE II

Year

Fassenf-ors

carried

1913 (Paso)
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
Soiir c e 1

Tons of
cnrpo

100:'

100^5

70
72
86

7^'

9'+

99
99
81

102
107

Gross
income
lOO'/o

Costs

100';:.

101
121
139
1S6
lk2

1/^7

165
203
201

"La Crisis PerroviaFi a~ Ar ri'en t ina".""~Rev i a ta ObfrnM
lublicas e Indus tr j as (Puenos Aires 1933Ti"pp. 3P-19.
1

^^DiputruloK,

Sosiones

.

12i2» II» 5^5-5'l8.

»

5^

Railroad statistics revealed startling increases in the cost
of fuel and materials.

The Central Argentine reported to

the Direcci5n General that whereas it paid $ 18.86 m/n for
a ton of coal in 1912, by I916 the price had risen to $ 26,23

m/n.

Increases in material costs faced by the Central C5r-

doba ranged from 50% to 730^ over pre-war prices, and the
Entre Rios Railways reported that for fiscal I9I7 the prices
it paid for materials were from 17% to 500% higher than

those quoted in 19l'+»
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Harry Usher, General

^'-'^anager

of

the Pacific, informed Nogu^s thati
In iron and steel materials, which occupy a very
prominent place in maintenance expenses, we note increases of 2^-1-0 per cent, and 3'^0 per cent, respecBoiler tubes for locomotives of which the
tively.
consumption is large, have been 13^^ per cent, brass
materials, 150 per cent.; coke, 3OO per cent.; kerosene, 100 per cent.; lubricating oils, 160 per cent.;
paint, 200 per cent., etc., etc. 5^
j

Usher moreover stressed that "low receipts and enormous
increases in working expenses" had placed the Pacific in a
"most distressing situation, the crisis afflicting it deep-

ening day by day.

In the effort to strengthen their

^^C. H. Pearson, General Manager of the Central Argentine, to Nogu^s, 3 August 1917? H. G. Cabrett, General Manager of the Central C5rdoba, to Moguls, 10 August 1917, both
printed in RRP, XLVIII (17 August 1917), PP. 383-387, and
Robert H. ?7~Stuart, General Manager of the Entre Rios RailIbid. (14 Sepways, to Nogu^s, 5 September 1917, printed
tember 1917), p. 6^3.

m

Tarifas Ferro^S"^erro carril Buenos Aires al Facifico,
viariast Informe de la kdminLsJra^cJ^^^
(Buenos Aires
Arrii"il |icmco"lob?e"l.l aumento del 221
19177, pp. 13-1^.
^5ibid., p. 1^.

Another indicator of high working ex-
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bargaining position with Government, some
companies also
presented figures depicting the poor returns
railroads
were realizing on invested capital (see
Table III).
TABLE III
Net Profits on Invested Capital
According to Company Figures

Fiscal
y^^^

Pacific

1^^-?

^rV!"
^.25

1913
191^
1915
1916

Central
Argentine

Entre
R£os
RIos

5.20^
6.50
5.10
4.70
3.70

2.59/^
2.59f-

6.80f.

2.38
2.82
1.11
2.84

6.8o
6.80
6.80
6.8o

3.23
4.01
3.85

Source

I

% allowed by
Ley Mitre

Percentages compiled from company notes sent to the
Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles August-September
1917, printed in RRP, XLVIII (17 August, l4 Septem»
ber 1917), pp. 383 - 387 and 6^3 respectivel y.
,

In a memorandum to Pablo Torello,

the Minister of Pub-

lic Works, Nogu^s expressed his satisfaction with the data

furnished by the companies.

Once the accountants of the

Direcci6n General had analyzed the companies' statistics,
there could have been no doubt that the Argentine Govern-

ment was fully

av/are of the

difficult financial straits

penses is the amount of the coefficient of exploitation,
_i,e.
In normal
the relation of costs to gross income.
years this was calculated by both the Government and the
lines at 60/v,
In 1917 the coefficient of exploitation for
See Jos^ Beltrame, La criall private companies was 74'?S.
sis de los ferr ocarriles a rgentinos de propriedad privada
Tluenos^'Aires 1946), p. 89,
,

»

^Sogu^s

to Torello,

Expediente 021746- D-I9I8.

12 August I9I8, AHT/MOP/DG,
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through which the railroads were passing.
V/estern Railway, however,

The Buenos Aires

chose to stand on its legal

rights with respect to the question of tariff approval.
The company was convinced that under the terms of Law
5315,

"which is practically a contract law and cannot therefore
be modified without the consent of both parties," the Go-

vernment could interfere in the V/estern

's

rates only if net

earnings on the capital accoujit were in excess of 6,8% for
three consecutive years,
V/ith

57

this in mind, Frank Foster, the General Manager

of the Western, advised Noguds on

8

August that the "pre-

tended intervention" of the Government in setting rates was
"contrary to law".

In Foster's opinion the V/estern should

enjoy absolute liberty in fixing its tariffs,

which principle the Company I represent has invariably
maintained and practised. Justice and equity is a legal attribute which the tariffs ought to present, and
as such, its appreciation is not and cannot be left to
the Executive Power by express constitutional resolu-

—

tion, 58

Nogu^s, after reading the communication, informed To-

rello that the contention of the company differed markedly

from his own position.

Consequently, he "felt obliged to

send the Western a note stating in succinct form the theses

sustained by this Direcci6n General in the matter of tar^"^ Buenos

Ayres Western Railway, Proceedings

,

1£12.»

^^Foster to Nogu^o, 8 August 1917, in MZ. XLVIII (17
August 1917), pp. 391-393.

57

iffs. "^^

Within five weeks, on 11 September,
the Director
General apprised Foster of the
"fundamental misconceptions"
of the Western Railway when it
deniei to the Executive any
right of intervention in the matter
of tariffs.
He ob-

served moreover thati
fofefroing, this Note might be considered
as
In^i^"^^?
'^^^^^
thinks
^-^^
fit iA viev/of II inconveniences
created by its ati
^"""^ "^^^ prejudice to the
general interest and
l.
to ^^t'^'n
the Company itself liable to result
from this emergency is so important that the Board over
which I prenecessary to establish quite clearly the
^t+f
J?^^^^"^
situation
in which both parties are placed,
because I
do not desire... that the attitude
of my Department
should be interpreted as constituting an attack
on
foreign capital. ... 60

m

.

IV£

^

In the Director General's eyes it was within
the

rights and powers of the Government "to guarantee that
the

profits obtained by the Company... be secured concurrently

with the greatest possible benefit to the public interest."
Nogu^s warned that if the railroads had absolute dominion

over fixing rates then they could establish all manner of

differential tariffs as they saw fit, favoring some shippers and producers to the detriment of others, destroying

natural sources of wealth while creating artificial ones,
or even,

"in an extreme case,

the line completely."

to nullify the utility of

The Director General did not believe

59
^Nogu6s to Torello, 12
Expediente 0217^6- D--1918.

Aueai.st

1918, AMT/MOP/DG,

to Foster, 11 September 1917,
(1^ September 1917), pp. 6^^5-647.
^'^iN'ogu^s

in RRP,

XLVIII

f

58

that the Western would resort to this procedure,
but the

railroad was a monopoly and such a state of affairs
was
within the realm of possibility.
In concluding, Nogu^s

emphasized that in accordance with the laws in force,
"the
right of the Company is merely a right to the procuring

of

^ specified profit which

is quite a different thiig to the

right of establishing any one of the multiple tariff systems capable of producing it."

Hence the company was ar-

rogating to itself "greater powers than those specified—
which constitute the maximum which

a

company can expect as

,,ol

privileges. ..."
.

The ot])or companies, alarmed by what they viewed as
the assault of the -director General against the "rights"

accorded by the Mitre Law to the V/estern as
themselves, closed ranks.

v/ell as

to

Lord Farrer, the outspoken Lon-

don Chairman of the Central Cordoba, declared at the annual

meetingof stockholders that "we
rights under the

Ivlitre

v/ill

maintain that our

Law are unassailable."

62

Similar

sentiments were expressed by the Chairman of the Great
Soutliern,

Albert E,

Bov/en,

proprietors of that company

ment can

h'dve nothing?; to

at the yearly gathering of the
1

"we maintain that the Govern-

do with our tariffs until the net

^^Nogn^s to Foster, ll' September 1917, in RRP, XLVIII
(14 September 191?), Pp. 645-64?.

^^Central Cordoba Railway, Reijort of Proceedings at
Th.i rty- irst Ordinary Gene_ra_l r.ieeting of the Company,
ii'^S.
1917 (hereafter cited as^'pro ce"e ingil Lon don 191?).
c1

(

t

59

receipts reach the Mitre Law standard of 6.8 per cent."^^
of London, usually reserved, reflected the deep-

lilims.

ening concern of the railroads and construed Nogu^s

note

'

to the Western as a rejection of all the projected tariff
.

increases; it was "the last straw which is intended to

break the camel's back."

6^-

Yrigoyen's decrees, the difficulties encountered by
the companies in the course of capital accounts negotiations

and the Government decision to press its claims to tariff

intervention had infuriated the railroads.

Two other prob-

lems present during Yrigoyen's first ten months in office
also helped strain relations betv/een the lines and the Gov-

ernment

j

clarification of the Mitre Law's article

8

which

defined the tax obligations of the railroads, and the con-

gressionally enacted pension law for railway v/orkers,
^Vhen

originally passed in 190? the Mitre

Lav/

had been

hailed by the companies for its benevolent treatment of
This in turn had encouraged them to invest
65
At first the law
great sums in railroad construction.

interests.

seemed clear and precise.

Article

8

guaranteed the compari-

ies freedom from all fiscal impositions in return for the
66

payment of a single tax of

3fo

charged against net revenue.

^^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railv/ay, Proceedings
^^The Times, 15 September 1917,

p.

,

10.

^^See above, p. 22,

^^Rdgind, Historia del Ferrocarril Sud,

p.

569?

3M»

I^IZ.

60

The lav/ was recognized by the companies
"as a most statesman,

like measure," fori
we believed that it so clearly defined
both our rights
and our responsibilities that we could look
forward to
a settled policy, and this would enable us
to devote
the whole of our attention to meeting the
requirements
of ohe country from a railway point of view.
6?

But in the course of the ensuing decade problems de-

veloped over the interpretation given article
relative to the

A number of cities held that exemp-

tax,

Jfo

8 of the law,

tion from taxation did not include municipal imposts for

such services as lighting, sewage, paving and street cleaning, and, beginning in 1913 they took the railroads to

court.

In 1915 the question reached the Supreme Court

which found in favor of the municipalities, thus encouraging
other cities to take legal action against the companies.
Naturally, the railroads were disturbed by the decisions

and contended that they had agreed to accept the Mitre Law

under false pretenses.

The Great Southern complained that:

almost every Municipality in the region served by the
Railway seems to think the Company good game for their
exactions, and, unfortunately, the Supreme Court decided that the claims made by the Municipalities were in

XLVIII (20 July 1917),

p.

133.

67

Buenos Ayres V/estem Railway, Proceedings IgT?* See
also John
Meelboom, "The Mitre Law No. 5315 Its Benefits
and Cost," report dated April 193^, ABAF/DA, GA ^^286, Meelboom was Chief Accountant of the Central Argentine,
,

»

Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, C^mara de^Diputados, Los immiestos m uni ci Dales ^ las empresas ferroviaria (Buenos Aires 191S), pass im.
i

61

respect of services, not taxes.
This, in our iudfz:ecertainly it is not what we
"^^'"^J
understood
when we accepted the option given us
of
comine- under the /Mitre/ Law.
The Great Southern had
ted by the arrangement made when we built,
at the request of the Government, what was then a
strategic
railway to Neuquen; but as all the other
Railways came
under the Law, at the urgent request of the
Authorities, we decided to accept it. 69
In February I917 the Federal Court sitting
at Buenos

Aires pronounced in favor of the interpretation which
the

Buenos Aires Western, together with the other railroads,

placed upon article
to the suit,

8

of the Mitre Law.

The second party

the city of Buenos Aires, appealed to the Su-

preme Court which, as the companies anticipated, over-

turned the judgement of the lower court.

Exasperated,

the railroads turned to Congress "for an explanatory law

which shall establish the true meaning of the exemptions

accorded to us...."

71

The Review of the River Plate com-

mentedi
The fact that eminent Argentine jurists (such as those
constituting the Federal Court in the Capital) coincide v/ith the views of the railway companies regarding
the interpretation of this vexed question, ought to
69

Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Froceedinf?:s

.

mi'
70

For the court proceedings see Feirrocarril Oeste de
Buenos Aires, Interpretacion de la ley no ^31^ La Empresa
del Ferrocarril Oeste de B ueno s Aires Lii.iitada versus la
Municipalidad de la Capital por devolucion de impuestos
(Buenos Aires I917).
1

.

«

t

''^Stated by a local director of the Pacific to a La
Naci6n reporter, in RRP, XLVII (29 June .191?) » P. 1^63.

make it apparent to Congress and to the
public, that
the cornpanies' contention can be held to
be based upon
law and equity and not merely upon material
interest.

During 1917 session of Congress the Committee
on Rail-

road Legislation, .composed of Jos^ Arce, a Conservative,

Victor

M.

Molina, a Radical, and Mtonio Zaccagnini, a So-

cialist, introduced a bill designed to clarify article 8
of

Law 5315.

The Cor.mittee, with Zaccagnini dissenting, pro-

posed to free the railroads from all taxes and fees with
the exception of the provision of running v/ater, sewer

service and street paving within the immediate environs of
stations. 73

The project was sanctioned by the Chamber of

Deputies but v/hen it reached the Senate it was caught by
the adjournment of Congress,

The railroads had no other

choice than to wait one more year.
The railroad pension problem that arose in 191? was
a legacy from the S5enz-Pena administration.

In I912 Ar-

gentina had been convulsed by a railroad strike unprecedented in its magnitude.

One of the conditions of the set-

tlement reached between labor and the companies called for
the establishment of v/orkers

'

Congress, however,

pensions.

delayed action on pension legislation until 1915 when Law
9653 was promulgated.

Briefly, the law provided for the

^^RRP, XLVII (9 March 1917), p. 521.
"^^Diputados,
'''^Bunge,

Sesiones. 1917

.

VI, 333-3^9.

Ferrocarriles Argentines

,

pp.

395-^00.

?

63

payraent of pensions to all full-time railroad workers as

well as to those men dismissed from service "without cause"
since 1? January 1913.

%

to contribute

To fund the project each worker was

of his salary, a sum which was also to be

matched by the compcinies.

Independent of these sources of

revenue, a special impost of

J/o

was to be assessed on rail-

road cargo and parcel tariffs and paid directly into the

pension fund.

Article 8 of Law 9653 ordered the formation

of a commission of experts to determine what were to be
the service, age and other requirements to be met by rail-

road workers to be eligible to receive pensions. 75
1 September 1915f

On

President De la Plaza named Hilari6n Lar-

gufa. President of the Caja Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pen-

siones, Jos^ Penna, President of the Departamento Nacional
de Higiene,

and Julio

Pablo Nogu^s, I^irector General of Railroads,

B,

Lezana, President of the Departamento Nacional

del Trabajo to a technical commission charged with the
76
Law,
Pension
the
tasks outlined in article 8 of
In spite of its labors, however, by July of the fol-

lowing year the technical commission had still not completed its study.

Concerned with the apparent inactivity of

the Government in implementing Law 9653, two Radical Depu-

ties,

Carlos F. Melo and Vicente Molina, interpellated

''^Law

9653 (1915), Anales

"^^Eunge,

,

vol. for 1889-1919.

Ferrocarriles Argentinos,

p.

^1-03.
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Minister of Public Works Manuel Moyano.

The Minister sta-

ted in Congress that the commission had
encountered considerable difficulties in its attempts to
determine the

exact status of railroad personnel.

He also mentioned prob

lems with the vague terminology of the Pension
Law, which
led to differing interpretations as the exact
obligations

of the companies.

Furthermore, Moyano noted that the rail-

roads had not complied with the law because they
considered
it in violation of their concession laws.

Pressed by Melo,

the Minister grudgingly admitted that although the law was

on the books it was in fact unenforced.

Recovering his

composure, Moyano concluded that because of the nebulous

nature of Law 9653 a new study of railroad pensions by Congress would be the most practical and prudent course of ac-

..77

tion.

The Committee on Railroad Legislation submitted a new

pension bill for the consideration of Congress on 28 Sep-

tember 1916, but little time

devoted to it because of

v/as

the Legislature's approaching adjournment.

reopened in June I917
Bunge,

v/hen the

The issue was

Socialist Deputy, Augusto

called for Congress to give preferential treatment
78

to the proposed pension law,'

In the meantime,

the com-

panies, who had opposed Law 9653 from its inception on both
"^"^Diputados,

"^^Ibid.

,

Sesiones.,

IQI7.

II,

I916

19-20.

,

II,

II8I-II9O.

65

constitutional and financial grounds, had been making their
own study of the whole a,uestion of railroad pensions.

presented their findings to Congress in

a

They

joint -note de-

livered on 16 July 1917.
The first argument cited by the companies against the

Pension Law of 1915 was founded on legal grounds.

The rail-

roads contended thati
any legislation disregarding the rights and guarantees accorded the Companies by their concessions and
laws, cind modifying their contractual obligations,
will never serve as a solid foundation for institutions intended to protect their employees, when age,
service and ill-health entitle them to just consideration, 79

Moreover, the railroad lawyers wanted to place on record

that

I

we once more reserve the right of the Companies we
represent to exemption from this compulsory contribution for accumulating funds under constraint to be
devoted to State institutions that may be created for
paying pensions and annuities to Railway employees and
80
workmen,

Turning their attention to economic considerations, the
railroads claimed that they could not possibly meet the

financial burdens imposed by the Pension Law.

The attor-

nies also noted that the legislation was discriminatory.
burden
It is not permissible. .so inconsiderately to
this
an industry which is precisely the one which
procountry earns least on its Capital.... The measure
posed singles out the railway industry, which is not

m

.

"^^Diputados, Scsiones,

^^Ibid.. 478,

1917

>

^77'

66

in a_ condition to bear any extra burden
whatsoever,
and imposes on it a charge afr^rrefratinf^ to
enormous
sums for the percentac;e of contribution is
so excessive that not even the most prosperous industries
could support it. 81

Congress

v/ds

also informed that the Pension Law and

the Legislature's proposed modifications had been
submitted

by the companies to J. Burn, one of England's leading ac-

tuaries, so as to determine exactly the extent of the railroads' financial liabilities.

Burn concluded that to put

the pension project on a firm financial footing the com-

panies would have to contribute annually an amount "ex-

ceeding

62/'t'

of all future salaries of monthly employees and

S5% of all future salaries of daily employees.

These per-

centages of the present pay roll represent a total of

^4,300,000 per annum approximately."

}Ie

also sliowed that

with respect to each new worker who joined the pension fund
in the future the companies would have to pay out "27> in

respect of

eacJi montlily

employee not exceeding 23 years of

age at entry and each daily employee not exceeding 3Q at

entry.

A higher percentage will be required where these

entry ages are exceeded,"

Summing up, Burn saidi

"I have

no hesitation in saying that the proposed Pension Scheme is

for many reasons most undesireable and will impose a finan-

cial burden of a magnitude which it is impossible to imagine
has been fully realised."
^^^Diputados,

82

Sesiones

,

1£12,

II,

^2in RRP, XLVIII (20 July 1917),

^79.
P.

135.

s

6?

But the companies did not deny the need
for

of rension legislation.
laws,

kind

eorne

Thoy insisted, however, that such

"while respecting our own rights, would
reconcile the

mutual aspirations of employees and Companies

Generally,

.

the railroads intei^proted the whole affair
of pensions as

one more manifestation of Government hostility.

Sir Henry

Bell, London Chairman of the Western, asserted that
the

Tension Law of 1915 was "so confiscatory

tliat

to have ac~

cepted it would have meajit ruin to the companies .... "^^
The Chairman of the Great Southern, Albert E.

plored

"tlie

Bowen,

chajige of attitude of the Government",

de-

wliich

has appeared to imagine that the railwnys are a field
for every sort of costly and unreasonable experiment,
such as the creation of a privileged class of workmen
in the rnilwny employees, who, it is suggested, are to
have pensions ranging from 100 per cent, of wages up
to $ 100 per month to k6 per cent, of salaries up to
$ 1,000 per month, juid be allowed to retire at the a^re
of 50
Thry further seem to imagine that there is some
sort of Fortimntus purse whicli will pay for all these
experiments .... 85

Actually, the sliift in

Government's attitude, which be-

t}ie

gan during the De la lla7,a administration, was not so much

another manifestation of official hostility to foreign capital as a response to social change and its accompanying

political demands.
^3Diputados, Se
8^

The assessment of the Review of the

i ones

,

1917,

II,

Buenos Ayres Western Railway,

^78.
I'roc ee dings

^^Buenos Ayres Great Soutliern Railway,
1212.

I

,

1917 *

roceedinAS

.

68

Mver

Plate was probably closer to the mark when
it repor-

ted that

I

Argentine railway pension legislation had its ince-ption at a time when a wave of "advanced" socia]
reform
was much in evidence in many countries....
Here it
coincided with a period when the reformed electoral also
law
instituted by the late President Saenz-Pena, gave a new
and highly important value to the labour vote,
making
it the keenly contested objective of each
political
party. 86
.

Rather than deliberate aggression, the railroads had become
"the expiatory victim" of an accidental combination of cir-

cumstances.

This was not the only time the British-ovmed

railroads would suffer the whims of "political considerations,"

They were to prove a handy scapegoat for the Radi-

cal Party.

Yrigoyen had promised the country a new railroad

policy in his congressional message of 11 May,

Prelimin-

ary steps had been taken in this direction! the decrees of
2

May and 23 June v/hich declared forfeit railroad conces-

sions and modified the tariff procedure of the Direcci6n

General had been favorably received by Argentine public
opinion.

Beyond the two decrees, however, the Government

could boast of little; rhetoric stood in the path of action.

Recognition of capital accounts, an issue on v;hich Yrigoyen
had promised to act with dispatch, and the right of official
^^RRP. XLVIII (20 July 1917). P. 133.
8?

Ubid.

intervention in tariff formulation had been heatedly discussed but remained open questions.

Congress, too, had for

hours debated bills to clarify the Mitre Law and to reform
the Pension Law of 1915;

enacted.

"but

no new legislation had been

Labor, hov/ever, was anxious to quicken the pace

of reform, to replace rhetoric with action*

kingman the Radical Party represented change.
of June 1917 his patience

v/as

For the worBy the end

wearing thin.

I,

I

i

"
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III

JULY- SEPTEMBER I917

"The strikers have triumphed.
Forei^ capital has been hu-

miliated,
'i'he Government is
acclaimed by the proletariat
as the protector of the
poor.
Review of the River
Plate. 2^ "August I917.

—

For the Argentine railroad v/orker, I917 promised to be
at once a year of hope and a year of anxiety.

The Radical

Party, self- proclaimed ally of the laboring raasses and friend

of the oppressed, was in office.

Workmen in all trades took

heart when, in December I916, President Yrigoyen intervened
in a stubborn maritime strike and forced a settlement which

fulfilled many of the strikers' demands.

For the first

time labor's rights had been protected by the Government,"^'
But for railwaymen, I917 also threatened to be a year of

belt- tightening.

Unemployment had already become a sad fact of life for
many of the men on the railroad construction gangs, for

with the outbreak of war in Europe the companies no longer
could attract the capital or import the m^aterials necessary
to add m^ore track to their networks or even to maintain the

existing lines.
"^See

2

Those workers who kept their jobs grev/

Baily, Labor

.

Na tionalism

,

and Politics in Argen-

tina, p, 35*

^Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the

71

concerned and then restless as they saw tlieir pay steadily

diminish in buying; power and their
four days.

v/ork

week reduced to

The Departaniento Nacional del Trabajo

(National

Labor Department), in its report for fiscal 1919, noted
that in 191? prices for a representative p;roup of staple
foods, consumed generally, had risen

26,8'/$

quotations for 19l6,

trend, which had begun

in

191^^-.

Ominously,

t)ie

above the market

to reveal no sif^is of reversing itself.

v/as

many months of I917 would pass before the men pressed

Not
tlie

company directors for salary and wage increases to meet the

rapidly rising cost of living.
The workers' dissatisfaction embraced more than economic

considerations, hov/ever.

from La Fraternidad,

tlie

On 5 Januai-y a delegation of men

engineers' and firemen's union,

talked with Pablo Torello, the Minister of Public Works,
and presented him witli an extensive list of grievances
whicli had been "forgotten or neglected by the regimen."

For graphs relevant to unemployArgentine Republic p. 52.
ment among railwaymen, see RA/LiOi/DG, Tarifas Ferrov iarias
Estu dio de_ la. Pi rocci(5n GciierrU. dj? Ferr ocarri] e s sobro su
1928), graph C/lj
revi sionT Cuadros num<5ricos TBuenos Aires
,

1

f

ERtadfs'ti ca Gr£fi_ca de los Ferrocarri les en Explotaci6n, 185?-1Q35. grr'ph 91 and RA/WOPA^G, Tarijju^
Estiidio de la Di recci6 n Genera l dje FerroFe rroviarias
RA/r^Top/DG,

1

>

carrl les s obre sii revj_si^i'i £3 2l ^^L^'^^S.ill^Al Central ArgonOn slacle
tino (Buenos Aire's 192877 graphs^C/l nnd M.
construction activity see above, p. ^^i-.
t

^Republica Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, Nemoria del f/'inisterio del Irrtcri^r pres entft. da al
""

Conrrcs'o do 1 a
p.

53^

"N a ci6 n~ "l 9 1 B ,

IW

(Buenos Aires

Hplio.rable
1

1919),
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They complained that for a number of
years the companies,
ina spite of repeated increases
in their rates, had denied
higher salaries and wages and better working
conditions to
their personnel.
The Fraternidad delegation also chastized past Government railroad policy for
its tendency to
deny nothing to the companies.

It had granted thera many

privileges, such as free importation of railroad
material,

exemption from

taxation, progressive tariff increases and

"the most ample liberty" in the observance of the
Nation's

laws.

On the other hand, the demands of labor had suf-

fered constant neglect from the Government.

But, La Eppca

reported, the times had changed and the men could be con-

fident that President Yrigoyen v/ould devote his attention
4
to their grievances.
Torello listened to the delegates with sympathy and

assured them that the President understood their plight.
Yet several months were to pass with little indication that
the Government seriously intended to concern itself v/ith
the railwaymen's complaints.^

La Fraternidad sent a second

group of representatives to interview the

Iviinister of

Public

Works on 2? April and, as before, he empathized v/ith the

workers and gave them additional assurances of Government
4

La Epoca

,

editorial, 6 January 1917>

P«

!•

The Eoletin de Obras Pu.blicas e Industrias (Buenos
Aires 1921 ) a pro- Government publication, reported in
1921 that the demands of railwaym.en had been under official
study since October I916.
I

,

^
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support/

Notwithstanding Torello's pledges, the union

maintained that "the companies pursued their
injustices,
imposing all manner of absurd orders on their
personnel."''
Faced on the one hand with official lethargy and
on
the other with a ground swell of discontent among
railwaymen,

the directors of La Fraternidad began to consider
the

possibility of a strike movement against the companies,
Jos6 San Sebastian, the young president of the union, knew

that he could depend on the support of the FGderaci6n

Obrera Ferroviaria, for, despite ideological differences,
both organizations had signed a solidarity pact in August

1916.^
Union plans called for a railroad strike in either

December I917 or January I918,

a

period in wliich the lines

would be intensely engaged in transporting the great cereal harvest from

t}ie

interior provinces to

tlie

ports,

But many workers, hard-pressed and disgruntled, broke

union discipline and declared a series of local strikes far
8

See above, pp.

26-27,

A strike during
La Fr aternida d. pp, 383-393.
the months of peak economic activity was not without precedent.
The most important had been the anarclust-led genSec Abad de Santillan, La
eral strike of November I902.
FOR A, p}), 105-107; Alberto Belloni, Del anarqu is mo al Jier^nisnio
Ilist oria 6el inovimiento obrcro. a r pent in o fBuenos Aires
19"^0'), p. 17.
David Kock, in an unpublis'hed dissertation on
the Yrigoyen Government's labor policy (Cambridge University
1971), p. 139, contends that La Fraternidad had been planning a general railroad strike since 1912, and that more
definite plans were drafted in 1^16 after the solidarity
pact had boon signed with t.he FOF,
^Cliiti,

I

7^

in advance of the projected time-table.

The.

trouble began

in Rosario, a port city some 200 miles
upriver from Buenos

Aires, where on 19 June I917 the men employed
in the talleres

(workshops) of the Central Argentine Railway downed
their
tools.

The ostensible focus of the controversy was
the

Chief Mechanical Engineer, J, F, Crouch, a stern taskmaster,

rigid disciplinariaji and totally "medieval in his methods."
It was because of his arbitrary decisions that the men re~

belled.
Three days later, before the Central Argentine walk-

out had been settled, another stoppage occurred in the workshops of the State lines at TafI Viejo in Tu.cum5n.

Neither

outburst had been authorized by the leaders of La Fraternidad or the FOFj the weakness of union discipline as well as
the

lov/

flash point of the men were in evidence.

La Fra-

ternidad sources, in trying to explain the spontaneity of
the strikes, argued that beginning in 1917 the

C^ara

de

Diputados had undertaken discussion of problems relative to

working conditions and wages, "which gave rise to increasing agitation in the unions whose spirits became excited,
...and local conflicts broke out which La Fraternidad could

not avoid.

"^''

Moreover, the union of the footplate staff

Taylor inter-view
argentin e II, 20?.

;

Marotta, El movimiento sindical

.

Actually, congres^^Chiti, La Fraternidad, p. 319.
sional consideration had begun as early as June I916 when
Zaccasnini introduced an eight-hour work day for railway-
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felt that FOF men in all probability had precipitated the
strikes at Rosario and TafI Vie jo because, even though the

Federaci6n had worked hard to unite its men, "it

v/as

not

humanly possible" in the short space of four years to organize some 100,000 railroad v/orkers into a disciplined
union.

Because the strikes were local and seemingly insignificant, the Government chose not to intervene.

But Yri-

goyen, hoping to convey to labor the impression that the

Radicals comprehended the problems of the workingmen,

ordered Nogu^s to
railwaymen.

drav;

up a set of labor regulations for

The Director General de Ferrocarriles con-

sulted the labor legislation of other countries, drafted
the requested regulations and submitted them to the unions

La Epoca expressed the Govern-

for their consideration.

ment's dismay when the societies "returned the project as

not suited to their needs,"

Piqued,

the semi-official pa-

per noted that Yrigoyen had shown his good will through
his efforts to better the men's situation and suggested

that the workers exhibit reciprocal good will by supporting
13
problems.
labor's
ease
attempt
to
President's
the
men.

See Diputados,

Sesiones

,

19l5

,

I,

5^1«

Fraternidad, Circular #6^, 10 November 1917, in
Chiti, La Fraternidad, pp. 325-326,
•"^La

See also
Epoca, editorial. 25 July 1917, p. 2.
Baily, Lgrbor ~Nationalism and Folitics in Argentina, p. 3^.
_

.

,
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On Zk July,

scarcely a fortnight after the indecisive

conclusion of the local walkouts at Rosario and TafI Vie jo,
another partial strike paralyzed thr two largest talleres of
the Central Argentine, at Rosario and the Gorton locomo-

tive shop in F^rez.

According to labor sources, work was

halted because of the company's dismissal of two men, Fortunato Folizzi and Casimiro Fernandez,

Incensed by the

company's move, the mood of the workers turned ugly.

For

the first time the Central Argentine informed the authori-

ties that some of its property had been destroyed by stri-

kers and requested that the Government despatch troops to

reinforce local police in the maintenance of order.

The

Government did nothing, which prompted the pro-British

Review of the River Plate to observe that "we hope that
there may be no occasion to regret this deliberate inaction.

Yrigoyen refused to antagonize the men further with the
presence of soldiers.

That had been a tactic of the regi-

men.

Even though Yrigoyen ignored the Central Argentine's

request for troops, the Chief Executive showed concern for
the situation.

In

sj^

attempt to bring the strikers and

management together, so as to facilitate
^^Chiti, La Fraternidad
sindical ar gentine II, 207.

,

p.

a

solution to the

319; Marotta, El movimiento

,

See also El
^^RRP, XLVIII (3 August 1917), p. 261.
Diario iBuenos Aires), 1 August 1917 p. 12.
»
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struggle, the President offered his Government's good offices,

Torello consulted separately with both the di-

rectors of the Central Argentine and union officials and

arranged a meeting between the contending factions oh

3

16

August.

Little came of the Government initiative, how-

ever, because the men were only interested in complete acceptance^ of their demands.

On 5 August the strikers,

having won the reluctant support of union leaders, presented the Central Argentine with a list of conditions and at
the same time issued a manifesto explaining labor's posi-

tion in the conflict to the public.

Not

onl^.

did the

unions demand reappointment of the dismissed personnel,

but they also sought guarantees from the company to the effect that no reprisals be taken against the strikers, that
the shops shut down by the railroad because of the violence
be reopened, and that J. P.

ferred, be removed.

Crouch, who had not been trans-

17

The Government seemed unaware that the increasing

agitation among railwaymen, evident since January, reflected deep-seated dissatisfaction.

La Epoca contended that

the roots of the conflict were shallow and the result of a

simple act of discipline by the company.

Strangely, the

paper mused, this had occasioned a serious trend of events
^^The Times, 4 August 191?
"^"^Chiti,

La Fraternidad

,

f

p.

P«

13

319.
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between the railroad and its employees "and was threatening
to get out of hand,"

The Government organ believed that

any furtlior extension of the strika, as intimated by the

workers, would harm unjustifiably "the sacred interests of
the people."

To the Casa Rosada the conflict was being

blown out of proportion.

18

The position of the Central Argentine was made clear
to Torello by the company's legal representatives,. Samuel

Hale Pearson, Jos^ A, FrJas and Atanasio Iturbe.

They

stated unequivocally that the railroad was not disposed to

reconsider the suspension of the two workers and their company did not believe it opportune to admit "foreign mediation" in a matter which "affected the discipline of its

personnel and its own interests."

19

The strong stand as-

sumed by the Central Argentine reflected the railroad man-

agement's lack of confidence in the Yrigoyen Government,

Unpleasant memories of their recent difficulties with it
over capital accounts, tariff problems, clarification of
the Mitre Law, forfeited concessions, and railway pen-

sions, apparently conditioned the unyielding attitude adop-

ted by the company.

Clearly, company officials feared that

the Argentine Government v/ould support labor in any dispute

with capital.
18 La Epoca

The Review of the River

,

3

August 1917,

p.

Hate complained

2.

in Ibid., 4 August 1917,
"^Reported
po

P.

2
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that

I

Since the present Government came into
pov/er there
have been several unmistakable indications
of its de~
propitiate— then, at least,
^nl^'^r.
/^''^.^lu''''^^^
not
to offend
the proletariat, where conflicts between
labour ajid capital have occurred. There was
first of
all the Port of Buenos Aires strike.
The attitude of
the Government
that conflict gave rise, at the
time, to complaints of partiality in favour
of the
strikers,... It seems to us, to put the matter
quite
plainly, to be the not unnatural result of the
policy
of a Government which has come into power on a
popular^vote of unprecedented ma^?;ni tude— and which is
anxious not to alienate the working class vote by any
manifestation of antagonism. 20
^

m

'

Probably to the surprise of the railroad directors,
the Government did not rush to labor's defense, and, at

first, appeared to incline toward the position of the Cen-

tral Argentine.

La Epoca. while castigating the intransi-

gence manifest in the arguments of both sides, singled out
the railroad unions for calling a strike "without taking
the general welfare into consideration,"

To the authori-

ties the strike was a legitimate v/eapon only in the defense

of "essential rights".
v;ere

Because the interests of the public

tied to the normal functioning of the railroads, the

worker

v/as

"not one

v;ho

/could/ leave work over every dif-

ference sustained with management.

His labor is essential

to the economic and social organization of the country, as

are the police and public health officials.,,,"

La Epoca

concluded that the Central Argentine's expulsion of folizzi
and Fernandez,
20

RRF,

"because of having commited acts which fall

XLVIII

(3

August 191?),

p.

26l.
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under the jurisdiction of the penal code," was not important enough to justify a railroad strike,

V/hether it was a

matter of discipline, as contended by the company, or a
case of reprisals, as claimed by the workers, did not matter,

21

Yrigoyen, while prepared to defend labor's rights,

was not prepared to tolerate license in the name of rights.

Anxious to end the dispute, Torello summoned repre-

sentatives of both labor and management on

meeting in the Government House.

6

August to a

After several hours of

tough bargaining, a compromise agreement was reached.

All

strikers, with the exception of Polizzi end Fernandez,

v/ere

to return to their jobs on the morning of the 8th,

The

cases of the dismissed men would be re-investigated by the

company in the presence of an official of the Ministry of
22

That evening the directors of La Fraterni-

Public Works,

dad and the FOF called a meeting in Rosario to announce to

their men the terras agreed to in Buenos Aires.

To the

con-

sternation of the union leaders, the strikers shouted them
down and the meeting degenerated rapidly into a brawl,

Alejandro Ruzo of the National Labor Board, whc was the

Government's representative to the conclave, tried to reason with the men but they remained deaf to his entreaties.

dismissed
There would be no work without the return of the
21^3.

Epoca

,

editorial,

5

August 1917» P» !•

editorial, 7 August 1917,
^^Ibid.
(24 August 1917), p. 4^5.
,

P.

1?

Ml* XLVIII
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er.'iployees.

Stung by the unexpected development, the Govern-

ment, angry, embarrassed and confused, reacted blindly and

cast the blame on unnamed "professional agitators" and
"ocultos erapresarios" who used the laboring masses to fur-

ther their own dark purposes.

23

Frustrated by its inability to reach accord with the
railwaymen, the Government attacked their irresponsibility
and placed the onus of the strike on their shoulders.

La

Epoca editorialized!
all our sympathies and our aid have been always in
favor of the v/orkers, but it is sensible and necessary
to confess that in this instance justice is not with
them.
The company has m.ade the concessions asked of
it,..« The strike is due to the absolute intransigence
of the workers. 24
At this juncture the leaders of the Federaci^n, obvi-

ously unable to control the men in the Rosario

ajid

F^rez

sections, gave in to the force of circumstances and once

again agreed to support the strikers.
sent

a

On 11 Augu.st the FOF

note to the Central Argentine and demanded the im-

mediate reinstatement of Polizzi and Fernandez,

If the com-

pany refused to comply, the Federaci6n threatened to paralyze the railroad's operations.

Taken unawares by the deci-

sion of the FOF, the directors of La Fraternidad met late

that same afternoon and resolved to order the engineers and

firemen to resume work.^^
^^l^a

The move by San Sebastian and his

SEOca, editorial, 8 August 'l917, p.

^^Ibid., editorial, 11 August 1917, P. 1.

1.

^I^A*
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associates seemed to be a desperate effort
to regain control over their men. Any further extension
of the rash of
unco-ordinated strikes, the leaders probably
reasoned,

might jeopardize the efficacy of the general
railroad
strike which was still in the planning stages.

But La Fra-

ternidad had broken solidarity with the FOF, a
development
not unnoticed by the Government.
Early reports received in Buenos Aires on the morning
of 12 August indicated that the movement
to the workshops in Rosario and P^rez.

v/as

still confined

This news, when

coupled with the no-strike decision of La Fraternidad, pro-

bably did much to convince the Government that the worst was
over.

That morning Torello met with Ruzo, who had returned

from Rosario.

La Epoca reported that both men agreed that

the conflict was nothing more than a disagreement betv/een
the company and its personnel over a disciplinary matter,

Ruzo and Torello rejected the FOF petition and were con-

vinced that the strike,

"now reduced", would not impair

seriously the country's rail service.
announced,

"Discipline", they

"was necessary to the maintenance of the com-

pany's integrity."

26

Torello must have been horrified when the strike, far
from collapsing, now entered a more violent stage.
in Rosario and F^rez,

2^La Epoca

.

The men

"excited over the negative results

12 August 1917i P. 1.
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thus far attained," halted trains, burned coaches and de-

molished signals.

To further embroil the issue,

the rank

and file of La Fraternidad in the Rosario area broke discipline, refusing to abide by the no-strike order of their

superiors, and joined forces v;ith the FOF workers, 27
San Sebastian faced a difficult decision.

Jos6

It must have been

clear to him that the men would not cease their agitation

until something concrete had been attained.

Furthermore,

if the tenuous bond between La Fraternidad and the FOF

broke, the success of the anticipated general rail strike,

planned for later in the year, became a questionmark.

Weighing the issues, San Sebastian bowed to the pressure of
the FOF and his

ov/n

unruly men and chose to support the

strikers, so not to occasion a division among workers.

28

On 1^ August the important FORA, which controlled 80% of
the trades unions, promised solidarity with the railroadmen,

an announcement v/hich gave rise to well-founded fears in

Government circles that a more widespread strike was a distinct possibility,

29

Slurried meetings were arranged by the Government be-

tween com.pany management and Torello in efforts to arrive
at some formula which might satisfy the workers.

^^La Epoca, 13 August 1917,

P.

1?

1^'

The Minis-

August 1917, p. 1

Chiti, La Fra ternidad, p. 320.

^^La Epoca 1^ August 1917, p.
movimiento sindical argentino II,
.

.

1? see
208,-

also Marotta,

El.
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ter of Public Works notified the Central Argentine repre-

sentatives that if the strikers refused to endorse the company's decisions then President Yrigoyen would settle the
conflict.

"He has chosen once and for all to end the pre-

sent situation created by the strike, which is so prejudice

cial to the country."-'^

The proposed Government intervention received the sup-

port, albeit indirect, of the Socialist deputies in Con-

gress,

On the 13th Antonio Zaccagnini mentioned the Cen-

tral Argentine strike and observed that for years "workers
have run to the Direccion General de Ferrocarriles demandThe Director General always listened

ing their rights,"

with "deference" but informed the men that under the law
"we can do nothing."

ernment

v/as

Zaccagnini then implied that the Gov-

standing up to the companies.

If the Executive Pov/er intervenes in the strike against
the Central Argentine, it is because the company has
not been able to prevent it; it has not dared to tell
the Government that it doesn't wish to listen to the
opinion of the minister /Torello/j neither has it been
able to withdraw the representative of the National Labor Board /Ruzo/. • . 31
.

Nevertheless, Zaccagnini was sure that the railroad was doing everything in its power,

"underhanded and tenacious", to

resist the Nation's right to intervene.

Enrique Dickmann,

one of the Socialist deputies from the Federal Capital,

^^La Epoca, l4 Augu.st 1917
^-^Diputados,

Sesiones

,

P.

1

1917

.

2,

lUi

375.
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asked why the company had not accepted the
intervention of
the President, "who ought to be the moderating
and regulating power in all those questions. ""^^
The workers rejected all attempts to mediate the

strike and on 1^ August traffic was seriously interrupted

along the entire length of the Central Argentine network.
Violence punctuated the movement and company officials informed the Government that many of the loyal staff had abandoned their tasks because of threats of bodily harm, and
that company property was being attacked by strikers.

Tele-

graph and telephone wires had been cut, freight cars set
afire, signal cabins wrecked and obstacles placed across
the tracks.

33

At the request of Rodolfo B. Lehmann, Governor of the

Province of Santa Fe, federal troops

v/ere

ordered to Rosario

by the Government to aid local forces in keeping public

order and to safeguard the passage of the few trains v/hich
were still running.

But this protection, at least in the

opinion of the Central Argentine, was woefully inadequate,
The depredations of the strikers continued.

^^Diputados, Sesiones

.

1917.

HI,

35

The troops

378.

•^^Central Argentine Railway to Torello, l4 August 1917,
in RRP, XLVIII (24 August 1917), p. ^71.

^^Telegram printed in La Epoca
5^ Central Argentine Railway,
1 917

(London

t

1917).

.

l4 August 1917, p. 1.

Annual Report and Accounts,
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could not be faulted for their apparent
failure to prevent

assaults against the railroad because their
instructions,

emanating f-om the Casa Rosada, limited their
effectiveness,
Elpidio Gonzalez, Minister of the Interior, had
telegraphed
the commander of the llth Infantry Regiment that his
unit

was to carry out their orders "without using the least
bit

of force."

To further complicate the soldiers' task,

Gonzalez' admonition was published prominently on the first
page of La Epoca .
The Government's vacillation and weakness of purpose

mirrored faithfully the dilemma of the Radical administration.

In his self- conceived role as arbiter,

Yrigoyen pro-

fessed the need to stand equidistantly between labor and
capital.

This implied that company rights, as well as

those of the workers, had to be protected.

Thus assaults

by strikers against company property and those men who chose
to work were countered v/ith the despatch of troops.

Yet

Yrigoyen, a shrewd and opportunistic politician, m.ust have

known that any show of force v/hich resulted in dead or

wounded workers would have probably alienated the Rosario
proletariat and the votes it represented.
Epoca, 1^ August 1917, p.
gust 1917), p. 379.
^^I^a

1;

37

Moreover, the

EM* XLVIII

(1? Au-

David Rock, in his study of Yrigoyen 's labor policy
(pp. 1^16-1^7), maintains that ever since 1912, when the
first Radical provincial Government was elected in Santa Fe,
"a considerable tradition had evolved of favouritism to
labour based upon tactical electoral objectives." Moreover,

8?

strike, While serious, still was
confined to one railroad,
martyrs could only exacerbate the
situation.
As a result,
the army and police stood by while
workers destroyed the
Central Argentine's property.
In one case, according to La
Naci6n, "soldiers of the National Army...
were taken off the
trains which they were guarding and tied
up with ropes by
the strikers. "^^

M

which generally sided with the railroads,

Ilacion,

bitterly attacked the half-way measures of the
Yrigoyen
Government.

However tender may be the solicitude of the Public
Powers tovrards the working classes, it can never be
admitted that it should be carried to the point of
forgetting the essential police functions incumbent
upon it, as agent for the preservation of public order.
In the lamentable state of disorder which prevailed in the recent emergency /the Central Argentine
strike/, the mildness of the Government exceeded all
anticipations. 39
The decision to forego the use of force against mar-

Rock contends that Yrigoyen harbored a deep-seated hostility toward Governor Lehmarm.
Thus Yrigoyen 's mildness in
dealing with the strikers may well have been an attempt to
usurp the sources of Lehmann's popularity, i.e., the Rosario laboring masses.
Rock's interpretation is based on
inter-v/iews with the late Dr. Manuel Menchaca, the first
Radical Governor of Santa Fe, and Diego Abad de Santillan,
a well-knov/n anarchist activist,
See^also Carl Solberg,
Immigr ation and Nationalism Argentina and Chile I89 OP-9.1^rAustini 1970Tr'p. 12^, and Gino Germani, "I'.Iass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Irving Louis
Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin A merica (New York» 1970),
pp. 319-320, for data on immigrants and politics,
1

•^^M Na ci6n
1917), p.

50'7.

^^La Nacion

.

26 August 1917, in RRF, XLVIII (31 August
Cf. La Frensa, I6 August 19-17, p. 7.
.

.

in RR|:. XLVIII

(31 August 1917),

p.

507.
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auding workers in effect moved the Government
closer to the
position of labor.
Concurrent with this development and un.
announced to the Central Argentine. Alejandro
Ruzo had conducted a hasty investigation into the causes of
the strike.

He submitted his findings to Torello on l4
August.

Based

entirely on workers' accounts, the report emphasized
that
Polizzi and Fernandez had been fired by the Central Argentine, an act which Ruzo construed as an unwarranted repri-

sal on the part of the company.

Only a week earlier

Ruzo had been convinced that the issue was a simple matter

of discipline.

The report, for the first time, mentioned

other factors which could have been responsible for the
strike.

Figuring prominently in Ruzo's findings were poor

working conditions, low

v/ages and a shortened work week of

four days, company deductions of up to

30?^

from the men's

pay for "medical expenses", the employment of some 500 boys
at wages of nine to eleven cents per hour with no chance of

advancement, and the iron-fisted tyranny of
In sum,

J,

F.

Crouch.

Ruzo charged that the workers in the Rosario and

P^rez shops "were in a terrible dilemma" and urged the pas41
sage of legislation to regulate railroad labor.
The Government used the report as a springboard to

^^Ruzo to Torello, l4 August 1917
August 1917f p. 2.

i

in La Epoca.

15

/l-i

Ibid.

.

16 August 1917, p.

La Uni6n Ferroviaria

.

p.

85.

2.

See also Fernandez,
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escape from the anomalous situation in which the party
of
the people found itself supporting foreign capital
against

Argentine workers.

The unexpected intransigence of the

strikers and their refusal to abide by the compromise

agreement engineered by Torello during the first week of
August had surprised and angered the Government, forcing it
closer

to the position of the Central Argentine, whose

conduct had been blameless,

Ruzo's report, welcomed by the

railroad unions, gave the Government the excuse necessary
to reverse its stance and espouse the cause of the workers.

Epoca quickly changed its tone and headlines announced
the importance of Ruzo's report and criticized the "indeci-

sive attitude of the Central Argentine,"
Iturbe, Frias and Pearson challenged Ruzo's report

and informed the Minister of Public Works that
the Notes of the V/orkmen's Committees addressed to
this Company, the contents of which you are aware of,
indicate with precision the causes of the strike.
They state that work has been abandoned on account of
The communication of the Chief
the workmen suspended.
of Legislation of the National Labor Department /Ruzo/
and the conclusions at which he arrives removes the
question. .. from the plane on which it had been placed
by the interested parties themselves. 44
The directors of the Central Argentine, realizing fully the

^^Some reports had been circulating in Buenos Aires to
See
the effect that Torello supported the Central Argentine,
La Epoca, 4 August 191? p. 3.
i

^3ibid.

,

16 August 1917, p. 1.

Central Argentine to Torello, l6 August 1917, in
RRP, XLVIII (24 August 1917), p. ^71.
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significance of the turn of events, decided
that they had
no other recourse than to submit the
whole question to "the
high authority" of President Yrigoyen
"without any restrictions whatever. "^^
Yrigoyen, working through his subordinates,
made it

known to the Central Argentine
that^if within the term of 2k hours the strike
persists owing to its refusal to reinstate the still
workmen
dismissed, tnis will not be considered as
constituting:
of force maieure justifying administratively
L^^?-^?"^
the interruption of the public services, end the
matter v.'ill pass to the General Railway Board for its
effects, 46
On 17 Aug-ust the Central Argentine submitted to the
Govern-

ment's pressure and promised to reopen the shops, admit all

workmen without exception and attempt to normalize rail service as soon as possible.
La Epo ca explained editorially the volte face of the
Governm.ent,

claiming that "in the present case a dispassion-

ate examination of the course of the strike shows that the

abnormality of the situation is not wholly to be imputed to
the workers."

The Government organ shifted the blame for

the strike to the Central Argentine, which had fired two

Central Argentine to Torello, l6 August 1917, in
RRF, XLVIII (24 August 1917), p. ^71.
Torello to the Central Argentine, 16 August 1917,
Ibid,

,

p.

472.

4?
'Central Argentine to Torello, 17 August 1917
Ibid
p. 473.
.

.

1

in
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workers "without visible justifiable cause. "^^

The Review

2l Ihl River Plate captured the feelings of the railroad
when it s-cated,

"The strikers have triumphed.

Foreign capl

tal has been humiliated.

The Government is acclaimed by
the proletariat as the protector of the poor, "^^

Although the strike against the Central Argentine had
ended and the trains were running again without incident,

many Argentines felt that the problems existing between

labor and capital had not been resolved definitely.
Ti<B7.6n

La

flatly stated that the Rosario strike was symptoma-

tic of a much more serious problem and considered congres-

sional approval of a railroad pension law to be indispensable for peace on the rails.

"He v/ho does not want to see

in the pension law the seed of new disturbances between cap.

ital and labor wants to close his eyes to the evidence.,.,"
The paper then blasted the railroad companies for their

blind opposition to all labor legislation, v/hich they auto-

matically considered unconstitutional,
is,,,,

in

China.,,,"

t)ie

"The Constitution

thinking of the com.panies, a great wall of

Constructive action, La Razon reasoned, had to

be taken on the issue of pensions.

50

M. Spoca, editorial, 1? August 1917t
^^RRP, XLVIII (24 August 1917),

p.

P.

1.

^^5.

^^M. Ra26n. 21 August 1917, p. 3. Albert E, Bowen,
London Chairman of the Great Southern, also considered the
existing pension law (9653) to be one of the principal
causes of the strikes, "because the men can see nothing
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La Naci6n

arid

La Prensa

certain that labor unrest

v/ere

would continue to plague the railroads.

The former daily

reprimanded the Government for its lailure
to keep public
order.
The Executive may have thou^-ht that
by acting hsrshlv
towards the companies it would ingratiate
itself with
a considerable mass of workmen.
It will very
lize Its error as it discovers the indifferencesoon rea~
of the
men to such and ajitecedent.
/The/ demands of labor
are actuated by economic and not by sentim.ental
motives. 51
.

As predicted,

Government.

.

.

there was little respite for the Radical

A series of strikes in late August and early

September compelled two French-owned railroads, the Frovincia de Santa Fe and the Compania General de Ferrocarriles
de la Frovincia de Buenos Aires,

to curtail service.

The

official reaction to the walkouts faithfully retraced the
pattern of response evident during the Central Argentine
strike.

Pablo Nogu^s, the Director General de Ferrocarriles,

at the behest of Yrigoyen approached both the unions and the

companies and offered to arbitrate the conflict through the

National Railroad Board.

La Fraternidad, anxious to end the

new wildcat movements v/hich were detrimental to union discipline and threatened the success of the co-ordinated strike

planned for December, accepted the overture.
v/hatever for their money so far,
ern Railway, Proceedi ngs 1917
.

Buenos Ayres Great South-

.

Nacl6n in RRP, XLVIII (31 August 1917), pp. 507,
See also La Prensa, editorial, 6 September 1917, p. 9.

^"^M.

509,

"

The companies,

.
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faced with incendiarism and the wanton destruction of rail-

road property by rampaging strikers, acceded without hesitation.

But the men affiliated with the FOF again sabotaged

the Government's conciliatory gesture by refusing to return
to their jobs.

To complicate further the Government's en-

deavors, reports of restlessness am.ong workers of the Central

C6rdoba and the State railways were filtering into the Federal Capital from the interior of the country.

52

Perplexed by its inability to communicate with labor,
the Government searched for scapegoats.

La Epoca charged

that "seditious elements

the v:orkers con-

v/ho

v;ant to see

stantly aroused" had fom.ented the strikes. -^-^

For the first

time political machinations were mentioned as possible fac-

tors in the strikes.

On 15 September the Bolsa de Coraer-

cio del Rosario met and concluded that the outbursts were
the consequence of "malignant political maneuvers and had

no other object than to create difficulties for the Execu-

Echoing the charge, La Epoca stated thati

tive Power,"

—

Until now we have ignored such assertions but the
character and seriousness of those v/ho have made the
It would not surprise us
charge give it credibility.
that the opposition to the Government, without thinking about the harmful consequences to the republic.

^Poca 31 August 1917, P= 1;
El Diario ^ September 1917, p. 5;
15 September 1917, p. 9.
.

.

^^L^ Epoca, 12 September 1917,
^^Ibid.

.

p.

7

M

September 1917, p.
Prensa, editorial,

12.

editorial, 15 September 1917,

p.

1.

9^

would implant in the im.pressionable soul
of the worker
the notion of blocking the progress
of the administration.
These are the tactics of ajiother epoch.
55
Estanislao

S.

Zeballos, a Conservative lawyer and edi-

tor of the Revista de Derecho

.

Historia

Letras

.

felt that

the culpability for the railroad strikes and,
indeed most

labor agitation lay with the Socialist Party.

He noted

that Yrigoyen's intervention in the im.portant port strike
of December I916 had led to a settlement which granted the

workers many of their demands.
v/ith the

Strike leaders, ecstatic

outcome, interpreted the attitude of the Radical

administration "as an act of solidarity against capital"
and allowed themselves to be convinced that they could count
on the support of the UCR.

But the Radical Party, with its

middle class roots and sympathies, would aid labor only insofar as their own bourgeois interests

v;ere

not threatened.

According to Zeballos, Socialist agitators realized Yrigoyen's error in catering to the laboring masses who expected

more than he was willing to concede.

Thus the Socialists

spurred labor on in the hopes of provoking a strong Govern-

ment reaction against the workers.

"This political maneu-

ver, abhorrent to our civilization, has placed the Govern-

ment in difficult straits

— to

make common cause with the

strikers or to use force against them.

"^^

55La S^go^a, editorial, 15 September 1917,

.

1.

Zeballos, "Gobierno Radical." Revista de DereSee
Letras LVIII (October 1917). P. 267.
Historia
^^E. S,

cho

p.

.
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Certainly the Socialist Party accorded labor their
complete support and subjected both Yrigoyen's Radical
Govern-

ment and the railroad companies to a constant stream of
vituperation through the columns of La Vajiguardia
paper.

.

the party

But the Socialist Party never condoned the use of

violence employed by workers during the strikes.

Argentine

Socialists were peaceful reformers who stressed reason and

education and sought gradual social change.

The Fartido

Socialista, since its inception in I894, had been building
a broadly conceived political base among skilled workers
57
and the lower middle class.
As early as I912 it had suc-

cessfully infiltrated the

Fraternidad and by

rajiks of La

1916 had men in decision-making positions, the most important being the union's general secretary, Amirico
Balino,

J.

Efforts to dominate the anarcho-syndicalist FOF

had proven less fruitful, although two militant Socialists,
Alejandro Comolli and Jer6nimo Delia Latta served on the
sejo Federal of the society.

Con'

Both men, hov/ever, were under

the shadow of the FOF's pov/erful and violent general secre-

tary, Bautista V, Mansilla, who urged his men to use direct

also Arturo H. Coleman, Mi Vida de Fer^roviario Ingles en la
"CorrupArgen tina. 1887- 19^^8 (Bahia Blancaj" 19^'?Tt p. "l3^^
ting elements of socialism" were mentioned as a factor in
La Epoca 12 Septem.ber 1917, p. 12.
the Santa Fe strike.
,

La.

Solberg, Immigration and Nationalism, p. 120; Galletti,
poltt ica ^ los partidos p. 63.
,

^^Miguel Leguia and Romualdo Lema, "Un grave momento
para el gremio f erroviario " La Epoca 1^ April I926, p. 3.
,

,
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action to gain their ends, 59

"
"
.

.

The Socialist oriented La Fraternidad was
appalled by

the lawless actions of the FOF.

Itoiisilla's ill-disciplined

union in every instance had precipitated or tolerated the

epidemic of wildcat strikes which had disrupted rail service
and seriously strained the solidarity agreement between the

FOF and La Fraternidad.

The Socialist Party would not have

sanctioned a movement whicli threatened to divide railroad
men into mutually antagonistic camps.

Whether or not the

party exercised a guldin^r hand in plans for the general

railroad strike, as claimed by Zeballos, is problematical,
Railwaymen, beset with a myriad of troubles, did not have to
be convinced to strike.

Their mood was explosive, waiting

for the incident, the reason, to down their tools.

The

movements began almost spontaneously, a fact admitted by La
Fraternidad, and they had developed a momentum of their own

which union leaders had extreme difficulty in channeling.
British and American sources saw Germans as the real
culprits behind the strikes.
reportedi

On 22 September the Times

"The Germans are everywhere assisting the strikers,"^"'"

Similarly, United States Ambassador Frederic

J.

Stimson tele-

^^See Marotta, El movimiento sindical argentine
216-222.

.

II,

^^Later, in 1918, harsh v/ords were exchanged between
the Socialists connected with the FOF and the party leaderSee below, pp. I6O-I6I,
ship over the issue of violence.
^""The

Times,

22 September 1917,

p.

5;

22 August 1917,

p.

5.
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graphed the Secretary of State that labor
agitation on the
railroads had been "undoubtably fomented by
German influ-

ences."

Such reports, however, were founded on rumor.

'

The Review of the. River Plate was "inclined
to reject the

theory of German machination," as was William

Plenry Taylor,

who denied the presence of the "German hand".^^

Meanwhile, the Government, unable to control the rash
of railroad strikes which was spreading and intensifying,

admitted publicly on 12 September that the worst was yet to
come,

and predicted a general transportation strike in No-

vember,

La Epoca

.

speaking for the administration, urged

Congress to sanction quickly the pension laws still pending
6^
so as to calm labor's intransigent spirit.
But the legis.

lators could not find the time to treat labor's demands,
V/hile

Congress debated other issues, the FORA, on 1?

September circulated fliers promising solidarity with the
FOF and La Fraternidad when the projected general railway
strike occurred.

There were also rumors in Buenos Aires

that v/ork stoppages seemed imminent on the Buenos Aires
Western, the Central Argentine and the Pacific railroads,
"It v/as time". La Raz6n urged,

"for the Government to act

^^Stimson to Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, 25
September 1917, USDS/RIAA, 835.50^5/7.
^^RRF, XLVIII (28 September 1917),
interview.

La Epoca

.

p.

12 September 1917, p. 12.

753? Taylor

6*^

decisively.
The Radical administration, again
caught uncomfor-

tably in the middle, became the target
of verbal brickbats
directed from both sides. La Naci6n,
sympathetic to the
companies' position, commentedt
The blame for what is now happening has
to be sought
in Its origin.
That was the vacillating action of the
National Government, which permitted the seditious
ruptions of the workmen during the Central Argentineirrailway strike.... It is clear... that such ejitecedents
operated as the stimulus to new strikes, equally
unbridled.
It is also strict logic that ineffectual repression by the public authorites engenders contemptuous arrogance against itself.... A Government which
does not prevent acts of useless destruction prejudicial not merely to private interests, but to^ervices
indispensable to social life, loses the power of administering justice, since any judgement lacking the
authority to enforce it is inconceivable. 66
^

^

liS.

IHQca, revealing Government sensitivity to the attacks

in the opposition press,

defended Yrigoyen's policy in

strong terms, and stressed that the only order not given
the troops standing guard over company installations was

the massacre of workers.

"Never would the present Govern-

ment stain the honor of the army by giving it a mission of

assassination."

67

It was not important that the strikers

burned some wagons or tore up some track; "that which is
portant is human life."
^•^La Raz5n,

68

17 September 1917, p. 1.

^^La Nacion, in RRP, XLVIII (21 September 1917),
67

im-

La Epoca, editorial, 19 September 1917, p. 1.

° GSlvez, Vida de Hip6lito Yrig-oven

,

p.

315.

p.

697.

'
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Labor, on the other hand, accused the Government
of

siding with the railroad companies.

Torello replied to the

charge on 18 September and stated that this was not
exact.
One has to distinguish between the protection of the
interests of the conipanies and the duty of keeping
vigil over public services, which imply the interests
of the Nation,... Arbitration was offered as a means
to a friendly and rational solution of the conflict-the companies accepted it gladly while the workers
discarded it absolutely and began to commit acts of
violence.
In this situation the duty of the Government is perfectly clear.
It is obliged to keep watch
over the property of the companies while they attempt
to restore service ... ajid to defend
the interests of
the country, seriously harmed by this emergency. 69
^

The Government had returned to middle ground after its

sobering flirtation with labor, which continued to reject
its conciliatory advances.
The unauthorized strikes, which had now spread to al-

most every railroad, worried La Fraternidad

's

leaders who

were concerned that such spontaneous and aimless outbursts

would compromise the success of the forthcoming

railroad strike.

•

general

Officers from both the FOF and La Frater-

nidad met in joint session on 1? September to discuss the
crisis in labor discipline.

Convinced that their men could

not be controlled adequately, the unions resolved to hasten
the general strike preparations

ajid,

to this end, worked

out a common list of demands so as to impart uniformity to
the movement,

70

^^In La Raz6n, 18 September 1917f

^^M. Spoca

,

p.

19 September 1917, p. 1;

1.

M ^renso.

,

1?
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Consisting of eleven major
articles, this list extended over a wide area.
Heading the demands
•

was the insis.

tance on company recognition
of the unions as bargaining
agents for the men.
La Fraternidad and the FOF
also sought
the readmission of personnel
fired as a consequence of the

1912 strike together with the reinstatement
of all employees
suspended, dismissed or laid off for
reason of economy or
without cause since that date. Demanded
also by the unions
v/ere the abolition of pi£i,ce-work
and fines, freedom for
all men not under criminal jurisdiction
who were being detained by the authorities, and guarantees
from the compai.ies that no reprisals would be taken
against the strikers

upon their return to work.

The unions also sought in-

creased wages and fixed salary scales, free passes,
days

off and annual vacation.

Passage of a pension law was urged

and modifications ordered in the number of hours worked
each
day.

i^lnally,

the men demanded that the chief of the tele-

graph office of the Central Argentine, Miguel Angel Tarantino,
71
be transferred.

Concurrently with these developments, La Fraternidad
ajid

the Federaci6n rejected Nogu^s

diate the disputes.

'

second attempt to me-

La Fraternidad, which earlier had ac-

cepted the arbitration offered by the Director General, now

September 1917,
71

p.

7.

Printed in La Epo ca, 1 October 1917, p. 1? cf* the
list in Fernttndez, La Union Ferrovia ria, pp. 86-87.
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informed a La Raz6n reporter that Nogu^s did not
understand
the position of the workers,

"because he had never done

anything to eliminate the abuses of the companies."

The

Director General was not a man to inspire confidence among
the strikers, who identified him with the oligarchy

"^^
.

But

La Fraternidad, alv/ays moderate in its policies, indicated
to Torello that arbitration might still be possible if Yri-

goyen lent his "high authority" and "spirit of justice" to
the proceedings.

The FOP, on the contrary, remained suspi-

cious of all Government inspired or directed arbitration,

remembering, perhaps, the broken promises of 1912, 73
By Friday,

21 September,

the situation had deteriorated

further and strikes and violence were reported by the news

media on five railroads

— the

British-owned Central Cordoba

and Midland, the French-owned Santa Fe and Conpanla General,
and the Ferrocarriles del Estado.
on most other railroads.

74

Agitation was in evidence

Argentina appeared to be on the

brink of the long-awaited general railroad strike.
The gloomy prospects for peace between workers and

the companies elicited a variety of responses from, a broad
72

In Congress,
La Raz6n. 18 September 1917 p. 3.
Socialist Deputy Zaccagnini stated that the Direccion General de Ferrocarriles had never done anything for laborers,
Diputados, Sesiones 1917. IHf 375» Session of 13 August,
i

,

73

La Razon, 20 September 1917,
La Frensa, 20 September 1917,
1917, p. 8.
.

p.
p.

3«

10;

21 September,
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sector of Argentine opinion.

On the evening of the 21st

the Radical Committee of the Capital District
met in extra-

ordinary seosion

3Jid

resolved to create a special committee

to act in conjunction with the National Committee
of the

UCR and the Radical bloc in Congress in efforts to
curb the

labor unrest. 75

The Socialist Party, meeting during the

same evening, maintained their anti- Government position and

reaffirmed their support of the strikers.

They condemned

the violence authorized by the authorities to "suffocate
76
the strike movement,

Economic interest groups, apprehensive of the adverse
connotations

of'

a breakdovm in rail transportation, began

to pressure the Government to act.

The Liga Agraria desig-

nated a committee to speak with Yrigoyen about possible approaches to bring the strikes to

aji

end.

The delegation

deplored the destruction of freight cars and track, which
made it difficult for them to get their crops and produce
to market, and emplored the Government to apply "extrem.e

repression" if necessary to bring rail traffic back to normal.

The Comit^ Nacional del Comercio also railed against

the strikers and termed the destruction of com.pany property

"sabotage."
7<

Such acts, if left unpunished,

"would cause

The committee included Ho Zaldua, Rafael E. Llambias, Carlos A. Becu, Lorenzo Caino, Amadeo E, Grandi,
Pedro Fodesta and Santiago Eellingeri. La Prensa, 22 Sep.
tember 1917, p. 8.
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capital to flee the country and
discourage new capital from
coming in, "'^'^
The Casa Rosada became the scene
of marathon meetings

between Yrigoyen and his ministers
of public works and war.
A month of sporadic violence and
interruption of rail service by workers who refused to arbitrate
their differences
had taxed the Government's patience. La
Razon reported from
official sources that the Executive had resolved
to

"take

new and severe measures to guarajitee the
property of the
companies against possible attacks." Above all else,

the

destruction of rolling stock, which could not be replaced
because of the war in Europe, was to be stopped.

Moreover,

the Government warned strikers to heed the orders of
sol-

diers and the police so as to avoid "bloody incidents"

which had begun to occur between workers and troops.''^
Given the constantly changing kaleidoscope of situations, the policy of the railroads had remained remarkably

consistent.

In the face of the Government's vacillation

and labor's intransigence the companies held out for arbi-

tration of most of the railwayman's demands.

The London

Directorates concurred with the deci si oris made in Buenos
Aires.

On 18 September the London directors held a private

meeting under the chairmanship of Albert
77
VLa Frensa. 22 September 191?, p.
'

"^^La

Raz6n

.

E.

8,

21 September 1917, p. 1.

Bowen of the

10k

Great Southern and "decided to give entire liberty
of ac-

tion to the respective Local Boards in Buenos Aires"
with

respect to the labor situation. "^^
The consensus of opinion was in favour of submitting
to arbitration all questions at issue between the companies and their men, provided that the impartiality
of such arbitration be assured and that questions relating to discipline or to existing contractual rights
or obligations be excluded, 80

Arbitration
arsenal.

v/as

the most effective weapon in the companies'

As long as the railroads seemed willing to com-

promise, the Government had no excuse to throw its weight
on the side of the workers.

At midday on Saturday, 22 September, delegations re-

presenting La Fraternidad, the FOF and the Asociacion Argentina de Telegraf istas presented each railroad with long
8nd uniform lists of demands which

vie

re not open to arbi-

tration and were to implemented by the comppjiies within J6
81
hours,
Frajik Foster, General Manager of the Buenos Aires
Western, noted thati

Judging by the nature and the number of the demands
(in our case 15^) it v^as perfectly obvious from the
outset that the deliberate intention existed of making
the strike a fait accompli this impression being confirmed by the fact that in their covering letter they
intimated the unanimous and irrevocable decision to
abandon work unless the Companies agreed outright to
every one of the conditions without exception. 82
,

Naci6n, 20 September 1917, in RRP, XLVIII (21
tember 191?) p. ^9?.
''^La

Sep.

i

S<^Ibid.

^•^Fernandez,

La Union Ferroviaria

,

p.

86.

^^Report dated 28 August I9I8, in Buenos Ayres Western
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The corapanies refused to comply with the
workers' de-

mands and at midnight on 23 September trains
came to a
halt througaout Argentina.
The general railroad strike
had begun.
*

*

¥r

An analysis of the prolonged labor crisis which led up
to the general railroad strike in September reveals a com-

plex and confusing amalgam of patterns and purposes.

Yri-

goyen's Government had been accused by labor of supporting
the foreign-owned railroad companies; it also had been ac-

cused by the companies and conservative press of showing

partiality toward the strikers.

The Radical administra-

tion, however, maintained that the Government's policy had

been strictly impartial and conciliatory.

Actually, there

are elements of truth in each argu.ment.

Official impartiality was apparent in Government sponsored efforts to terminate the conflict on the railroads.
The arbitration arranged first by Torello, the Minister of

Public V/orks, and then by Nogu^s, the Director General de

Ferrocarriles

,

was v/ell-intentioned and tried to protect

the interests of labor, neglected by past administrations,
as well as those of the companies and general welfare.

83

This policy was consistent with Radical doctrine which

Railway, Annual Report and Accoiuits

,

1918.

^^See Baily, Labor. Nationalis m, and Politics in
gentina p, 35«
,

Ar.
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stressed class conciliation under the aegis of the Govern.

rnent.

8^

But the Government's objectivity, real and. alleged,

often was overshadowed by opportunism and political expediency.

This was particularly evident during the Augu.st

strike against the Central Argentine Railv/ay.
ran its course,

As the strike

the Government's policy moved through four

successive stages

i

initial indifference, officially inspired

mediation, grudging support of the company's position, and,
finally, espousal of the complaints of the workmen.

As long

as the strike seemed under control and localized the Govern-

ment regarded it as a matter of company discipline.
the unrest threatened to spread,

When

the Government offered

arbitration, which was accepted by union leaders but not
by the strikers.

Startled and angry, the Government at-

tacked the irresponsibility of the strikers, which in effect aligned the Radical administration
tal.

v/ith

foreign capi-

But when the strike spread along the entire network

of the Central Argentine and threatened to have serious

repercussions in other labor sectors, the Government, ostensibly the friend of the working man, quickly abandoned
the railroad company.

Realizing the error into which it

had fallen, and its possible political consequences in Santa
See also Del Mazo,
^^Bianco, Doctr ina radical, p. 155.
pensami ento escrito^de Y rigoy en, pp. 110-111, and Carlos
Strasser, ed,. Las i zg'u 1 e'r d.as_ en el procesq j^olitico ar^ISIl'tino (Avellanedat 1959 )» P. 10^

Fe and perhaps in other parts of the country, the Govern-

ment managed a complete volte face, condemned the Central
Argentine for fomenting the strike and imposed a settlement
favorable to the workers.
Significantly, however, the Radicals had attacked labor.

It was an emotional and perhaps unthinking response

to the Government's failure to convince the unions to sub-

mit to arbitration under official auspices.

But it laid

bare one weakness which the Radical Party would never be
able to overcome

— its

middle class roots and proclivities.

The UCR did not understajid the nature of the labor unrest

which gripped Argentina.

V/hen

faced with the utter intran-

sigence, contempt and violence of large numbers of rail-

road workers whose demands did not admit negotiation, Yrigoyen's Government was left without a viable course of action.

The Radical Party, with its bourgeois orientation,

"could not comprehend the all or nothing attitude of the

left,"^^

To Enrique

Dickmann, a prominent Socialist and

one-time editor of La Vanguardia

.

Yrigoyen's policy ap-

peared simplistic and patronizing, intuitive and impulsive.
The UCR, with its vacillation and uncertain purpose, had

^^Rodolfo Fuiggros, Historia CrTtica de los Fartidos,
Pollticos Argentinos (6 vols.j Buenos Aires 19o5T7 II El
Yrigpye nismo p. 55*
i

»

,

Dickmann, Recuer dos de un militant e socialista. p.
See also Diputados, _Sesion_e,s, 1212, HI. 373-378 for
279.
the Socialist position during the Central Argentine strike.
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failed miserably in its endeavors
to solve the labor problems plaguing the railroads.
Until September
22nd the

strikes had been partial in nature.

A similar policy, if

applied to a more widespread strike,
could only compound the
failure.

"
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"Entiendan, sorfores, quo los
privilef.ior, han conclu.i'do cn
el pafr,
IlJpollto Yrlpioyen, October
1917.
.

—

.

.

.

No trains ran in Ar^ientjna on ?h September 1917
Passcncicra

,

stranded on platfornin,

of transportation

v/liile

haci

to r.eek other rnenns

hundreds of freight trains, aban-

doned by their crews, sat idle on the tracks.

"For the

first time the encinemen made common cause with the traffic, v;orkshops,

running shed and permanent way workers."^

Nearly 1?0,000 men had Joined the walkout spearheaded by
three railroad unJonn, La Fraternidad, the FOF and the
Telef.raphistr,

Co-ordination of the movomont was assured

.

by the creation of a Comlsion Mixta de Huelp;a (mixed sti'ike

committee) under the direction of Jose San Sebastian, president of the engineer's union, with the aid of representatives from the other two organizations.

2

In support of the

railwaymen, the FORA promised its solidarity and announced
^Extract from a report of John Montague Kddy, Acting
Manager of the Great Southern Railway, dated 3 September
1918,' in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Report and
Account s 19l8
,

Union

«

"'chiti, La Fr a tq^-n id ad,
(''erroviarla, pp. B'j-Hb".

pp.

322-2^1;

Fernandez,

Lri
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that preparations for a general strike were nearly
complete.
Anticipating; the PORA's planned action, partial strikes

broke out in some panaderlas (bread bakeries), light and

power companies, meat-packing plants and tramways.^
La Prensa called upon the Radical administration to

respond to the crisis "in a manner befitting a Government
elected by the people."

The Casa Rosada's policy, the

paper suggested, "should be free from the influence which
can be maintained and paid for by the companies as well as

from the passions

...

developing in the unions."

The influen-

tial paper considered arbitration to be the key to solving
the conflict.

On the other hand. La Razon argued that even

though official arbitration "would be very good as a stopgap measure... it could not be the basis for a conclusive

settlement."

The Government, La Razon cautioned, by inter-

vening in the conflict "ran the risk that one of its decisions might favor one side or the other
or political artifice."

— through

error

If partiality was shown by the

authorities, the prestige of the Government would be
5
"shattered with a single blow."

Yrigoyen's administration had never discounted arbi^

La Razon , 22 September 1917,

P-

1.

^La Prensa, editorials, 2^ September 1917, p.
September 1917, p. 5.
^La Razon, editorial,

2^1

September 1917,

p.

1.

6;

25

Ill

tration under Government auspices.

According to press re-

ports based on official sources, Pablo Torello,. the
Minister
of Public Works, still believed in the efficacy of
official

intervention despite its failure to break the deadlock between the unions and the companies during the August strike
against the Central Argentine.

On 25 September he urged

Yrigoyen to issue a decree which would impose obligatory

arbitration on both parties as the first step to a resumption of rail service.

The President, apparently unconvinced,

took the question under advisement.

A day

later, on the

26th, company managers informed the authorities that they

wished to negotiate a settlement with the workers, but em-

phasized that they sought arbitration and not dictation.
The strikers, however, refused to bargain, fearing that

their demands would not be met if they abandoned their in-

transigent attitude.^

Labor's unyielding position virtually

precluded any form of negotiated settlement.
ment's first task, then, was to discover

a-

The Govern-

new method to

break the impasse betv;een labor and management.

In the

meantime. La Epoca cast Yrigoyen in the role of peacemaker,
a man "trying to foster a sense of accord between the two

groups and avert excesses by one against the other."
^La Razon, 25 September 1917, Peditorial, "29 September 1917, p. ^.
''^La

Prensa ,

Epoca, editorial, 27 September 1917, p.

1.

112

The administration's efforts

unappreciated by

v;ent

the opposition press in Buenos Aires.

Nev/spapers contended

that the chaos enveloping Argentina could be ended if

Yrigoyen's Government acted energetically and decisively.
La Prensa worried that the situation

v;as

becoming "revolu-

tionary" because of the Government's passivity and impotence.

The paper stated editorially that the Radical ad-

ministration had to perform three "solemn duties" as long
as the crisis persisted;

to guarantee the rights and well-

being of the population as a v;hole, to defend the persons
and property menaced by the strikers, and to offer to arbitrate the dispute.

8

/

La R azon urged Yrigoyen to lend the

authority of his Government to bring order to the incoherent
mass of ideas, opinions and rumors which clouded and confused the real issues.

9

London papers castigated the hesi-

tant and vacillating policy of Yrigoyen.

The Times stated

that the inactivity of the Argentine authorities "merely

encouraged the adhesion of other trades to the railway
men."t.lO
To observers of the Argentine scene. Radical leader-

ship seemed incapable either of formulating alternative
^La Prensa , editorials, 25 September 1917, p.
September 1917, p. ^; article, 29 September 1917, p.

°La Razon
''•^The

,

editorial, 28 September 1917,

Times, 28 Septem.ber 1917,

p.

7.

•

p.

1-

5; 29
8.
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policies or taking decisive action in the face of the un-

yielding attitude of the strikers.

Indeed, public opinion,

which demanded prompt and effective measures to end the
strike, received the impression that the Government lacked
the competence to control the spreading labor crisis.

Yrigoyen's tendency to dwell for inordinate lengths of time
over possible courses of action in effect rendered his

Government

immobile."'""'"

La Epoca tried to fill the apparent

policy vacuum by resuscitating the ghosts "responsible" for
labor's intransigence during the Central Argentine strike.

The semi-official organ assailed with renewed vigor "the

professional agitators, the socialist press, and sinister
elements for maintaining the spirit of the workers in an

atmosphere of rebellion."

}

2

The Review of the River Plate grimly surveyed the

first week of the railroad strike.

The general strike movement has assumed the proportions of a labour revolution. The social and
industrial life of the country is disorganised.
Transport and postal services are paralysed....
Fratricidal blood has been shed in encounters
between strikers and military forces the provocation coming in every instance from the
...Labour is in open revolt, arrogant,
strikers.
insolent, intemperate, unreasonable, and unreaThe strikers reject the arbitration
soning
which the railway companies offer. Their demands

—

''See Galvez, Vida de H ipolito

Y rigoyen

,

^^La Epoc a, editorial, 30 September 1917,

p.
p.

260.
1.

Ilk

are disproportionate and tyrannical.
The Government, despite its good intentions has so far been
unable to get the labour leaders to agree to arbitration
The fact is that the situation has
got "out of hand"--is beyond the control of the
Government.
Mob rule threatens to prevail. ^3

Congress, too,

v;as

concerned with the violence and

intensity of the railroad strikes which had spread across
the republic.

Since June the Camara de Diputados had re-

ceived numerous petitions from groups of railwaymen who

demanded that the legislators expedite the passing of laws

regarding railroad pensions and working regulations."^^
Alejandro Ruzo's investigation into the causes of the
Central Argentine strike had stressed the need for immediate

legislation on the same issues.

The Government had also

exhorted Congress to act on pending pension legislation.^^
Congress, hovjever, could not initiate debate on either

working regulations or railwaymen'

s

pensions until the Com-

mittee on Railroad Legislation of the Camara de Diputados,

which had been studying both questions since the conclusion
of the Central Argentine strike, offered its recommendations
See also
XLVIII (28 September 1917), p. 753.
La Epoca, 28 September 1917, p. 1 for similar statements
regarding the "revolutionary overtones of the labor unrest.
•^^RRP,

1*

"^^For a

representative petition see, Diputados,

Sesione s, 1917, II, 679-680.
^^See above, pp. 88-89.
^^La Epoca, 12 September 1917,

P-

12.
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to the Legislature.

The Committee, working quickly, pre-

pared a provisional set of regulations governing railroad
labor practices and submitted them to the Chamber of Deputies at the end of August.

But the proposed legislation,

little more than an enlarged version of an earlier con-

gressional study made in 1916, was returned to the Committee
for further modification.

The revised bill, designed to

control the working conditions of railroad personnel and to

establish clearly the nature of the reciprocal relations

between the companies and their staffs, was presented for
congressional reconsideration by the Committee on l8 September, Just five days before the outbreak of the general

railroad strike.

17
'

All three members of the Committee on Railroad Legislation, Jose' Arce, a Conservative, Alfredo Demarchi, a

Radical, and Antonio Zaccagnini, a Socialist, unanimously

endorsed the revamped reg lament a ci(^n del trabaj o

viario

.

f erro-

Briefly, the proposed legislation would establish

guidelines regarding labor conditions, set maximum hours
of work and assure equitative wages and salaries.

Moreover,

it would create a system of promotion based on years of

service and merit, and envisaged the constitution of a

permanent committee of arbitration composed of the President
-'•''Diputados,

XLVIII (31 August

Sesiones

iWlTTV^

,

See also RRP,
1917, V, 27^ff.
505 and 28 Septem.ber 1917, p. 757.
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of the Departarnento Naclonal del Trabajo, two company representativ.^s and two workers.

The committee would be

chaired by the Director General de Ferrocarriles

"'"^
.

La Prensa was sure that the measure would not produce

results because the companies had not been consulted.

"It

is simply a partial law which consults the interests of

only one party.

Because of this it is unconstitutional

""'^
.

To the Review of the River Plate the project seemed "to

controvert elementary constitutional and legal precepts
most flagrantly." 20

The unanimous agreement over the regla

mentacion among Committee members who represented three
mutually antagonistic political parties was surprising,
given the obvious shortcomings and inadequacies of the proposed bill.

Curiously, despite the bill's faults, the

opposition to it which should have been generated by Conservative deputies never materialized, and the reglamentacion del trabajo ferroviario received lower house approval
on 2k September.

21

Just two days later Arce, on behalf of the Committee
on Railroad Legislation, presented a reconstructed railroad

pension law to the Camara de Diputados.
•^Diputados,

S esiones

,

He stated that an

1917 , V, 272-27^1.

^^La Prensa, editorial, 29 September 1917, p.
2°RRP, XLVIII (28 September 1917). p.

^^Diputados, Sesiones , 1917

,

757.

VI, 153-168.

^.
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I

earlier pension scheme, formulated In September I916, had
been objected to by both the companies and rall-road employees.

The new legislation, according to Arce, took into

account the arguments advanced by all interested parties.
The funding of the Caja de Pensiones had been carefully re-

considered, as

v/ere

service and age requirements.

Under

the new pension bill 32 years of service and 55 years of

age were deemed essential conditions to the right of a pension.

As in the case of the labor regulations, the revised

pension legislation was quickly sanctioned by the Deputies
and passed on to the Senate.

22

The Review of the River Plate

,

which had been outraged

by the congressional approval of the reglamentaci(5n, reacted

more positively to the proposed pension project:
we welcome an indication that the committee [on
railroad legislation] has dealt with the matter
in a more broadminded spirit than has inspired
some recent railway legislation initiatives ^3
.

A

somewhat similar view was taken by railv/ay managers.

Henry Bell, London Chairman of the Buenos Aires VJestern,

informed his company's stockholders that the terms of the

amended pension law were "less onerous than any suggestions
yet made."

^^Diputados, Sesiones, 1917. VI, 224-237. 244-249.
253-274, 302-331.
XLVIII (28 September 1917),

P-

757.

^^Buenos Ayres V/estern Railway, Proceed ings, 1917.
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It cannot be denied that the railroad strike had in-

fluenced congressional activity vis a vis the two bills

prepared by Arce's committee

While the nation's repre-

.

sentatives were anxiously discussing pensions and regulations the newspapers were reporting shortages of foodstuffs
and milk in Buenos Aires and an alarming increase in the

incidence of violence and bloodshed.

Arce admitted that

the legislation had been rushed through Congress with the

object of "avoiding the great evils which would befall the
country" if the railroad strike continued.

27

But the bills

'

had been approved with the forbearance of the Conservative

deputies, whose sympathies were closer to the position of
the companies than they were to the intransigence of the

strikers.

By arrangement with the Radical Party leaders,

the Conservatives agreed not to delay or oppose the pas-

sage of the reglamentacio'n or the pension scheme if the
UCR in return supported a bill designed to clarify article

8

of the Mitre Law (5315), legislation sought by the

^^Buenos Ayres Western Railway, I'roceedings
also RRl, XLVIII (28 September 1917). p. 757.

,

1917

.

See

^^For some representative reports on the strike see:
26 September
La Razon
25 September 1917, p. 1; La Prensa
27 September 1917, p. li La Kpoca
1917, p." 9; El D iario
20 September 1917, P- 1,

,

,

,

^'^Diputados, Sesiones

,

1919

,

VT,

193-
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companies since 1915.

In sum, although all political

factions were concerned with what seemed to be the open

rebellion of labor, the Conservatives refused to cater to
the demands of the strikers without first securing some-

thing for the companies.

On 2? September, the day follow-

ing congressional sanction of the pension law, the Committee on Railroad Legislation, with Zaccagnini dissenting,

introduced a law which proposed to clarify article
Law 5315.

8

of

The measure was approved by the Camara de Dipu-

tados on the same afternoon.

29

The degree of company participation, if any, in the

Conservative-Radical arrangement effected in the Ca'mara de
Diputados is impossible to assess because of the lack of
evidence.

But the companies did not hesitate to make use

of the influence they could command in the Conservative-

dominated Senate.

On the 25th, when the labor regulations

bill, already passed by the lower chamber was introduced
in the Senate for further consideration, the companies

lodged a protest.

The legal representatives noted that the

proposed law would deprive the railroad companies of the
"right to fix freely the remuneration of their employees"
as well as the "right to dismiss or promote them."

Further

^^Arce implied that such an arrangement had been made
For further disSee Diputados, Sesiones, 1919, VI, 193cussion of article 8 of the Mitre Law see above, pp. 56-59-

^^Diputados, Se sione s, 1917

,

VI,

333-3^9.
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more, In the opinion of the lawyers, the bill appeared
to
be designed to solve problems in a sphere

In which it is very doubtful whether the State can
intervene without violatin^^ the constitutional precepts which guarantee freedom of labor, and freedom
in trading and in contracting, assailing at the
same time the rights of property. 30

The Review of Uie River Plate commented that the legisla-

tion under consideration by the Senate was unjust and that
it would never "achieve the laudable but Utopian aim whJ ch

has obviously inspired it

— that

of conciliating irrecon-

cilables.

Company interests found a powerful spokesman in the

Senate in Benito Villanueva, a Conservative, of Mendoza.
He argued that the haste urged by his colleagues. Senators

Enrique del Valle Iberlucea, a Socialist, and Jose Camflo
Crotto, a Radical, was precipitous and that a matter as

important as railroad labor legislation demanded careful
consideration.

Villanueva, seconded by two Senators from

Cordoba, Lufs Garcia and Julio Roca, also asserted that the

companies had not been consulted on the questions under
discussion.

This being the case, the men do cino argued, it

would not be right to subject foreign capital, which had
"fostered the progress of the counti-y", to such peremptory
to the Senate, dated 26
XLVIII (28 September 1917), p.

^"^Note of the companies

September 1917, in RRP,
^^Ibid.

7'j7
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treatment.

Villanueva brushed aside Del Valle's arguments

that the immediate passage of the law would
help to end
the general railroad strike which gripped the
country, and

noted that the first article of the reglamentacion
gave
the companies 90 days within which to implement the
pro-

visions of the law.

The points made by the Senator from

Mendoza carried the day and the upper chamber voted to
refer the bil] regarding labor regulation to
for further study.

A

a

committee

similar fate befell the pension leg-

islation while the clarification of the Mitre Law was
never discussed because of the adjournment of Congress.
Meanwhile, the solidarity of the strikers began to
show signs of strain.

In a meeting between the union lea-

dership and company representatives held on 29 September,
the Fraternidad delegates hinted that some agreement seemed

possible on a number of issues, including wage increases.
The FOF representatives disagreed with their sister .society
and demanded that the companies accept in toto the workers'
lists, which in effect ruled out a partial settlement.

The

resultant impasse convinced the company delegates that nothing was to be gained in dii'ect negotiations with the strikers

and strengthened their desire to submit the dispute to

^^Senadores, Sesiones, 1917, II, IO67-IO69, 10951097, 110^1, 1131-1135.
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official arbitration.^^
La Fraternidad's president, Jose San Sebastian,
in
an interview with La Razon said nothing of the
uncompro-

mising attitude of the FOP and in fact claimed that it
was
the companies who were intransigent.

But he indicated that

La Fraternidad still believed in the chances for a nego-

tiated settlement.

As he phrased it:

You asked me about the prospects for a favorable
solution.
Well, by discussing the complaints with
the great capitalists one could arrive at an accord.
If the firemen, for example, ask for an increase in
wages of 20^, then \2% or 15^ could be conceded to
them, an increase which the companies say would harm
the national economy a prospect in which I do not
believe. 3^

—

San Sebastian did not discount official arbitration either,
but such a course of action would be acceptable to the un-

ions only if the companies first recognized the societies
as legitimate bargaining agents for the men.-^^

In any

event, both statements were in direct opposition to the
"all or nothing" policy pressed by the Federacion.

While strikers and company representatives met in
futile sessions, powerful economic interest groups affected
by the dispute began to pressure the Government to end the

conflict.

Joaquin Anchorena, president of the prestigeous

^^ti Razon ,
3^

Ibid.

^-^Ibid.

1

October 1917,

p.

,
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and Influential Sociedad Rural Argentina, called
a meeting
of his officers on the 27th to discuss the role,
of the

organization in the face of the strike.

As a first step

the Sociedad drafted a note which emphasized "the
serious

harm and dislocation" caused by the strike to the public
interest, "and especially to agricultural and cattle interests" of the country.
the 29th.

The message was sent to Yrigoyen on

The organization also decided to lend its good

offices in an effort to settle the strike and normalize

rail traffic.

At the end of September,

the Sociedad Rural

extended invitations to the companies and trades unions
involved in the strike and requested their presence at a
conference scheduled for

2

October in the offices of the

organization on Calle Sarmiento.

Although no solutions

were decided upon at the well-attended gathering, La Epoca

praised the attempt to discern the real causes behind the
dispute.^

The Liga Agraria, under the leadership of

Carlos Guerrero, adopted a more militant stance than had
the Sociedad Rural.

Guerrero, in a sharp note to Yrigoyen

on 29 September, demanded that the Chief Executive end the
37

strike and punish the workers, "who were breaking the law."

Sociedad Rural de la Argentina, Anales de la
Soci edad Rural Argentina (hereafter cited as SRA, A nales
LI (October 1917)', p.~T^2; La Epoca, 2 October 1917, p. 3)

^"^La

1917, P.""^.

Razon

,

1

October 1917, p.

^' i

El Diario,

1

October
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Yrigoyen's Government was under constant pressure
from many quarters to act.

The strikers held out for the

satisfaction of their demands prior to a return
to work,
a tactic which had proven its value during
the Central
Argentine dispute.

Equally unyielding, the companies re-

mained committed to a policy of "work and talk."

Decisive

and energetic action was urged by the Argentine press,

while the London Times expressed its grave concern over
the threat to "British capital and interests, as well as
the country's, trade."

Powerful economic interests had

also voiced their reservations with the Government's ap-

parent inactivity.

The Sociedad Rural felt constrained to

intervene in the conflict while other groups advocated the
use of force if necessary to break the strike.

Yrigoyen, however, chose to ensconce himself in a
torre de marfil, waiting on events.

It may be assumed

that he had decided that the time was not propitious for
his personal intervention in the strike.
fused, the viev;

v;as

clouded.

Events were con-

Until the chances of success

seemed better, Yrigoyen appeared content to cultivate the
Image of his impartiality and sense of justice.

On

oo

Frederic Jesup Stimson, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina,
to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, 29 September 1917,
USDS, RIAA, 835.50^15/10; La Pre ns a, editorial, 29 September
1917, p. 4; The Tines , 29 September 1917, p. 6; La Razon
3 October 1917, pp. 1, 3.
-^^Taylor interview.
,
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October it was reported that the Chief Executive
remained
unalterably opposed to the use of force to end the
1

rail

strike.

In his words, the demands of the workers
merited

"respect", as did the interests of the companies.
The image was given more substance on

3

October when

a committee of businessmen representing the
commercial and

industrial interests most injured by the railroad strike

visited Yrigoyen at the Casa

Rosada.^*"^

They urged him to

break the strike so prejudicial to their interests by ordering the navy to run the trains.

Reportedly, Yrigoyen

reacted strongly and negatively to the suggestion and told
the assembled entrepreneurs:

"Let it be understood sirs,

that privileges have ceased in the country and from this
day forward the armed forces of the Nation will not be em-

ployed except in defense of honor or its integrity "^^
.

Behind the presidential facade of impartiality and
40

/

La Razon ,

1

October 1917,

p.

4,

hi

Represented at the meeting were the Sociedad Rural,
Liga Agraria, Bolsa de Cereales, Centre de Consignatories,
Unio^n Industrial Argentina, Camara General de Cereales y
Molineros., Mercado Central de Frutos, Camara de Comercio
Francesa, Centre de Importadores y Anexos, Masurels Fils,
Sociedad Primitiva de Lecheros y Tamberos, Centre de Propietarios de Co'rdoba, Conf ederacion Argentina del Comercio,
SRA, Anales
Industria y Produccio'n, and the frigorl'f icos
LI (November 1917), p. 714.
.

,

42

This often-told Incident was related by Senator
Carballero in 1925.
See Senadores, Sesslones
1925, II,
327-328.
,
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Justice, Yrigoyen's subordinates worked
feverishly, searching for a practical solution to the strike.
At the ministerial level Government activity during the
first week of

October was intense and complex.
were explored.

All possible solutions

Arbitration, which had constituted the

nucleus of official policy since the opening days
of the

general rail strike, had failed.
to bargain.

The men simply refused

Consequently, an alternative policy had to be

found which would satisfy the aspirations of the strikers.

Labor had to be given a palliative.
Not unexpectedly, the Government struck upon the idea
of a new set of labor regulations for the railwaymen.

This

had been anticipated by Senator Jose Camilo Grotto in his

remarks made at the close of debate on the railroad labor

regulation bill in the upper chamber of Congress.

Grotto

informed his colleagues that Congressional approval of the

legislation was not really necessary, because Yrigoyen
could implement a labor regulation by means of Executive
decree.

Indeed, as soon as the Government discerned that

the railroad legislation passed by the Chamber of Deputies

would be delayed in the Senate, Yrigoyen contacted Pablo
Nogue's,

the Director General de Ferrocarriles

,

and directed

him to formulate a new reglamentacion del trabajo for the
railv/aymen.

Nogues submitted a hastily drafted proposal to

^^Senadores, Sesiones
1917.

,

1917

,

II,

1135.

28 September

.

12?

the unions for their consideration on or about 30 Septem-

ber
La Praternidad'

leaders, never favorably disposed

s

toward Nogues, considered the proposed regulation to be
"ridiculous and inadmissible."

San Sebastian and Balino,

the general secretary, charged that the Director General

"knew absolutely nothing about railroad labor."

Although

Nogues' reglaraentacion had been ill-received, the Govern-

ment was not discouraged and re-directed its approach to
the problem.

At the bidding of the Casa Rosada, Julio B.

Lezana and Alejandro Ruzo of the Departamento Nacional del
Trabajo, together with the directors of La Praternidad,

re-wrote the reglamentacion in a form acceptable to the
footplate staff.

Nogues was not invited to the meeting.

V/ithin hours the "corrected" and amended version was passed

on to Pablo Torello, the Minister of Public VJorks, with

the understanding that it was to be the basis of a defini-

tive labor regulation.

Torello immediately contacted the legal representatives of the railroad companies and asked them to meet with

him at 5:30 in the afternoon on
See La Razon

,

1

2

October to discuss the

October 1917,

p.

^^La Praternidad, Circular f/S^\, 10 November 1917, In
Chiti, La Praternidad, p. 327; La Razon, 2 October 1917,
p. 1; La "Prensa, editorial, 19 October 1917, p. 4.
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reglamentacion approved by La Fraternidad.

As soon as the

lawyers had assembled, Torello startled them with the news
that If they had no great objections a decree approving
the labor regulations would be published, possibly on the

following day.

Before they had recovered from Torello

's

initial remark, the Minister informed them that the Government considered it necessary that the companies grant to
the workers an increase in wages and salaries, abolish all

piece-work and institute an eight-hour work' day.

These

conditions, according to Torello, had to be met before the

men would agree to return to work.

All remaining points

of contention, the representatives were assured, would be

submitted to arbitration.
Shocked and outraged by the Government's unilateral
action, the company representatives resisted the pressure
so liberally applied by Torello and expressed their reser-

vations against the proposed labor regulation.

On the

following day the railroad managers rejected the reglamentaci(5n and claimed that it "enormously prejudiced the

interests of the companies."
as salary increases of 30%,

The strikers' demands, such

"exceeded all bounds", while

the implementation of the reglamentacion del trabajo would

have forced the lines to expand their personnel by as much

p.

1;

^^La Razo n, 2 October 1917, PP.
La Epoca,' 3 October 1917, P- 3.

1,
•

3;

3
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as kO%,

Considered together, the managers argued that the

requested salary hikes and the labor regulation would cost
the companies between

$

90 and $100,000,000 m/n per year.

Especially objected to by the company officials was the
eight-hour work day for traction personnel.

Such a regula-

tion would not allow the circulation of long-haul

trains.^'''

Concurrent with the discussions over the La Fraternidad- approved regulation of railroad labor, Torcllo,

anxious to get the trains rolling, approached the company

representatives and asked them to provide him with a provisional schedule of rail service,

"for which the Govern-

ment would offer all possible guarantees."

The managers

refused to entertain the suggestion because they feared
that any restoration of service would invite serious trouble from the more militant strikers and present great dan-

ger to both passengers and crews. 48
The Government's two-pronged policy, based on labor

regulations and the restoration of partial rail traffic,
was designed to end the strike by playing on the differIt will

ences existing betv/een La Fraternidad and the FOF.

be recalled that the labor regulations introduced by Torello
in his meeting with the railroads'

3

October 1917, p.
October 1917, p. 1.

,

5

^^h^ Ep_qca,

ber 1917, p.

1;

La Kpoca

legal staffs had been

H

October 1917,

p.

3;

1-

Ha^(^n

,

2

Octo-
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the product of a joint collaboration between representa-

tives of the Departamento Nacional del Trabajo and La Fra-

ternidad.

The POP, which had yet to pass Judgment on

Nogues' reglamentacio'n, was not consulted in the matter by

Government officials and appears to have been deliberately

excluded by Torello.

The Minister of Public Works, con-

fident that the traction personnel would return to work if
the companies agreed to their basic demands, then approached
the railroad managers and requested that they make prepara-

tions for renewing partial service.

Once the engineers and

firemen returned to their jobs, the strike could be broken.

La Fraternidad had long been

an'

unwilling partner in

the series of strikes which had disrupted Argentina's rail-

roads since July.

San Sebastian and Balino were also dis-

pleased with the inopportune timing of the general railroad
strike, which they blamed on the indiscipline of the FOF,
for the companies were still in the midst of their slack

season.

Transportation of the cereal harvest did not begin

until mid-November.
The strike came at a bad moment and, because of this,
in snite of the unanimity and enthusiasm [of the
workers], the companies were able to resist and the
Government permit... the total paralysis of rail
^^La Razon,

3

October 1917,

p.

1-

.

131

traffic for many days.^^

Given the poor prospects for the r-trike's success. La Fraternidad, seeing the chance to realize its most important
demands, welcomed the concessions offered by the Government.

After nine days of strikinc, the solidarity of the

union movement appeared to be breaking
But the Government's concessions to La Fraternidad

had been made without the knowledge or approval of the companies.

Torello's clumsy attempts to browbeat the managers

into granting labor's demands and to renew the running of

trains had failed miserably.

Tlie

companies realized that

their rejection of Torello's initiatives would probably

prolong

tlie

strike, but they chose to take the risk.

Be-

yond the actual destruction of property, the financial
losses accruing to the railroads because of the strike were

considered acceptable by the managers, especially when the
costs of the reglamentaci6n were taken into account.
over,

More-

the companies seldom operated at a profit during the

off-season and several of the smaller lines sustained net
losses.

Until the crops were harvested the companies could

resist the demands of both the strikei's and the Government.^"^

^^Chiti, La PrjitGiinidB.6y p. 325.

^^See La Razo'n,

3

October 1917,

"

p.

3-

132

Had Torello succeeded in Imposing a labor
regulation

on the companies, it was reported that Yrigoyen
stood

ready to affix his signature to the necessary Executive
decree.

V/ith the

resounding lack of success of his Minis-

ter of Public Works Yrigoyen had no choice but to wait for
a more favorable turn of events before chancing his repu-

tation.^^
^^^o^ vigorously attacked the obvious partiality
of the Government's railroad labor policy and noted that

the reglamentacion del trabajo had been drawn up without

either the necessary collaboration of the companies or the
expert advice of Pablo Nogues.

Furthermore,

given the official criterion of hearing one side
it is not easy to gain the bank of the river, and,
if the harm done to the public has not been enough,
it is now possible that things will get worse....
This paper cannot be suspected of taking the
side of the companies....
But capital has legitimate rights also.
V/e believe that the rights of
the companies, as well as those of the workers,
ought to be attended to at once for the good of
the country. 53

—

The main thrust of official policy, then, centered
on the implementation of labor regulations coupled with

attempts to restore service.

At the same time, however,

Torello, understanding that the Government probably would
have to grant some concessions to the companies to win
^^La Razon
^^Ibid.

,

5

,

3

October 1917,

October 1917,

p.

p.
3-

1.

.
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their co-operation, quietly explored the possibilities
of

allowing the railroads to raise their rates.

Tariff nego-

tiations over a planned increase of 22% had been in progress between the National Railroad Board and the legal

representatives since July, but had been interrupted by
the outbreak of the strike on 2^ September

.

Apprised of

the companies' need for additional revenue to meet the

war-induced inflation of fuel and material costs, Torello
determined to use the issue of higher rates as a bargaining point with railroad management

Preparatory to raising the issue with the companies,
the Minister of Public Works talked with the country's

most influential commercial and industrial interests.

He

emphasized that if they were intent on ending the strike

then they should be favorably disposed to

a

"rational in-

crease" in freight rates for the transportation of their

products and produce.

The additional income accruing to

the companies, Torello noted, would cover in part the

greater costs which the railroads would have to absorb as
a result of higher wage and salary payments.

manager, when approached by

a La

One railroad

Razon reporter on the

^^See above, pp. 51-59 for a detailed account.
^^See Nogu^s to Torello, 12 August 1918, AMT/MOP/DG,
Expediente 0217^l6-D-19l8 and the Legal Representatives to
Nogue's, 10 April 1918, AMT/MOP/DG, Expediente 07939-E-916.
,

13^

subject of tariffs, said that "with an increase of 22% in
the rates the companies would resolve to improve salaries
by 10;2."

But more than that, he cautioned, "was out of

the question."

The qualified but favorable response of

the railroads to the question of wage increases must have

heartened the Radical Government.

The demands of labor,

however, encompassed far more than higher wages, and, until
the workers and management reached accord over working con-

ditions, the prospects of ending the conflict were poor.
The railroad strike was thirteen days old on

6

Octo-

ber, and in the opinion of La Prens a was no closer to being

settled than on the first

Every major officially-

day.-^'

inspired initiative to end the dispute had aborted.

Yet

it was clear to the Government that it had to find a way

to get the trains running again.

Some 4,700 cars loaded

with freight clogged railroad yards.
supply in the Federal Capital.

Food was in short

Ominously, the daily re-

ports furnished to Torello by the Direccion General de

Ferrocarrlles had begun to take on an alarming tone as they

recorded an increase in the frequency and violence of inThe most serious

cidents involving v;orkers and soldiers.

encounter occurred at the Taff Viejo workshops of the
Razon,
^"^La

Prensa,

October 1917,

3

6

October 1917,

p.

p.

1;
8.

5

October 1917,

p.

1
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State-owned Railroads in Tucuman.

Troops, who were trying

to prevent strikers from setting fire to freight
cars and

ripping up tracks, were suddenly attacked by the frustrated
and incensed mob.

In the bloody confrontation that ensued

two workers were shot and killed and an undertermined

number wounded. ^8
Commercial interests, earlier rebuffed by Yrigoyen,

approached the Chief Executive again on the morning of the
6th and insisted that the Government take the measures

necessary to end the strike.

Joaqufn Anchorena, president

of the Sociedad Rural Argentina, met separately with Torello

and impressed upon the Minister of Public Works "the great

damage being done to the nation's cattle industry."
Sociedad'

s

The

leader asked that rail traffic be resumed, "with-

out losing a minute."

Responding to the pressure of circumstances, Yrigoyen,
late in the evening of the 6th, summoned his cabinet ministers to the Casa Rosada to discuss the Government's role

According to La Epoca

in the crisis.

with Yrigoyen'

s

,

the ministers agreed

assertion that the restoration of railroad

service was imperative.

On the 7th Yrigoyen, "deeming the

general well-being of the country to be more important than

,

6

October

Prensa,

6

October

^^La Epoca 5 October 1917, p. 2; La Prensa
1917, p.~H; La Razon 6 October 1917, p.~^.
,

,

^^La Epoca ,
1917, p.~^.

6

October 1917,

p.

1;
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the partlculcir interests of labor and capital",
announced

that a provisional time-table of railroad service
would be

established as soon as possible and "under the protection
of the State."

He indicated that the action should not

affect the relative positions of the strikers or the companies; it was a step taken to satisfy "the most urgent
needs of the national economy.

"^'^

Once ordered by the Government to get the trains
moving, the companies had no choice but to comply or face
legal action and heavy fines.

Before partial service could

be restored, however, the lines had to be inspected for

damage by running exploratory trains over the rails,

which promised to consume several days.

action to the news was mixed.
ing,

a task

The strikers' re-

While the majority did noth-

some complained to the Government that the decision

to run the trains hurt their cause.

Others resorted to

violence and scattered instances of destruction of company
property were reported by investigators

General de Ferrocarriles
A

of.

the Direccion

.

second phase of the Government's plan to renew rail

service involved the granting of some concessions to the
strikers.

On the morning of the 8th Torello called the

^^La Epoca
p.

,

editorial,

7

October 1917,

3.

61

La Epoca,

8

October 1917,

p.

^

P-

1;

article,
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Mixed Strike Committee to his office and informed its members that President Yrip;oyen was in the process of drafting
an Executive decree approvinc a revised reclamentacidn for

traffic personnel, i.e., those men involved directly In the

movement of trains.

All other grievances, the Minister of

Public Works noted, would be submitted to arbitration.^'^
If Torello's announcement was intended to shatter

the shaky solidarity of the strike, it succeeded.

Andre's

Solanot, a member of the Federal Council of the FOP as well
as one of its representatives on the Mixed Strike Committee,

rightly claimed that the proposed labor rer^ulation favored
the enf.incers and firemen.

He angrily informed Torello that

neither La Fraternidad nor the Telegraphists had the right
to speak for the majority of the strikers, implying that the

FOF had been frozen out of the negotiations over the labor

regulations.

As the FOF could claim the allegiance of

80,000 men, Solanot reasoned that any decision affecting
the outcome of the strike had to reflect the will of the

Federacion.

Torello reportedly took issue with Solanot, as

did the Fraternidad members of the strike committee.
in a majoi'lty vote, the committee repudiated Solanot

Later,
'3

com-

promising comments and demanded that the Federal Council
10 November 1917,
^^See La Fraternidad, Circular
in Chiti, La Fraternidjad p. 3?0; La Ration, B October 1917,
For the 'comple'te text of the reglamentacion see La
p. 1.
Epoca, 8 October 1917,. pp. 1-?.
,

"

,
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of the POP disavow his actions and "replace
this traitor
to the movomont

.

La Epoca, mirrorine the fresh optimism of the
Govern-

ment, confidently predicted that the end of the
strike was

near and hailed the now rcculation of labor for railwaymen.

On the 8th, La R azon reporters interviewed "in-

fluential members of the unions" who said

tliat

even thounh

they did not know the exact contents of the reelamentacion

"they believed that it would be a basis for settlement

which possibly could be definitive, if the companies accepted the suppression of piece-work and granted an equitable increase in wages."

The Government's air of hope-

fulness was to be short-lived, however, for once the

strikers were advised as to the limited scope of the new

regulation they took matters into their own hands and refused to accept the Government's solution.

The breakdown

in union discipline was reminiscent of the course of events

during the Central Argentine strike.
It seems probable that the men had seen or at least

^^La Praternidad, Circular
Chiti, La Praternidad, p. 3?8.

Epoc a, editorial,
ber 1917, pp. 1-2; see also
^^^'ha

7

9

f/GH,

10 November 1917,

October 1917, p.
October 1917, p.

1;
1.

8

In

Octo-

^^La Razon, 8 October 1917, p. 1. Tlio union leaders
interviewed were probably associated with La Praternidad
or the Telegraphists.
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heard about the reglamentacio'n which had been printed
in
La Epoca.
A quick reading of Article 2, which -in
effect
denied the eight-hour day to rallwaymen, including
traffic
personnel, together with other objectionable provisions,

infuriated many of the strikers who thereupon went on a
rampage.

On the lines of the Great Southern the home of

the traffic manager was singled out by the mob and set

ablaze, a signal cabin was burned and six coaches were
gutted.

The Pacific Railway also reported extensive dam-

age to rolling stock and track.

Early the next morning the FOP rejected the labor
regulation, noting that it was too vague and would lead to

further difficulties between labor and management.

More-

over, the Federacio'n made it very clear that it was not

willing to rescind any of its demands.^'''

The companies,

too, refused to accept the reglamentacion because they felt

that it obliged them "to dictate new internal dispositions"

which violated their contract laws.

But the managers in-

formed the Government that they were still v;illing to renew
the circulation of trains V7ith men

v;ho

were content with

the old working regulations as long as the authorities pro-

vided sufficient protection for the property and those men
^^La Epoca
October 1917, p.
^''^La

,

Razon,

8

October 1917, PP. 1-2; La Ra^cn,

1.
9

October 1917,

P-

1-

9

1^0

who chose to work.^^

La Fraternidad, stepplnc cautiously,

asked Torello for a "legal copy" of the reglamentacl^n
del
trabajo and Implied that "certain clarifications"
were
needed.

Later, after both the FOF and the companies had

rejected the Government proposal, the union of the
footplate
staff also refused to endorse the revised labor regulations.
In the opinion of La Fraternidad the project

v^as

too limited

in scope and at times seemed to favor the companies.

The Radical Government, worried by the repeated failure of its railroad policy, responded quickly to the rejec-

tion of the latest reglamentacion by both the unions and
the companies.

On the 10th Yrlgoyen announced that he was

preparing an important new decree relative to working conditions on the railroads.

That afternoon he met with his

cabinet ministers to discuss the crisis and then arranged
to speak personally with company representatives and union

officials. 70

Working with unusual celerity, Yrigoyen de-

manded that railroad management furnish him with

a

list of

improvements which they were prepared to grant to the workers.

These, he told the company representatives, would

serve as the basis of new negotiations under official
68

*

La Razon ,

9

October 1917,

p.

1.

^^La Razo^n, 9 October 1917, p. ^; L£ EpjDca, 10 Octo
ber 1917, p. 1; La Prensa 10 October, p. 9.
,

"^^La

Razon,

10 October 1917, p.

1.

1^1

auspices.

The railroads replied in a carefully worded

statement informing the President that they would
"grant
all improvements within their economic capacity",
implying
that greater concessions could be made if the
Government

agreed to higher tarif fs

.

La Praternidad leaders also met with Yrigoyen on the

10th and, while not advised of the precise contents of the

Chief Executive's forthcoming decree, were assured that
"certain modifications" had been made in their favor.
f^azo'n

La

reported that the workers were "confident of victory"

and that the end of the strike was close.

'''^

Apparently,

Yrigoyen chose not to speak with the leaders of the Federacion, thus driving a wider wedge between the two railroad

unions.

An atmosphere of guarded optimism filled the Casa

Rosada on 11 October, the seventeenth day of the strike.
Despite continued acts of violence by some strikers, most
companies were running inspection trains over their lines
and a few trains carrying milk had arrived in Buenos Aires.

Two railroads, the Central Cordoba and the Companla General,

had gone so far as to establish provisional service.

More

significantly, Yrigoyen had taken it upon him.self to end

'^'"La

Razon, 10 October 1917, pp.

"^^Ibid.

,

11 October 1917,

p.

3-

1,

3.

.

1^2

the strike and issued his promised decree with respect to
the regulation of working conditions on the country's rail-

roads.

Yrigoyen emphasized that the decree was

a

temporary

measure to insure the circulation of passenger and freight
trains while making certain concessions to labor.

Yrigoyen'

s

In

estimation the promulgation of a reglamentacion

del trabajo was a prerequisite to ending the strike.

He

wanted no repetition of the great railroad strike of 1912
with its inestimable damage to the nation's economy.

The

President Justified his intercession in the conflict under
the provisions of the General Railroad Law (2873) which

empowered the Executive to dictate regulations over working
conditions.

The companies, by law, were bound to observe

such regulations

7^

The first of the twenty-one articles constituting the

decree ordered the establishment of an eight-hour work day
and a forty-eight hour work week for railv;ay personnel.

Article

2,

however, listed some important exceptions to the

eight-hour day, indicating that the companies had scored
some telling points with the Government.

Traffic personnel,

Prensa 11 October 1917,
rial, 13"0ctober 1917, p. 1.

La Epoca

'''^La.

,

p.

8;

,

edito

"^^Executive decree of 11 October 1917, in Republica
Argentina, Ministerlo de Obras PublicaSi Trabajo del
Disposiciones
Pers o nal de las Empresas Ferrovi arias
Reglamentarias (Buenos Aires: 1920), p. 11.
:

1^3

freight chiefs and their subordinates and ticket sellers
could be required to work

a

twelve-hour day.

Men actually

manning the trains were called upon to work an eight, nine
or ten-hour day, depending on the type of train they ser-

viced, i.e., passenger or freight or a mixture of the two.
At stations with little traffic no limitation was set as
to the number of hours to be worked.

The remaining arti-

cles covered a wide range of subjects, including days of

rest, sick pay, military service provisions, annual leave

of absence, and pay for overtime.'''^
La Prensa , which had consistently urged arbitration
of the dispute, immediately assailed the decree and asserted

that in spite of the pressing need to end the paralysis of

railroad traffic, the decree was illegal and unfair to the
companies.
ear open

"The Executive Power has acted with only one

— to

the side of the strikers."

Criticizing what

it termed "pure improvisation," La Prensa added that Yri-

goyen's action also tied the hands of Congress which was
the only body constitutionally empowered to treat the

question of labor regulations.

Far from ending the dispute,

the paper asserted that the decree "threatens to renew the
conflict."'''^
^^

pp.

Trabajo del

P ersonal de

Ian Em presas Ferroviarias

12-l'G~.

"^^La

Prensa,

11 October 1917,

p.

5-

Jos^ Arcc,

,

<

Labor's response to Yrif.oyen's decree was not entliu-

siastic and Torello felt the need to meet with

tiic

Mixed

Strike Committee in two lengthy sessions on 12 October in
an effort to win union approval for the Government's policy.

When approached by La Razon after the second meetlnc, the

Minister of Public Works was circumspect in his comments
and admitted on]y that the strike committee "had virtually

accepted" the presidential decree and

tliat

the on]y ques-

tions still unresolved pertained to salary increases and
the abolition of piece-work.

But the Mixed Strike Commit-

tee no longer represented the interests of the FOF, for

after Solanot's censure the Federaclon had resolved to

abstain from further participation in the committee's
activities.

^'^

Indeed, while Torello was conversing with La Frater-

nldad and the Telegraphists, the FOF jssucd a manifesto

demanding that the companies accei)t their first list of
demands by 6:00 that evening.

This display of irrespon-

sible intransigence was not welcomed by the truncated Mixed

Strike Committee or Torello, because It threatened to

Chairman of the Committee on Railroad Legislation of the
Chamber of Deputies, had stated on 27 September that the
initiative with respect to a labor regulation lay with
Congress and not with the Executive. Diputados, Seslones,
1917, VI,
''''La

3^32.

Razon,

12 October 1917,

p.

1-

.
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Jeopardize the delicate negotiations in progress.

To fur-

ther embroil the issue, Bautista V. Mansilla, the
General

Secretary of the Federacion, now pressed the railroads to
pay the workers for strike days.

In conjunction with the

FOF action the anarco-syndicalis t Federacion Obrera MarftJma

declared its solidarity and called upon its men to down
their tools at 1:00.'7 8

Mansilla, fully aware that a settle-

ment was being negotiated without the participation of his
union, was evidently making a desperate gamble to disrupt
the Government's settlement and, perhaps, force the authori-

ties to submit to the wiil of the l''ederaci<$n

Ignoring the violent manifestations of the Federacion,
La Epoc a stated editorially that "without resorting to ex-

cessive optimism" the termination of the railroad strike
"may be announced on the basis of the acceptance of the pro-

visional reglamentacion del trabajo ferroviario proposed by
the President."

E^oth

sides had accepted the Government's

settlement "in principle" and restored rail service was

announced for the iHh.

The semi-official organ admitted

that the railroad directors were correct in insisting that

their increasing exploitation costs precluded any meaningful wage increases.

But,

the paper pointed out,

manded more money for its men.
''^La

Razon,

labor de-

Consequently, the Government

1? October 1917,

PP-

3,

•

146

had resolved to authorize wage hikes for all railwaymen
who earned less than

$

100 m/n per aonth and agreed that

the companies would be able to recoup the additional ex-

penditure by correlative tariff increases!

With the ac-

ceptance of the labor regulation La Epoca was certain that
"the lion's share of the discord between the companies and

workers had been removed.

7Q
"'-^

To impress upon both labor

and management his firm intent to end the strike, Yrigoyen

issued another decree on 13 October which set a ^8-hour

deadline for

.the

resumption of public service.

In connection with the decree of 11 October, the le-

gal representatives sent a note to Torello on the 13th

which summarized the concessions considered acceptable by
the local boards of the railroads.

Briefly stated, the

companies were v;illing:
[To accept] a pension law in the form of a
contract and a fund individualized for the personnel
of each company....
To grant an additional 10 per cent of the total
2.
amount of salaries up to $300 m/n... [to be proportionally distributed so that] the increase shall
apply to a greater extent on the smallest salaries.
To suppress the system of fines.
3«
5.
To reinstate in their old positions the strikers
of the year 1912 ....
1,

•

La Epoca , editorial, 13 October 1917, p. 1; see
also La Razdn, 15 October 1917, p. 3- The railroads were
authorized to raise their tariffs by 22^, the increase to
go into force on 20 November.

^^Por the text of the decree see Pepublica Argentina,
Boletin Oficlal, 1917 .(Buenos Aires: 1917), V, 3^9.

.

Ik?

[To take]... no reprisals of any kind againstp.
the v;orkers who have participated in the strike.
5.

To "give practical effect" to the concessions made and "to

meet the expenditure involved", the companies also informed

Torello that they would raise their tariffs as soon as the
Op

new costs had to be met.
In the same note the legal reprebontatives were care-

ful to tell the Government that their companies had not

accepted the Executive decree of 11 October per se.

Rather

without denying the authority which the State may
have to implant [working regulations]..., the companies expressly reserve their rights to object by
authorized legal procedures to those clauses which
involve violation of the guarantees accorded by the
Constitution and by their contract laws.°3
The Mixed Strike Committee, less the Federacion re-

presentatives, convened on the l^th and after lengthy discussion voted to accept the provisional labor regulation
and return to v/ork.

Torello'

s

Once aware of the committee's decision

attitude toward the unyielding FOP hardened and

he ordered the companies to substitute other workers for

those strikers affiliated with the Federacion.

The Minis-

ter of Public Works then conversed with Julio Moreno and
O

1

Railroad Managers to Torello, 13 October 1917,
AMT/MOP/DG, Expediente 017739-F-1917
^^Ibld.

^^Ibid.

1/|8

Tomas Zurueta, the Ministers of War and Navy respectively,
as to the measures necessary to enforce Yrigoyen's decree

of 13 October relative to the restoration of rail traffic.

According to reports emanating from the Casa Rosada, Yrigoyen was prepared to implement his policy "without considerations or tolerance."

At the President's insistence,

tough orders were drawn up for all military sectors of the
country providing for the protection of rolling stock,
O

h

tracks, works and stations.

President Yrigoyen, in part to justify his intolerant
and uncompromising policy toward those strikers who had

rejected the 11 October decree and in part to underscore
his decision to renew rail service, seized upon a bloody

incident to convey his feelings to the public.

An inspec-

tion train, manned by naval conscripts, had been derailed

deliberately on the 15th and injured seriously several of
the young personnel.

La Raz6n recorded that the accident

"provoked a sincere reaction in official circles".
yen,

nov^:

Yrigo-

"convinced" of the rectitude of his policy, no

longer would "permit the sacrifice of the Government's
soldiers or the destruction of private property by workers."
Trains, the authorities announced, would "be protected in
all respects by troops", and "anyone opposing their passage
^^La Razon, 15 October 1917, p.
October 1917, p. 1.

1;

La Kpoca ,

15

,

1^9

will be fired upon."

Weary of the deliberate obstruction-

ism of the POP, the Chief Executive "proposed to act with
firmness and promtitude so as not to appear to be Joking
about his decision to restore traffic. "^^

Attempting to fathom the reasons for the position
tenaciously maintained by the Pederacion, La Raz6n inter-

viewed the society's Secretary General, Mansilla.

Queried

as to why the presidential decree about labor regulations

had been rejected, Mansilla replied that "in spite of the

fanfare, the workers held the opinion that their hopes had

been defrauded."

The Pederaclon, according to Mansilla,

had approved of many of the provisions included in the
original reglamentacion that had been drafted by the De-

partamento Nacional del Trabajo.

But the President's deo

/-

cree was completely different and not acceptable.
The Secretary General was then asked about the dif-

ferences existing between the unions.

Surprisingly,, he

answered that "dissidence which affects the unity of the
movement ... does not exist at this moment."

But in the next

breath he noted that the problem was due to "the vacillating attitude of the Directing Committee [of La Fraternidad]
^^La Razon

October 1917,

p.

,

Epoca ,
15 October 1917, p. 1;
Pren sa, l6 October 1917, p.
1;

15
9.

The text of the interview may be found in La Hazon,
16 October 1917, p. 1.
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in whose judgment the strike should be
ended, the decrees

of the President honored and the concessions
of the com-

panies accepted."

The fiery Mansilla then accused La

Fraternidad of performing an about face, having
rejected
the reglamentacion of the 8th and accepting
Yrigoyen's

decree of the 11th, which was nothing more than a slightly

modified version of the previous regulation.

Mansilla

criticized the provisional settlement which had been

reached among the companies, the workers and the Government, noting that the wage increases "are really insigni-

ficant" and that the companies had reserved the right to

resist legally those portions of the decree they considered
Illegal.

Upset, he informed the La Razon reporter that the

strike would not end on the following day, that his men

were inspired by their "inviolable rights" and that the
FORA would call a general strike if the decree was enforced.

On that same day, the l6th, the Pederacion notified

Torello that they had broken relations with both La Fra-

ternidad and the Telegraphists, an act which officially

dissolved the Mixed Strike Committee.

San Sebastian, a

month later, wrote that:
This note in the hands of the Government was nothing
more than a weapon with which to kill the movement
and the organizations; it demonstrated the internal

^''^La

Razon, l6 October 1917, p.

1.
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division between the unions and had the Government
wished at this time to give the coud de grace to
the railroad organization the FOP would -have given
it the means to do so....
To be fair, the responsibility for the crumbling

solidarity of the railroad unions cannot be ascribed to

either the FOP or La Praternidad.

Theirs had been an un-

natural alliance from the beginning.

In organization and

method a broad ideological gulf had always separated the
moderate. Socialist-leaning La Praternidad from the militant, anarco-syndicalist POP.

Under the strain and ten-

sion of the strike, the tenuous bond had broken, abetted
by the Government which was able to exploit successfully

the differences.

Once the united union front had been

fragmented, the Radical administration was able to impose
Its own settlement.

The general railroad strike, which had persisted for

twenty-five days, ended with a bizarre twist.

On the after

noon of the 17th, a delegation of the FOP led by Mansilla
spoke with Yrigoyen and told him that "in homage to the

President" the union had resolved to return to work and to
accept the reglamentacio'n del trabajo.

This curious change

of heart was cryptically explained in La Razon as "owing to

new factors which as of last night removed those things
oo

La Praternidad, Circular
Chiti, La Praternidad p. 328.
,

//64,

10 November 1917,

in
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delaying a solution."

^

Quite possibly, one of the

"nev;

factors" was the utter failure of the FOF to intimidate
the Government.

During the evening of l6 October Torello

rejected the petition of the Pederacion demanding pay for
strike days for all workers and ordered the unions to return to their jobs.

The Chief Executive, according to the

Minister of Public Works, had "resolved to see full compliance" with his decree with regard to the restoration of
service.

Those men who did not report to work would be

replaced.
A second factor, which could not be overlooked by

the FOF leaders, was the strike weariness of the men.

Ac-

cording to La Fraternidad sources, the Mixed Strike Com-

mittee had been informed as early as 13 October that unity
was breaking in many FOF-af filiated sections.

A third

and possibly decisive consideration which could have accoun
ted for the Federacic^n'

s

reversal of policy

the factionalism rampant among its

leadership.

v/as

spasmodic actions and startling

Mansilla's act of "homage" may well have

signaled deep-seated disaffection among other more moderate
La Razon 17 October 1917, p. 1; ,see also La Enoca ,
17 October 1917, p. 1, Fernandez, La Union Ferroviaria
pp. 89-90.
,

,

90

La Razo'n, 17 October 1917, p.

^^La Fraternidad, Circular
Chiti, La Fraternidad, p. 328.

//G^J,

1-

10 November 1917,

in

.
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members of the Consejo Federal who were able to
impose
their will over that of the unruly General Secretary.
Trains ran throughout Argentina on l8 October but
there were no guarantees that labor would remain dormant.

The men expected that their labor was now regulated by
the Government decree of 11 October and awaited the
issuance

of a second decree to explain in detail the provisions of
the new labor code.

The explanatory decree was published

by the Government on 21 November.

The companies, however,

had accepted only that portion of the reglamentacion del

trabajo which in their opinion was constitutional.^-^

Frank

Foster, the General Manager of the Buenos Aires Western,

reported to London that:
regard to the very complicated set of regulations governing the services of railway servants...
we resolved to accept them in so far as affecting
the staff connected with the security and regularity
of the train running, but reserving our right to
impugn, by legally authorized channels, those clauses
which might be regarded as depriving us of the
guarantees granted by the Constitution of the country
V/ith

See Union Ferroviaria, Memoria y_ Balance de la
Comislon Directiva Presentados a la Primera Asamblea
General de DejLe^ados (Buenos Aires: 192^), p~.
See
belov/,

p.

iZTV"^

The companies' policy pertained to both the decree
of 11 October and the second decree which explained in
detail the provisions of the reglamentacic^n del trabajo.
For the text of the 21 November decree see La Reglame ntacion del Tr abaj o en las Empresas de Ferro c arriies de
Decretos oejL P.E.N, y Not as de
Jurisdi ccio'n~Nacional
20-^11
"las "Empresas TBuenos Aires: i917), PP
:

•

15^

and our contractual laws or concessions.^'^

Scarcely three weeks had passed after

the.

conclusion

of the general railroad strike when agitation, fomented by
the FOF, was again evident on many railways.

Prom Novem-

ber until the following May partial work stoppages became
so commonplace that the Review of the River Plate was

moved to observe that:

"A week without some kind. of a

strike in Argentina in these modern times, would be as

savourless as an egg without salt...."
case,

In virtually each

the railwaymen's unrest was traceable to their inter-

pretation of the reglamentacion del trabajo.

Lord St.

Davids, Chairman of the London Board of the Buenos Aires

and Pacific Railway, informed his company's stockholders
that
The men v/ent back, and we have ever since been faced
with disputes, local strikes, men leaving their engines outside stations after the expiry of a period
they considered just, and all the signs of disorganisation, lack of order and discipline 9°
.

in Buenos
Ayres V/estern Railway, Annual Report and Acco unts 1918
For a detailed criticism of the reglamentaci Jn by the companies see Railroad Managers to Torello, 7 November 1917,

^Report of Frank Foster,

28 August 1918,

,

.

AMT/MOP/DG, Expediente 017739-F-1917
95 RRP, XLIX (1 March 1918), p.

515.

^Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway, Proceedings, 1917

see also Central Co'rdoba Railway, ^r^qe_c6in£Sy 19J,8T Buenos
Ayres Great Southern Railway, Annual Report and Accounts ,
1918.

;
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During the last week of January I918,
the Federacio'n,
convinced that the Central Argentine
was ignoring the

Government's decree with regard to working
conditions,
called a strike against the company and
sought solidarity
from La Fraternidad.
San Sebastian, now completely alienated from the POP because of its "treachery"
during the
general rail strike, refused to support the
walkout.

In-

deed, he went so far as to tell one newspaper
that most

workers opposed the movement and that "the Government
should
act energetically as the strike menaced natural
resources."

Clearly, La Fraternidad was no longer interested in
the

strike as a vehicle to the realization of union demands and
in fact had opened negotiations with the Direccion General
de Perrocarriles over the possibilities of establishing

fixed wage scales for its men.

San Sebastian was not pre-

pared to risk the success of the talks by supporting the
rash pretensions of the

FOF.^'''

Even without the aid of the Fraternidad, the FOF was

determined to continue its agitation against the Central
Argentine and instigated partial movements on other lines
as well.

Q P>

Public opinion was outraged.

25 January I918, p.
February 1918), p. 389.

'La Razon,

98

1;

La R azon termed

RRP, XLIX (15

The other companies affected were the Central
Cordoba, Midland, Pacific and V/estern. RHP, XLIX (1 February 1918), p. 271.
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the strikes an "unrighteous adventure"
which promised to

benefit no -one, while La Prensa worried that
the new outbreaks would threaten the transportation of

the crops and

urged the Government to take preventive measures.

Even

the Italian Patriotic Associations in Buenos
Aires appealed
to railwaymen of Italian descent, urging them
to continue

working, because
to take part in such a conflict today is to ally
oneself with the enemy
To support the strike...
would interrupt the transport of cereals destined to
maintain in Europe the lives of the soldiers, of the
peoples who are fighting for liberty, and foremost
among them, our brothers in Italy...

On 11 February, the Federal Council of the Federacion

announced that it had informed the Minister of Public Works
of their willingness to arbitrate "the questions at issue."

Torello, speaking for the Government, agreed in principle
but expressly excluded all Federacion proposals which sought
to amplify the reglamentacion del trabajo or to extract

greater salary concessions from the companies.
Government the working regulations served
pose

j

a

To the

two-fold pur-

to improve the lot of the railwayman but at the same

time to channel the demands of labor.

^^La Razd'n,
February 1918, p.

8

February 1918, p.

The decrees of 11

3;

La Prensa ,

10

6.

^°°ln RRP, XLIX (15 February 1918), p. 391. The
groups involved were the Italian V/ar Committee, General
Delegation of the Italian Red Cross, Federation of the
Italian Societies, and the Chamber of Commerce and Arts.

.
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October and 21 November represented limits
beyond which
Yrlgoyen was unwilling to venture
The. POP

rejected the offer of the Minister of Public

Works and, on the 13th, demanded arbitration of
their own

"pliegos de reclamaciones

.

"

At the same time,

"with a de-

lightful inconsequence, born of Carnival", the Federacio'n

intimated to the Great Southern, the Pacific, the Western
and the Compania General that strikes would become effec-

tive on those lines at midnight unless their demands vis

K vis the Central Argentine and Cordoba Central were met.
The Government stood fast and countered the Pederacion's
threat with a decree issued that same evening which ordered
the striking employees of the Central Argentine and Cordoba

Central back to work within twenty-four hours and called
upon the companies to normalize all services within three
days.

In addition, a fifteen day period was established

within which the personnel of all companies were to present
to the Ministry of Public V/orks "their individual complaints

regarding non-compliance on the part of the companies" with
the decrees of 11 October and 21 November.

102

Confronted with the firm attitude of the Government,
'^^In RRP, XLIX (15 Pebruary 1918),
11 February 1918, p. 3; Ardigo interview.
"^^RRP, XLIX (15 Pebruary 19l8), pp.
also La Razd'n, 13 February 1918, p. 1.

p.

389;

389,

La Razon,

'^O?.

See
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the Federacion decided to cancel preparations
for a more

general strike and ordered its men on the Central
Argentine and Co'rdoba Central back to work. The
Review

of the

Mver

Plate felt that the FOP had backed down because
its

leaders

found themselves up against a combination of moral
and material influences which was bound to reduce
their efforts to fiasco at an early stage of the
game.
The moral influences we refer to were:
the
appeal to the patriotism of the Italians; the appeals
[by company managers] to the commonsense of the
railwaymen.
the general unwillingness of the
majority of the men to embark in an adventure of
doubtful success.
The chief material considerations
were the attitude of the engine men affiliated to
"La Fraternidad" and a realisation that the Government would afford adequate military protection 103
.

.

;

.

On 26 February, however, the FOF, which was becoming

ever more reckless as its position became untenable, called
a strike against the Pacific.

Perhaps Mansilla and the

other militant members of the Federal Council

— Carlos

Molina, Vicente de Todaro, Jose Somariva and Francisco

Garcfa

— were

planning to use the upcoming congressional

elections, scheduled for

3

March, as a lever to force con-

cessions from the Government.

maneuver miscarried.

If this was the case, the

Torello regarded the sudden and un-

expected strike as a

veritable act of treachery, seeing that it is
adopted at the moment v;hen the Ministry of Public
Works, through the intermediary of the General
^°^RRP, XLIX (1^ February 1918),

p.

391.

159

.

Railway Board, was occupied in the solution of
all the difficulties still subsisting between
the railwaymen and the Buenos Aires and Pacific
Railway Company.
That Company, moreover, had
just satisfied all the demands which had been
formulated to it in accordance with the already
established Regulations and the terms of the agreements already arrived at.
It is evident that
these meneurs intend to act without any scruple
whatever, and without respect for any engagements.
We have had enough of it, and now we are at the
end of our patience and indulgence.
The moment
has arrived to make this felt and the Government
will not hesitate to adopt any rigorous procedure
to repress these manifestations of bad faith. 10^'

Torello also said that troops had been placed at the disposal of the company and had orders "to act without undue
scruples and with all the rigor necessary."

If conditions

warranted, the Government was prepared "to apply the last

resource left to it, that of deportation.""*"^^
Yrigoyen, on

1

March, decreed that the Pacific re-

store its traffic to normal by midnight of the 2nd.

who did not report to their jobs were to be replaced

Men
"^^^
.

La Razon asked Mansilla about his reaction to the Govern-

ment decree.

He replied that:

We understand that the government is trying to
salvage its position in the face of the election
and v;ants to normalize traffic for tomorrov;
[3 iMarch]; but the policy adopted is contrary to

Interview in Le Courrie r de la Flsta, 2? February
1918, reprinted in RRI. XLIX (1 ["arch 1918), p. 515.
10"^

-^Ibid.,

106

p.

La Epoca,

517
1

March 1918, p.

1.

l6o

law [improcedente]--thls "manu milltari", and
official
terrorism is a menace to those who are defending
their
constituted rights. -L^'

But the union bowed to the Government's pressure
and re-

turned to work on election

day."'-^^

Calm returned to the railroads, and, for

month service was normal.

m.ore

than a

But on 17 April the Federal

Council of the POP challenged the number of hours cargo
guards were required to work on the Great Southern and im-

mediately announced a strike against the company.
action was taken against the Pacific

a

week later.

Similar
By the

first week of May, however, the movement had collapsed from

within.

Most of the men, wearied by the constant state of

unrest and frustrated by their lack of success, turned
against the leaders of the POP and gradually returned to

work without any modification of their working regulations."^^
Pollov/ing the strike's failure, the dissension within

the Pederal Council of the Pederacio'n, evident in the closing
'days

of the general rail strike, burst into the open.

Razon

,

2

March 1918,

p.

1.

'^^La Epoca

,

3

March 1918,

p.

1.

'^'''La

On

^^'^La Pren sa, editorials, 21 April 1918, p. ^; 25
April 191"8T p. 5; 7 May 1918, p. 9; La Epoca, 2 May 1918,
April 1918, p. 5; 1 May 1918, p. 5;
p. 1; The Times,
RRP, XLIX TI May 1918), p. 1071; Report of J. M. Eddy,

Septem.ber 19l8, in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway,
Annual Report and Accounts 1 9 1 8
3

,

5
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May a majority of the Council
expressed their disapproval
with the policy so disastrously
pursued by the intransigent wing of the union's leadership.
Mansilla and Juan
Giordano, the Pro-Secretary, offered
their resignations,

which "to their surprise and chagrin"
were accepted. The
Government further discredited Mansilla and
his henchmen
by ordering their arrest on charges of
"inciting
sedi-

tion",

"^l^

In place of Mansilla, the Council chose a
militant

Socialist, Alejandro Comolli as interim General
Secretary.
The new leader, together with other moderate union
officials, arranged a meeting with Yrigoyen on the 6th and
in-

formed the Chief Executive that the FOP had abandoned its

original demands against the Great Southern and Pacific

regarding maximum hours of work for the cargo guards and
asked only that all strikers, including those who had been
replaced, be reinstated.

Yrigoyen, anxious to aid the

moderate faction of the society, promised that if the rail-

waymen would desist from further agitation then he would
communicate the request to the companies with his support

."^^

XLIX (10 May I918), p. 1135; La Accion, 5
February 1927, p. 3. For details of the division within
the Federal Council of the FOF see Marotta, El movJjTiiejito
sindical argentin e, II, 216, n. 1. Quoted words from HHP".
'•^^RRP,

'"'••'La.

Epoca,

1918), p.* 1135.

6

May I9I8, p.

1;

RHP, XLIX (10 May
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The Chief Executive quickly Gummoned
Fernando D.
Guerrico and Santiago G. O'Parrell,
chairmen of the Great
Southern and Pacific respectively, to
the Casa Rosada and
endeavored to convince them to reinstate
all strikers.
Both Guerrico and O'Parrell wore
willing to take back most
of the men in question but refused to
readmit
some fifty

strikers whom the chairmen termed "anarchists
intent on

destruction."

Angry notes were exchanged between the

Government and the companies but the railroad management

remained firm in its position.

Both Guerrico and O'Parrell

claimed that the entire issue was one of the internal
discipline of the companies and that the Government had no
right to intervene.

They charged that if they acceded to

the Government's demands then the administration of the

companies would be taken out of their hands.

The London

directorates of all the British-owned railroads expressed
similar reservations and telegraphed their respective Buenos
Aires boards to second the position of the Great Southern
and the Pacif ic

"^-^^
.

Neither the companies nor the Government were willing
to compromise over the question and,

in the absence of fur-

ther manifestations from the severely weakened POP, the
TIP

La Epoca 6 May I918, p. 1; 7 May I9I8, p. 1; 9
May 1918, p. 1; La ^Jaci.OJ^, 20 May I918, p. 7; The Times
9 May 1918, p. 5.
Texts of the notes exchanged may bo"
found in La Epoca, 1^1 May 191 8, p. 1, and HRP, XLIX
May 1918), pp. "1289, 1291.
,
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issue quietly slipped from the public eye.

In effect,

however, the companies had carried their point, as
the most

dangerous agitators were not readmitted.

By mid-May, nearly

a year after the first outbursts had been
directed against

the companies by angry strikers, all railroads had
resumed

their normal schedules

"'"^^
.

The railroad strikes which had convulsed Argentina
left an indelible imprint on the Radical Government, the

companies and the railwaymen's unions.

Moreover, the move-

ments were to have far-reaching consequences which would be
felt in the country long after the men had resumed their
tasks.

In this respect, the strikes of 1917 and 1918 are

a watershed.

Yrigoyen's Radical Government, unlike previous administrations, had shovm that it was capable of making concessions, albeit under duress, which raised the standard
of living and bettered the working conditions of Argentina's

Working regulations had been decreed,

railwaymen.

v/ages

salaries increased, and a new pension scheme discussed.

and
But

even though rail ivorkers had reaped significant material

^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Repor t of
Conservative opinion in Argentina
I918
strongly favored the position taken by the companies. See
La Prensa, 15 May I918, p. 5; La Macion, 20 May I918, p. 7;
Estanislao S. Zeballos, "Gobierno Radical", Revista d_e
Letras , LX (June 1918), pp. 25^-257.
Derecho , Historia
Proceedinp;s

,

.
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benefits, the strike had shattered union solidarity
and
left both La Praternidad and the Federacio'n
financially

exhausted.

Admittedly, the solidarity pact between the

two associations had never been strong and it is
probable

that the unions would have parted ways if only because
of
the basic contradictions inherent in their alliance.

But

Yrigoyen, the "friend of the workman", had consciously

promoted the dissolution of the pact by playing on the
differences between the organizations or by favoring one

while ignoring the other.
As has been shown,

'''^^

the reglamentacio^'n del trabajo

ferroviario so loudly praised by Radicals also had a more
"sinister" side.

It conferred benefits to the railwaymen

but it was at the same time a means with which to control

their aspirations.
Government.

Further reform would come from the

Neither did the Government, radical in name

only, shrink from employing troops to quash the strikes

when they seemed to threaten revolution or disrupt con-

gressional elections.

Soldiers had been ordered to fire

on vrorkers on more than one occasion and, in one instance,

the authorities had considered the deportation of agitators.

Against this background the excesses of the semana

Justo, the leader of the Socialist Party,
attacked the Government's policy of dividing the railroad
unions in a speech delivered on I'l April 1918. Marotta,
El movimiento sindical argent 3 no, II, 2l6
"''^'juan B.
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traglca in 1919 seem less extraordinary.
Th.-

policy pursued by the Radical administration vis

a vis the companies during the strikes was
relatively con-

sistent with that prior to the upheavals.

Yrigoyen, who

had repeatedly challenged the "rights" claimed by the companies under Argentine law or their concessions, continued

assailing the railroad's "privileged" position throughout
the months of labor unrest.

The decrees of 11 October and

21 November had imposed a settlement on the companies which

railroad lawyers considered to be unconstitutional.

More-

over, the interests and rights of the companies were re-

spected by the Radical administration only when they hap-

pened to coincide with the best interests of the Government
The strikes were also a watershed for the companies.

Reacting sharply to the hostility of the Yrigoyen Government and to the alarming erosion of their rights, the London directorates became convinced of the need to work in

concert and co-ordinate their policies toward the Argentine

authorities.

The companies' unanimous support for the

Great Southern and the Pacific in their struggle with the

Government over the readmission of strikers was indicative
of the new spirit of co-operation and presaged the develop-

ment of joint committees in the 1920's.
Most affected by the strikes were the unions themselves.

After a year of negotiation, agitation and partial

and general strikes, the railwaymen

'

s

organizations, once

united, had fallen to mutual recrimination.

La Praterni-

dad had discarded the strike as a weapon
with the conclu-

sion of the general railroad strike and had
resolved to
settle its differences with both the companies
and the

Government over the bargaining table.

But the POP, under

the ruthless direction of Bautista V. Mansilla and
the in-

transigent wing of the Federal Council, continued to rely
on the strike for increasingly frivolous reasons and
nearly
dealt"

the Federacion a mortal blow.
It seemed at the time that the Government had won a

double victory.

Once the unions had been divided there

was little possibility of another general railroad strike.

Thus the authorities were able to act from a position of

strength and put down the partial movements which had
sprung up in I918.

In addition,

the repeated failures of

the POP-inspired walkouts after the conclusion of the gen-

eral strike had precipitated a crisis within the Federal

Council resulting in the ouster from the union of its most

disruptive elements.

With the departure of Mansilla, the

POP was captured by moderate elements led by the militant

Socialist Alejandro Comolli

.

Gradually, the Federacion

would be drawn into the sphere of the Socialist Party and,
with the moderate leadership firmly ensconced, the Pederacidn began to move tov/ard a rapprochement with La Prater-

16?

nidad, which was already Socialist in its
orientation.

In

this sense Radical strategy, which had sought
a temporary

advantage, paid a high political price in the long
run.

C}{
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FROM RANCOR TO RAPFROCHEMENT

.

I9I8-I920

have got difficulties before us,.., but I do believe
our worst days are over...."
Lord St, Davids, London
Chairman of the Pacific RailWay, 18 December I919,

•'We

—

The strain existing between the British-owned rail-

roads and the Radical Government of Hip6lito Yrigoyen

v/as

not eased by the termination of the railroad strikes in May
1918,

Indeed, even before the Government had resolved the

labor question, fresh problems appeared along with the per-

ennial ones to further bedevil the reciprocal relations between the Casa Rosada and the railroad directorates.

IVo

thorny issues, the damage done to company property by

workmen and the demand for new tariff increases, had their
roots in the strikes.
Given the violent and destructive nature of labor's

outburst, the railroads had incurred substantial property

losses,^

In May the general managers of all the companies

met in the offices of the Great Southern overlooking Flaza

Constituci5n and decided to seek restitution from the authorities for the damages suffered.

Each manager agreed

^Losses varied according to the intensity of the
While the Argentine north Eaststrikes on each railroad.
ern reported "very slight" property damage, the Great SouthFigures relative to strikeern claimed losses of £79.305.
caused property losses for all companies may be found in
-their Reports of Irocee dings for 1917 and I9I8.
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to prepare an estir.ate of replacement costs
for the rolling

stock that had been totally destroyed.

In the words of the

agreement, the calculations were to be "based upon
the original cost of the wagons," but a statement was to be
appended "explaining clearly that to replace the corresponding

Rolling-stock would, at the present time, involve an expenditure of at least an additional 100^."

Repairs to damaged

cars, buildings and other property were to be estimated

separately on the "basis of the value of the necessary materials" at "present market prices, together with the value
of the corresponding labor, ..."

2

As each company's accountants completed their computa-

tions, railroad attornies drafted statements of losses

which were then presented to the Government,

Attached to

the Western's claim was a note to the effect that "in most

countries riot damages to private property were made good

by the local authorities,"

3

The Government rejected the con-

tention and informed the company that there was no provision
in Argentine law for the payment of such claims.

Once

cognizant of their shaky legal position the V/estern, together

with the other companies, backed

dov/n,

but not before urging

Sleeting of 13 May 1918, minuted in ABAP/OMGiM, I9I8.
^Buenos Ayres V/estern Railway, Froceeding:s

^Ibid
inp:s.

,

1918,

;

,

1918

*

Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Pro ceo d-
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the Government to consider new legislation,

because if we are exposed to having our property destroyed by civil commotion without any recourse to the
Authorities, it is not at all likely that investors
will provide more money for the further necessary development of the country, 5
Tariff increases had always been a fountainhead of con-

tention between the companies and the Radical Government,
It v/ill be remembered that in October 1917»

a part of

the strike settlement reached among labor, the Government

and the companies, the railroads had agreed to better the

wages and salaries of their workmen by 10% and to modify
the working hours of their employees.

As partial compen-

sation, the Chief Executive authorized the companies to in-

crease their rates by

22fo,

with the oral understanding that

all additional costs incurred by the railroads as a result

of later regulatory decrees vis a vis the reglamentacion
del trabsjo ferroviario "should be met immediately by a
6

further addition to the tariffs,"
By March 1918 company managers were aware that the
Nocosts of implementing the decrees of 11 October and 21

vember demanded further rate adjustments.

Henry Bell, Lon-

remarked at the
don Chairman of the Buenos Aires Western,

^Bueros Ayres Great Southern Railway, Froceedin.p-senter
ottempteo to
/s a last resort, some companies
1Q18
working expenitrTke damages in their .mnual report under
Proceedings, 1218.
See Buenos Ayres Western Railway,
ses.
Repo.rt and
^Buenos Ayres and lacific Railway, Annual
1/^5-1^6.
See also above,
Accounts, 1917
.

171

1918 meeting of the company's stockliolders that the cost
of the extra staff hired to fulfill the new Government regu-

lations amounted to

£

6,000, double the amouiit the company

paid for the wage increases.

At the end of March the

legal representatives advised Pablo Kogu^s, the Director

General de Ferrocarriles

,

that with the exception of subur-

ban passenger traffic, the companies were going to raise

their tariffs by
tioned that the

lOJb
22:%

as of 1 May.

The railroad noted men-

increase in rates, wliich had taken

effect on 20 November, promised only enough new revenue to
8

cover the skyrocketing costs of fuel,
Nogu<5s

'

first reaction to the note was that the com-

panies were deliberately contravening the dispositions of
the Executive decree of 23 June I917 wliich required that

all tariff modifications be submitted to the General Rail-

road Board five months in advance of their effective date.

Acting swiftly,

tlie

Director General ordered the companies

to remove notices of the new tariffs from station bulletin

boards and to publish retractions in the newspapers.

No-

gu^s also informed the Buenos Aires boards that "the pre-

sent was an unpropitious moment" and that the existing
"^Buenos Ayres Western Railway,

}roceedings

,

I9I8,

^Nogu^s to Torello, 12 August I9I8, AMT/MOf/DG.
Expediente 0217^6- D-918.
^For more information on the decree of 23 June 1917,
see above, pp. 50-5^.

9
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tariffs "had not been long enough in force to prove that
they were not sufficient to cover increased expenditure."
The Director General closed his note to the railroads with

a request for data v/hich would show in detail the increased

costs resulting from the new labor regulations ."'"^
La Frensa

.

after studying the points of view of both

the Government and

companies, concluded that the nation's

"the

guidelines for tariff formulation were so crowded

witli

unccr

tainties that they precluded a quick solution to the problem.

An exhaustive and impartial study of the c^uestion by

the Direccion General de Ferrocarriles was seen by the con-

servative paper as the sine qua non for any decision as to

whether the railroads' request for higher rates was reasonable
The Reviev/ of the River Plate chose to support the posi

tion of

tlie

companies, commentingi

it has to be admitted that a regrettable and prejudicial conflict of views on fundamental aspects of railv/ay working and policy has become very acute v/ith the
announcement of the new increases in tariffs. An impartial and careful study of the facts' of the case
legal and economic produces upon us the conviction
that the companies are not only within their rights
in their attitude, but that the Directors would have
been neglecting the interests of their shareholders

—

to Torello, 12 August 19lB, AI/iT/MOP/DG, ExpeFor a synthesis of the notes ex02i7'-l'6-D-9l8.

No.^cu^s

diente
changed between Noru^s and theconpanies see the excerpts
from 'the June 1918" circular of the British Bank of South
America, in The Times 15 July 1918, p. 11.
,

l^La Irensa, editorials, 28 Liarch I9I8,
1918, p. 10.

p.

9j

3

April
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had they proceeded otherwise.

Confronted with the Governinent

12

refusal to sanction the

rate hikes, the general managers met on k April and unani-

mously decided to draft "an entirely new application formulated upon the rights accorded to the railways under the
Mitre Law." 13

The new note,

communicated to Nogu^s on 10

April, served a two-fold purpose.

On the one hand it an-

nounced that a 10^ increase in rates would be collected on
general cargo, cattle on the hoof, parcels, excess baggage

and passen^ger traffic, with the exception of suburban service, beginning on 15 September,

On the other hand the note

reflected the opinions of the railroad directors as to the
scope and nature of their companies' rights under Argentine
law.

In brief,

the railroads maintained that their announced

tariff increases were justified under the provisions of article 9 of Law 5315 which established that the Government

could not intervene in rate making unless the railroads had

realized a net profit of 6.8^ or more on their invested
capital for three consecutive years.

Perplexed and angered by Nogu^s

'

stance, the general

managers reminded him that the 10^ increase in rates which
they had announced on 2? March was predicated on a prior
^^RRP, XLIX

(5

April 1918), p. 821.

•^\iinutes of the meeting of ^ April I9I8,

ABAP/OMGM,

1918.

^^Legal Representatives to Nogu^s, 10 April I9I8,

Alv.T/

17^

agreement reached with Torelloi. "we understood that the

matter had been decided in the conference of 18 October
1917 with the Minister of Public Works, when the labor regu-

lations were being discussed."
to Nogu^s'

The managers then responded

charges that they had violated the decree of 23

June, asserting that "it was not our intention to provoke
a debate over the legality of the decree...."

Nevertheless

the company directors maintained that their attitude of non-

compliance with regard to the decree was "justified", in-

dicating that they still considered it illegal and not
binding,

Just as in 1917» the companies had decided to

cling tenaciously to

they held to be their right to
16
fix tariffs without official interference.
v/hat

The policy of the -director General de Ferrocarriles

had been carefully considered and represented a conscious

attempt to impose order on the chaos which typified Argentine railroad legislation.

In a remarkably candid memoran-

dum to Torello, Noguls outlined his views on tariff formula,

Consistency in applying the law, he believed, would

tion.

establish a precedent and serve as a guide in any future
tariff disputes.

Of particular concern to Nogu^s was the

MOf/DG, Expediente 07939-E-918.

^^Legal Representatives to Moguls, 10 April I9I8, AMT/
For further details of the
IvIOP/DG, Expediente 07939-S-918.
controversy over the decree of 23 June 1917. see above, pp,
50-52.
-^^The

56-59.

tariff dispute of 1917 is considered above, pp.

"
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companies' contention that the Government could not inter-

vene in rate making unless the railroads exceeded a certain
level of profits on their invested capital.

He -realized

that the railroads had to be given "just compensation" for
the huge investment they had effected in Argentina, but he

also insisted that "the liberty to establish tariffs is not
17
absolute
,

According to Nogu^s,

"one isolated article in law 5315

does not grant uncontrolled authority to create tariffs."

All rates, he stressed, had to be just and reasonable, as

established by article

h-k

of the General Railroad Law,

The

6»S% figure so often quoted by the com.panies, the Director
General explained, was the maximum profit allowed under

Argentine law and could not automatically be considered as
a just jmd reasonable return.

Rather, the economic situa-

tion of the country had to be the determining factor in the

formulation of the railroads' rates schedules,

Moreover,

"the railroads are a privileged industry and have to be

controlled."

18

Nogu^s, in urging stricter controls over their rate

making powers, was not implying that the railroads were
guilty of wrongdoing.

He absolutely discovinted the wild

accusations made by some commercial and industrial interests
•^'^Nogu^s to Torello,
diente 0217^6- r)-9l8.

18

.

Ibid.

12 August I9I8,

AL'T/lviOF/DG,

Expe-
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politicians to the effect that railroad
tariffs were
little more than extortion and that the
compaiiies concealed
their real profits by keeping tv/o sets of
books.
ajid

In terms

of the Mitre Law, Nogu^s argued, the

6.8f.

profits indirectly regulated tariffs.

ceiling on net

Aware, however,

that

some railroad critics were inalterably convinced
that the

capital accounts of the companies were laden with water,

Kogu^s assured Torello that the Argentine Government had

never agreed to the inclusion of ficticious sums in what
it considered to be the capitalization of the British-

owned lines,

,

In concluding his report,

ted that the Great Southern and

the Director General suggesV/e

stern railways be allowed

to raise their rates by 8^ on 15 September, because they

were the only two lines to supply his office with the re-

quested data as to increased labor costs arising from the

implementation of the reglamentaci6n del trabajo.

^^ogu^s

No in-

12 August I9I8,

AMT/MOI/DG, Expediente 0217^^6- D-918. For further elaboration of Nogu^s
position with regard to tariff formulation aj^d its relation to capital accounts, see his "Capital y tarifas en la
ley 5315," Bolet^n de Qbras Publicas XV (December I916),
Nogu6s vindicaSee also above, pp. 3^^-3<^.
pp. 25O-268,
tion of the companies v/as supported by Dante Ardigo, who
served in the statistical section of the Direcci6n General
Interview.
Manuel 1^, Castello, Director
from I92I-I936.
General from I928-I932, informed me that the Direcci6n alv/ays used its own criteria and guidelines to determine the
to Torello,

'

,

•

and in Scalabrini Ortiz, liistoria de lo£ ?err ocarrilc
Arp:entinoG
p. I9.
.
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creases for the other railroads were to be approved until
they furnished the necessary information, 20
Torello passed on Moguls' recommendations to Vicente
L6pez, the Frocurador del Tesoro, for his judgement,

Lopez,

in a closely reasoned report, expressed the opinion that no

Even thou^i two com-

tariff increased should be allowed.

panies had forwarded statistical data to the Direcci6n General, they still denied the Government's right to intervene
in fixing railroad tariffs.

As long as the companies per-

sisted in their attitude, Lopez counseled the Government to
21
In conformity

reject all applications for higher rates.

with this recommendation, Yrigoyen issued a decree on

6

September I9I8 which disallowed the increases announced by
22

the Buenos Aires directorates on 10 April.

The railroad

managers vip-orously protested the Executive's decision and
23

reaffirmed their "right" to set rates.

But the company

^^Nogu^s to Torello, 12 August I9I8, AIv1T/I.:0P/DG, ExpeThe other companies considered tne
diente 0217^6- D-918.
superaction of the Great Southern and the Western to be
See the minutes of the
fluous and not legally necessary.
Ami/
ordinary general manager's meeting of 2 July 1910,
omgm, 1918.
Torello, 28 August I918. AMT/MOP/DG, Expe^^L<5pez to
diente 0 217^6- D-918.

^^Decree of
ente

6
0217^1-6- rx-9l8.

September I9I8, in AMT/KOP/DG, Expedi-

Dir^^^
^^Railroad Managers to Ariodaijte^Giovacchini,
Sopcembei I910,
tor General do Ferrocarriles ad interim, 13
022427-E-918 attached to Expediente
Expediente
I'^A-5?AG.
021746-D-918.
,
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lawyers advised the managers that the decree, no matter how
onerous,

"was legally observable."

Reluctantly, the rail-

roads cancelled their plans to collect higher fares,

Argentina's Congress also manifested a keen, if indirect,

interest in railroad rates.

On 10 January I9I8 Nico-

las Repetto, a Socialist Deputy from the Federal Capital,

suggested that a commission be created to investigate rumors
that the millers in Buenos Aires were operating as a trust.

Other deputies concurred and amplified Repetto
dation.

's

recommen-

On l4 March a comiGi6n invest if?:3dora of five depu-

ties was constituted to probe into the business practices

of the millers and other industries, including flour, sugar,
wine, petroleum and meat.

The commission, once it had

initiated its investigations, also found it to be "of capital importance" to examine the nature of the relationship

between the country's railroads and the great industrial
and commercial establishments.

25

the railThe congressional investigators believed that

preferential tarroads, through the use of differential or
-,

monopoly.
iffs, could contribute to the creation of a

26

de los
^^ABAP/Actas de la Junta Consultiva de Abogados
Ferrocarriles, Acta 80, 11 September I9I8.

Camara do Dipu^^Diputados, Sesiones, I^IZ, V, 3785;
investi£adora de los trust s
comis'i6n
la
de
Informe
tados
In^M^.
SeUer;bi^l219 "(heFF^ft^ci ted as AsDiputados, ^^IB
pe^
(Buenos AiFi-s7l919 ) PP^ 3-9. 226.
^^//'^^
^enjar^In Bonif cxo,
commission consisted of three Radicals,
^'^^
S
Octaviano
and
Anguin
D.
Ireneo
J. A. T^ioreno.
B. Justo, and the Conservative,
a particular locality by
favors
tariff
differential
26a
1

,

,
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In support of their argument,

the legislators cited the

"classic example" provided by the Rockefeller oil trust in
the United States.

Rockefeller was able to form his monop-

oly "thanks to a contract by virtue of which the railroad
was obligated to trsmsport his products for a lower rate"
than those of his competitors.

Although the commission did

not contend that the British-owned railroads in Argentina
approached this "monstrous" extreme, they agreed that the
companies could favor a particular business or locality to
the detriment of others.

27

From 28 June to 25 July 1918, the commission, chaired
by Juan

Justo, questioned individually six railroad of-

B,

ficials as well as the Director General de Ferrocarriles
.

Fablo Nogues,

28

V/ith the sole

exception of Harry Usher,

"who disliked speaking from memory,

"

the company officers

co-operated freely with the commission members.
tigators

v/ere

of Henry

G,

especially taken

v/ith the fraxik

The inves-

declarations

Cabrett, the General Manager of the Central

charging it lov/er rates thaji another district for the transIt
portation of the same product over the same distance.
might also be one which assessed one rate from the interior
to the coast and another, usually higher rate in the oppoPreferential tariffs were those which fasite direction.
vored specific compajiies,
^'^Diputados,

Inf orme

,

p.

226,

^^The railroad officials were Alejandro L^rtora, Fresi.
dent of the V/estern's local board, Atanasio Iturbe, Legal
Representative for the Central Argentine, Henry G, Cabrett,
General Manager of the Central Cordoba, Piarry Usher, General
Manager of the Pacific, Justo Lavandera, Chief of the Tariff
i
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C5rdoba,

"v/ho

not only announced the existence of the sugar

and lime trusts, but also revealed the /tariff/ formula of
the railroad monopoly

j

All the traffic will bear."

During

the course of their testimony, the railroadmen admitted

that differential rates for meat, wheat flour, fruits and

wine destined for exportation had been collected for years.

Similar foodstuffs intended for domestic consumption in-

variably were charged higher tariffs. 29
After weighing the information which they had gathered,
the commission tentatively concluded that
1,

The formation and development of the trusts are
favored by the railroad companies, v/ith their spe-

cial tariffs,
2, This preference is contrary to the social peace
and the economic v/ell-being of the country,
3» The especially low rates for foodstuffs destined
for export are one evident cause of the high cost
of living in our country,
4, An equitable and economic system of tariffs ought
to be im.posed on the companies v/hich would remove
all speculation and would serve the permanent interests of the nation, 30

Damian F, Garat, a Progressive Democrat who had joined
the coraisi6n on 5 September 1918, disagreed with the find31
While it was "well to accept the
ings of his colleagues.

Section of the Pacific, and Julio Labarthe, Chief of the
mercial Department of the Great Southern.
^^Diputados, In forme
^^ Ibid

,.

pp.

,

pp.

Com.

226^250.

255-256.

opinions were seconded by two other members
of the comision, L^arcial V. Quiroga and Octaviajio S, Vera.
Both were Radicals,
-^"^Garat's
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general terms of the conclusions reached by the Comisi6n,"
Garat argued

tliat

"the pronouncement of absolute and defin-

itive judfrements with respect to questions so complicated

and transcendental is a little adventurous,"
he observed,

Certainly,

in some instances the railroads had created

special tariffs which favored' the formation and development
of trusts.

But all special rates could not be condemned on

these groLinds,

Some had been designed to encourage the

growth of industry and agriculture while the adoption of
others was necessary so the railroads could better meet the

competition of river traffic.

32

Neither was Garat convinced that the companies had
knov/ingly contributed to the creation of monopolies, because

such associations often had the adverse effect of cutting

revenue by diminishing rail traffic,

"Can it be conceived

that a transportation company would contribute to the for-

mation of

a

trust to diminish its income?"

Garat conclu-

ded his report by asserting thati
The formation and development of the trusts has been
favored in determined cases by the special tariffs
of the railroad coinpc'nies, but it cannot be affirmed
that such tariffs were created with this single end
in mind,
2, All preference which does not correspond to t)ie ends
of fomenting production and the growth of industry
attacks the roots of the national economy and should
not be permitted,
3, The especially low rates for foodstuffs destined
for export evidently contribute to the maintenance

1,

of inequitable prices

^^Diputados, In form e

,

p,

^n

256,

Argentina/,
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^.

An equitable and economic system of tariffs ought
to be imposed on the companies which would remove
all speculation and would ser-ve the permanent interests of the nation. 33

The commission's final summation on the involvement of

the railroads in the creation of trusts tended to shift the

responsibility for inequitable tariffs from the compajiies
to the framers of the General Railroad Law of I89I.

The

investigators noted that the railroads had been built with
an eye to profits and that they were controlled by men who

served their own interests.

Consequently, the railroads as

a rule inclined to prefer and favor the volum.e shippers at
the expense of smaller dealers,

"thus powerfully contribu-

ting to the formation and strength of the trusts,"

But the

commission also realized that in most cases there was nothing illegal about the railroad rates.

Article ^9 of the

General Railroad Law provided the authority for the railroads to reduce their tariffs for those consignors who
could guarantee cargo shipments of a specified minimum numIn the opinion of the commission,

ber of tons.

the article

3i|.

"openly favored the trusts."
In spite of their antipathy towards all special tar-

iffs, the congressional probers recognized the financial and

practical advantages of lower rates for volum.e shipments.
They were cheaper for the companies and allowed the rail^^Diputados,

In forme

^^Ibid.

271-272.

,

pp.

,

pp.

257-258.
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roadn to make better use of their rolling stock.

But the

comisi6n frowned on the use of differential tariffs and de-

manded equr.l rates for all shippers who were the same distance away from the ports.

commission rephrased article

To f;uard against abuses,

the

of the General Railroad Law

and urged the CSmara de Diputados to accord serious consi-

deration to the new version.

Under the revised article, all

special tariffs would be required to have the prior appro-

val of the Chief Executive and the railroads would be prohibited from arrnnging special rates with specific companies,

i'urthermore

,

the companies would be forbidden to col-

lect higher tariffs for service in one direction than in
the other or to assess dif i'erenticil rates according to the

ultimate destination of the cargo.

35

Unquestionably, the tariff policies practiced by the

railroads were open to a measure of justified criticism.
Some rates, especially those on passenger service, were high

while others were of a preferential or differential nature.

Many were confusing to the public.

Hundreds of special

tariffs had been authorized by the Direccion General during
the war years to

"alleviate emergency situations."

Because

such rates were often of short and irregular duration and
were frequently modified, annuled, replaced or combined
The revised article
35Diputados, In forme p. 274.
In "1920 it was unsuccessfully intronever became law.
See Diputados, Seduced in Congress by the Socialists.
Eiones, 1920 Ill, 584-5G6.
,

.

184

with others, La Epoca claimed that shippers often "had
no
idea" which special tariff corresponded to their
particular
situation,
But,

"^^

in general terms, were the rates reasonable?

Did

the formula "all the traffic will bear" constitute a menace
to the Argentine economy?

According to Dante Ardigo, the

chief statistician in the Direccion General during Alvear's
administration,

"the only fair measure of tariffs is whether

or not they are harmful to the economy of the country,"
The companies had developed their tariff systems with defi-

nite objectives— "to extend their lines and to stimulate all

traffics," including such unremunerative cargos as construction materials.

Moreover, the use of parabolic tariffs,

which encouraged long distance hauls by offering attractive
rates, had generated an interest among landowners in devel-

oping agriculture in previously marginal zones and encouraged
the creation of new extractive industries in locations far

from the coast,

"thus contributing to the harmonious devel-

opment of the country,

37

^

Ardigo interview; La Epoca 12 October 1922, p. 50.
More thaji 600 special tariffs had been approved in 191?
In one representative case, the Iviunicipal Intendant
alone.
of Buenos Aires, through Torello, pressured the companies
to help ease the inflated cost of food in the city by reIn such "emergency situducing their rates for vefretables.
ations" the railroads usually complied. A! iT/MO i-/DG Circular
'^'he quoted words are from La Epoca
No. 33, 6 July 1917.
.

,

.

Dante Ardigo, "Los f errocarriles y la economfa argenInfenieria ano XLIX, No.
tina en el perlodo 1895-1945,"
851 (September 19^+5), P. 730.
-^"^

M

,
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Another indicator of fair railroad rates is
the margin
of profit shown by the cojnpanies.
Oliver Ramoni, a former
chief statistician with the Central Argentine,
naturally

remarked that "the railroads were efficiently run
and certainly no great profits were realized.
This, is one
sure

sign of fair tariffs."

38

Santiago

G.

O'Farrell, Chairman

of the local board of the Pacific, bemoaned the fact that
"the net average return obtained by the British railway
compajiies during the last five years /l9l4-19l87 figures at
a.

meagre

3. 50

per cent.'"

Reflecting his view of the Yri-

goyen Government's tariff policy, O'Farrell also complained
that!

"No one pauses to consider the crude injustice of

obliging railv/ay companies to serve all the other thriving
industries of the country at a starvation remuneration'.'-^^
Ardigo, in 1970 and speaking as a former Government employee

maintained thati "The profits which the railroads were earning were not high.

Indeed,

they v/ere a factor for progress,

^^Ramoni interview.
39
-^^Santiago G. O'Farrell, "Railways in Argentina," RRF,
LI (Special Peace Number, 28 February 1919 ), lacks pagination,

ko

Ardigo interviev/.
For a concurring view see Manuel
F, Castello, "Vias de Comunicacion
El concepto de justicia y razonabilidad de las Tarifas, en las Leyes Ferroviarias de la Nacion; Derecho de intervencion del Estado en
la fijaci6n de las Tarifas," La Ingenier3!a, ano XX'v^II, no.
For a pro-company interpretation
567 (January 1922), p. I9.
of railroad profits in the nineteenth century see Colin
Lewis, "Problems of Railway Development in Argentina, 1857I89O," Inter- American Economic Affairs XXII (Autumn I968),
1

,

p.

73.

.'

'

•
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Because Argentina's economy was export-oriented, it

was logical that the drafters of the I891 General Railroad

Law sought to facilitate the movement of goods from the in-

terior provinces to the ports.
moni's words,

Railroad tariffs, in Ra-

"were designed to promote the exportation of

bulk goods, especially cereals.

This was based on very

high turnover— the crops were taken to port as quickly as
possible and the wagons returned for reuse."
the volume shippers were preferred by
the Government,

t)ie

Naturally,

companies and by

Finally, it must not be overlooked that

in the last analysis the responsibility, for determining
the "justicia y razonabilidad" of railroad tariffs lay with
the Argentine Government,
By November I9I8 the relations botv/een the Argentine

Government and the railroads had reached their nadir.

Much

of the mutual ill-v/ill had been the direct result of the
strikes.

The railroads had greatly increased their staffs

in accordance with the Government's labor regulations, but

the authorities had failed to make good their assurances of

correlative tariff increases.

An especially bitter dispute,

exasperating to both the companies and the Radical adminis4l

Ramoni interview.

The Government at times ordered the companies to supply v/agons preferentially to large v/heat shippers ^such as
See for example Raul ZavaBunge y Born or Luis Dreyfus.
lla,' Legal Representative for the lacific, to Ilerminio Cap5 February 1923i
"devila, Director General de Ferrocarriles
,

AMT/i'.IOP/DG,

Expcdiente 02753-P-923.

,

18?

tration, had centered about the respective rights of the

railroads and the Government in the formulation of tariffs.
As of September, Yrigoyen had resolved to force -the compan-

ies to recognize his Government's authority to intervene in

rate making, and refused to sanction their applications for

higher tariffs.

Finally, the constant in-fighting had pro-

duced a deep-seated antagonism between the authorities and
the local directorates.

On more than one occasion Yrigoyen

had suggested that London recall or replace the Buenos
Aires officials.
The London boards were deeply troubled by the deter-

iorating relations of their companies
ernment.

v/ith

Yrigoyen

's

Gov-

Albert E. Bowen, Chairman of the Great Southern,

announced to the railroad's stockholders on 13 November that
he,

ern,

in the compajny of Henry Bell of the Buenos Aires West-

intended to visit Argentina.

culty in securing berths, the

tv/o

from London until 29 March 1919

.

Because of the diffi-

chairmen did not sail
Both were "in a somewhat

pessimistic hum.our" and harbored doubts about their prospects of success v/ith the Radical Government,

—

The atmosphere was not at all clear there was a widespread idea here in London that the Argentine Government v;as not, to say the least of it, sympathetic to
British capital, and especially to the English Railways, and we had several important questions pending

^^Castello interview.
^^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Proceedinp.g
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which it seemed could not be moved,
much lesq -pttipri
When we arrived at Buenos Aires
th^ same bad a^ino'phf^e
seemed to prevail--we could not
understand it? ^d^so
set ourselves seriously to work
to find out wha^it
all meant, and how matters could be
improved. 45
Apprised of the visit of Bowen and Bell,
La Bpoca commented, "Welcome to them, they will be
received with open

arms— their coming will destroy

at once the warped myth

about the persecution of English capital, which
contributes
to the national prosperity."

Simultaneously, however, the

semi-official organ complained that many of the local
directors,

"save a few honorable exceptions," were politicians

and not administrators,

"and ought to be replaced. "^^

Government promised to be receptive.

The

Much depended upon

the attitude of the chairmen once they made their landfall
in Argentina,

While Bowen and Bell were crossing the Atlantic there

occurred in Buenos Aires a bloody confrontation between

striking workers and the authorities.
Buenos Aires

v;as

For one tragic week

caught up in a whirlpool of violence.

Fears of social revolution and the rumored presence of Russian agitators threw the Government into a panic.

Rising

in defense of its middle class interests, the Radical ad-

ministration authorized troops and police to fire on workers
and tolerated the actions of private gangs, organized by

^^Buenos Ayres Great Soutliern Railway, I'rocoedinr s
46
La Epoca

,

editorial, 4 April 1919i

p.

3«

"
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employers, against the strikers.

The expulsion of foreign

workers and jailing of Argentine
laborers "put a fitting
"^'^
end to this task of oppression.
...
Yrigoyen's Government was badly shaken by the events
of "la semana tragica.
In the coming months railroad
management would not hesitate
to play on the administration's fear
of renewed labor un-

rest in order to force concessions from the
Government,
Bowen and Bell disembarked in Buenos Aires
on l4 May,

conferred with the local staff of the railroads
and then
sought out the authorities.
Talks began with Torello

just

two days later.

Speaking in Spanish, Bowen informed the

Minister of Public Works "that they had not come to demand
or solicit anything from the Government."

Rather, the

chairman of the Great Southern astutely affirmed "his perfect conformity with the social policies of the Argentine
Government in conflicts between capital and labor." 48 Warming to the conciliatory approach of the railroad officials,

both Torello and Yrigoyen enjoyed a series of cordial meetings with the chairmen.

According to Bowen, after a week

of talks he was able to convince himself that the problems
plag;uing the relations between the Government and the

British-ov/ned railroads were "due to misunderstandings"

p.

^"^Romero,
224.

48
15

f'iay

Epoca

A History of A rgentine Folitical Thought

,

'

,

22 May 1919

1919, p. 9.

1

p.

3.

See also La

I

ren sa,
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and that President Yrigoyen was "friendly disposed to Bri-

tish Capital and especially to the British Railways ....
For

tlie

first time the railroads admitted that the "bad

atmosphere" was as much their fault as anybody's.

Refer-

ring to the tariff controversy of I9I8, Bowen stated that»
We v;ere inclined to stand on our rights as we interpreted them under the Mitre Law, and to resent not being allowed to so adjust tariffs as to earn something
nearer the 6,80 per cent, on the Capital allowed by
that Law, but when we came to close quarters with the
Government people we found that there was no desire
to infringe this right, but what the Governm.ent insis-

—

ted on-"and I now think rightly was that any adjustment of tariffs which we might require must be made
in conference with them so that injustice should not
be done to any class of traffic. 50

Having yielded gracefully on the tariff dispute of
1918, Bowen and Bell then turned to other issues which had

troubled the railroads' relations with the Government,
During the next

tv/o

months official recognition of capital

accounts, new tariff increases
8

ajid

clarification of article

of the Mitre Law were all profitably discussed.
At the end of May, La Frensa reported that the visiting

representatives had met with Torello over the long-standing
question of ca.pital accounts and that both sides appeared
to be motivated by an attitude of conciliation.^"^

The

I.iinis-

ter of Public Works promised Bowen and Bell that he would

^^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Proceedin.f^s

.

2SJ^'

^Qlbid.

^^Lr Prensa editorial, 28 May 1919»
dents see above, pp. 3^-37. ^7-50.
.

P.

7.

For antece-

»
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shortly issue a decree which would fix the capitalization
of their compaiiies "for the purposes of the Mitre Law, "^^
Apparently, an understanding was alro reached with the

other railroads for, according to the local directorate of
the Pacific,

Torello had assured them that he would enter-

tain their points of view on the issue prior to any decree

relative to capital accounts.

Working with surprising rapidity, the Government pub-

lished a series of decrees on 1 July which fixed the capitalization of the different railroad companies up through
The Government's figures indicated that the Radi-

1912.

cal administration had accepted most of the objections

raised by Pablo Moguls in 1915.

In accordance with the ex-

Director General's guidelines, only those amounts actually
invested in works, installations, plant, rolling stock,
lands and equipment were to be authorized.

Discounts on

the issue of debentures and other watered capital were re-

jected absolutely by the Government,

Additional capital

deemed questionable by the Government, such as expenses of
stock issues, were to be amortized over a ten-year period

^^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railv/ay, Proceedings
^-^Local Board to London,

,

I919.

Buenor Aires, k July 1919

ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1.

^^For the complete texts of all the decrees, sec "Sintesis de la gestion clesarrollada por el actual gobierno en
materia de Obras Fiiblicas, I916-I9221 Frimera Parte? Ferrocarriles." Bqlet^n de Obras I fiblica s e Industr ies (Buenos
Aires 1922), pp. "39-^8,
I
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(See Tables IV, V).^^

Considered together, the Argentine Governnent refused
to authorise the inclusion of 12.?^ of the total capitali-

zation of the British-owned lines as reported in company
accouiits.

The railroads, however

,

'

anxious to secure of-

ficial support for possible new tariff increases and clari-

fication of the Mitre Law, raised no great howl of indignation as they had in 191? when capital accounts were under

Government consideration.

Actually, the decrees were sig-

nificant to the companies only on a long- term basis, as

noted by the South American Journal

,

While at the moment the question of Government expropriation /of the railroads/ does not need to be taken
into account, sooner or later,,.this may become an important matter, and on any deal of this kind the price
to be paid would, generally, be based upon the recognised capital plus a 20 per cent, bonus /as provided
for in the Mitre Law/. 56
The short-term effect of the Government's action on
the companies was slight.

Some railroad accountants, after

examining the Government's figures, reported to their superiors that a portion of the rejected capital probably
could be recovered through discussions with the authorities
or litigation.

57

Such action

v/as

^^See above, pp. 3^-35 and
Davids, London, 1^- August 1919»
resigned in August I9I8 after a
the reorganization of the State
(16 August 1918), p. ^31.

^^Reprinted in RRP.

LIU

initiated by the compan-

Loiidon Board to Lord St.

Nogu^s
ABAF/DA, GA 3312/1.
dispute with Yrigoyen over
See RRP, L
railroads.

(2? February 1920),

p.

595.

^^see for example, George Murray, Chief Accountant of
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.

~

Capital as
per Company's
Accou nts

Railroads

.

Buenos Aires and Pacific
Villa Karia to Rufino
Bahia Blanca and Kort h-".7e stern.
Argentine Great V/s stern
Argentine Transandine
Central c6rdoba (to 6/30/1913)..
Central .-argentine
Buenos Aires V/estern
Great Southern
Gt. £outhern--Ensenada and
South Coast
Gt. f:outhern--La Plata ?ort
Entre RioE"-Yilla Zlisa to San
Salvador (to 6/30/1914)
E^tre Pdos--£ection in Province
of Buenos Aires (to 6/30/14).

.

Totals

LIU

(27 Fe b ruary

Net capital
recognized by
Govornp.ent

^

•

Source: RRP,

_~

Tit3LE IV
Rgco,"ni7.ed Capital

.

21,8A2,A07
1,135,209
9,479,555
12,081,890
2,241,073
16,543,268
47,812,686
21,842,064
45,^26,079

19,345 ,782
1,135 ,209
8

676 ,358

,

11, 200 ,819

1,481 ,097
12,532 ,726
38,623 ,070
20,573 ,163
43,611 ,638

363,710
318,968

363,710
318,968

258,212

238,944

69,373

69,373

.181,414,494

158,370,857

l"92"0),

p.

595.

TABLE V
Rejected Capital

Absolutely

Railroads

To be amortized
in ten years

Totals

.

i

s:

Buenos Aires and Pacific
Bahia Blanca and NorthWe stern
Argentine Gt. V/estern
Argentine Transandine
Central c6rdoba
Central Argentine
Buenos Aires V/estern
Great Southern
Entre ?.ios--Villa 21isa
to San Salvador

.

Total

1,368,036

1,128,589

2,496,625

200,726
14,607
366,239
3,484,249
8,989,616
1,268,901
1,814,441

602,471
866,464
393,737
2,526,293

803,197
881,071
759,976
6,010,542
8,989,616
1,268,901
1,814,441
19,268

19,268

17,526,083

5,517,554

23,043,637

19^

ies,ajid,

pending a final decision or "eventual Government

expropriation," the railroads continued to pay the

Jfo

sin-

gle tax on the basis of their own calculations of net
re-

ceipts.

The Government, however,

determined the

J/o

tax on

what it considered to be the railroads' income after costs
and maintained that the tax payments should have been
higher.
Two sensitive issues which Bov/en and Bell hoped to

discuss with the authorities, a revised pension law

clarification of article

8 of the

down in Congress since 1915.
in Buenos Aires, however,

sjid

Mitre Law, had been bogged

Before the two chairmen arrived

Congress, meeting in special ses-

sion, had sanctioned new pension legislation and law 10,650

was promulgated on 30 April 1919. 59

The railroad managers,

who had bitterly contested the original pension law for
58

Ramoni interview; Ardigo interview; Castello, personal letter to the author, 12 April 1971.
In 1924 the
Alvear Government allowed the Pacific to reincorporate in
its capital account the 1 1,128,589 which the Yrigoyen administration had ordered amortized. Usher to Sanders,
Buenos Aires, 22 July 1924, ABAP/DA, GA 3312/1. No decision was reached with regard to the remaining companies
until Justo's administration (1932-1938 )» v/hen the railroads were ordered to pay the difference, excepting a fev;
minor concessions. See Ar.iT/l.lOP/DG, Expedientes 019185- C922, 019191- F-922, 022891- P-922, 022892- P-922, 022893-FV/inthrop R. Wright mis922, 023341- P-922, 024733- P-922,
takenly contends that the companies feared imminent expropriation, the decrees of 1 July being the first step. Ar gentine Railways ar_id^ the Growth of N ation alism (unj)ublished
Ph.D. dissertation," University of Pennsylvania, 1964), pp,
126-127.
59sej^ac3ojpes,

158-172, 193-213.

Sesiones

,

I9I8

.

II,

103-126, 128-155,

•
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railwayraen (9653), reacted positively to
the legislation

because, in their words,

"the men are satisfied with it"

and "although it necessitates some sacrifice
on the part of
the Railways we are pleased because we
fully understand what
a great asset a contented staff is."^^

sions of Law 10.650 the conpanies

Under the provi-

were expected to contri-

bute annually to the pension fund an amount equal to
the wages and salaries paid to personnel.

8fo

of

But the com.pan-

ies were able to pass the cost of the law on to the
Argen-

tine public, for the contribution was to be recouped with
a

5fo

rate increase, with the Government assuming the re.

sponsibility for any deficit.
V/ith

^"^

the passage of the pension law, the only out-

standing legislation involving the railroads concerned
clarification of article

8

of the Mitre Law.

During April

the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies had considered var-

ious proposed revisions, but the issue had not been decided

when the special session of Congress ended on the 30th.
The Conservatives were furious with the repeated delays,

for they had cast their votes in favor of the pension law
and the Government's labor regulation for railv/aymen in re-

^^Buenos Ayrcs Great Sout}icrn Railway, Iroceedinp;s

.

I919.

The tariff increases, which
^'•Article 59» Law 10,650.
would be applied to cattle on th" hoof and general cargo,
were fixed at 5/^ by Executive decree on 31 December 1919
Beltrame, Crisis de los f errocarriles arrentinos p. 79.
See also Buonos Aires and laciiic Railv/ay, Report and A£,

count s

,

1212.*
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turn for Radical support of a bill which would
define more

precisely the liabilities of the companies under article
of Law 5315.

8

As soon as the new legislative session opened,

Mariano Demarfa, a Conservative deputy from Buenos Aires
Province, accused the lower house of "deliberate obstruc-

tion."

Alluding to the deal which the Conservatives had

made with the UCR in September 1917, Demarla demanded that
the compajiies be accorded "some consideration" for the vast

sums of capital v/hich they had invested in Argentina.

Bowen and Bell were concerned with the developments in
Congress and raised the question of the Mitre Law with Yri63
goyen.
The President of the Republic told us that he considered that the country's honour was involved in this
Law being passed as the Railv/ay Companies had raised
so much Capital on the strength of their interpretation of the original Law, and he promised that it
should be passed. 64

True to his word, Yrigoyen pulled party v/ires and pushed

for congressional approval of the long standing legislation.

Some viruently anti-railroad Radical deputies, led

by Rogelio Araya, strongly resisted the Chief Executive's

pressure.

Araya

v;as

incensed

v/ith-.

the Government's posi-

tion and delivered a blistering attack in the lower house

^^Diputados, Sesioncs
pp. 116-119.

.

1919

^"^M Kpoca, 22 May 1919,

p.

.

I,

581.

See also above,

3.

Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Proceed] ng?

1919

»

.

;
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against both the compaxiies and Yrigoyen
in an attempt to
defeat the bill.
As I have already said in the Chamber,
we, in a political sense are a Nation and therefore
independerrt
but econoiin.ically we are a colony of England.
We
exploited and treated as a colony. Hence these are
concessions, which are the concessions of
spoi]ation. We
are treated like a country of negroes....
The Executive Power has been up to now
an accomplice of the railway companies, and it is for
that
reason that we are combating rot only the policy
of
the companies as being immoral, but also
that of the
Governm.ent, as being likewise immoral....
65

La Frensa, seizing the opportunity to embarrass
the

Radical Government, paraded Araya's accusations in its
columns.

66

La Epo ca retorted that the railroads were

operating "within the boiinds of the laws and regulations"
of the country, and that the companies were "not treated

with undue complaisance,"

Indeed,

"under the present ad-

ministration the railroad companies will enjoy all the pri.
vileges they merit, but they will never be able to count
upon /the favors/ which they were accustomed to under the
regimen"

67

Araya, his fiery oratory notwithstanding, failed to

muster a majority of votes and Law 10,657i which clarified
the Mitre Law to the companies' benefit, was promulgated

on 22 August I9I9.

Exclusive of the

^^La Frensa, 9 August 1919f

p.

3?^

single tax paid on

6.

^^Ibid.
^^li^

Epoca

,

editorial, 10 August 1919t

p.

1.
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net receipts, the revised article guaranteed
the railroads
exemption from all taxes, rates or fees assessed
at the na~
tional, provincial or municipal level with three
exceptions.
The railroads would still have to pay for running
water

and sewer service and were expected to contribute to
paving
costs in the iramediate vicinity of stations/^

The compro-

mise legislation was "quite satisfactory to the railway
com.panies

"^^
,

The last remaining point of contention between the

companies

ajid

the Government pertained to the railroads*

need for additional revenue to offset fuel and material
costs.

Following the administration's refusal to approve

new rates in September I9I8, the Pacific, on

5

applied for tariff increases ranging from 5^ to

November re2J/o

on cer-

tain items which the company felt could best absorb the

higher charges.

70

Counteracting O'Farrell's request, the

Government Interventor for the Pacific, Octavio Ealta, notified the Direcci5n General that the railroad "was as prosperous or more so than in past years" and recommended that
no higher rates be granted,

71

O'Farrell then refuted

Araya defended
^^Law 10,657.
See Diputados, Sesiones
November,

position again in
1919 VI, I68-I69.

liis
,

.

^^RRP. LIT (15 August 1919), p. ^11.
"^^O'Farrell to Giovacchini, 5 November I9I8,
DG, Expediente 026155- P-1918,

AI.:T/r.OP/

Inspector General, to Giovacchini,
30 April 1919, Ar.'iT/lviOP/DG, Expediente 026155-^-1918.
'''^Octavio

Bacci,
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Ealta-s "equivocal interpretation."
and complained to
Giovacchini that "our econoMio
picture is deteriorating.
We have not paid
the dividends our
stockholders deser-.e..
Operating costs are rising. "^^
Pressing the Director General, the local chairman of
the facifio shrewdly reported
that without the new rates
"the company reels that it
will
be unable to attend to the
needs of its personnel, especially the laborers...."''-' -LI
Tf on
r,n the r.+',„„
•
otner hpnd ^,
the new
rates were sanctioned, the
Pacific promised to raise the
wages and salaries of its workers
and issued a circular to
this effect on 28 May.^^ The
marieuver, which played on
Government fears of possible new labor
unrest, also succeeded
in aligning the men behind the
company's position.
On 20
i

,

June Yrigoyen, the workman's "friend",
approved the new

tariff increases,

"^^

The other companies, employing similar
tactics, also

convinced the Government to approve measures which
would

augment their revenues.

Government decrees of 12 May and

6 August authorized the Great Southern and the Central Ar-

gentine respectively to renovate and streamline their

^^O'Farrell to Giovacchini, 20 May I919, AiVTA'iOf/DG,
^
Expediente 026155- F-I918.
73

Giovacchini to Torello, JO
Expediente 026155- P-1918.

O'Farrell to Torello,
Expediente 026155-F-I918.

f.Cay

2 June

1919, Ar^.'T/rOP/DG.

I919,

Af.lT/l.iOP/DG,

'^Decree of 20 June 1919, in Ar.;T/MOP/DG, Expediente
026155-:^~1918.
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tariff systems, thus eliminating or rationalizing
the hundreds of special rates which had come into force
during the
war.

For the Great Southern the revised tariff schedules

promised to yield an estimated 10.^^ additional revenue.
The Buenos Aires Western instituted higher rates on
15 Au-

gust.

Three months after the 29 July departure of Bowen and

Bell from Buenos Aires, Lord St. Davids, the Pacific's London Chairman, visited Argentina,

Like the chairmen of the

Great Southern and the Western, St. Davids believed that

rapprochement .with the Radical Government was in order if
the companies were ever to escape from the economic and

legal morass into which they had fallen.

He admitted that

"the Government were quite right" with respect to the tariff

controversy of I918,
They said, "You cannot take the items of a railv/ay and
put them all up 10 per cent.
you might kill some traffic; what you have got to do is to go through the thing
item by item to see what will bear an increase...." It
v/as perfectly right. 78
;

St.

Davids was also pleased with the new tariff increases

^ RA/I'OP/DG, Tar i fas Ferroviarias
Estudio do la Direccion General de Ferrocarriles sobre su revision TBuei

See also the report of J. M.
nos Aires: I928), pp. 152-153.
Eddy, Acting General Manager of the Great Southern, 2 September 1920, in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Report
and Accounts, 1920
.

"^"^Euenos

LIU

Ayres Western Railway, Froceedinn^s

"^^S-oeech delivered on 18 Decem.ber 1919
(23^ January 1920), p. 239.

1

,

1919 *

printed in RRP,

,
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authorized by Yrigoyen's Government and informed the
shareholders of the Pacific that
the Government have been absolutely fair, absolutely
reasonable, and they have given us such increase of
tariffs, or rather they have consented to such increase of rates on all the Argentine railways, that
we have
fairness nothing to complain of on that
score"-no thing at all, 79

,

m

•St.

Davids said nothing of the arm-twisting tactics used to

force the Argentine Government's hand with respect to rate

increases
The pension scheme passed by Congress on 30 April

also praised by the Pacific's chairman

i

v;as

"We have a good

pension scheme.', .and the Government is responsible for the

solvency of it.

We have been able to accept it,

have no grievance at all? the matter is settled,"

and we
St,

Ca-

vids then gave Yrigoyen's Government full credit for the
passage of legislation clarifying the Mitre Law.
They used their great power in Congress to carry
through,,.an amendment to the Llitre Law which m.akes
the position of the railv^ays, as we think, perfectly
clear, and ensures us against unjust demands.
That
has been settled, 80

A further indication of

tlie

improved relations between

the companies and the Government in mid-1919

v;as

the un-

qualified success of the railroads in securing oil properties,

'//hile

Eowen and Bell were in Buenos Aires, they had

"^^Speech delivered on 18 December 1919.
LIII (23 January 1920), p. 239.

printed in RRP

.
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contacted the Cornpanla Fetroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia,

which had oil wells adjacent to the Government's fields
on
the Patagonian coast, and talked about leasing its
properties.

The companies had long been considering the conver-

sion of a number to their locomotives to oil-burners because of the high cost of Welsh coal.

After preliminary

negotiations, the chairmen "sent an oil expert of their
own,

r.ir.

Campbell K, Hunter, to examine the fields, and

upon receiving a favourable report saw Lord St. Davids,
who agreed to join the scheme."

By June I920 an Argentine

company, backed by the Great Southern, Western and Pacific

railroads, had been formed to lease and work the properties.

81

Underscoring the good feelings between the rail-

roads and the Government

v/as

the relative ease with which

the companies secured the oil fields.

This stood in marked

contrast to the utter failure at the same time of both

United States and Great Britain based petroleum interests
to gain permission to exploit Argentine oil.
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The improvement of the British-owned railroads' posi-

tion in Argentina was due in large measure to two factors

1

the desire of the railroads to ease the strain between them0-1

Buenos Ayres Western Railway, Proceedings 1920, The
Pacific had manifested an interest in oil from Comodoro
See ABAP/DA, GA 556.
Rivadavia as early as I9IO.
,

.p.

^^La Naci5n, 3 July 1920, p.
1; La Raz6n
5 July 1920, p. 1.
.

3?

Epoca

.

July 1920,
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selveB and tho Radical GovcTnmont, and domestic
unrest in

Argentina.

The visits of Bowon.

been helpful.
problomr; witli

Boll and St.

Davids had

TJieir cool and tactful hnndlinfr of rallrocd
tlie.

autJioritics had eliminatod mucli of

Llie

friction and sntagoniRin whicli had been commonplace since
the Radical victory of I916.

But what con account for what one British observer

termed

t)ie

Ings with

"pJionomonal improvement" in
tlie

Governmoiit?
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tlie

rallronde' doal-

Labor, perlinpr;, played

tlie

de-

cisive role, for after the "revolutionary" action of the
sem£ina trc^if^lca in early I919 Yrigoyen

cate the workinrmc-ui.

Accordingly,

Chamber of Deputies promulf^ated

waymen 5n April.

a

war;

anxious to pla-

the Radical-dominated

new penruon law for rail-

The compnnies did not object to Law

10,657 because they could pass the cost on to their customers while the Government would be renjtonsible for covorinf;

any deficits wlucli

mi^'.hL

develo]).

Furthe ruioro

,

the

companies were able to exploit the volatile labor question
for their

ov;n

purposes.

By promising wage increases to

their men if the Government S£inctioned rate hikes, the railroads were able to force Yrigoyen's

liand,

New tariffs wore

qui ckly sanctioned by the Radical Government.

By the end of

1919 a spirit of rapj ruchrjnent had replaced the old finimosities,

Uiifortuna tely

,

the spirit would prove to be ephemeral.

^^otephen h. M, KilJik, fiiLinu.-}!
for 19?0 (Londoni 1920), pp. 5-^."

p_f

Ar ^^:enttn e Rai.lways

CHAP'TER

VI

TARIFFS AND POLITICS: THE END OF RAPPROCHEMl' NT
1921-1922
"Public opinion has to be considered by political chiefs,
and, if possible, placated."
The Rev iew of the River
Plate 18 March 1921

—

,

On 27 October 1920 the sun was shining brichtly over

Finsbury Circus, site of the River Plate House offices of
the British-owned Argentine railroads.

Inside the imposing

structure, turned gray with the years of accumulated soot,
the Chairman of the Great Southern, A. E. Bowen was presid-

ing over the annual meeting of the company's shareholders.
His report was one of measured optimism, mirroring the rail-

road's satisfactory relations with the Radical administra-

tion of Hip6lito Yrigoyen.

Financially, too, it had been a

gratifying year for the Great Southern

ar,

the gross income

revealed a remarkable 30^ increase over the past fiscal year.
Bowen told his applauding audience that the company proposed
to pay its stockholders an additional dividend of

^\%

on or-

dinary shares, making a total dividend of 7% for the year.
The bonus, while modest, was still higher than any dividend

paid out since the outbreak of the war in Europe.

The

Great Southern was not the only railroad to recover its
^Buenos Ayres Groat Southern Railway, Proceed! ngs
1920.,

,

3

.
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financial footing, for the Western, Central Argentine
and

Pacific lines announced dividends of 7^, 6% and
^% respectively on ordinary shares.^

Even though the gross receipts of the four largest
companies had been of record proportions, the figures were

misleading in that they were the result of

a

fortuitous but

abnormal combination of circumstances in Argentina.

Bowen,

cognizant of the Great Southern's anomalous economic success

warned his listeners that the "progress" shown by the railroad's net income, a reported
1919,

£

1,322,000 more than fiscal

could not bo maintained in the coming year.

He ex-

plained that:
We were exceptionally favoured during the year ...as,
owing to shipping difficulties, a good part of tlie
1917/1918 wheat crop was still uncarried in our roadside deposits, so we had not only to deal with that,
but with practically the whole of the 1919/1920 crop,
which v/as all shipped, so that we were working almost
to full capacity during the whole of the year.

The other major cereal carriers reported a similar situation.

An unexpected financial cushion for the British-owned
"Buenos Ay res V/estern Hallway, Proce edings
1 920
Central Argentine Railway, Annual Report" and Account s , 1920;
Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway, Annual Report and Acco unts
1920.
,

;

^Buenos Ayres Great Southern RailWciy, Proceeding s,

]

,

920

^Buenos Ayres Western Railway, Procee dings 1920 Cen1920;
tral Argentine Railway, Annual Report and Accounts
Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway,"^ Annual Report and_ Acco'unts,
;

,

,

1920.
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lines had been the extraordinary profits they made on ex-

change remittances when, beginning in March 1919 and continuing into 1920, the pound sterling was quoted below peso

parity. 5

Indeed, the appreciation of the peso, caused by an

international balance of payments favorable to Argentina,
was so marked that Stephen H. M. Killik, the noted author of
an annual analysis of Argentine railroads, was moved to re-

mark in February 1920 that:
if no material fall in the value of Argentine dollars
[o/s] takes place before the close of the current six
months, some of the Companies will have earned sufficient to pay dividends approaching those distributed last year from this source alone.

For the fiscal year ending in June 1920 the Pacific had

earned profits totaling £194,000 on the favorable exchange
rate while the Great Southern reported the startling sum of

^1,231,000, an amount equal to the company's operating profit for the year.

7

Virgil Salera, Exchange Control and the Argenti ne
See also RA/MOP/DG,
Market (New York:
19^1), pp. 26-30.
Estudlo d£ l_a Dlreccion Genera l de
Tarifas Fer roviarias
sobre su r evisic^n Graflco s (Buenos Aires:
Fe r r o c a'r ril e
192b), graph R, "Cotizaciones medias mensuales de la Libra
Esterlina.
:

;

^Killik, Manual of Argentine Railways for 1920, p.

7.

Annual Report and
Accounts , 1920 Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, ProThese substantial sums did not escape the
ceedings, 1920
attenFfon of the Argentine Government. As early as March
1918, Pablo Noguc^s, the Director General de Ferrocarrlles
recommended that earnings or losses resulting from the exchange rate between gold pesos and pounds sterling be in"^Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway,
;

.

.
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But the astounding earnings on exchange transactions

promised to end as quickly as they had begun.

With the end

of the war Argentine export markets began to shrink.

Indeed,

the re-establishment of normal trade relations resulted in an

increase in imports to meet a pent-up demand resulting from

wartime shortages.

The influx of imports when coupled with

declining exports reversed the favorable balance of payments
enjoyed by Argentina during the

v/ar.

the 3rd quarter of calendar 1920.

The decline began in

(See Table VI).

In July

1920 the Radical Government, worried about the increased

drain of specie from the country, ordered an embargo on all
TABLE~VI

ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN TRADE, OCTOBER 1919-DECEMBER 1920
Quarterly Figures
(in millions of gold pesos)
Quarter

Imports

Exports

Balance

Mth
1st
2nd
3rd
Mth

191.17
191.25
215.79
266.69
261.23

311.19
276.83

120.62
85.58
131.82
31.75
75.53

1919
1920
1920
1920
1920

3^17.61

23^

.9^t

185.70

Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic
Source:
^^^^
Position of Argentina (Philadelphia:
1938'T7~PRepCiblica Argentina, Direccio'n General de Estadfstica,
El Comercio Exterior Ar gentine Boletln No. 211.
,

eluded in the working accounts of the companies so as to
better define the 3% contribution under the Mitre Law. A
decree to this effect was signed by Yrigoyen on 3 Aupust
For all pertinent documents see AMT/MOP/DG, Expe1920.
diente 018313-D-918
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gold exports.

Rapid peso depreciation with respect to for-

eign currencies followed and by March 1921 the railroad com-

panies

v;ere

suffering losses in the conversion of pesos to

pounds.^
In spite of the record gross receipts of the large com-

panies, the reported net profits were not inordinately great.
Fuel, material and labor costs, which had risen precipitously

during the war years, revealed no signs of leveling off
even after the armistice had been declared.^

The tremendous

increase in costs was reflected in the coefficient of exploitation, i.e., the percentage of gross income absorbed by

working expenses.

In an average year a coefficient of 60%

was considered normal by the Government and by the companies;
in 1920 the coefficient attained the unsettling level of
(See Table VII).

78.8JS.

TABLE VII

Coefficient of Exploitation for all
Private Railroads 191^-1921
1914...
1915...
1916.
1917...
.

Source:
p.

9.

.

65.9^
62.3^
61^.3%

7^.0^

1918...
1919...
1920.
1921...
.

.

15.2%
12.0%
IQ.8%
82. Q%

Beltrame, Crisis de los Ferrocarriles Argentines
Beltrame 's figures are" from official sources.

,

Sal era, Exchange Control and the Argentine Market ,
Positio n of
pp. 30-31; Phelps, The Intern ational Economic
Argentina , pp. 38-^2.

^For examples of increased wartime costs see above, pp.
'
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A reliable barometdr

of public confidence in the eco-

nomic position of the British-owned railroads was provided
by the London stock market.

In December 1920 the quotations

reflected the uncertainty of the coming year.

In the words

of one worried shareholder, "one cannot help feeling— and

the market evidently shares the feeling

— that

present is scarcely one of unclouded serenity

the outlook at
"-^^
.

As shown

in Table VIII, the highest quotation, that for the Great

Southern, was still 36 points below par and 66 points below
the 1913 high.

TABLE'TlII

Quotations on the London Stock Exchange 1913, 1920
Stocks or shares

Argentine North
Eastern

Quotations 1913
low
high

Class

Ordinary

59

^9

Quotations
12/30/1920

17

Great Southern

II

129

121

Pacific

11

92

77

Western

II

129

121

61

Central Argentine

II

112

102

55

Entre Rios

II

79

60

21

RRP, LIV (31 December 1920), p. 1777; The Times;
Source:
All shares had a par value of
29 December 1913, p. 1^.
f 100.

Graphs published by the Direccidn General de Ferro53-54.
carriles illustrating the rising fuel, material, exploitation and labor costs are reproduced in Appendix II,
Laurence, in Buenos Ayres Great
1920
•Southern Railway, Proceedings
'"^Sir Perceval M.

,

.
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If the larger companies were uncomfortable with their

prospects for 1921, the smaller, less profitable lines must
have been frantic.

By the end of 1920 the Central Cdrdoba

was in poor financial shape and the Entre rIos and North

Eastern Argentine railroads were on the verge of bankruptcy.-^
To compound the railroads' problems, traffic began to

diminish on all lines during the last quarter of 1920.

Henry

Bell, the London Chairman of the V/estern, noticed that "a

severe trade slump set in, the demand for products and manu-

factured items of every description diminished, and a period
of depression set in such as we have not seen before."

Wheat

traffic promised to be especially hard hit because of a poor
crop.

Cattle transportation, the life-blood of the Western,

also shov;ed signs of slackening.

indications

— continued

12

By the close of 1920 all

high operating costs, peso deprecia-

tion, lower volumes of rail traffic, and a lack of confidence
in railroad stock on the London market

— pointed

of economic troubles for the companies.

to a period

13

For
''"Central Cdrdoba Railway, Proceedings , 1921
fiscal 1919 and 1920 both the Entre Rios and North Eastern
Argentine railroads recorded debit balances. Entre Rlos
Railways, Report and Accounts , 1920, 1921; North Eastern
See also
Argentine Railway, R eport and Accoun ts, 1920 1921
Informe de la Direccic5n General de Ferrocarriles ref/ tariF. C. Nord E. Argentino, AMT/MOP/DG, Expediente
fas:
.

.

,

I2726-F-I92I.
•'"^Buenos
•^^An

Ayres Western Railway, Proceedings

,

1921

.

examination of railroad reports and accounts for
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An obvious counterbalance to the deepening financial

problems of the railroads was the imposition of higher rates.
Early in January 1921 the British-owned lines, for the third
time since Yrigoyen's election to office, submitted requests
for increased tariffs.

They also asked that certain classi-

fications be modified so as to augment revenues.
As the railroads had always experienced difficulty in

securing Government approval for rate increases, Alejandro
Lertora, the chief legal representative for the Western,

thought it worthwhile to approach Ariodante Giovacchini, in-

terim Director General de Perrocarriles since Nogues

'

resig-

nation in August 1918, and impress upon him the sorry plight
of the companies.

The inexperienced official listened sym-

pathetically and then, on his own authority, told Lertora:
"I anticipate that my report will be favorable."

15

Approxi-

The post-war de1921 reveals similar trends on all lines.
pression promised to be especially debilitating to the Entre
R^os and North Eastern Argentine railroads, whose profits
were marginal at best. For a report on the serious plight
of the smaller lines see Francis W. White, United States
Charg^ d'Affaires ad interim, to the Secretary of State,
Buenos Aires, 10 January 1922, USDA/RIAA, 835.773/11.

rates were sought on excess baggage, parcels,
passenger service and livestock. RRP, LVI (30 September
1921), p. 859.
"""^Higher

'•^From Lertora 's account of the meeting, in ABAP/Actas
de la Junta de Representantes y Gerentes. de los Perrocarriles
(hereafter cited as AJRG), Acta 2, 7 March 1921. These Actas

were considered strictly confidential.
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mately a week later, in mid-January, Giovacchini orally
informed Jose A. Pr^as, who headed the legal staff of the
Central Argentine, that both the proposed rate hikes on excess

baggage and parcels and the reclassification of general merchandise and cereal tariffs "offered no difficulties" and in
his judgment appeared reasonable

.

"^^

Acting on the Director General's assurances, the companies believed that the intent of the decree of 23 June
1917 had been fulfilled and posted notices on their stations

announcing the effective date of the approved rates.
Because Giovacchini had not given his express approval of the
increases sought on passenger and livestock traffic, the company lawyers in this instance counseled the railroad managers
to conform to the letter of the 1917 decree and wait four

months before advising the public of the rate changes.
On

2

1

ft

March, the day after some companies had begun to

collect higher rates on excess baggage and parcels, the legal

representatives received a startling circular from the Direcci(5n

General de Ferrocarriles
•^^Frias'

.

The communication, signed by

report, in ABAP/AJRG, Acta

I,

3

March 1921.

decree provided for a mindatory grace period of
four months before tariff changes could be announced to the
Supposedly the time gave the Government ample
public.
opportunity to examine the "Justicia y razonabllidad" of the
proposed rates. For antecedents see above, pp. 50-51.
^''^The

•"•^

ABAP/AJRG, Acta

1,

3

March 1921.

.
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Giovacchin.1

,

warned that the railroads could not impose in-

creases or modifications in tariffs without the prior appro-

bation of the Government.

In the note Giovacchini stated, to

the probable surprise of the lawyers, that no new rates had

been sanctioned by his office and that the railroads were in

violation of the General Railroad

Law."*"^

Hoping to discern the underlying reasons for Giovacchini 's change of heart, the legal representatives and general

managers convened on the following morning.

Miguel M. Pa-

dllla, the Duenos Aires director of the Central Cdrdoba,

mentioned public opinion and "that element of the press which
was hostile toward the railroads" as possible factors leading
to the Government's action.

He emphasized, however, t}iat re-

gardless of other considerations the final decision probably

emanated from the office of President Yrigoyen.

20

It is very possible that the Executive Pov«/cr is strongly opposed to tariff modifications and there seems to
exist an indication of this in the note of the Direc-

General de Fcrrocai'riles the content of which is
contrary to the oral information that the Director Gen.^1
eral de Ferrocarriles gave to some r^epresentativcs
ci<5n

,

.

.

Others present generally concurred with Padilla's observations

22

^^AMT/MOP/DG, Circular No. 13,

2

March 1921.

^^ABAP/AJHG, Acta 1,

3

March 1921.

^•ABAP/A JP^G, Acta

3

March 1921

22

'^'^Ibid.

1,

.
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Predictably, agricultural, commercial and industrial
interesty, which were beginning to feel the effects of the

worsening post-war depression, closed ranks and voiced their
unanimous opposition to the imposition of higher tariff s.^^

Argentine newspapers also railed against any further increases.

La Vanguardia, the implacably anti-railroad So-

cialist daily, had assailed both the companies

and. the

cal Government at the first hint of higher tariffs.

menaced by a new increase in railroad rates....

Radi-

"We are

Will the

Radicals exhibit the same tolerance, the same docility with
the companies as on two previous occasions?"

pi)

La Prensa,

while more moderate in its tone, also castigated the railroads' decision to charge more.

The new impositions, the

paper argued, were inopportunely timed given the languishing

economy of the country.

25

Unhappy v;ith the abrupt turn of events, L^rtora, in
the company of Guillermo E. Leguizam(5n, who was also affil-

iated with the Western railroad, decided to interview Giovacchini.

The Director General informed the company lawyers

that before any new tariffs could be enforced it was necessary
to secure the approval of the Executive Power.

Leguizamo'n

^^White to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, 10
January 1922, USDS/RIAA, 835.773/11.
^

La Vanguardia , 20 December 1920, p. 1.

^^La Prensa, editorial,

7

March 1921, p.

5.
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disagreed and replied that it was within the authority of the
Oficina Te'cnica of the Direccion General de Ferrocarriles to
pass judgment on the fairness of the rates.

The question of

Executive approval, Leguizamon suggested, "from a legal point
of view is hardly necessary".

Giovacchini, a party appointee

who obviously had little idea as to the scope of his powers,

backed down and v/eakly confessed to the two lawyers that he,
for one, "would be greatly pleased to see this question de-

fined in whatever sense, so it would not remain a future
source of difficulties."^^
At this juncture the companies resolved to assume the

Initiative and force the Government to show its hand.

On

March 8th Fernando Guerrico, the local director of the Great
Southern, Raul Zaval£a, a member of the Pacific's legal staff,
and L^rtora visited Pablo Torello, the Minister of Public

Works.

Before they could present their case Torello surprised

them with the news that "it was considered that the Direccion
General de Ferrocarriles had overstepped its authority with
its circulars" and that "the approval of tariffs, when they

were not basic tariffs, was within the power of the Direcci6n
and the intervention of the Executive was not necessary."

To

further confound the company representatives, Torello ad-

vised them to defend their position before the Direccion
^^The account is drawn from Leguizamon 's memorandum of
ABAP/AJRG, Acta 2, 7 March 1921.
the interview.
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General de Perrocarriles in as detailed a form as was
possible.

Heax-tened by Torello»s position, the lawyers began

to prepare a defense based on his recommendations.^'^

Pending the Government's final decision on the controversy, the companies resolved to continue collecting those

new rates which they maintained had been approved by the Direccio'n General.

On 15 March, while the lawyers were in the

midst of preparing the companies' case for higher tariffs,
the railroads were shocked to learn from the press that the

Minister of Public Works had issued a resolution upholding
Giovacchini

s

original contention that the rates were illegal

because they had been put into force without Government approval.

ordered a

The text of the resolution as reported in
$

La,

Epoca

5,000 m/n fine to be assessed against each

guilty company and an additional

counting from

9

$

1,000 m/n "for each day

March during which it [each company] has un-

duly collected the new tariffs."

The companies were ordered

to suspend the illegal increases within 2^ hours "under the

penalty of having the daily fine raised to

$

5,000 m/n."

28

To ascertain the truth of the press reports, Guerrico,

^""^From a

8

memorandum of the meeting, ABAP/AJRG, Acta

3,

March 1921.

The fines were im^^La Epoca, 15 March 1921, p. 1.
posed on the Western, Great Southern, Pacific, Entre Rios
See also ABAP/AJRG,
and North Eastern Argentine railroads.
16 March 1921.
Acta
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Zavalfa, Lertora and Padilla called on Torello.

The Minister

confirmed the news and emphasized the serious
character of
the dispute.

Zavalfa angrily reminded Torello that the com-

panies had acted in accordance with his advice.

Torello

calmly admitted that "effectively this was so", but it was

incumbent upon him to "rescue the Direccl6n General de Fer-

rocarriles from the difficulty in which it found itself."
He added that Giovacchini had been under the impression that

his actions were in conformity with precedents established
by Pablo Nogues which required presidential approval for

rate increases.

Almost as an afterthought Torello revealed

what was undoubtably the primary reason behind the Govern-

ment's decision to disallow the tariff hikes, the uproar

which the

nev/

rates had produced among agricultural, com-

mercial and industrial interests.
Torello 's move served a two-fold purpose, to keep the
companies badly off balance and to convey the impression to
the country's important economic interest groups that the

Government was sensitive to their v/orsening situation.

In a

meeting on 16 March attended by Torello, businessmen from
Entre rIos and G. H. Harrisson, joint director for the Entre
rXos and North Eastern Argentine railroads, the thrust of the

^From

the memoranda of company officials, ABAP/AJRG,
Acta ^, 16 March 1921. Foremost among the complaining interest groups were the Sociedad Rural Argentina, Unic^n IndusSee RRP, LV (I8
trial Argentina and the Bolsa de Cereales.
March 1921), p. 669; La Epoca, 17 March 1921, p. 1.
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Government's policy became unmistakable.

Harrisson later

complained to the other members of the Junta of legal
representatives and directors that "during the whole time
the

interview lasted,

I

was not given the opportunity to combat

the arguments used by the representatives against the in-

creases."

The embittered director had been left with the

distinct impression that the tariffs would not be approved.
With a presidential election only a year away, the UCR
was anxious not to offend either the powerful economic interests of the country or public opinion.

The Review of the

River Plate commented in rather crude terms that:
Public opinion has to be considered by political
chiefs, and, if possible, placated. The Government
cannot conveniently ignore the numerous protests
(some of them somev/hat grotesque) which it is constantly receiving from influential and representative
business centres. So we think that it finds that it
must gnash its teeth a little, and stamp its feet
with rage, for a while, and foam at the mouth, in
moderation for the benefit of the gallery. 31

—

The companies appreciated the political overtones which

had shaped the Government's position and decided to take ap-

propriate counter-measures.

On the legal front the lav/yers

advised the managers and directors to continue charging the
"illegal" tariffs until circumstances forced the issue into
the courts.

There, the railroads hoped, an apolitical de-

^'^Harrisson' s account of the interview, ABAP/AJRG
Acta ^, 16 March 1921.
^^'RRP,

LV (18 March 1921), p. 669.
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cision would be handed down as to the legality of the
rates.

But court proceedings promised to be lengthy.

Railroad management, confronted with rapidly falling revenues, had to find a more immediate means to bring pressure
to bear on the Radical Government.

Labor provided a possi-

ble answer.
Since September 1920 the Confraternidad Perroviaria,
a newly constituted railwaymen's union which embraced both

La Praternidad and the Pederacion Obrera Perroviaria, had

been unsuccessfully attempting to bargain with the railroads
for the implementation of fixed wage and work schedules
(

escalafones ) for traffic and workshops personnel

.

But

each railroad management, fearful of the potential power of
the new union, insisted on bargaining directly with its own
men.

By the middle of January 1921 the patience of the

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta

^1

,

16 March 1921; RRP_,

LV (l8 March

1921), p. 669.
The Confraternidad Perroviaria was established in
It was a loose federation within v/hich both La
June 1920.
Praternidad the FOP maintained their separate identities.
See La Vanguardia, 29 June 1920, p. 1, and Pernandez, La
La Praternidad had already
Uni(3n Perr ovi aria , p. 127.
signed a three-year escalafdn agreement for traction personPor details of the negotiations,
nel on 3 September 1920.
see Escalaf on de Sueldos para el p ersonal de conduccidn de_
locomot oras In terpretacidne s" de las dis posic ionos regla mentitrias del trabajo , version taquigrgcf ica (Buenos Aires:
19207T
;

Taylor interview.
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Confraternidad had worn thin and the union
announced that be
cause of the companies' Intranslgonce a
work slowdown would
be called against the railroads.

The Government, anxious to avoid serious
labor distur-

bances with their possibly adverse political
implications,

intervened in the conflict on the eve of the work slowdown.

Yrigoyen Issued a decree on

5

February which intimated to

both the companies and the railroad workers that the Ministry of Public Works would aid in the formulation of a
scale

of wages and working regulations for traffic and workshops

employees.

The decree ordered the railroad managers and the

union to name representatives to a committee under Torello's

auspices

Negotiations between the men and the companies had begun on 12 February and were still in progress when the tariff controversy arose.

For the companies the labor situa-

tion seemed to provide the perfect lever with which to pry
loose tariff concessions from the Yrigoycn Government.

On

15 March the general managers met and resolved to inform

Torello that the railroads, because of their poor financial
prospects, "could admit no increase in costs as a result of

RRP

,

^^La Fraternid ad, Ano XIII (20 January 1921), pp. 3-6;
LV 128 January 1921), p. 217.

^^I^ E£oca, editorial, 6 February 1921, p. 1; La Fra'
ternidad', 'aKo XIII (20 February 1921), pp. 3-5; RRP, LV~
111 February 1921), p. 3'I9.

"
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escalafones until a favorable decision had been reached by
the Government in the matter of rates increases ....

"^"^

The Government did not yield to the companies' pres-

sure and on

6

April the Direccion General announced that it

had undertaken judicial action to collect the fines, which
by the end of March totaled

$

581,000 m/n.^^

Frustrated,

the legal representatives approached Torello and asked him
to arrange a meeting vjith President Yrigoyen.

The Minister

was reticent and told them only that "the President was very

upset with the companies for having placed in force tariffs
not approved by the Government."

Yrigoyen 's annoyance with

the railroads, in Torello 's words, "precluded any immediate

audience

.

The railroads' plan to use the labor question to force
a favorable decision on the matter of tariff increases had

Even though the same tactic had pro-

obviously miscarried.

vided efficacious results during negotiations over rates in
ABAP/Actas Reuniones Mensuales de Gerentes Nos 1 a
100 del 15 de Marzo 1921 al 27 de Noviembre de 1928 (hereafter cited as ARMG), Acta 1, 15 March 1921. The railroads
were in any event willing to grant only fixed woi'k scales
"If we sacrifice
and refused to consider fixed wage scales.
the right to reduce wages we, besides weakening our control
over the men, lose our only defence in case the Government
refuses further tariff increases that may be necessary...."
ABAP/OMGM, 31 March 1921.
;

^^La P rensa ,

6

April 1921, p. 6; La Vanguard ia,

1921, p.' 2.

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta

8,

8

April 1921.

.

7

April
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1919, circumstances in 1921 were not analagous.

The Govern-

ment was not faced with a labor "revolution"

Indeed, the

.

Confraternidad, reflecting the moderate character of its
leadership, had chosen the bargaining table in 1921 in place
of the strike.

Another consideration which the Government

could not overlook was the steady drumbeat of alarm raised
by powerful economic interests against higher tariff s.^"*"

Far from adopting a more conciliatory stance toward the
companies, Yrigoyen now decided to ignore them and closed his
doors to their legal representatives, men whom he had always

associated with the hated regimen.

ho

Refused admittance to

the President's office, the company lawyers sent him a note
on

8

April outlining their position.

The communication

stated that the whole question of tariff modification and
its relation to the Government's pov/er of approval had been

misunderstood.

To end the dispute the note suggested that

in exchange for Yrigoyen 's approval of rate modifications the

The railroads had used the labor issue in May and
June 1919 as a "scare tactic" with which to gain tariff concessions from the Yrigoyen Government. Although serious
rural unrest had convulsed the national territory of Santa
Cruz in 1920-1921, it lacked the alarming revolutionary overtones of the Semana Tragica in 1919. For railroad policy in
the aftermath of the 1919 unrest see above, pp.. I88-I89, 199-200.
^^On 5 April a long complaint-filled report was submitted to Torello by the Unidn Industrial Argentina. It
claimed that the nation's industry could support no further
Reprinted in RRP, LV (8 April 1921), p. 865.
burdens.

^^Taylor interview.

I

See also above, pp. 1^-15.

223

companies would return to the public "whatever sums they had

overcharcod" since

2

March.

This arrangement, the companies

contended, would show "their respect for the President's

authority" without hindering the railroads in the collection
of tariffs they considered reasonable.

Yrigoyen did not

answer the note but two days later, on 10 April, Giovacchini
raised the daily fines against the railroads to
m/n.

$

10,000

''^

Santiago

G.

O'Parrell, the local director of the Paci-

fic, managed to gain an audience on 21 April with Yrigoyen

over a matter extraneous to tariffs.

Eventually, however,

O'Parrell directed the conversation toward the deadlock over
rates "even though the President appeared desirous of shun-

ning all conversation in this respect."

Finally, Yrigoyen,

his face grave, spoke and accused the railroads of surpassing
the limits of the law and "rising in revolt against the re-

spect due to the Government and public opinion."

Moreover,

he asserted that "the only solution that remains to us is to

back up and return things to the point where they were when
the Government gave the order to suspend the application of
the modified tariffs."

^

^^Legal Representatives to Yrigoyen, Buenos Aires,
April 1921,' in ABAP/AJRG, Acta 8, 8 April 192.
^^La Epoca, 11 April 1921, p.

3.

''^From O'Parrell's memorandum of the interview,
ABAP/AJHG, Acta 11, 22 April 1921.

in

8
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O'Parrell tried to sooth Yrigoyen's ruffled feelings
and emphasized "that it had never been the intention of
the

companies to rise in rebellion against the Government, as
the Minister of Public Works well knew."

Yrigoyen shot back:

"Tliese are words;

Interrupting,

the companies have

committed deeds which ought to be destroyed with deeds. "^^
Despite the stormy character of the interview, O'Farrell
later noted that Yrigoyen had raised no fundamental legal

questions nor had ho disavowed the possibility of some tariff
concessions.

The President had said only that any rate in-

creases had to conform to the letter of the

law.''"^

But what was meant by the "letter of the law"?

This

confusing and complex question became the subject of long
and heated debate in railroad circles.

Miguel M. Padllla,

local chairman of the Central Cordoba, assumed the most un-

compromising position in the marathon meetings of the Junta
of legal representatives and directors held during the last

week of April.

He argued that under the law the companies

could earn up to 6.8^

on"

their invested capital after costs

without Government intervention and suggested that "It would
^^From O'Farrell 's memorandum of the interview, in
ABAP/AJRG, Acta 11, 22 April 1921.
From O'Farrell 's memorandum of the meeting, AHAP/
AJRG, Acta 11, 22 April 192].
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be worth the pain" to go to court /'^

O'Parrell, however, stated that his legal advisors
"were very doubtful as to the success" of a suit against
the

Government and suggested that "it would be better if the matter could be amicably settled .. .without compromising funda-

mental principles."

The local director of the Santa Fe,

Manuel A. Montes de Oca, then argued that article

9

of the

Mitre Law did not obstruct the Government's right to approve
tariffs on the basis of their fairness.

"The liberty of the

companies with respect to tariff formulation is limited, as
are all liberties."

In his concluding remarks, Montes de

Oca pointed out the sharp division of opinion among the legal

representatives and prudently asked:

"who is to say that the

same thing will not happen in the Courts?

It is a bad chance

to take."*^^

By 29 April, after many hours of discussion, the legal

representatives had harmonized their views to some extent.
All agreed to continue friendly relations with the Govern-

ment in the hope of gaining some concession on rates.

Pend-

ing a final solution, the lawyers also resolved to counsel
the companies to continue enforcing the higher tariffs.

over, preparations for a possible court battle were to be

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 12, 25 April 1921.
^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 13, 2? April 1921.

More-
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maintained in the event a Judicial decision proved
necessary.
With respoct to any legal proceedings, the lawyers were
in

agreement that "the Companies have the right of adjusting
their tariffs within the limits defined by Article

9

of the

Mitre Law... and that these tariffs are subject to control."
But wliich Government body had the legally constituted authority to exercise control over railroad tariffs?

extent of such control?

What was the

These questions caused fundamental

disagreements among the legal representatives.

Lawyers for

the Western, Central Cordoba and North Eastern Argentine

argued that a "preliminary Government decree is not necessary
to implement tariffs, for... the Government lacks the authority to impede rate increases as long as profits to not ex-

ceed G.Q%»"

On the other hand the Central Argentine and

Pacific's attornics were of the opinion that they could not
"object to the Government's authority to declare, before new

tariffs were put into force, whether they are legal or not."
The advisors for the Great Southern and Entre Wios railroads

assumed a neutral position, seeing some merit in both arguments

.

Having clarified their respective positions, the companies smoothed over their differences and once again ap-

proached the Government.

In a note sent to Yrigoyen on

'I

May the railroads hoped to dispell the "misunderstandings"
50

AI3AP/AJHG, Acta 15,

29 April 1921.
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which had enveloped the tariff question.

They reiterated

their plea for more revenue and cautioned that the poor

financial situation of the companies "could affect the regularity of transportation" and, by extension the most vital

interests of the national economy.
were outlined by the railroads:

Two courses of action

to lower expenses by cutting

down on costs and reducing wages and salaries, or to increase
income by raising the rates.

^"^

The companies also tried to minimize the political

dangers posed to the Radical Government by higher rates.

In

their note to the President the companies expressed the belief that because the result of the approaching national

election was not in doubt, it was imperative "to modify
railroad rates, within the limits of the law, and after consultation with the country's economic interests."
In the same communication, the companies made it clear

that it had never been their intention to question the

State's "prerogatives" in the matter of tariffs and offered
to accept any modification of the rates under discussion.

To make the proposal more attractive to the Government and

possibly to temper the hostility of the powerful cattlemen's
associations, the railroads promised to grant rebates on the

Representatives to Yrigoyen, Buenos Aires,
May 1921.
May 1921, copy in ABAP/AJRG, Acta 16,
^''"Legal

t\

^^Ibid.

^
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transportation of livestock to winter pastures.

The com-

panies were also amenable to establishinr, a special fund
to
repay the public any difference resulting from the new

Government-approved rates and those the railroads had been
collecting since

2

March.

Yrigoyen made no reply to the note and, in his message
to Congress on 20 May, gave no indication of having seen the

companies' proposal.

The Radical leader charged that the

tariffs being collected lacked Government approval, which
made it "necessary to apply the penalties authorized by the
law."^^

According to Torello, Yrigoyen did not take notice of
the railroads' offer until 17 July.

In a conversation with

his ministers the Radical President told them that the com-

pany proposals were unacceptable.
the note of

^1

Yrigoyen maintained that

May was "denigrating to the principles of

Government" and that any decision relevant to the "Justness
and reasonability" of tariffs was wholly within hjs Jurisdiction.

No deal, Yrigoyen emphasized, would be made with the

companies.

On the following day, however, Torello told

Gucrrico that "some progress might be made" if the railroads
substituted the first note with another "which expresses
^^Legal Representatives to Yrigoyen, Buenos Aires,
May 1921.
May 192], copy in ABAP/AJRG, Acta l6,
^1

^'^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobicrno, IV, 255.
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concretely the facts and does not affect the principles
of

Government."

The companies, unable to overcome the Radical

administration's delaying and obstructionist tactics, had
little choice but to comply and began to draft a revised
proposal.

SB'^
It was generally knovm in Argentina by mid-July that

the railroads had suffered their worst financial year in history.
$

The Buenos Aires Western reported a deficit of

1,501,972 m/n after servicing obligations and debentures

while the North Eastern Argentine lacked the resources to
eg

pay even its fixed obligations.^
57
in similar straits.-^'
2-t

The other companies were

Shocked with the results, the Review

River Plate remarked that saner people would no longer

take seriously the "malignant shrieks of extorsion raised by

ignorant cranks" and that:
With the stocks of the leading companies quoted at half
nominal values, there is to-day an excellent opportunity for enterprising Argentine capital to secure, cheap,
a participation in the "pingiies ganancias" of which one
used to hear so much. 58

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 22, 19 July 1921. Guerrico had also
spoken with the Minister of Agriculture, who substantiated
Torello's remarks. Lertora, of the Western, said that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs also corroborated Torello's offer.
See also La Epoca,
^°RRP, LVI (22 July 1921), p. 219.
22 July T5"2"l, p. 3, for an example of railroad-sponsored
propaganda in support of tariff increases.
^"^See the

various company financial statements for 1921.

^^RRP, LVI (22 July 1921), p. 221.
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The London boards, who had been watching the
financial

difficultieo of the railroads with growing apprehension,
felt

obliged to lend their weight to the dispute.

On 30 July

Lord St. Davids, whose personal relationship with
President

Yrigoyen had always been cordial, stepped ashore in Buenos
Aires for the second time in two years.

The London chairman

of the Pacific system was asked if the tariff increases

sought by the companies were necessary.

His reply was pre-

dictable:
The finances of the companies are passing through
difficult, times
The Argentine public should have been
persuaded, if it studied the income from traffic, that
the companies are doing very poorly, but I am afraid
they do not realize the intensity of the malady
In
our case [Pacific system], during the past year we have
earned nothing on our capital and we will probably be
forced to use what was saved the year before so as to
be able to fulfill our guaranteed obligations.
If we
fail to earn enough to cover our guaranteed dividends,
the Bahia Blanca and Villa Maria to Rufino lines will
be divorced from the system, and the present network
will be dismembered into small entities .... 59
.

La Epoca took issue with St. Davids' gloomy predictions

and argued that rate increases would add substantially to the

Admittedly, the semi-official organ noted,

cost of living.

the companies' profits were "not as great as in other times"

but this was not reason enough to raise tariffs.

The paper

then suggested that the railroads use their reserve funds.
59

La Naci<5n, 31 July 1921, pp. 5-6.

Even the larger com^^La Epoca 31 July 1921, p. 1.
panies were forced to borrow from their reserve funds to pay
,
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St. Davids, having acquainted himself with the legal

position of the companies, advised the railroad .lawyers and
directors to re-open negotiations with Torello.

Anticipating

some action on the part of the companies, Torello told both

O'Farrell and Guerrico, the local directors of the Pacific
and Great Southern, that Honorio Pueyrred6n, the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, had given a rough draft of a note to Alejandro L^rtora, the legal representative of the Western.

If the

companies signed the note, which would be addressed to the

Minister of Public Works, O'Farrell noted that "the Executive
Power would immediately take steps favorable to the

companie;s"

in the matter of tariff increases.

The note in question consisted of one sentence to the

effect that the railroads, by raising their tariffs without

official approval, had failed to recognize the authority of
the nation and its Government and that "they hasten to de-

clare that such was not their intention and that consequently
they manifest their absolute acquiescence with any decision
the Government may take in the matter."

When the communica-

tion was read to the assembled lawyers and directors it
The Great Southern and V/estern each had to
dividends of ^%
transfer i 500,000 from reserve to revenue accounts. RRP,
LVI (21 October 1921), p. 1072.
,

^^Torello informed O'Farrell of the note in an interview on the afternoon of 2 August and Guerrico over the telephone that same evening. ABAP/AJRG, Acta 2^1, 3 August 19?1;
•see also 23, 1 August 1921.
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elicited a mixed response.

Frlas and Padilla, of the Central

Argentine and Central Cc^rdoba, refused to sign "because
it

signified that in the future all the rights which the railroads had with respect to tariffs would be renounced."

O'Parrell, however, argued that there were only two paths
open to the companies, to sign or withdraw their tariffs.
He, together with the representatives of the Great Southern

and V/estern resolved to affix their signatures to the note

without further delay.

Their lines were in desperate need

of increased revenue and, after all, Yrigoyen had promised
to allow rate increases if they bowed to the Government's

plan.

By

4

August most of the other companies had also

signed.
On 21 August, to the utter discomfort of the railroads,

Yrigoyen signed a decree which declared all their increased
tariffs null and void, ordered the companies to return all
excess charges to the public and authorized the Ministry of

Public Works to "consult the economic capacity" of the country to determine what increases in rates could be reasonably

Among the British lines the Central Argentine refused
to sign because it felt its situation to be unique in that
the company had withdrawn its tariffs on 17 March and had
never been fined. Thus the company saw no need to beg forgiveness because it was guilty of no infraction. The Central
Argentine did raise its rates on 1 August, supposedly with
Central Argentine
the approval of Giovacchini and Torello.
Railway, P roceeding s, 1921. The Central Co'rdoba refused to
sign because the note threatened its "rights". For further
details see ABAP/AJRG, Acta 23, 1 August 1921.
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borne by Argentine agriculture, commerce and Industry.
Obviously, a detailed examination of the nation's economy
could be stretched out for months before any decision vis a
vis tariff hikes would be reached.

greater profits, had fallen into
note of

^

a

The companies, seeking

carefully laid trap.

The

August was not made public until the decree of 21

August was promulgated.

Moreover, there was no mention of

any Executive promise to sanction rate increases.

The im-

pression conveyed to the public was that the companies had
capitulated to the Radical Government and thrown themselves
upon its mercy

— excellent

propaganda in an election year.

Lord St. Davids, on behalf of all the companies, spoke

with Yrigoyen on 2k August and attempted to impress upon the
Radical leader the critical financial state of the railroads.
The London chairman of the Pacific may have also mentioned

that the Government's policy v/ould do Irreparable harm to

Argentine credit on the European market.

Yrigoyen listened

courteously and reportedly promised St. Davids that he would
take steps to sanction tariff increases before the chairman's

departure date of

2

September.

6^

^^Tho decree was published in La E poca 21 August 1921,
To the
See also ABAP/AJRG, II, 27, 22 August 1921.
p. 1.
companies' relief, the decree also cancelled the fines which
had been mounting since March 9th.
,

^^ABAP/Actas del Directorio Local [Pacific Railroad],
Acta 88n, 31 August 1921; ABAP/AJRG, Acta 28, 20 September
On St. Davids' references to foreign credit see Buenos
1921.

23^4-

Accordingly, on 26 August the Director General de Perrocarriles, with Torello's tacit approval, indicated to Lertora, O'Farrell and Guerrico that prior to any rate adjust-

ments it was necessary for the companies to present a note
to the Government in which the railroads "would manifest

their compliance with the decree of 21 August".

The second

part of the note would embody the railroads' request for

authorization to apply higher tariffs.

The railroad delega-

tion, empowered to speak for all companies signatory to the

note of

'I

August, agreed to the conditions and even allowed

Giovacchini to draw up the note.

To avoid any further mis-

understanding the rough draft was then submitted to Torello,
who agreed to its terms. 65
On 28 August the railroad deputation, uneasy with of-

ficial assurances, "believed it opportune" to speak with

Torello once again.

To their great stupefaction, the Minis-

ter of Public Works denied any knowledge of Giovacchini

resolution.

'

Incredulous, O'Farrell, Guerrico and L^^rtora

Ayres and Pacific Railway, P roceedings 19Hthe Minister of Foreign Affairs, also assured
panies and the British Legation that the rate
would be authorized without delay. See White
tary of State, Buenos Aires, 10 January 1922,
835.773/11.
,

Pueyrred6n,
both the comincreases
to the SecreUSDS/RIAA,

^^The account is drawn from O'Farrell 's memorandum of
The
ABAP/AJRG, Acta 28, 20 September 1921.
the meetings.
Government's published version of the events of August may
October to the companies.
be found in Torello's note of
See RRP, LVI (7 October 1921), pp. 929-933.
'I
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argued to no avail that such actions could only undermine
the Government's credibility.

In O'Farrell's words, this

"juego de tarifas" had to stop.

The railroad officials left

Torello's office with the distinct impression that the Government, "pressed by exigencies of a political character," had

decided to disavow Giovacchini
,
increases.

•

determination to allow rate

s

66

But the Director General de Perrocarriles , apparently

oblivious to the political machinations in the higher echelons of Government, informed the companies on 31 August that
"he vjas in a position to issue the expected resolution...."

On the same day the companies received his authorization to

raise their cargo rates on

1

after a month's notice.

Strangely, Giovacchini

tion

v/as

September and passenger fares
'

s

resolu-

not published in the semi-official press and never

appeared in the Boletfn Of icial , although Buenos Aires newspapers repeated rumors attesting to its existence.

68

ABAP/AJRG, Acta 28, 20 September 1921. The "political exigencies" probably referred to the gubernatorial campaign being v;aged in Ccfrdoba, a commercial center always
opposed to higher railroad tariffs.
'From the Legal Representatives' note to Torello, 30
September 1921, in RRP, LVI (7 October 1921), p. 927. For
the reputed text of the resolution of 31 August, see Ibid
(30 September 1921), p. 861.
.

^^See for example La R azon 5 Septem.ber 1921, p. 1 La
Vanguardia., 6 September 1921, p. 1, and the important finan5 September 1921, p. 1.
cial paper El Avisador Mercantil
Socialist deputy Nicolas Repetto requested information from
,

,

;
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But why had Yrigoyen allowed Giovacchlni to circulate
the authorization for rate increases to the companies?

It

was not a question of incompetence on the part of the Director General, for he closely coordinated his actions with the

wishes of his superiors.

It might be suggested that Yri-

goyen 's "policy" was in part intended to calm railroad circles in London.

For weeks Argentine railroad stocks had been

subject to wild oscillation because of speculation.

V/lth the

news that the Argentine Government had authorized rate in-

creases the market stabilized.

^

More importantly, Giova-

cchini's resolution "fulfilled" Yrigoyen 's promise to St.
Davids that the tariff question would be settled before he
departed.

Yet the London chairman of the Pacific must have

known that the Radical Government had little intention of

allowing the tariff increases even though the lines had begun
to collect higher rates on

1

September.

His hands tied by

the force of circumstances, Lord St. Davids, upon his embar-

cation for England, remarked more out of hope than conviction
that:

"I have always held and expressed the opinion that the

Argentine Government would treat the railways justly, and

remain of that opinion."

I

70

the Ministry of Public V/orks about the "secret decree" during
Diputados, Sesiones ,
the legislative session of 23 September.
1221, V, 260-262.

^^The Times
"^^Ibid., p.

,

3

7.

September 1921,
.

p.

12.

.
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By concealing Giovacchinl

'

s

resolution of 31 August,

the Governm3nt in effect fabricated an "example" of railroad

"perfidy".

To the public it seemed as if the new tariff

exactions were a brazen contravention of the Executive decree of 21 August which had declared null and void all rate

increases. 71

It would be only a matter of time, determined

by political expediency, before Yrigoyen chose to "respond"
to the clamor of public opinion, defend the country against

"grasping" foreign capital and cancel

the newly augmented

rates.
The Union Cfvica Radical had been closely following the

progress of the gubernatorial campaign in the key province of
Cordoba and, on

2

September, Yrigoyen sent one of his closest

associates, Elpidio Gonzalez, to report on the party's chances
for victory.

7P

Gonzalez returned quickly to Buenos Aires and

reportedly told Yrigoyen "that it would be impossible to
make any headway towards swinging the

...

election to the Radi-

cal Party should the increased railroad rates be allowed to
go into ef feet

'^-'•RRP,

"''^^
.

Coincident with Gonzalez' alarming pre-

LVI (30 September 1921), p. 86l.

It was
election was scheduled for 13 November.
also reported that Gonzalez was Yrigoyen 's personal choice
for governor and that Ms trip was made to unite the badlysplit UCH in Co'rdoba and secure the endorsement of the provincial party organization. La Prensa, 12 September 1921,
"^^Thc

p.

5

"^^White to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, 10

January 1922, USDS/RIAA, 835,773/11.
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diction, commercial interests in C6rdoba sent a flood of re-

criminatory telegrams to the Casa Rosada, dcnouncins the
railroads for assessing illegal tariffs."^''
With the crucial C6rdoba election just two months away, Yrigoyen decided that the time was opportune to inter-

vene once again in the tariff question.

On

8

September the

Government ordered the constitution of a Comision Te'cnica to
study the legality of the tariff increases of

1

September and

to report on the economic capacity of the country to bear

further rate increases.

715

A week later, on the 17th,

Yrigo-

yen ordered Torello to conduct an investigation into the

charges raised against the companies by Cordoban economic

Interest groups.

The President, at the same time, announced

through the press that he had never authorized the railroads
to raise their tariffs.

1 f\

The companies were alive to the political overtones of
the Government's policy but were virtually powerless to comSec also La Van La Epoca , 17 September 1921, p. 1.
The Socialist paper conguardla, T September 1921, p. 1.
sidered the whole tariff question to be a colossal farce and
accused the Radical Government of collusion with the railroads
See La Vanguardia , editorial, 5 September 1921, p. 1; 8 Septem
ber 1921, p. 1.
^

"^^Decree of 8 September 1921, in Republica Argentina,
Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Antecedentes , discusi(5n e info rmes de la Com isl(5 n Tdcnica de F.studlos y Revision d£ Tari"
fas (hereafter cited as RA/MOP, Comlsidn Tucn lca) (Buenos

Aires:

1922), p. 5.
76

La Epoca, 17 September 1921, p.

1.

.
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bat it.

At a meeting of the legal representatives and
direc

tors, JoGe Prlas and Miguel Padilla expressed a desire
to

present the railroads' version of the controversy to the
public, "to show that the railroads had been acting within
the dictates of the law."

Their colleagues, however, coun-

seled caution, realizing that any argument the companies

might advance could easily be turned to the Government's

advantage

77
'

,

The next phase of the tariff battle, which La Vanguar -

dia likened to a serialized movie, opened on 27 September

when Torello openly repudiated the "unauthorized" actions of
the Director General de Ferrocarriles and declared null and

void those rates which had taken effect on

1

September and

gave the railroads three days to withdraw the increases.

Moreover, the Minister reminded the companies that no new
tariffs could be levied until the Comisi(5n Tcfcnica had com-

pleted its investigation of the country's economic health.

7 ft

La Epoca dutifully blasted the pretensions of the companies

and castigated the hapless Giovacchini, whose actions were

associated with the politics of the oligarchy.

"The whole

incident shows the amount of energy necessary to expel from
the Government the vices and devices used in other eras.

'^'^ABAP/AJRG,

Acta 28, 20 September 1921
•

Van guardia 19 September 1921, p.
Circular"T457"2B September 1921.
"^^La

So

,

1;

AMT/r40P/DG,

2^0

deep had been the corruption

""^^
I

In response to the Government's latest maneuver,
com-

pany lawyers and directors met to air possible counter-measures.

Guerrico maintained that Torello's resolution forced

the railroads into "a disagreeable and uncomfortable posi-

tion" because it intimated that the companies were rising in

rebellion against the Government."
ello's note could not go unanswered.

It was decided that Tor-

On 30 September the

railroads petitioned the Government for reconsideration of
its resolution and reminded the Minister of Public Works that

both Giovacchini and Yrigoyen had sanctioned their tariff increases.

Because of the seriousness of the dispute, the

local boards also elected to sound out London as to possible

courses of action.

80

Upon receiving telegrams apprising them of the situation in Argentina, the presidents of the railroad boards met
in special session at the River Plate House.

After much de-

liberation they unanimously resolved to withdraw under protest all rates of doubtful legality, excepting, however.
Giovacchini, in a
^^La Epoca 28 September 1921, p. 1.
meeting held on 13 September with Torello and several railroad officials, denied that he had usurped the President's
authority in the question of rate increases and threatened to
Torello said that "this could not be permitted" and
resign.
convinced the beleaguered Director General to remain in office.
From O'Farrell's minutes of the meeting, ABAP/AJRG, Acta 29,
28 September 1921.
,

The text of
^°ABAP/AJRG, Acta 29, 28 September 1921.
the companies' note may be found in RRP, LVl (7 October 1921),
pp. 925-929.

.

2^1

"the increases in the tariffs established in accord with
the

law and approved by resolution of the Direction General of

Railways on the 31st of August

"

London also counseled

that all those rates approved by Giovacchlni be defended before the Courts.
The Arfsentinc Government, on its part, quickened its

campaicn acainst the companies.

La Kpoca cast the railroads

in the role of villain and assailed them in daily editorials
and articles. 82 On
October Torello rejected the petition
^1

of 30 September and warned the lines that they would be sub-

ject to the maximum fines allowed by law if their elevated

rates were not withdrawn by the 8th.

refused to comply, daily fines of

$

When the railroads
10,000 m/n were charged

and Torello sent a well-publicized note to the Minister of
the Interior asking him to instruct the capital, provincial

and territorial police to refrain from helpinp; the companies
to collect the "increases illep;ally put into force."
81

Tclep;ram from the London Boards to the Lep;al RepreOctober 19?1, AHAP/AJHG, Acta 31,
sentatives, London,
Confident in the ability of their ler.al staffs
October 1921.
in Buenos Aires, the London Boards directed them to "use at
thcJr discretion the means of effectlnp; these decisions and
in each case can count upon the firm support of the Directors."
^1

Ibid

.

^'^See

almost any front pape of La K poca for October 19?L

^^AMT/MOP/DG Circular //'18, 5 October 19^1; I-1 Kpoca
October 1921, p. 1; AFUP/AJRG, Acta 32, 5 October V02l; HHP
LVI (I'l October 1921), P- 987
^'4.a r.Doca,

8

5

,

,

October 1921, p.

1.

,
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The Great Southern, Pacific and Western railroads,
to

force the tariff controversy into the Courts, announced
that
they had done nothing to make themselves liable to
fines and

refused to pay unless judicially compelled.

Reacting

swiftly, the Government instituted executory action before

Federal Judge Anchorena who ordered each company to pay
$

60,000 m/n in fines and

$

4,000 m/n in costs.

With the

Court's decision the railroads paid the penalties and with-

drew their rates on 15 October,

Simultaneously, they pre-

pared counter-claims against the Government for the recovery
of the fines.

Because litigation promised to be long and involved,
any short-term solution to the tariff controversy was effec-

tively in the hands of the Government-controlled Comision
T^cnica.

87

The Review of the River Plate commented that

^^RRP, LVI (21 October 1921), pp. 10^9, 1051.
Once in
the Courts, the railroads could legally challenge Yrigoyen's
pretended right to regulate all rates.
86

Suing for money was the only legal action which
could be taken against the Government without the prior consent of Congress, an eventuality v/hich the companies scrupuSee Ibid , p. 1051.
lously avoided.
.

Comisi6n Tecnica consisted of Agustfn Garimaldi,
the General Accountant of the State-owned railroads, Federico E. Coma, the Chief of the Tariff Section of the State
railroads, Emilio Rebuelto, the Chief of the Section of
Railroad Statistics and Plans of the Direccion General de
Ferrocarriles , and Ariodante Giovacchini, who served as
chairman in spite of his disagreement with the Government.
RA/MOP, Comision Tecnica p. 5.
^"^The

,

2^3

regardless of the solution reached by the Commission the
Government "will have had the satisfaction of having figured

prominently as the inflexible protector of the people and
the zealous custodian of the national sovereignty."^^

There was no doubt in the minds of the local directors

that they were being victimized by the Radical political

machine and that Yrigoyen's Government was deliberately "exciting the passions of the public" against the foreign-con-

trolled railroad companies who were voiceless in local elections.

89^

Early in December the United States Charge

d'

Af-

faires reported that one manager had told him that the entire issue was "purely political" and that with the conclusion

of the presidential elections in April "the railways v;ould
be allowed to charge whatever tariffs they wished."

on

In

the meantime, Yrigoyen privately told the railroads that he

would entertain new tariff increases only if the companies

would express in writing that their "procedure derived from
ah erroneous interpretation of the resolution dated 31

August...."

Realizing that such a categorical statement

"would shatter all possibility of the success of the Judicial

action initiated to recover the fines", the companies decided
^^RRP, LVI (21 October 1921), p. 1051.

^^O'Farrell's words, ABAP/AJRG, Acta 33, 19 October 1921
^^White to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires,
December 1921, USDS/RIAA, 835.00/263.

2

2^^

to wait for the recommendations of the Government commission.^-^

The closing stages of the tariff battle opened on

January 1922 when Torello invited the nation's

7

economic in-

terest groups to meet with company representatives and the

Comision T^cnica over the matter of rates.

Beginning on 19

January heated arguments raged for more than a month between
the delegates of commerce, agriculture and industry and the

railroads.

Some delegates, such as Francisco Segul of the

Liga Agraria, raised the familiar charges that railroad

capital was watered and that the companies were much richer
than they were v/illing to admit.

Members of the Bolsa de

Comercio de Cc5rdoba cited exhorbitant tariffs as the chief
reason for their economic difficulties.

Others claimed that

the railroads could ride out the crisis by cutting passenger

service.

Even though most of the delegates eventually admit-

ted that the railroads were in the midst of a real financial
9
crisis, none would admit to tariff increases as the solution.'

Pressed by both Torello and the companies, the rcpre^^Minutes of Guerrico's interview of l8 December with
Yrigoyen, ABAP/Actas del Dircctorio Local, Acta 886, 31 December 1921.
Both Torello and
^^f{A/MOP, Comisi(^n T^cnica , passim
the members of the commission defended the companies against
accusations referring to watered capital and questionable
.

accounting procedures.

.

2^5

sentatives of the country's economic life reluctantly conceded that tariffs for alcoholic beverages, tobacco, cereals
and flax could be modestly raised.

With the approval of

commerce, industry and agriculture, the commission tenta-

tively recommended increases of 10^ on cereals, 15% on flax,
23% on luxury items, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco, and

10^ "on articles of everyday use", excepting those "recog-

nized as of prime necessity."

The commission also urged in-

creases of up to lS% on passenger fares, 15% on excess baggage and 20% on parcels.

Obviously the passenger had no

lobby to defend his interests.

93

The final recommendations of the Comlsidn were delayed

until 20 May, more than a month after Marcelo

T.

de Alvear,

the UCR presidential candidate, had been elected.

It v;as

not until 2H June that Yrigoyen finally signed the decrees

granting rate increases to the railroads, and then only
after the companies had again threatened to reduce rail ser95
vice, cut salaries and wages and lay off workers.

The

railroads, which had flirted with financial disaster for more
See also
^^RA/MOP, Comisi(5n T ^cnica pp. 552-560.
ABAP/Actas del Directorio Local, Acta 888, 28 February 1922.
,

^^"Informe de la Comisidn Revisora de Tarif as Nota de
Elevacidn", Buenos Aires, 20 May 1922, AMT/MOP/DG, Expedlente 01^199-C-922
;

^^For example see La Epoca 11 May 1922, p. 1. YriExpediente
goyen 's decrees may be found in AMT/MOP/DG,
OI2726-F-I92I.
,

?M6

than a year, began to collect the hlf.hcr tariffs on

1

August

1922,
»

«

An analysis of the tarl

ff

«

controversy of 1921-1922 re-

veals the extraordinary lonRthu to which the Radical Government was willlnp; to
ests.

p;o

to advance its own political inter-

The British-owned railroads were transformed into un-

willing; pawns in

tlio

hands of a master politician.

Yrigoycn

seized upon the rates question and in a remarkable tour de
force used it to his party's advantap-.e in both the C6rdoba

gubernatorial campaip;n and in the national elections.
The foreig;n-ownod railroads becaino natural targets for

political parties and economic interest p;roups as soon as
the post-war depression settled over Argentina.

Many busi-

nessmen remained unalterably convinced that railroad rates
were to blame for the economic malaise which gripped the
country.

Consequently, when the railroads announced further

tariff increases

a

wave of anti-railroad sentiment swept over

commercial, agricultural and industrual circles.

Yrlgoyen

was quick to exploit the situation and cancelled the increases

even though the conipnnlcr, were in urgent need of increased
revenues.

The Radical President rnpoused the "national inter

est" in his anxiety to placate Influcntia] economic groups In
an election year.

The railroads were handy scapegoats.

economic
In spite of Yrlgoyen 's later reputation as an

.

2^7

nationalist, his antipathy toward the railroads throughout his

administration had been sporadic in nature and usually corresponded to periods of domestic crisis or elections.

So too

in I92I-I922, his apparent hostility was politically and not

ideologically inspired.

But the President did have a genu-

ine aversion to the local directors, most of whom were from

the oligarchy and belonged to opposition parties. ^"^

worth noting that La Epoca

,

It is

the Government organ, seldom

attacked foreign capital per se.

Indeed, the bulk of its

complaints were usually directed against company officials
"lacking in administrative ability" or who persisted in the
"corrupt ways of the regimen".

98

In more than one instance

La Epoca stated unequivocally that the Radical Government

was not hostile to railroad capital.

99

The rates dispute also sheds light on Yrigoyen as a

manipulator who

v;as

able to take advantage of ill-defined

96

On Yrigoyen's economic nationalism see Romero, A
His tory of Argentin e Political Thought, pp. 220-221, and
Wright, Argentine Railways and the Growth of Nationalism
pp. 12^-T27r;

,

notable exception was Atanasio Iturbe, a Radical
on the legal staff of the Central Argentine who later became
the company's general manager and was able to "play politfcs"
with the Government during Yrigoyen 's second administration.
William Henry Taylor claimed that the
See below, p.
railroads made a great mistake by not replacing some of their
Interview.
managerial staff with Yrigoyenis tas
^"^One

.

.

^^For example see La Epoca
p

.

,

editorial, I6 October 1921,

1

^^Ibid.,

7

January 1922, p.

1.
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Argentine railroad law to brow-beat the companies and to infuse his pr2sence into the Direccion General de Ferrocarriles.

Giovacchini was a much weaker man than Pablo Nogues

and had an imperfect understanding of the powers of his office.

This allowed Yrigoyen to usurp the proper authority

of the Direccion General and to subject it to his political

whims.

Such arrogation of power by the Executive was not

unique; the cumulative results planted the seeds of admini-

strative breakdown which rose to the surface during Yrigoyen
second administration.

With Yrigoyen 's passing from office on 12 October 1922

railroad management probably heaved a sigh of relief.

The

new president, Marcelo T. de Alvear, was a Radical but his

upper class roots, European orientation and "broader view of
things" convinced the companies that he would accord them

more sympathetic treatment than they had been accustomed to

under Yrigoyen.

The railroads looked to the future with

hopeful anticipation.

"^^^

1958), pp. 53Felix Luna, Al vear (Buenon Aires:
8 April 1922, p. 3l0
54; South American Journal
,

"

CHAPTER
THE PROSPEROUS '20

's:

VII

THE ALVEAR PRESIDENCY

"Durante su administracid'n
no hubo grandes alteraciones
econdmicas ni en el pa^s ni
en el mundo.
Moneda estable,
ocupacldn plena, abundancia
de vivienda, afluencla de
capitales
Luna, Alyear, p. 63.
.

.

.

,

.

—

.

.

.

In a solemn session of Congress on inauguration day
1922,

the outgoing Chief Executive, Hipolito Yrigoyen, en-

trusted his successor, Marcelo

T.

de Alvear, with the baton

and classic blue sash, symbolic of Argentina's highest elected office.

The new President was in many respects the anti-

thesis of Yrigoyen.

Of upper-class lineage, Alvear's con-

nections and sympathies were with the wealthy of the nation.
He

v^as

tleman.

friendly, respectable and, most of the time, a genFar less parochial than ex-President Yrigoyen, Al-

vear was attuned to the world beyond Argentina's borders,

enamored with France and alive to the country's need for

continued foreign investment.

A strict constitutionalist,

the new President was repelled by Yrigoyen's callous disre-

gard for the nation's

laws and his usurpation of authority

properly within the purview of other branches of government.^
Raul Molina, "Presidencia de Marc-olo T. de Alvear"
in Academia Nacional de la Historia, Hist oria Argentina ConI, part 2,
19^2-196T)
tempor anea 1862-1930 (Buenos Aires:
Un cuarto s iglo
Anos ^ errores
pT~?9l5; Manuel GoldstraJ
,

,

,

:
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Like Yrlgoyen, the new Chief Executive was a
member of
the Radical Party and had been among the organizers
of the

Union Civica de la Juventud in 1889.

From the outset of his

term, however, Alvear showed signs of breaking with the
poli-

tical machine controlled by Yrigoyen.

Even though he had

been chosen personally by the former Chief Executive, who
expected to maintain his grip over both the UCR and the
country through the manipulation of "straw men" in the Alvear

Government, the new President quickly revealed intentions of

being his own master.

In the face of Yrigoyen's suggestions,

Alvear named to his cabinet men who were opposed to the old
President's style of Government.

This display of indepen-

dence brought the new administration Yrigoyen's wrath and

shattered the fragile remnants of party unity, disintegrating
since I916.

In 1923 the UCR was a party in crisis; in

192't

it v;ould split into two mutually antagonistic factions.

It

is against this backdrop of political in-fighting that the

relationship of the British-owned railroads to the Government must be considered.

2

de polftica argentina (Buenos Aires:
1957), p. 53; Luna,
Alvear, p. 66 Ysabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Rep ublic
For criticism of Alvear
(New York:
19^5), pp. 219-221.
see Ernesto Palacio, H istoria de la Argentina (^th ed
Buenos Aires:
1965), II, 356-357; Del Mazo, El Radlcal ;

.

ismo

,

II,

22.

In the new Government only Vice-President Elpidio
Gonzalez and the Minister of Public V/orks, Eufrasio Loza,
See Del Mazo,
could be considered as yrlgoyenistas
.

.
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\
*

The railroads, with their unhappy experiences under

Yrigoyen's administration, welcomed the accession of Alvear
to power.

Indeed, Sir Albert Bowen, the London Chairman of
'

the Great Southern, who happened to be in Paris when the

results of the Argentine election were announced, seized
the opportunity to interview the President-elect, who was
at that time the Argentine ambassador to France.

Bowen, in

his annual report to the company's stockholders, reflected

upon his conversation with the new President.

The chair-

man assured the audience that he was confident that Alvear
would accord the British-owned railroads in Argentina "a
due recognition" of their rights.^

Wasting little time, the general managers met on 17
October 1922 and resolved to take measures to reassert
their "right" to set rates free from Government interference.

The railroads adopted the decision of the Western to

return to the old practice of merely informing the Dlreccic^n
General de Ferrocarriles of tariff changes by forwarding
notices of the

nev;

rates without seeking previous Govern-

ment approval.^

Radicalismo , II, 21-22; GoldstraJ Ahos y crrores pp. ^951; Luna, Alvear p. 57; Crdnica Histdrica Argentina V,
p. V-292.
No. 73, "Presidencia de Alvear"
,

,

,

,

,

^Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Proceedings

,

1922

^ABAP/ARMG, Acta 22, 17 October 1922. The V/estern's
"test case" involved a. rebate for the transportation of polo
ponies

.
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Unfortunately for the railroads, their scheme was exposed in the personalista newspaper La Epoca on
ber.

'16

Novem-

That daily, fulminated against the companies' blatant

violation of policies made during Yrigoyen's presidency and
called upon the Alvear Government to stand firm against the
railroads, for they were threatening the "national sover-

eignty".^

Eufrasio Loza, the yrigoyenist Minister of Public

Works, ordered the Direccic^n General to conduct an immediate

investigation of La Epoca 's charges.*^
The new Director General, Herminio Capdevila, was a

personalista Radical from Cdrdoba who had been appointed to
his post by Yrigoyen on 10 October.

Because of his inex-

perience, Capdevila entrusted the investigation to Manuel
.

F.

Castello, the capable young Inspector General de Ferro-

carriles.

g

Within a week Castello had drafted an informe

The term "personalista" refers to that wing of the
Radical Party which supported Yrigoyen.
See also the edi^La Epoca l6 November 1922, p. 3.
torials in the issues of 17 November 1922, p. 3, and l8
November 1922, p. 1.
,

'^

Ibid

.

,

17 November 1922, p.

1.

o

Dante Ardigo, one of the Direccidn General's chief
statisticians in the 1920's, had a low opinion of Capdevila
and cast him as a politician who knew "nada de nada". InterCastello remarked that Capdevila knew
view, 1 June 1970.
little of railroad law and less of the technical aspects of
To illustrate the point, Castello noted that
his position.
Capdevila had been removed from his teaching position in the
.engineering department at the University of Buenos Aires allegedly for a lack of technical competence. Interview, 9
June 1970.

,
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which declared that the railroads could not modify
their
tariffs without previous Government consent.^

His report,

a technical and legal tour de force, was in
essence a fur-

ther elaboration of the position assumed by ex-Director
General Pablo Nogue's vis h vis the Government's rate-making

powers.

'•^

Earlier in the year, Castello had argued in the

journal La Ingenieria that tariffs per se possessed a multi-

plicity of facets, many of which were either ignored or mis-

understood by the companies unless they had a direct bearing
on their "profits".

Because the railroads had a naturally

myopic and self-seeking interpretation of their right to
formulate tariffs, the Inspector General contended that it
was the Government's duty to intervene in rate-making "in
the public interest ".

^"^

On 22 November the companies received a circular from
the Direccic5n General which defended the Government's right
to intervene in the constitution of tariff schedules.

12

Inasmuch as the details of the dispute had become public
^

See also AMT/MOP/
La Epoca , 23 November 1922, p. 1.
DG, Expediente 025806-C-922 for correspondence between Capdevila and the Central Cdrdoba over this question.

Some offi
^^For Nogu^s policy see above, pp, 56-58.
cials in the Direccidn General believed the railroads' acSee Castello, "vfas de Comunicaclon"
tions to be legal.
La Ingenieria No. 568 (February 1922), p. 85.
'

,

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

88-91.

^^La Epoca, 23 November 1922, p.

1.

25^

I

property, the companies realized the inadvlsability of
pur-

suing the matter further and withdrew their notices.
f^c

La

ci6n , the semi-official organ of Alvear's Government,

played down the incident and announced only that Capdevila
had established the right of his office to intervene in the

preparation and approval of railroad tariff s.-'-^
The entire episode revealed that Yrigoyen, even though

out of office, was still able to make his influence felt in

the Government.

Through La Epoca 's revelations and proba-

bly with the connivance of Loza and Capdevila, his partisans
in official circles, Yrigoyen had forced the Government to

respond.

The result was to cast the personalistas as the

true defenders of the national sovereignty while placing

Alvear in a dubious light.

''"'^

While the companies and the Government sparred over
tariffs, rumblings of discontent were growing louder among

railwaymen.

Labor's dissatisfaction had its roots in two

decrees issued by the Yrigoyen Government in March and May
1922 which granted workshop personnel the right to eight
days annual vacation with pay, and provided for up to 90
•^La Acci(5n ,

2^1

November 1922, p.

3.

'"'^Castello's report was apolitical and pursued the
policy developed by Nogu^s. Yrigoyen, when it suited him,
passed the policies off as his own. See La Epoca , I6

November 1922,

p.

3.

.
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days leave at half wages in the event of prolonged
sickness.
The decrees had never been implemented by the
companies,

however, because of their poor financial shape at the time.

Yrigoyen had responded to the companies' economic distress
and had authorized the railroads to ignore, temporarily,
the decrees' provisions

Early in December, both La Fraternidad, the engineers'
and firemen*s

union, and the Unidn Ferroviaria, heir to the

defunct FOF, insisted that Loza enforce the decrees.

Railroad management, however, refused to negotiate with the
workmen's associations because they did not recognize them
as legal bargaining agents for the men.

The Government,

aware that the railroads were in the midst of transporting
a record crop to Argentina's port cities, acted to fore-

stall any slov;down in rail traffic.

Two decrees, issued in

accordance with the General Railroad Law of I89I, were published on 20 December; they called for obligatory arbitration to settle the labor dispute
cic5n

17

and ordered the Direc-

General to assemble an arbitral tribunal to discuss

^^La Frater nidad Ano XV (20 August 1923), pp. 5-6;
RRP, LVIII (29 De'cember 1922), p. 1577.
,

Ferroviaria was established on 6 October
See Fernandez, La Union F erroviaria pp. 139, 1^16.
1922.
Both organizations remained within the Conf raternidad
Ferroviaria.
'"^The Uni(5n

,

provided for in paragraph 20, artl
Anales, vol. for 1881-1919.
cle 71 of Law 2873 (I891).
"'"'^Arbitration was
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the workmen's demands.
On

5

1

o

January 1923 Capdevila ordered the companies to

name an arbitor within five days.'^

But the railroads, in

a joint note to the Minister of Public Works, argued that

compulsory arbitration violated the law and infringed upon
the direction and administration of the railroads.

No ar-

bitor, the companies stated, would be named to the tribunal

Their contention apparently carried some weight in official
circles, for the Government passed the note to its legal

advisers for their opinion.

?n

The railroads had never opposed arbitration as such,
but strenuously objected to the Government's pretension to

compel them to participate in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.

21

The Unidn Ferroviaria realized that the

chief complaint of the railroads involved a point of law,
the clarification of which would consume months in the
-1

o

For the texts of the decrees see AMT/MOP/DG, CircuThe tribunal was to consist of
lar 53, 26 December 1922.
three members, representing the companies, unions and the
Government

"^AMT/MOP/DG, Circular

1,

5

January 1923.

^^The note is summarized in ABAP/AJRG, Acta 58, 10
January 1923. See also RRP, LIX (19 January 1923), p. 1^1,
and 26 January 1923, p. 207.
On 31 January railroad management met in the offices of the Minister of Public Works and stated their willingness to voluntarily submit their personnel problems to
arbitration. See O'Farrell's minutes of the meeting in
ABAP/Actas del Directorio Local, Acta 897, 31 January, 1923
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courts.

Assuming the initiative, Antonio Tramonti, the

union's shrewd president, suggested that the Government

allow the companies to voluntarily assist in the formation
of an arbitral tribunal without calling Into question their

legal arguments against compulsory arbitration.^^

Tramonti

's

proposal was opportunely timed, for less

than a week later the Treasurer General released a hastily

assembled report which indicated that Alvear's decrees relative to obligatory arbitration contravened the dispositions
of the General Railroad Law.

Pending a more thorough ex-

amination by Honorio Rodrfguez Larreta, the Attorney General, and because of the sudden Illness of Eufraslo Loza,
the Minister of Public Works and a central figure in the

discussions, the companies thought it advisable to shelve

further consideration of annual vacations and sick pay.
The Unidn Ferrovlaria had little choice but to wait.

While the labor question momentarily receded from

public attention, the post-war depression in the cattle
industry, v/hlch had reached alarming proportions by 1923,

began to have an important Influence on the railroad's
For a summary of the Unidn Ferrovlaria s note to
the Government see RRP, LIX (9 February 1923), p. 331.
'

(l6 February
^^For the text of the report see Ibid
On the effect of Loza'"s infirmity on
1923), pD. ^122-^23.
the negotiations between the railroads and the Government
see ABAP/AJRG, Acta 62, 5 February 1923.
.

,
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relationship with the Government.

In September 1919 the

price index on the Argentine market for cross-bred cows

began to plummet.

Although the index for chiller steers^^

at first held firm, it too began to fall a year later.

The

sharp decline in values was indicative of an oversupply of

cattle at a time when overseas markets were contracting.^^
The powerful Sociedad Rural Argentina, led by Joaquin
C.

de Anchorena and a Board of Directors who were prominent

ranchers, understood the roots of the crisis and adopted a

wait-and-see attitude.
on

8

But this position changed abruptly

November 1922 when Pedro

T.

Pag^s, a trust-baiter, de-

feated Anchorena in the Society's biennial elections.

Pag^s

blamed the crisis on the meat packers and called for Government intervention.

26

Soon after Pages' victory both the Rural Society and
the Special Committee on Livestock Affairs of the Chamber

of Deputies turned to the railroads for help in easing the

cattlemen's difficulties.

On 30 January the general mana-

gers met with the congressional committee to discuss ways
oil

"Chillers" were top-grade calves which usually had
been fattened on special alfalfa pastures. By the mid1920's chiDled beef was by far the leading item in ArgenSmith, Politics and Beef in Argentina
tine meat exports.
,

p.

35.

^^

.

,

pp.

82-85.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

86-87.

Ibid
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in which the railroads could alleviate the crisis.

At a

second session the committee suggested that the
railroads
.

adopt a sliding tariff for livestock which would correspond
to the fluctuations of the market price.

The companies,

determined to resist the cattlemen, asserted that it was
not possible for them to institute a sliding rate.^^

John

Montagu Eddy, the Great Southern's General Manager, argued
that even the present profits made by the line could not

make up the serious losses incurred during the war and its
aftermath.

Furthermore, he argued, the railroads had never

made much profit on the transportation of cattle and that
tariffs for carrying livestock had not been raised in 1922.
Any additional rebates, Eddy explained, could do nothing
to ease the crisis.

29

La Acci6n , the Government newspaper. Joined with the

cattlemen in their demands for lower livestock tariffs.
The nine-man congressional committee, chaired by
Mario Guido, a Radical from Buenos Aires Province, v;as
composed of four more Radicals, tvio Conservatives, a SoSee Smith, Politics
cialist and a Progressive Democrat.
and Beef in Argentina p. 9^. For the minutes of the meeting betv/een the railroad managers and the committee, see
ABAP/AJRG, Acta 63, 21 February 1923.
,

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 6^,

6

March 1923.

^^Reported in La Epoca 9 March 1923, p. 2. The Committee apparently found merit in the companies' arguments,
for in its report to the Chamber of Deputies on 5 April it
Diputados Se si ones
said nothing about lowering rates.
,

,

1922, VII, 57-70.

,
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Noting "the striking valorization of railroad stocks
since
1921", the paper proceeded to contrast the new era of rail-

road prosperity with the depression which gripped the cattle
industry.

La Accidn argued that because cattle traffic ac-

counted for a large portion of railroad revenue "it is only
right, given the situation, that the railroads lower their

tariffs. "^°
The Sociedad Rural lodged its first formal complaint

against the companies in June, when Pagds sent a note to

Minister of Public Works Loza, who had regained his health,
informing him that cattle tariffs were a factor in the con-

tinuing crisis. ^1

Responding to the pressure of the gana -

deros (cattlemen), Tomas Le Breton, the Minister of Agri-

culture and a member of the Rural Society, summoned Alejandro L^rtora, the Western Railroad's chief legal representative, to his office.

As the V/estern carried the bulk of

livestock traffic, Le Breton asked the company lawyer if
La Accidn reported that railroad stocks had risen
See also
Issue of 13 March 1923, p. 7.
an average of 36^
editorial, 1^ June 1923. p. 5.
.

o-|

The letter was reproduced in Sociedad Rural ArgenAs early as
tina, Anales , LVII (1 July 1923), pp. 559-560.
July 1921 other cattlemen's associations, such as the Liga
de Ganaderos del Sud, had sought Government intervention to
secure a substantial rebate for livestock transportation.
At a meeting of the
See RRP, LVI (15 July 1921), p. 1^19.
Rurar~Society , however, held on 22 July 1921 railroad rates
were never once mentioned as a factor in the cattle crisis.
Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anales , LV (1 August 1921), pp.
•587-588.
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the railroad could grant a rate rebate.

L^rtora explained "that at the present time the trans-

portation of livestock was realizing very little profit" and
that the traffic in any event was subject "to one of the

lowest tariffs."

Indeed, he remarked, cattle rates had not

kept pace with rising operating costs.

For this reason L^r-

tora "believed it would be very difficult to accord any rebate, unless the Government modified the code of labor regu-

lations in a manner which would lower exploitation costs."
The Minister (Quickly agreed to Ldrtora's proposal and,

through him, asked the companies to submit those changes
they deemed necessary in the reglamentacidn del trabajo.
At the same time, Le Breton admitted his conformity with

the railroads' often-repeated requests to divide their systems into zones based on traffic intensity to the end of

reducing the number of personnel in those districts of
least importance.

As L^rtora turned to leave, the Minister

promised to discuss possible modifications of the labor
code with the Cabinet.

^^From L^rtora's notes of the meeting.
Acta 70, ? August 1923.

ABAP/AJRG,

The
^^From Ldrtora's minutes of the meeting, Ibid
railroads had been dissatisfied with the reglamentacidn
In May 1919 the companies had submitted prosince 1917.
posed modifications of the work code as to hours and
AMT/MOP/DG, Expediente 09241-L-919. See also
cycles.
above, Chapter IV.
.
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Pleased with the Govornmont's apparent willinr.ness
to
co-operate, the Junta of Lopal Representatives and Directors agreed to accord tariff rebates to ease the critical

situation of the cattle Industry.

On

3

August the compan-

ies Informed the Government that until 31 December they

would charge

7.0%

less for livestock carried from pasture to

pasture and ^0% less for transporting unsold cows from the
Liniers Market in Buenos Aires back to the campo.

The new

tariffs, however, would bo limited to distances greater
than 150 kilometers from the Capital and for cattle not

consigned to the market or packers.

Accompanying the pro-

posed tariff concessions were company recommendations for

modification of the reglamentacidn del trabajo as it applied to little used branch lines.
Le Breton, who had expected substantial reductions in

cattle rates, was disappointed with
the companies' proposals
Jose? A.

Krfas

,

ilio

limited scope of

sent an official to speak with

arid

the President of the Junta of Railroad law-

yers and directors.

The Argiculture Ministry representa-

tive, armed with diagrams and statistics relative to live-

stock tariffs and traffic for the previous decade, demanded
that the companies agree to a rebate of

traffic until the crisis abated.
^''aBAP/AJIKI

,

Acta 70,

3

"^0%

for all cattle

Unmoved by the Oovern-

August ]9?3.
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merit's arguments,

the railroads refused to consider greater

reductions than had been accorded.

Alvear, in an attempt

to wring greater rebates from the railroads, delayed
his do

cision with respect to changes in the reglamentacidn del
trabajo.

But the companies stood firm.

As cattle prices

returned to normal levels in 192^ and I925 the controversy

eventually evaporated.

The labor regulations remained un-

altered.^^
The question of annual vacations and sick pay for

railroad workers, which had lain dormant since February
1923, sprung up once again in late July of the same year

when Attorney General Rodriguez Larreta handed down his decision about the legality of compulsory arbitration.

In

his opinion it was not necessary to submit disputes between
the companies and their personnel to arbitration.

Alvear

in response to the findings of the Government lawyers, sum-

moned Loza and the railroad attornies to his office on
October.

9

According to Frfas, the Chief Executive queried

the railroads as to their willingness to grant concessions

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 71, I6 August 1923; Acta 72, 29
August 1923.
^^

Ibid , Acta
December 1925.
.

9't,

17 December 192'l;

Acta IO8, 16

decision is synthesized in La Fraternl dad
See also ADAP/Actan del
Affo XV (20 August 1923), p. 6.
Dircctorio Local, Acta 902, 31 August 1923.
^"^Thc

,

26^

to their employees.

Frfas was noncommital

but promised

,

Alvear an answer within a week.^^
The company lawyers and directors, after a long ex-

change of proposals finally agreed among themselves to

offer to pay their workshops staff half wages for up to
ninety days, not counting the first eight, in cases of illness, with the condition that the infirm worker have more

than six months of uninterrupted service.

Annual leave,

however, was voted down by the Junta.
On 18 October the railroads presented their findings

to Alvear.

Speaking for the Junta, Miguel M. Padilla, the

local director of the Central Cdrdoba, told Alvear that it
was the companies' understanding that his decrees calling
for obligatory arbitration were without substance.

Never-

theless, Padilla continued, the companies were willing to
pay half wages in the event of prolonged illness, but they

"could not see their way to grant annual leave."
Alvear, replying to Padilla, admitted that the decrees lacked a legal foundation and informed the attornies

that they would be withdrawn "once the companies made ef-

^^From Frfas' notes of the meeting.
75, 11 October 1923.
3

Acta 75,
19 October 1923.
9 Ibid

.

,

H

ABAP/AJRG, Acta

October 1923; See also Acta 77,

^°ABAP/AJRG, Acta 77, 19 October 1923.
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fective their promise to reach agreement with their
staffs
in the matter of salary payment in cases of infirmity."''^

Having won their point, the companies immediately opened
discussions with their men.

The Great Southern was the

first to negotiate a settlement with its workshops personnel, but vihen the other lines adopted the Southern's suc-

cessful formula many workers objected to the terms.

Alvear

was informed of the difficulty and, after consultation with
the company lawyers, authorized the railroads to publish

notices announcing that all lines would adopt sick pay reforms in step with the Great Southern's agreement.

Aware

of Alvear 's feelings, the workers quietly accepted the com-

pany proposals.
By 192^1 the essentially conservative railroad policy

of the Alvear Government had revealed no significant trends

which would imperil the generally satisfactory relations

existing between the companies and the administration.

Al-

though the Government had assumed an uncompromising position with respect to the delicate question of rate-making
and had Jealously guarded the nation's right to intervene

^"ABAP/AJRG, Acta 76, 17 October 1923; Acta 77, 19
October 1923. See also ABAP/Actas del Directorlo Local,
Acta 903, 31 October 1923.
^^Ib^id.,

Acta 78, 25 October 1923; Acta 82, 19
ABAP/Actas del Directorio Local, Acta

December" 1923
31 December 1923.
;

90'l,
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at any time in railroad tariffs, the impetus to act
had come

from La Epoca

's

revelations.

The personalistas lost no op•

portunity to embarrass publicly the Alvear Government.''^
With respect to the administration's efforts to enforce compulsory arbitration on the companies in the event
of labor disputes, Alvear seemed more concerned with avoid-

ing a rail strike during the peak months of traffic than

with championing the cause of the railroad worker.

Admit-

tedly, the railroads found it necessary to pay their per-

sonnel for sick days, but on terms dictated by the companies with the acquiescence of Alvear.

The Executive decrees,

when shown to be illegal, were withdrawn.

Furthermore, the

Radical Government had shown its willingness to tamper with
Yrigoyen's reglamentacirfn del trabajo to the companies'
benefit if the railroads reciprocated with lower rates for
the crisis-bound cattle industry.

To Alvear, labor was

little more than a means to an end.
By the end of 1923 the railroads had regained their

^In two court cases, in December 19^3 and March 192^1,
the Government's proclaimed right to intervene at any time
in setting tariffs suffered a serious set-back when Federal
Judge Zavalfa found that the rate increases of 1921, which
had been put into force without Government authorization,
Zavawere legal within the context of laws 2873 and 5315.
ifa held the 6.8^ profit on invested capital to be invioFor details see RRP, LX (28 December 1923), PP 1517,
late.
In March the Govern1519, and LXI (V\ March 192'0 , p. 665.
ment returned $60,000 m/n in fines to the Pacific. ABAlV
Actas del Directorio Local, Acta 905, 31 March 192'i.
•

26?

financial footing (See Graph I).

Argentine trade had re-

bounded from its post-war slump, cattle prices had begun to
recover and a record harvest was producing a volume of rail
traffic unsurpassed in the nation's history.

These fac-

tors, in combination with decreasing fuel and material costs,

signaled a new era of prosperity for the British-owned railroads

.

Because of World War

I and the

accompanying depres-

sion following the armistice, railroad expansion had not
kept pace with the needs of the country.

In the opinion of

the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Argentina, more feeder

lines were necessary, "even in thickly populated areas".

Some representatives in the C^mara de Diputados

,

notably

Mario M. Guido and Alejandro Gancedo, while not faulting
the railroads for failing to expand their systems, did com-

plain that they lacked sufficient rolling stock to transport the harvests to market, a charge denied by both the
companies and the Government.

^7

^^Killik, Manual of Argentine Railways for 1924, p.

5.

^^See Graph I, p. 268'.
'^^From the report of Major E. L. McColl in the Commercial Int elligence Journal (23 February 192^), reprinted
iTTEMT LXr (21 March 1924), p. 709.

DiDutados, Sesiones 1922, VII, 7 March 1923,
William
pp. 355-357, for the charges of Guido and Gancedo.
Henry Taylor, long associated with the Pacific Railroad,
called Gancedo a "terrific nuisance". He "wanted us to
^'''see

,
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GRAIH I
Consolidated Accounts' of the Four Principal
Brltlsh~qwn^JRanr^p
I92I-I926
191'}
t

millions

Fiscal Years
191^

Line A = Gross Receipts
Line B - Expenses
Line C*l-rofits Before
Dividend layments

.5

0.0

Source

I

Compiled from published company accounts,
191^, 1922-1927.
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President Alvear, in his congressional message of
20 June

,

said nothing of a shortage in rolling stock

but did call upon the companies to expand their systems.
It is to be hoped that the augmented receipts of the
railroads will assist the companies so benefited in
raising new capital for the purpose of extending
their present lines or to begin new ones which would
bring prosperity to the most remote parts of our

extensive territory.

Even before Alvear addressed the Legislature, the
Great Southern had announced "an impending new era of con-

structional progress and expansion" and planned to petition
the legislature for concessions involving three new branch

lines in Buenos Aires Province.

The Review of the River

Plate felt that the request, which would involve a capital

outlay of

^

3,000,000 would be "willingly and promptly"

maintain constantly a roster of wagons sufficient to carry
instantaneously a full grain crop during a couple of months
and then idle for the rest of the year." Letter to the author, 19 December 1970.
The Government investigated the
supply of rolling stock and concluded that the companies
had a surplus carrying capicity of 500,866 tons. See Diputados, Sesiones 1922, VII, 17 April 1923, pp. 4^»5-^l55.
The railroads claimed that delays were caused by factors
other than a shortage of freight cars. Large shippers often
speculated on market prices v;hile the major exporting grain
firms held the crops in overtaxed port storage facilities
because of a scarcity of shipping, high ocean freights, or
Consequently, the ports were congested,
other factors.
freight cars could not be unloaded for lack of space and
"the cry of shortage of waggons is again raised." From an
address by Ronald Leslie to the Argentine Centre of the
Institute of Transport on 31 May 1929, in RRP, LXVII (7
June 1929), pp. 19-21.
,

Senadores, Sesiones

,

192^

,

I,

12^
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granted by Congress/^

Howard Williams, the General Manager

of the Central Argentine, reported in August that his com-

pany now had the means "to resume important pioneer work"
and to extend the railroad's tracks into Argentina's "ex-

tensive uncultivated regions ....

"^"^

The railroads, however, much to their dismay, found

Congress woefully slow to act on their proposed concession
laws.

Lethargy and legislative impotence stemming from the

factionalization of the Radical Party were to characterize
Congress for the remainder of Alvear's term.

Indeed, during

1924 and 1925 a total of only twenty-one laws were passed
by the legislature.

It was not until 8 September 1926 that

the branch lines planned by the Great Southern were approved

and construction could begin.

51

The Central Argentine's plans to build a connecting

line between Villa del Rosario in the Province of Cc^rdoba
^^RRP, LXI (6 June 1924), pp. 1393-1396.

^^Report dated 24 August 1924 in Central Argentine
Railway, Report and Accounts 1924
,

.

^'"Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Proceedings ,
For the course of debate in Congress see Senadores
1926.
Sesiones, 1925, II, 4-37; Diputados, Sesiones , 1926 , V,
ryi-iydT Arthur Coleman, the traffic manager of the Great
Southern on the Bahfa Blanca section of the system, ascribed
See his Ml
the delays and obstruction wholly to politics.
Vida de Ferroviario Ingles en la Argentina , Chapter V. C.
A. Tornquist sharply criticized the Inaction of Congress vis
k vis the passage of railroad legislation in "Balance of
Payments, 1923-1925", in RRP, LXIV (5 November 1926), p. 21.
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and Garza in Santiago del Estero were exposed to the
full
fury of the political storm which blew across Argentina in
the mid-19.20's.

In early 1925 all political factions save

the Socialists promised the voters of C6rdoba, who were to

choose a new provincial legislature and governor on

8

March

that they would support the quick passage of the necessary

concession law in the national Congress.

But the person-

alistas did not win their campaign in Cdrdoba and immediately lost interest in promoting the branch line in the

legislature

52

Nevertheless, according the anti-personalista daily
La Accidn, ex-President Yrigoyen retained a special interest in the construction of the line and reportedly informed
the Central Argentine that if the company asked for his

support he would see that the necessary legislation
passed.

v/as

If the company refused, Yrigoyen threatened that

"his legislators would boycott the branch line."

La Ac -

eion , noting that Congress had tabled the Central Argentine
bill, concluded that the railroad had not dealt with Yrigoyen.

In the paper's words, the line so necessary to the

economy of both provinces, became the "victim of bastardly
53
and pernicious politics."

^^La Accion ,
53 Ibid.

3

September 1927, p. 12.
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Some members of Congress, while hesitant to
consider

further extensions of the private companies' rail
networks,
were always willing to criticize the railroads for their

reputedly high tariffs.

But Alvear, in his congressional

message of 1924 had found no fault with rail rates and re-

minded the legislators that tariffs were closely controlled
by the Government.

Unconvinced by Alvear *s assurances, Ernesto Padilla,
a Liberal from Tucuman, asked the Government in July if it

was not possible, considering the flourishing financial con-

dition of the railroads, to roll tariffs back to 191^ levels.

Padilla felt that the repeated rate increases granted

to the companies had been Justified because of the extra-

ordinary circumstances created by the war, but, he argued,
the emergency had passed and rates should be adjusted ac-

cordingly.

The first concern of the railroads, Padilla

suggested, should be the welfare of the public. 55

Director General de Ferrocarriles Herminio Capdevila,
in response to congressional pressure, ordered Manuel Cas-

tello, the Inspector General, to study the rates question,
54

Senadores, Sesiones, 1924, I, 124.

In Decem^^Diputados, Sesiones, 1924, II, 519-523.
ber 1924 Jos^ Heriberto Martinez, a Progressive Democrat
from Cordoba, urged Alvear to intervene in railroad rates
Ibid., VII, 264-272.
and return them to pre-war levels.
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a task

port,

completed by the end of August 1925.
v^hicli

Castello's re-

analyzed the fiscal years 1921 to I923, was not

considered by the C^mara de Dlputados until August
1926, a
full year later.
Briefly, the report noted that as railroad expenses had not measurably decreased, the rate increases authorized by the Executive were still valid.

More-

over, the report explained that if the coefficient of ex-

ploitation rose above 60%

,

as it had for the period from

1921-1923, the limit for tariff intervention by the Govern-

ment had to be correspondingly higher.

^

In Castello's opin-

ion, the Government could do nothing to affect a general

tariff reduction unless the companies violated law 5315.^^

Congressional concern over railroad tariffs often reflected the periodic crises endemic to

a

pastoral economy.

In 1923, when the ganaderos were suffering from the postv/ar

depression, a congressional committee had examined the

rate schedules of the British-owned railroads to ascertain
if the companies could accord tariff rebates on livestock

traffic.

So too v;hen the wheat, oat and barley crops

failed in

192^1

and again in 1925 a number of deputies looked

to the railroads to aid the cereal producers by lowering

their freight charges.

In a rare display of harmony, the

Camara de Diputados on 29 July 1926 designated a committee
^^Por the complete text see Diputados, Sesiones
IV,

^151-^73.

i

,

1926

27k

of five members to conduct a general investip;atlon of
rail-

road tariff s.^"^

Early in 1926 the Government began to apply pressure
to the railroad companies in an effort to persuade them to

reduce their cereal tariffs.
torial that the railroads

La Acclc^n noted in a lead edi-

v;ere

indisputably an essential

factor in the national economy and deserved support for all
their "reasonable initiatives and planned extensions".

But,

the semi-official organ cautioned, "we are also sympathetic with the other sectors of the economy."

Directing its

attention to the plight of the cereal producers, La Accio*n
criticized the railroads for paying high dividends at a
time when they should have been helping to alleviate the
crisis.

Agricultural interest groups sent

a

steady stream of

complaints about railroad freight charges for their products
to the Ministries of Public Works and Agriculture.

In a

note to Roberto Ortiz, who had replaced Eufrasio Loza in
1925 as Minister of Public V/orks

,

the Asociacio'n Nacional

de Agricultura called for a general revision and reduction

Sesiones
gation proved inconclusive.
^'''biputados,

,

1926, III, 28-39.

The investi-

In 1925 the four
major railroads paid an average dividend of 6.5w on ordinary
See RRP, LXIII (25 December 19?5), p. 3'*.
shares.
^^La. Accic^n

,

25 January 19^6, p.

3-
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of rates because agriculture was "In no condition
to sup-

port the elevated tariffs."

In addition, the note ex-

plained that rates for transporting agricultural produce
had been raised at a time when the growers could bear
them.
But, the Asoclaci<^n reported, conditions had changed.

Or-

tiz was requested to return cereal tariffs to the levels

of 1914.^^
In chorus with the Asoclacl6n Naclonal de Agrlcultura,

other important organizations, including the Centre de Con-

slgnatarlous del Productos del Pais and the Bolsa de Cereales, complained to the Government that the adverse com-

bination of low cereal prices and rising production costs
demanded railroad tariff re forms.

Anxious to please the

producers, the Government asked railroad management to consider rate rebates.^"*"

Convinced that they could do little to help the cereal
producers, the general managers, meeting on 17 August, decided that "there was no need to accord any rebate whatsoever, neither

v/as

it up to the railroads to carry the bur-

den in alleviating the situation."

62

When Ortiz hoard of

^^Ihe note was printed in La Accldn
^'^

August

Ibld

,

6

August 1926, p.

1;

,

22 June 1926, p.

ABAP/ARMG, Acta 66, 17

192^
^^See ABAP/OMGM, 13 August 19?6.

^^ABAP/ARMG, Acta 66, 17 August 1926.
Epoca, 18 August 1926, p. 1.

Sec also La
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the railroad's decision he summoned the managers to his of-

fice and impressed upon them "the emergency situation which

had developed on the market because of falling prices for
wheat, oats and barley."

He then questioned the railroad

officials as to possible ways in which the companies could
help.

The managers remained firm in their decision that

no rebates could be granted, but they did offer to store

the crops free of charge in their sheds until 31 December.
The Minister thanked, the managers for their proffer but

again asked them if some rebate could not be given on the

transportation of wheat for distances greater than 150
kilometers.

Having promised to reconsider the question,

the managers departed.

6

La Acci(5n , writing for the gallery, reported that

Ortiz had convinced the companies to provide free storage
and that the Minister of Public Works was "confident" that
the railroads would lower their cereal tariffs.

The tone

of the article did not surprise the companies for they real-

ized that the Government's position was dictated by political considerations.^^

If the anti-personalistas were to win

the national elections in 1928, Alvear's administration had
to begin showing some positive results.

By acting vigor-

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta ll6, 20 August 1926.
^^La Accion, 21 August 1926, p.
117, 1 September 1926.

.8;

ABAP/AJRG, Acta
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ously the Government hoped to convey a sense of
accomplish-

ment to a public which had been treated to the disgraceful

conduct of the nation's lep;islature

.

It also hoped to de-

prive the opposition of possible election issues.

Bothered by the adverse turn of events, the p;cneral
managers resolved to lot the Junta of lawyers and directors

determine the best course of action, for in their opinion
the cereal crops emergency and its solution "was more a

matter of politics than railroads."

The Junta could not

convince itself that rebates would alleviate the crisis on
the wheat market, but "for powerful reasons of a political

order" the lawyers and directors agreed that some action
was necessary "to show the good disposition of the railroads
in the emergency."

give rebates of

5/»

Grudgingly, the railroads decided to
for distances between 150 and 250 kilo-

meters and 10% for greater distances.

In addition the 5%

charge on tariffs established by the railroad pension law
(10,650) would be suppressed for cereal cargos.

The new

.^^
rates would remain in effect until 31 December 19?6

La Acci(5n hailed Ortiz' success in constraining the

companies to lower their rates.

The Government, endowed by

the paper with an aura of boundless energy and enthusiasm,

was shown as the defender of the country's collective well-

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 117,

1

September 1926.
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being.

Alvear's policies were "devoted to the Republic".
Once the railroads had given ground the Government

pressed its advantage.

On 15 September Atanasio Iturbe and

Ronald Leslie, the chief attorney and general manager respectively of the Central Argentine, were summoned to the
Casa Rosada.

Upon entering Ortiz' office they wore informed

by the Minister that President Alvear had promised the

Governor of Santa Pe that the railroads would extend the
franquicia (rate rebate) to all distances because the companies' revised tariff schedules did not include many de-

partments in the governor's province.

Leslie stalled for

time and replied that the matter should be discussed with
his colleagues.

Cutting the manager short, Ortiz observed

"that in his Judgment the railroad principally affected by
the Executive promise was the Central Argentine" and de-

manded an immediate reply, as the Governor had to return to
Santa Pe in a day or two.

Iturbe met with the company's

legal staff and then with the Junta which decided that in
viev'/

of the Government's "peremptory terms, which did not

admit either to delay or a negative reply", there was no
choice but to accord rebates of 5^ for distances less than
150 kilometers, 10% for 150 to 250 kilometers and 15^ for

greater distances.
^^La Acci^n, editorial,

5

September 19^6, p. 10.

^'^Prom Leslie's notes of the meeting, AHAP/AJHC, Acta
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Simultaneous with the cereal crops crisis, railroad
labor again became restless.

In mid-April 1926 Ortiz had

warned at least one company that workers not included in
fixed wage and labor scales were making insistent requests

through the Union Ferroviaria for higher day wages and that
"there might be trouble on the railroads "^^
.

According to

a manifesto circulated by the Uni(5n Ferroviaria, the ques-

tion of more pay for laborers not included in the escalafon

had been outstanding since 1921, when Minister of Public
Works Pablo Torello had arranged such increases with the
companies.

At the time the railroads did not object to

Torello's proposal because their requests for higher tariffs

were still under discussion by Yrigoyen's Government.

After

the companies had been authorized to raise their rates, however, they refused to pay higher wages because they felt

that the issue demanded further "study and consideration."

69

By 1926 the Unidn Ferroviaria, which had been growing

rapidly in membership since its inception in 1922, was ready
to test its strength.
119, 15 September 1926.
1927.

It informed the companies in a letter

The rebates were extended to March

^^ABAP/Actas del Directorio Local, Acta 921, 22 April
1926.
The Unic^n Ferro^^La Acci(5n 23 April 1926, p. 3.
2H April 1926,
viaria's manifesto was reprinted in Ibid
,

.

p.

3.

,
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that a work slowdown would begin on 23 April if
they failed
to give wage hikes to unclassified (non-escalaf6n)
personnel. 70 While most of the companies remained silent
the

Great Southern, in a surprising display of independence,
came to terms with the disaffected workers.

Tramonti, Presi

dent of the Uni^n Perroviaria, quickly exploited the unex-

pected division in the ranks of the companies and built a
strong case for the railroadmen.
V/ork

slowdowns spread to most of the other railroads

by April 28.

La Accidn

,

mirroring the Government's posi-

tion in the controversy, reported that the situation "was
not yet dangerous," but in view of La Fraternidad

'

s

soli-

darity with its sister society "it could develop into a more
serious crisis which could harm the national economy."

Weighing the respective arguments advanced by the companies
and the workers, the semi-official paper concluded that the

railroads could support the increases already granted by
the Great Southern.

72

RRP, LXIV (30 April
For figures of the union's growth see
1926), pp. 11, 13.
Fernandez, La Unio^n F erroviaria p. I66.
"^^La Acci(5n

,

22 April 1926, p.

2;

,

La Epoca, 22 April
The Great Southern's action was the first mani-

'^'La Acci(5n,

22 April 1926, p.

2;

1926, p."?.
festation of what a Pacific official later called "a deliber
ate policy which does not bind itself to co-operation with
the other Enterprises." Memorandum of Mervyn F. Ryan to Sir
Arthur V/atson, ^ April 1927, ABAP/DA, GA 35612.
"^^La

AcciJn, 28 April 1926, p. 8.

i
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Negotiations between the union and the Pacific proved
especially laborious because of the absence of the
company's
new general manager. Sir Arthur Watson, who was' on an
in-

spection trip of the railroad's system.

While Sir Arthur

was out of Buenos Aires, Manuel Montes de Oca, the president
of the Pacific's local directorate, was reluctant to deal

with the Unidn Ferroviaria.
able.

Watson was to prove more pli-

A vain man susceptible to flattery, Watson was sur-

prised by the effectiveness of the work slowdown on his company's lines.

Following several conversations with union

leaders, who praised his sterling qualities. Sir Arthur became convinced of the necessity to treat with the associa-

tion and recognized the Uni<?n Ferroviaria as the official

bargaining agent for the Pacific's staff on

7

May 1926.*^^

William Henry Taylor painted a vivid picture of the results
of Watson's action:
Well, at the next manager's meeting I remember that
there was a tremendous shebozzle because he [Watson]
came along and said... he'd found it very necessary
that the railways recognize the Unidn Ferroviaria and
have somebody to deal with. And he was quite right.
"Damn it, why did
But they [the other managers] said:
you do it on your own, on your own bat?" Oh, there
"Here we're all supwas a terrible, terrible row.
posed to work together and you go and do a thing like
that and what are we going to do now? We can't do
anything else. We're forced to accept the Uni(5n
Ferroviaria." And they had to.'''^

—

8

'^Fernandez, La Unic5n Fer roviar ia, p. 172; La Acci(5n,
May 1926, p. 3; Taylor interview, 11 June 1970.
"^^Taylor interview,

11 June 1970.
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Their solidarity shattered, within a month most of the companies extended official or semi-official recoo;nltlon to
the union.

Sir Arthur's action did not end the work slowdown on
the Pacific, however, for the Uni(^n Perroviaria now demanded
the right to organize the company's administrative personnel.

Watson was horrified by the prospect and rejected the demand.

The Government, too, looked askance at the union's

attempt to gain control of the white-collar staff.
May Capdevila., the Director General de Ferrocarriles

On 13
,

or-

dered the Pacific to normalize its services, as the "go
slow" movement had caused an unacceptable disruption of rail

traffic.

The company was also authorized to dismiss any

worker who broke the law.

Rather than calming the labor

agitation, Capdevila's resolution spread the movement to

other lines and rumors circulated that a railroad strike
.

was imminant

''^^

^^See La Accid n, 10 June 1926, p. 3, and ABAP/OMGM,
Special Meeting of Ge"neral Managers, ^ June 1926. Semiofficial recognition meant that the company in question would
speak with union officials although the union would not be
considered as the men's sole bargaining agent, i.e., the
railroad reserved the right to treat directly with its own
personnel
13 May 1926 , p. 3; 1^
In May 1927, Lawrence Usher, a junior clerk
May 1926, p. 2.
on the Pacific staff, expressed his fears vis a vis unioniza"^^La

Accion

,

11 May 1926, p.

2;

"The staff must be loyal and
tion of white collar workers:
These virtues must
trustworthy under all circumstances
certainly disappear if the men belong to societies such as
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Worried by the sudden intensification of the dispute,
Ortiz called together the union lee^ders, Director General

Capdevila and the president of the Pacific's Buenos Aires
board, Montes de Oca.

They hastily assembled in the minis-

ter's office on 15 May.

A

marathon session, lasting all

night, resolved the conflict.

The Uni(5n Perroviaria, in

return for higher wages for unclassified workers retroactive
to 1 January 1926 and reinstatement of all men dismissed by

the Pacific, ceased its efforts to organize clerical staff.
By 12 June all railroads adhered to the agreement reached

between the Pacific and the Unidn Perroviaria.

La Accidn

praised Ortiz and gave him full credit for solving all difficulties and conciliating all interests

"^"^
.

La Acci6n , moreover, seized the opportunity to con-

trast the labor policy of the Alvear Government with that of

Yrigoyen.

Noting with satisfaction

tlie

facility with which

Ortiz settle a potentially serious labor disturbance, the

Government press reminded its readers that Yrigoyen's policy
had resulted in broken promises and the semana tragica.

Furthermore, Alvear did not fear v/orkmen's associations, as
did Yrigoyen, because he realized "that they had a social
the "Union Perroviaria".

See ABAP/DA, GA 35^12.

Accion, l6 May 1926, p.
12 June 192F7^p. 3.
'^''^La

8;

10 June 1926, p.

3;

28^

conscience.

""^^

Although the presidential elections were

well over a year away, the anti-personalis tas
were already
drawing the lines of battle.

By 1926 the influences and events which shaped
the

Alvear administration's railroad policy could be easily
discerned.

Unquestionably, the country's economic interest

groups played a major role in determining the nature of the

Government's relationship with the companies.

Both the cat

tie industry and agriculture had powerful lobbies in offi-

cial circles and, during periods of adversity, succeeded in

persuading the Government to bring pressure to bear on the
railroads for lower freight rates.

Although the strong class identification of the Government with the pastoral industries was probably the main
factor in the direction of Alvear's policy, political con-

siderations cannot be ignored.

Indeed, during the course

of the cereal crops crisis railroad managers had few doubts

that the Government's vigorous activity on behalf of the

producers was more politically than economically inspired.

Tariff reductions, in the opinion of the companies, had no
impact on the price indices for wheat, oats and barley.

But the Government realized that any rebate would pay poli78

La Accion,

1

June 1926, p.

8.

285

tical dividends.

Not only would the producers be
molli-

fied, but the Government could also
hall itself as the de-

fender of the nation's economic life.

Furthermore, the

display of energy deprived the political
opposition of
possible election issue in I928.

a

The railroads, constantly on the defensive,
found

that they could not disentangle themselves
from the all-

embracing web of Argentine party politics.

Their proposed

branch lines and plans for new terminals had been
delayed
in a paralyzed Congress for years because of
party maneu-

vering; their tariff schedules had to be readjusted to
the

exigencies of politics.

To complicate further the compan-

ies' position,

their traditional unanimity of action broke

down in 1926.

The Great Southern, under the hand of John

Montague Eddy, chose to deal independently with its unclassified personnel while Sir Arthur V/atson shocked the other

general managers when he unilaterally extended official

recognition to the Union Ferroviaria.
The railroad unions made substantial gains during the

years from 1923 to 1926.

They had secured salary improve-

ments, sick pay benefits and, most importantly, company

recognition.

Their success, however, stemmed from their

own initiative.

President Alvear's labor policy at best

tolerated the unions, but on more than one occasion he was

willing to suggest modifications in work rules to lure the
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companies into making tariff concessions
to the powerful
economic Interest groups.
As 1926 gave way to the new year
an air of expectancy

hung over Argentina.

Preparations for the national elec-

tions, schedules for April 1928, attained
a sense of urgency.

The railroad managers, although they had
no voice in

the forthcoming elections, must have wondered
if they would

again become a political target.

i

CHAPTER VIII
THE RAILROADS

FROM ELECTION TO REVOLUTION
MB YRIGOYEN'S SECOND ADI/JNISTRATION

i

I927-I930

"It is difficult for the foreigner to know what to do, yet
it is essentisl that, if he
has business of any kind, he
should keep in with the President of the moment.
That much
is quite certain. "--Sir Malcolm

Robertson, British Ambassador
to Argentina, 29 January I930.
In January 192? the yri^oyenist newspaper La Epoca

with

a-n

eye to the forthcoming national elections,

fied its campaign against the Alvear Government.

.

intensiIt not

only reminded its readers of the achievements of Yrigoyen's
presidency, but also, to the probable discomfort of rail-

road management, directed politically-inspired complaints

against the British-ov/ned companies.

In the paper's opinion

rail rates were too high and a shortage of rolling stock had

resulted in the loss of thousands of tons of cereals which

had rotted for lack of transportation.

Actually, however,

the personalista attack against the railroads was inciden-

tal in that La E-poca reserved its most damning accusations

for the Government, which "did nothing to alter the situation.

..1

See for example La Epoca
25 January 1927. p. 1; cf
charges against the
'-^'he
RRP LXV (4 February 192?), p. 9.
Alejandro Eunge writing in Ija
companies were unfounded.
Nacion for 13 April 192?, showed statistically th^t the capacity of the rolling stock had increased by 16.7;? over that
of 1913, that existing rolling stock could carry a consi.

.

,

,
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Coincidentally, La Epoca began to devote
increasing
attention to railwaymen in a concerted
attempt to woo them
away from their Socialist-controlled
unions.
Articles and
editorials repeatedly assailed the leaders
of the Union
Ferroviaria and La Fraternidad and claimed
that the societies falsely represented the true
aspirations of labor.

Daily homena.ies from all parts of Argentina
pledged the support of railroad workers to the personalista
camp and

praised Yrigoyen for the benefits he had secured
for them.^
Forgotten were the repression of rail strikes in
I918 by
federal troops and the bloody semana trSgica of I919.
La Epoca

's

attempts to rally railwaymen to the Yrigoyen-

controlled wing of the UCR went largely unchallenged by the

Government press.

Late in 192?, however, La Accion did note

with satisfaction that the most prestigious railroad unions
opposed personalismo and that La Fraternidad had repudiated
all aid to the yrigoyenista campaign.

cording to La Accion

.

"Under Alvear", ac-

"workers have been fairly treated."

"Never has the Government impeded their orgcini zation or

movement."

FurtJiermore

the semi-official orgc'n contended,

,

derably increased tonnage if necessary and that wliile the
cost of running per train kilometer had risen by 105/S, tariffs per train kilometer had increased only 7Syo,
Reprinted in RRlf LXV (13 May 192?), p. 32.
..

2

See the following issues of La Epoca for a representative sampling of its political propaganda relative to the
railroads and railwaymen 11 March 192?, p. 1; 19 April 192?,
June 192?, p. 1; I6 December 1927,
p. 1; 29 May 192?, p. 1|
p. 1; 17 December 1927,- p. 1.
»

^1-
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Yrigoyen was obviously seeking votes
among railwaymen,
whereas Alvear sought only harmony.^
Throughout 192?
the Government, even though not
especially interested

in

trying to convert rail workers into
active anti-personalista
partisans, was anxious to keep labor
tranquil, as aiiy unrest
could, have serious political
repercussions given the
prox-

imity of the presidential elections.
To complicate the Government's task,

on 31 December

1926 the escalafon, which had been arranged between La
Fra-

ternidad and the railroad companies three years before,
expired.

Som.e

seven months before the expiration date, Fidel

Desaho, La Fraternidad

'

s

president, had sent

a

note to the

companies in which he asked them to state their positions

with respect to the anticipated re-negotiation of work and
wage scales.

Cautiously, the general managers replied that

they were "willing to continue the present agreement for a

further period."^

Railroad management, however, was rea-

sonably sure that La Fraternidad would seek modification of
the escalafon and directed their traction superintendents to

"prepare a com.plete case wiiich shall include all the points

and amendments
del Trabajo

— both

— it

in the Escalaf6n and the Reglamentaci6n

is considered desirous the

Companies should

Accion editorials, 1^ December 192?,
December 192?, p. 10.
.

ABAP/OKGI-l,

^ Ibid

.

,

7

11 June 1926;

July 1926.

?

July 1926.

p.

12;

l6
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endeavor to secure...,"^
Beginning on 5 January I927, company
officials and
union leaders met to discuss work and
wage
scales.

Al-

though both parties expressed their
willingness to compromise, La Fraternidad insisted that
engineers and firemen be
asked to work fewer hours aiid that the
men be paid higher
wages.
The companies, while flatly refusing
to entertain
the union's proposals vis a vis wage hikes,
did indicate
that they were prepared to cut the number of
working hours
with the condition that the railroads have
absolute liberty
in drawing up the men's work cycles.

La Fraternidad rejec-

ted the companies' offer and by the end of Jajiuary
negotiations became deadlocked.

Public V/orks Minister Roberto Ortiz, concerned that
the im.passe might occasion unrest on the railroads, issued
a resoD-Ution on 3 February calling on the companies and La

Fraternidad to appoint two delegates each to serve on a committee under the chairmanship of the Ministry's section chief
for Railroad Labor.

Once constituted, the com.mittee was to

study the feasibility of La Fraternidad

'

s

proposals.

^ABAI-/OMGM, 10 Septem.ber I926.
La Fraternidad had also
requested the Government to alter the reglamenta cion del trabajo.
See the letter of Fidel Desaho to Roberto Ortiz, 26
March I926.
ALT/MO P/DG, Expediente O9665-V-IQ26 attached
to 09241-L-919.
,

"^ABAP/OMGM, 14 Januarv 102?

;

La Acci5n

.

1927, p. 3.
See AP-iT/MOl/DG, Expediente 09241-L-919.

2^ February
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Both the union and corap.nnies.

the latter reluctantly,

agreed

to support the Government's
initiative and debate the issues
in committee.
But the general managers made it
clear that

they would not discuss any question
which affected their authority in matters of administration or
discipline.^

Dissatisfied with

tlie

investigating committee, which

had not met, and anfrered by the companies
subsequent refusal to re-open direct negotiations, PJmilio Firpo.
the new

president of La Fraternidad, tlireatened to call

a

work slow-

down on 6 March "unless the railroads agreed to
meet them
and discuss wages and all aspects of the escalafon."

Alarmed

by the unioj^'s menacing attitude, Ortiz spoke with John
Mon-

tague Eddy,

the general manager of the Great Southern,

ing the evening of

2 r/!arch.

dur-

The Minister advised Eddy to

inform his colleagues "that the Government cannot put up

with any labor trouble at the present

time."-*-^

If,

Ortiz

remarked, the companies would reconsider their position

with regard to wage increases, the Government would entertain the railroads' proposed alterations in the reglamenta9see H.G, Cabrett, General Manager of the Central
C6rdoba, to Director General Capdevila, 2^ February 192?;
Manuel Montes de Oca, Buenos Aires Director of the Pacific,
to same, 26 February 192?; Fernando D. Guerrico, Buenos
Aires Director of the Great Soutiiern, to same, 3 I-arch 192?.
AMT/MOl/DG, all letters attached to Expediente 09241-L-919.

^^Memorandum of Mervyn F, Ryan, Co-ordinatinr Officer
of the General Managers Conference on Railroad L'^bor, to Sir
Arthur V/atson, General Manager of the lacific, 3 March 1927.
ABA}/DA, GA 35612.

292

cion del trabajo."^"^
The general managers, sensitive to the Government's

vulnerable political position, assembled on the following

morning in the Flaza Constitucion offices of the Great
Southern.

After several hours of heated debate the mana-

gers decided to advise Ortiz

that if in order to avoid Labor difficulty he decreed that there were to be ample discussions between
"La Fraternidad" and the Companies, the Generftl Managers would be open to such an arrangement, but with
the reservation that any concessions granted would not
become effective until the reformed Reglainentaci6n del
Trabajo had come into force. 12

That evening Ortiz accepted the companies' recommendation

and within a week negotiations between the railroads and La

Fraternidad were renewed.

13

After more than a month of tough bargaining, the parties agreed on most of the union's demands for modification

of those clauses in the escalafon concerning work rules.
No settlement was reached, however, on a new salary scale.
To railroad management the union's proposed wage increases

of

l6fo

on the v/ide gauge lines and

l<^fo

narrow gauge were v/holly unacceptable.

on the one meter

ajid

The companies were

willing to concede much smaller raises, on the order of

^fo

I^ABAP/AJRG, Acta 129, l6 August 192?.
•'^Ryan's memorandum to Watson,

3 f'^arch 1927f

ABAF/DA,

GA 35612,
•^^

Ibid

.

See also ABAF/AJRG,

1927.

i

Acta 129, l6 August

,
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and 6^% respectively/^

While La Fraternidad and
railroad management discussed
changes in work and wage
scales, the committee which
had
been created as a result of
Ortiz' resolution of
3 February
directed its attention to the
troublesome reglamentacion
del trabajo.
During Jm.e and early July the
companies and
the union exchanged proposals
and counter- proposals as to
possible modifications in the general
work rules.. The rail,
roads were apjalled by La Fraternidad
's demands and protested that they were more onerous
than the work rules in force
Piqued, however, by what it considered
the intransigence of
the companies, the union retired its
delegates from the committee
By mid-July the discussions between
the union and the

companies had again become deadlocked.

Firpo, La Fraterni-

dad's president, appraised the situation and
decided that
the union's best chances for success lay in the
area of wage

increases.

In a brief note to Ortiz, he asserted that
be-

cause the companies had refused to consider substantial
pay

raises the union would begin to "go slow" on
25 August/^
Aware of La Fraternidad
1/j.

's

plans, the general managers

ABAI/AJRG, Acta 129, l6 August 192?.

^IMd.
June 1929,

See also Castello's memorandum to Ortiz, ?
ALIT/r-iOJ/DG, attached to Expediente 092'^1-L- 919,

^-^ABAl/Or/iGM,

August 1927,

12 August 192?; ABAF/AJRG, Acta 129, I6

29^

resolved to pass the question to the Junta of
legal representatives and directors and to name a committee to
speak with
Ortiz.

Convening on l6 Augxist, the Junta debated possible

approaches to the dilemma.

including Raul Zavalla and

Several members of the group,
Iviontes

de Oca of the Pacific,

and Atanasio Iturbe of the Central Argentine, reported that
they had spoken with Ortiz.

All were shocked to discover

that the Minister, in spite of earlier assurances, now
"wished to discard all questions relating to the Reglamen-

tacion del Trabajo," because "this was within the exclusive

control of the Executive Power."

Although the company of-

ficials had impressed upon Ortiz that in their opinion modifi cat ion of the labor reg-u.lations presupposed wage increases,

he refused to reconsider his position.

17

Reflecting on the latest set-back, Fernando

D.

Guerrico,

Buenos Aires Director of the Great Southern, remarked that
the companies could not resist the labor movement because of

public opinion and the approaching elections.

To openly

fight La Fraternidad's demands would only provide eager politicians v/ith ample ammunition to blast the railroads, and,
possibly, result in an even more onerous settlem.ent with
the locomotive men,

^"he

British-owned lines were not anxious

to be cast again in the role of scapegoat to satisfy Argen-

tine political maneuvering.

Most of the Junta concurred

l^AEAP/AJRG, Acta 129, l6 August 192?.
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with Guerrico, it being generally felt that "for
reprons of
political convenience" the railroads would have to concede
wage increases with no guarantee that
del trabajo would be altered.
On 2k August,

down,

J

tlie

reglaiTientaci6n

o

a day before the threatened work slow-

the Junta appointed a committee to interview Ortiz

about wage concessions.

Iturbe, speaking for the compan-

ies, was prepared to offer increases of $ 15 m/n per month,

$ 10 m/n higher than their first offer.

But to the com-

mittee's surprise Ortiz said little about higher pay rates
"and spoke in generalities."

The Minister asserted that

modification of the work rules was wholly within the Government's preserve, just as salary adjustments appertained to
the companies,

"because the Government did not pretend to

administer the railroads."

Ortiz then impressed upon the

committee the seriousness of La Fraternidad

'

s

intentions

and insinuated that personalista Radicals "were striving to

produce a niovement to obtain advantages,"

19

Insisting that the companies consider the situation
Another possi^^ABAl/AJRG, Acta 1?,9, l6 August 1927.
ble factor in the companies' decision to yield to the union
was Ortiz' earlier assurance that if Congress passed an
eight-hour v/ork day he could be trusted "to see that justice
Would be done to tlie railroads", i.e., that they would be
Furthermore, the railroads v/ere enjoyinr an exexempted.
See
traordinary volume of traffic for the time of year.
Ryan's memorandum to V/atson, 1? Karch 192?, AEAI/DA, GA 35612.
For a typici
Acta 130, 25 August 192?.
personalista attack on La Fratern Idad 's Icadersliip sor Li
Epoca. 16 December 19^7 p. 1.
^^AJP-Al/AJRC,

»
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with

a

"cierta liberalidad "

,

Ortiz instructed the railroads

to meet at once with the workers and grant the
increases

they requested.

Buckling under the Government's pressure,

the Junta met with Firpo that same afternoon.

La Fraterni-

dad's president, hard-pressed for results by an increasingly

vocal group of yrigoyenista locals, demanded that

the rail-

roads concede $ 5 m/n more per month than the proposed
$ 15
m/n, or,

in lieu of the additional increase contribute

$ 6o,000 m/n each per month for the construction and main-

tenance of

a

hospital for railwaymen.

20

Advised by Ortiz that La Fraternidad would postpone
the work slowdown to allow the Junta time to discuss the

union's demands, the company lav/yers and directors agreed
to convene once again on the following morning,

the 25th,

Meeting in the offices of the Great Southern, the directors quickly agreed that the hospital project should be

opposed, but, before they could formulate a resolution the

proceedings were interrupted by an urgerit telephone call
from Ortiz.
claimed,

"The moment is critical,"

theMinister ex-

"Last night's meeting of La Fraternidad had been

stormy" and the men, in

a close vote,

the scheduled v/ork slowdown."

"refused to postpone

Ortiz urged the companies to

support the hospital contribution as

tlieir

failure to do so

"would produce a very bad effect" among the workers,

20ABAP/AJRG, Acta 130, 25 August 192?.
^Ijbid.

21
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Their backs to the wall, the
J.uita resolved to oppose
the hospital scheme and trusted
that La Fraternidad 's rank
and file would accept instead the
additional $ 5 m/n per
month earlier proposed by Firpo.
To no one's surprise the
union accepted the offer.
It seemed as if Ortiz had
frightened the compaiiies into granting wage
increases they
had previously considered exorbitant.
But more important
for the Government, Ortiz had quashed
the personalista

threat to La Fraternidad

•

s

leadership, kept Yrigoyen's par-

tisans from politicizing the powerful union,
and, in concert
with Firpo, forced the companies to make substantial
con-

cessions with respect to wages.

M .^oo^on
the dispute,

praised the Government's policy throughout

terming it a "brilliant triumph".

Just as the

conflict "had reached an impasse and trouble loomed, President Alvear, with the best interests of the country at heart,

ordered Ortiz to arrive at a solution which would be in har-

mony with both workers and the companies

.

"^-^

The railroads

were understandably less ecstatic over the results.

In a

sober report to Sir Arthur Watson, the general manager of
the Pacific, Mervyn F.

Ryan estimated that the new escalaf 6n

22

ABAF/AJRG, Acta I30, 25 August I927.
See also Ryan's
memorandum of 25 August 192? entitled "Interview with the
President of the Republic," ABAP/DA, GA 35612.
In the final
settlement firemen were accorded increases of $ 20 m/n per
month and engineers $ 25 m/n.
La Accion. 26 August 1927, p.
^-^La Acci on.

26 August 1927,

pp.

1,

12.

1.
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would cost the Pacific
approximately 5> 4o 000 per annum,
the
wage hikes "being in the
order of llf..
The Junta, Ryan explained, had "no other course
but to accept the terms indicated by the Government with
as good grace as possible.Moreover, "the increase has been'
conceded unconditionally
and without any compensation under
the
.

••Reglamentaci6n del

Trabajo"."^^
The railroad companies' problems
did not end with the

Fraternidad settlement, for during the
midst of the dispute
renewed rumblings of discontent against

rail freight charges

were heard in Saiita Fe and Cordoba.

The Bolsa de Comercio

del Rosario had "sent several complaints
to the Ministry of
Public Works during the month of f^lay
1927 and pressed for a

downward revision of tariffs.

Other commercial groups

quickly followed suit.
In response to the campaign of the commercial
interests

for lower rates, the Junta of legal representatives
and di-

rectors met to adopt counter-measures.

Guillermo Leguizamon,

2k

Ryan's memorandum to Watson, 1 September 1927. ABAF/
^
DA, GA 35612.
text of the Eolsa's note see RA/MOi/DG, TaHstudio de_ 1^ Pi re cc ion General de
r^ fas Ferroviarias
Ferro car riles sobre su revision", p. 29.
Tho most insistent
groups demardins: lower rates included the Sociedad Rural de
Rosario, Cg.mara Gremial de Cerealistss de Rosario, Sociedad
Rural de fergamino. Centre Uni6n de Almanceros de Rosario,
Sociedad Rural de Santa Fe C5mara Gremial de Cereales de
Buenos Aires and the Bolsa
Comercio de Cordoba.
See
IMjd
139-140
for
Director
General Castello's comments
pp.
on the notes.
-"For the

1

,

.

,
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Chairnian of the Buenos Aires
Board of the Western, was of

the opinion that the railroads
"should not wait on events,"

but either refute or
cial centers."

i^.;.ore

"the pretensions of .the commer-

The Junta agreed "that it was
not a simple

matter of propaganda" and that the
"charges had to be
squarely met." A committee was then
formed to investigate
the question,
The Government,

in view of the number of petitions,

the importance of the organizations
involved and the simi-

larity of their conclusions, was prompted to
act.

On 15

November La Accion reported that Alvear had
directed the
Minister of Public Works to investigate the tariff

question.

Ortiz in turn ordered Manuel

F.

Castello, who was to become

Director General de Ferrocarriles in January I928, to ini_L •

,

tiate the study.
I

.

28

On 29 March, the eve of national elections. La Acci6n

unveiled

v/hat was

to be the policy of the Alvear administra-

tion with respect to tariff modification.

Noting that rate

AEAF/AJRG, Acta 12?, 18 May 192?; Acta 128, 15 June
1927.

Accion
M
Ferrovi arias
27

15 November 1927, p. I6; RA/MOi/BG, Tari Estudio de la pirec ci6n Gen eral de Ferro carriles sobre su revision p.
According to Castello,
he was the first to advise Ortiz that the rates of the Central Argentine and the Great Southern were too high and

fas

.

t

,

needed revision.

Interview.

28

Castello had been in control of the Direccion General
for r-.ost of 1927 as the Alvear Government had decided to
force Capdevila, a personalista, to resi^;n.
La Accio n blasted Capdevila for his "sterile administration and his lack

^"^
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schedules were under scrutiny, -the paper
emphasized that
the action "was not being taken with
an eye to hurting the
companies, which helped the country to progress."
But meat
and cereal prices had been falling off while
production
costs continued high, even after the Government
had urged

farmers to adopt more modern methods.

Some positive results

had been attained, La Accion commented, however, these were
not enough.

As railroad freight charges

"added measurably

to production costs," the paper announced that Ortiz was

pressing for tariff revision.

With reference to Yrigoyen's

first administration, La Accion adivsed its readers that a
"simple decree was not the answer?" a detailed study was

necessary to "avoid injustices." 2Q
'

That very day Director

General Castello released the news that his exhaustive report with respect to a general reduction in rail rates had

been completed and would be published during the ensuing
,

week,

30

Castello

's

informe was submitted to Ortiz on

3 A])ril,

two days after Yrigoyen and the personalistas had swept the

presidential elections by a two-to-one majority.

The report,

replete with graphs and tables, focused its attention on the
of skill and dedication," Both the public cind the railroad
companies v;ere subject "to his capricious policies"? he was
See also
a "Trojan horse",
Ls Acc i6n. 8 April 1927, p. 1.
RRP, LXVI (10 February 1928]", p. 26.
20

M

Acci6n

^^Ibid.

,

p.

.

editorial, 29 Liarch 1928, p. 10.
^.

301

tariffs of the Great Southern,
althouf^h Castello intended to
use much of the material in
subsequent reports devoted
to

the remaining companies.

Divided into three sections, the

report examined in depth the Government's
legal right to
ter^vene in tariff formulation,
the economic condition

in-,

of the

nation's agricultural and industrial sectors,
and the financial picture of tlie Great SoutJiern. ^"^
In building the Government's legal
case,

Castello re-

viewed all pertinent decisions of both the
Federal District
and Supreme Courts, as well as the various
opinions expressed
by the Solicitor,

Treasury and Attorney Generals.

The Di-

rector General em.phasized that Argentina's railroad
laws
were analagous to the powers given to the Inter- State
Com-

merce Commission in the United States in that both were em-

powered to regulate public utilities.

Neither the I.C.C.

nor Argentine law had as its object the pruning of railroad
revenues.

Rather they had been created to keep railroad

companies from abusing their monopoly position and burden31ra/IwO}/DG, Tarifas Ferroviarias Estudio de_ la Direc cion Genera l de Ferrocari-iles sobre su rovisidn ."
i

32

Specifically, Castello mentioned the decisions handed down by the Federal District Court of Buenos Aires on
2? October 1924 (Juan B. G<5mez v. Ferrocarril Central de
Cordoba)
by the Supreme Court on 21 May I926 Adolf 0 G6mez V, Ferrocarril Central de Cordoba).
Eoth reversed earlier verdicts which }iad found in favor of the railroads.
For details see above, p.
n.
Castello also felt
th^t the 1853 Constitution (j^aragraphs 12, 16 and 23 of article 67) as regulated by articles '6 of Law 2835
^9
and 71, paragraph 8 of Law 2873 preserved the State's inalienable rig/it to control railroad tariffs.
See Ibid.
pp. 5-'^5»
(

,

,

.

175.
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ing the national economy.

.

Furthermore.

Castello could not

believe that Argentina's Congress
would have sanctioned
laws 2873 and 5315 and the
various concession laws with the
intent of renouncing the Government's
right to review rates
prior to their coming into force.
In conclusion, the Director General defended the State's
right to intervene in the

constitution of rail rates.

"^"^

As to the economic condition of
Argentina's commercial,

agricultural and industrial interests, Castello
noted a disequilibrium between tariffs and the ability of
the national
economy to bear them.
The agricultural sector
was particu-

larly depressed as low prices on the world
market had created a situation of more or less permanent crisis.

Castello

reached a similar conclusion with respect to the
cattle industry and felt that freight charges, especially on the
Great Southern, could be reduced by at least lOfo,^^

Directing his attention to the Great Southern, Castello was struck by the company's flourishing condition.
Indeed,

the railroad was realizing the

in its history."

"most brilliant year

The line's coefficient of exploitation

had improved notably since the dark days of 1921, net profits had risen sharply, stocks were quoted at high prices

^^^RA/MOF/DG, Tar i fas F erroviarias Estudio de la Direccion General" de Ferrocarriles sobre su revision, pp. 5t

25.

34
Ibid., pp. 27-159, 176-179.

.
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and the volu.e of traffic
had grown markedly. 35

according to the figures
of the Direccion General,
the
Great Southern had exceeded

for three consecutive
years the
limit set on net profits
by Law 5315.^^ For all
of
these reasons Castello
advised Ortiz that the Great
Southern's tariffs were neither
just nor reasonable and asked
that they be lowered through
presidential intercession
Fernando D. G^errico, who headed
the Great Southern's
legal staff, disagreed with the
Direcci5n General's findings
and sent a note of protest to
Ortiz on 2 May.
According to
Guerrico, the company had not
surpassed the limits imposed
by the Mitre Law and reminded
the Government that the Great
Southern's rates could not be interfered
with unless the
law was violated. Moreover, the
company attorney claimed
that contrary to Castello 's information
the financial prospects for the current year were not
auspicious, for operating costs were rising and part of the crop
in the

zone

served by the railroad had been lost.^^
35

RA/MOP/DG, Tar i fas Ferrwiarias, Estudio de
la Direction General de Ferroca^les sobre s{rre7iiT6^
Fp.~T59^rff.
Government figurei-the Great Southern's
if!;.^coefficient of exploitation, which reached a hi^-h
of 82.45'^. in
fiscal 1921. had fallen to 63.28f. for fiscal
1926? Coinpany
figures were 83.17f. and 66. Of. respectively. For
further data
on the Great Soutnern's financial condition
see RA/rot/DG.
iarifas Ferroviarias Estudio de la Direcci6n General
de Ferro
carrile£ sobre su revisi6n» Cuadros Numgricos
ATiVI/E
,

.

,

table B/l.

37

RA/MOP/DG. Tar i fas F erroviarias Estudio de la Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles sobre su revisi6n
p. 181',
\

.

^^Ferrocarril del Sud, Nota dirip-ida a S.E. el Senor

30^

In conjunction with Guerrico's
protest,

the Great

Southern also attempted to win the
support of public opinion through the press.
Using charts, tables and" maps demon
strating the company's growth from
I875 to I928, the rail-

road attempted to educate the average
Argentine to the tremendous increases paid out by the Great
Southern in salaries and wages, the great expansion
in the number of stations and the thousands of kilometers
of track laid in 53
39
years.
But the protest and the propaganda failed
to convince
the Government to reconsider its position.

Castello, in

reply to the Great Southern, observed that the
railroad had
not answered many of the issues raised in his original
re-

port and reaffirmed his contention that the company's
rates

lacked "justicia y razonabilidad"

.

No longer could the

country's economy support the inflated wartime tariffs.

In

conclusion, the Director General made a special point of

stating that the Government- initiated

plan, to

revise rates

was for the well-being and progress of the country.

The

move was not to be interpreted "as a hostile act toward the

railroads."

Because the companies were prospering, they

were obligated to aid the less fortunate sectors of the

Ministro de Obras fublicas de la Hgcion Dr Roberto M.
Ortiz con motive del Info rm e de_ la D ireccio n General de
Ferrocarriles referente a tarifas (Buenos Afresi 192877
,

pp.

.

^~5.
39

"^^See

for example La Eroca

.

2^ Kay 1928,

p.

36.
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economy.

Castello reminded the Great
Southern that when,
at the end of the war, the
railroads were passing through
difficult fina..cial straits they
had been helped by those
industries which now cried out for
tariff reductions/^^
On 13 June President Alvear
issued a decree ordering

the Great Southern to present
within 30 days a revised

rates schedule drawn up on the basis
of the tariffs in
force before the increase of 2^1
June 1922.
In the' President's opinion the Great Southern
could afford
to

cut its

freight charges and passenger fares
without harming its
financial integrity or prejudicing future
investments.
Rather, he maintainted that a general tariff
reduction would

act as a great stimulus to rail traffic.

Above all, Alvear

reaffirmed his decision "to harmonize capital
investment
with the national economic interest." Tariff
adjustments
were to be an integral part of that policy. ^"^
RA/MOF/DG, Tar i fas Ferroviarias Estudios de la D.i.reccion General de Ferrocarril es relative s a~Ta~revTsl6n""de
24^ tan fas del Ferrocarril del Sud, analizando las observa£^ones contenldas en la Not a de la empresa del T~de f.'avo de
1928 (Buenos Aires 192877~pp7~6^68r
t

.

i

4l Republica

Argentina, Ministerio de Obras Publicas,
Revision de la£ tar i fas del F errocarril del Sud (Buenos
Aires 1928), pp. o-8.
On 3 July the conipajiy asked the Government to reconsider the decree of 13 June, noting that
neither the Attorney General nor the Treasurer General had
been consulted.
Ferrocarril del Sud, Tar if as Nota dirif ido
a S.E
el Senor Ministro de Obras Publicas
Dr. Roberto M.
Orti_z, pi di en do la reconsideracion del decreto" d_e l^ de
Junio de 1928 (Buenos Aires 1928).
Tiie Government t/ien solicited the opinions of both attornies, who, in reports issued
»

i

.

.

i
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The Central Argentine was the second railroad com-

pany to come under Director General Castello's scrutiny.
As in the case of the Great Southern, he contended in a

lengthy report released on 20 June that the tariff increases granted during the war and in 1922 "had taken on a dan-

gerous character,"

In his opinion it was

to readjust the Central Argentine's rates,

"indispensable"
for the company,

over five consecutive years, had earned more than a

6,87^

net profit on its invested capital.

Even higher profits
ho
were anticipated by Castello for I928,

Central Argentine officials, in a note to Ortiz on 18
July, accepted "for the time being, pending a study by the

railroad, the conclusions of the Director General's infonne,"
They accordingly agreed to reduce tariffs to levels prior
to the 1922 increase,

In response to the company's com-

on the 10th and 18th of July, supported the Governinent 's
On 23 July the Great Southposition in the tariff question.
Republica Arern yielded ajnd agreed to reduce its tariffs.
gentina, Minis terio de Obras lublicas, Revisi6n de las T& r iDictamenes de los senores irrof as del Ferrocarril del Sud
curado r General de la Nacion irrocurrido r del Tesoro decretos del loder E.je cutivo y_ nota de n-resentacion de la Smpre sa (Buenos Aires I928 )
;

,

,

1

Tarifas Ferrovi arias Estudio de la DiFerrocarriles sobre su re vis i6 n en el
reccion
Ferr ocarril Central Ardent ino (Buenos Aires 1Q2;8T, Ppt
35-33.'
See also Castello's note to Ortiz, 20 June 1928,
AlvlT/lnOP/DG, Expediente OI583I- EU928.
RA/i.iOP/DG,
General de

t

i

^3jos€ A. FrTas, Atanasio Iturbe and Ronald Leslie,
President of the Local Board, Chief of the Legal Staff and
General Ivianager respectively of the Central Argentine to
Ortiz, 13 July 1928, Ai.T/i'.iOF/DG, Expediente 019046-0-1^28.
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munication, Alvear published

decree on 2^ July ordering

a

the Central Argentine to submit a revised
rates schedule to
the I.linister of lublic Works within
15 days.^^

While the cornpajiies and the Government exchanged
notes
the nation's press followed the development of the
contro-

versy with interest.

La Acci(5n

mirroring the official view

.

claimed that the projected tariff revisions should not be

construed as a "capricious attack against the companies."
But,

in spite of the

"marvelous work done by the railroads,"

the law had to be enforced.

Ortiz,

in the paper's opinion,

had taken the. correct approach and, although it provoked a
great debate, there was a real possibility that future rail-

road policy would be guided by the "invariable norms" being
formulated by the Alvear Government,
In a display of agreement rare in Argentine journal-

ism.

La Epoca

.

the yrigoyenist daily, La Vanguardia

voice of the Socialist

i'arty,

.

the

and La Prensa all supported

the Government's uncompromising position with respect to
the reduction of rail rates.

La Prensa urged the Alvear

administration to examine rates on all the railroads, terming most tariffs "anachronistic".
^ ^Decree of ?A July 1928,

The prestigious paper

in AfiT/LlOP,

Expedicnte

1^8^0-F-928.

^^La Accion

,

editorial, 25 June 1928,

2.

p.

^^See La Eyoca. 11 July 1928, p. 2; La Vangu.ardia 22
June 1928, p. 1; 21 July 1928, p. 2; La Prensa editorial,
5 July 1928, p. 13.
,

.
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also hailed the administration's dispassionate
interpretation of article 9 of the Mitre Law, the
"caballo de batalla"
^"^
of the railroads,

Speaking in defense of the companies before a
meeting
of the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos^ Aires,
Ezequiel Ramos
r.Tex.ta,

a former Minister of Public Works who,

by I928, had

become Chairman of the Local Board of the Entre RIos
Railways, bitterly criticized "the disregard of certain
citizens

of standing, in the Government and out of it, for the value

of the signature of our Nation on contracts which engage
the public faith,"

Obviously upset, he proclaimed his pro-

found dissatisfaction with "those who invoke the teachings
of juridical science in order to arrive at conclusions

which conduce to the gravest conflicts without any possible

constructive solutions,"

Mounting the companies' "battle horse", Ramos Hexfa
crossed swords with Alv ear's decree of 13 June, v/hich had

ordered the Great Southern to lower its rates.

The Presi-

dent's action, he argued,

involves the absolute disavov;al of the rights accorded
by the Mitre Law,.,, /The/ decree completely destroys
the economic regimen that the law had created for the
great transport industry in the Argentine Republic,
47

^La Prensa

editorial, 21 July 1928, p, 9.
See also
Juan A, Gonzalez Calderon, Doctri na constitucional (Buenos
Aires 1928), pp, 302-317.
The author, a one-time lav/yer
for the Great Southern, built a legal case supporting Govern
ment regulation of railroad rates.
,

t

Quoted in RRF, LXVI (13 July 1928), pp, 15-21.

i
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Nothing that is worth while of this
system will remain.
vvill subsist wil/be the tax
o? 3%'

on%Z]l

'""i^^"

""^"^^ "^^^ companies will have to
pay n v/>'4
virtue/^r^n!!?^?
of their contracts of adhesion, the
Exec'
utive Fower applying this singularly
one-sided law
which allows one party to keep the
money without delivering the goods.... li^

m

But why had the Government chosen the closing
months

of its term to undertake a major revision of
railroad rates,
the results of which would be felt during
Yrigoyen's admin-

istration?

The Review of the River Plate was convinced

that the tariffs assessed by the British-owned
railroads
did not impose

"ajiy

greater hardship to the producer than

they did in certain previous years in the term of office
of
the present administration."

Furthermore, export trade sta-

tistics demonstrated that the producing sectors of the Argentine economy could probably bear the rates in force.

^^Quoted in RRP, LXVI (13 July 1928),
^*^Ibid.

(27 July 1928),

p.

21.

Carlos Diaz Alejandro
in his excellent Essays on tj2e Economic H istory of the Argentine Republic, pp. 52-53i demonstrates that between the
fiscal years I917 and I929 Argentina's export quantum expanded at an average annual rate of 6,6^,
For the same period
he shows that the rural sector enjoyed an annual growth rate
of 5«5?^.
Clearly, the Argentine economy was not stagnating
as has been suggested by Guido di Telia and I^Ianuel Zymelman
in their Las Stapas del Desarrollo Economico Argentine (Buenos Aires I967).
The econoi;iist Jacono V/ainer in his "Un
problema de contabilidad; El contralor de contabilidad de
los Ferrocarriles " Revista de C iencias Economical, Serie
II, no. 101 (December I929), pp. 109'3-1097, corjdained that
the Alvear Government had ignored "razones de orden contable y num^ricas" when it decided to order the Great Southern and Central Argentine railroads to lower their tariffs.
In V/ainer 's opinion, tJie Government had based its action
v/holly on legal grounds.
,

»

,

p.

24.
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The pro- British Review found an answer in the
Argentine

political situation.
roads

;Yere

According to the weekly, if the rail-

forced to cut their rates before the Alvear ad-

ministration left office then the incoming Government would
"be left in what might appeal to the political opponents
of

Doctor Irigoyen as an awkward position...."

Tariffs would

be so low that wage increases for railwaymen would be out

of the question while "should the railway earnings later be

adversely affected by any unforseen circumstances ... it will
fall to the lot of the Irigoyen administration to consider
the necessity of putting the railway tariffs up again. "^'

Both the Central Argentine and the Great Southern rea-

lized the political implications of Alvear's policy and
strove to keep the question of rate revisions open until

Yrigoyen took office on 12 October,

The Central Argentine,

in accordance with the Executive decree of

2^^

July, submit-

ted a plan of tariff reductions to the Direcci5n General on
Ik August,

Accompanying the proposed revisions, whic?i v/ould

lower the company's gross revenue by an estimated $ 6,000,000

m/n per annum,

v/as

a

written complaint implying that the Cen-

tral Argentine was being unfairly treated as other lines
were enjoying a prosperity equal to their own.
Castello studied the Central Argentine's proposal and

^•^RRP.

LXVI (27 July 1928), p. 24,

Iturbe end Leslie to Castello, l4
1928, Ar.T/i:Ol/DG, Sxpcdiente 020878- C-1928,

^^Frlas,

Augi.ist
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in a report to Ortiz on 21 September asserted
that the re-

ductions were insufficient.

The Director General recom-

mended that the Government lower the company's tariff
re-

venues by an additional $ 2,000,000 m/n per year.^^
the basis of Castello's suggestions,

On

President Alvear pub-

lished a decree on 24 September approving

a

new tariff sys-

tem for the Central Argentine which would cut the line's
gross intake by $ 8,000,000 m/n per

The decree,

annujji.

formulated with the obvious intention of settling the tariff question before inauguration day, set

8

October as

tlie

deadline for the implementation of revised rates,
At this juncture the railroad began to stall for time,
v/ith the hope of

avoiding a final decirJ-on before Yrigoyen

took office on 12 October.

waited a

v/eek

after the Governirient published its decree snd

then, on 1 October,

2873

sjid

Frias, the company's director,

informed Cas telle that according to Law

the Reglamento General de Ferrocarriles a 30 day

waiting period had to transpire befire the new rates could
take force.

Because of the Government's brief deadline,

Frias refused to consider any change in passenger fares
^^The report is m.entioned in Frfas to Castello, 11
I could
October I928, AF:T/Iv:OF/DG, Expediente 028032- C-1928.
See also Iturbe, "Alp;unas
not locate the original informe.
leyendas sobre los ferrocarriles," Revista de Economla Argen
tina XXII (Jajiuary I929), p. 562 for additional details.
,

text of the decree may be consulted in AIuT/kOF,
Expediente l4840-F-928.
•^^The
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until 1 November, althouph he did promise
to readjust
freight rates by 8 October, ^-^
Castello,

in a note to Ortiz on 2 October;

expressed

his conformity with the Central Argentine's
complaint.

Acting swiftly, Alvear issued another decree
on

3

October

which ordered the railroad to lower its livestock
rates on
the 8th and extended until 1 November the deadline
for a

reduction in passenger fares,

^"^

Then, at the last possible moment, the CentrtO. Argen-

tine played its trump card.

On 11 October,

Just a day be-

fore Yrigoyen's inauguration, Frias advised Castello that

Alvear 's decree of 2A September would in effect "reduce the
railroad's profits to a level below that allowed by article
9 of Law 5315" and,

consequently,

pany's concession law."

"infringed upon the com-

Frfas explained that the Central

Argentine had offered in its note of l4 August to cut rcven.
ues through tariff reductions by $ 6,000,000 m/n,

Alvear 's

decree, however, had increased the rate cuts to $ 8,000,000
m/n, a sum considered excessive by the coinpnny.

Having

stalled on a technicality, the Central Argentine succeeded
in carrying over the rate dispute to the Yrigoyen Govcrn-

^^Frlas to Castello, 1 October 1928, AMT/r.:0}/DG, Expediente 02675O- C-1928.

^^Castello to Ortiz,
pediente 026758- C-I928,

2

October 1928, Al.T/im/DG, Ex-

-^'For the complete text of the decree see
podiente 216^^3- F-I928,

Aj..T/r.;0}

,

Ex-

"

i
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^
ment.

58

What could the railroads expect duringYrigoyen's

second administration?

Would they again be used as pawns

in the political battles of the Uni6n CIvica
Radical? Per-

haps surprisingly, the British-owned railroads did
not

dread Yrigoyen's return to the Casa Rosada.

Rather, they

looked to the future with confidence and expected to
co-operate with the new president in the initiation of a tremendous public works program.

The companies had attached much

importance to the words of Albino Fugnalin, a former under-

secretary for public works during Yrigoyen's first administration, when he commented

imderstand that during his administration the vastest plan of Public Works ever conceived in this country will be carried out..,,
I have spoken of a vast
plan of Public Works and this makes it necessary to
mention the acquisition of materials, and to give expression to my ov/n private views as to the opportionity
which the execution of those works will give for
bringing about a full co-operation between British
capital and Argentine and British industries,.,, 59
I

^

A major portion of

tlie

plan involved the extension of the

railroads to all parts of Argentina,

60

Shortly after Yrigoyen assumed office, he invited the
^^Fri'as to Castello,

11 October 1928,

AMT/MOP/DG, Ex-

pediente 028032- C-I928,

^^Quoted in RHP, LXVI (7 September 1928),
also the various P rocee dings for 1928,

p.

11.

Sec

^^See La Na cion editorial, 2? October 1928, p, 6,
and Iturbe, "Algunas leyendas sobre los f errocarriles
Revista de EconomJTa Argentina, XXII (January 1929 ), p, 5^2,
.

,

31^

chairmen of the local boards of the railroad
companies to
his office for the purpose of discussing
points of contention between them and the Government as
well as to outline
his public works proposals.
Warming to the new Chief Executive's request, railroad management accepted
the offer and
met with Yrigoyen in the Government House on
October/"'23

The President conversed at length with the
railroad offi-

cials over a broad range of topics which included
the clcaii-

ing and disinfection of cattle cars to help combat the
spread
of hoof- and- mouth disease, delays in transportation, shortages of rolling stock, the possibility of constructing

coaches and freight cars in Argentina, and the extension of
the companies' lines.

La Epoca

.

62

once again the official spokesman for the

administration, blessed Yrigoyen's "transcendental initiative" in defense of the national production.
the paper,

According to

the President's interview with the directors had

been fruitful, as they had accepted Yrigoyen's proposals to
eliminate the numerous difficulties v/hich obstructed the

transportation of the country's products.

La Epoca also

hailed the Chief Executive's "great plan of economic devel-

opment," the success of v/hich demanded the amplification of
See the report of the Buenos Aires Eoard of the Pacific, 21 August 1929, in Buenos Ayres and Pacific, Report
and A ccounts 1Q29.
.

^^ABAP/AJKG, Acta 1^5, 29 October 1928; La Syoca
torial, 2'4 October 1928, p. I

.

edi-
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the railroad network then
serving Argentina.
'

Putting on their best faces,
each company in it;;s annual report to stockholders
expresced full confidence in.
and admiration for, Yrigoyen,
whose policy had always been
"firm and fair"/^

La Epoca in turn praised the
railroad

companies and claimed that foreign
capital had confidence
in the Argentine Government/^
Indicative of the improved relations
between the railroads and the Government was the
manner in which Yrigoyen
treated a delegation of cereal producers
who had called on
him during the last week of October.
L| Epoca reported that
the President's meeting with the railroad
officials had been

much warmer and that the directors had been
more willing to
co-operate than had the cere alistas ,
An important factor in the good feelings existing
be-

tween the companies and the new Government was
the close re-

lationship Atanasio Iturbe, now general manager of the Central Argentine, enjoyed with President Yrigoyen.

Iturbe

/To

Spoca

editorial, 2k October I928, p. ?• 25
See also ABAP/AJRG, Acta l46, 21 Nop. 1.

October 1928,
vember 1928,

.

Report of H. C. Allen, London Chairman of the Great
Southern, in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Iroccedii2£S, 1928.
See also Lord St. Davids' remarks in Buonos
Ayres and Pacific Railway, Pro cee dinars 1928
.

.

65

La Epoca editorials, 20 October 1928,
October I928, p. 1.
.

^^Ihid.

.

editorial, 30 October 1928, p.

p.

1.

1;

25
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had been one of the UCR's earliest affiliates and, an a

young man had participated in meetings of the Union Civica
de Juventud.

According to fenuel

F.

Castello,

Iturbe had

also been one of Yrigoyen's private secretaries.

Through

the new General Manager of the Central Argentine the rail-

roads had an unmatched entree into official circles,^''

For the Central Argentine Iturbe

's

the President paid immediate dividends.

over Castello

's

friendship with
On 31 October 1928,

protest, Yrigoyen issued a decree postponing

the Central Argentine's deadline to reduce its tariffs.

According to the Chief Executive, the imposition of the new
rates "v/ould create a situation of preference for the other

companies,"
question.

Castello

v/as

ordered to re-study the rates

Moreover, the Director General's plans to inves-

tigate the rates of the other companies were shelved.

Re-

miniscing years later, Castello admitted that he had been
•^caught short by

Iturbe."

68

^Castello interview.
ZD

For t}ie text of the decree see AMT/l'/OF, ExThe Central Argentine's rates were
pediente 23^1-0^- F-I928.
never lowered during Yrigoyen's term. See the memorandum
of J0S.6 Benjamin Abalos Minister of lublic V/orks, 6 June
In September
1929, AI.:T/MUP/DG, Expediente 023^!-0^l-F-928.
1929 the Independent Socialist Deputy Antonio de Tomaso introduced a resolution seeking information as to why the CenJosd MarJa Gutiertral Argentine's rates had not been cut.
rez, a personalis ta from the Federal Capital, claimed that
had the company lowered its rates the C^^ntral C6rdoba_ would
have been financially ruined because of unfair competition.
On 12 October I928
Diputados, Sesio nes, 1Q2Q, III, 565-572.
the Great Southern instituted legal proceeding?.: seeking annulment of Alvear's decrees of 13 June and 23 July as well
Ibid .
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On 3 November La Epoca rej)orted the

"first great re-

sult" of the meeting held on 23 October.

The Great South-

ern had annoujiced plans to lay 1000
kilometers of new track
at an estimated cost of $ 90,000,000 m/n.
While praising
the company's initiative, the official
organ intimated that

credit was due to Yrigoyen who had "virtually
hypnotized"
the directors with "illuminating words "^^
.

The high tide of rapprochement between the
railroads

and the Government was reached during Kay I929.

On the 13th

Mi Acci^. which had degenerated into the worst kind of tabloid, published a sensational article v/arning that United

States interests

v/ere

considering the purchase of the Euenos
90

Aires and Pacific Railway/

The news, which

v/as

quickly

reprinted by the other papers, prompted an im.mediate reaction in both Argentina and London.

La Frensa. often criti-

cal of the railroads, stood squarely behind British capital,

which had always been "respected" in Argentina.

Maintain-

ing an outward calm, the paper reported that many Argentines

feared a further incursion of United States investments in
their country, especially when considered in the context of
as reimbursemiCnt for damages.
p.

La Naci6n

,

12 October 1928,

9.

69

La Epoca, 3 November 1928, p, 1; editorial, k November 1928, p. 1.
In December both the Central Argentine and
the Pacific announced important nev; construction and renoIbid .
vation plans.
23 December 1928, p.l; 28 December
1928, p. 1| 16 January I929, p. 1.
,

70 La Accion

.

13

I^^ay

1929, p. 1.
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American involvement in Central America
and the Caribbean. "^^
Even more satisfying to the usually
beleaguered companies was Yrigoyen's response to the
rumored purchase.
According to Sir r'alcolm Robertson, the
British Ambassador
to Argentina, the President informed
him with unforgettable emphasis
You may tell your Government, and I know that I
am
speaking not only in my own name end in that of
my
party, but
the name of the wliole country, that we
are aiad always have been entirely contented
with British capital, which has never caused us trouble
or
uneasiness.
We do not wish to see it replaced by any
^
other whencesoever it may come. 72

m

Despite years of complaints of high rates, shortages of
rol-

ling stock,

EMI

and'

transportation delays ,. despite cries of pin -

ganancias and accusations of hidden profits and secret

books, Argentina seemed reasonably content with the record

of the British-owned railroads.
In London's River Plate Plouse on 1?

r.:ay

the Board of

Directors of the Pacific held a special meeting of stockholders.

The assemblage,

in a virtually unanimous action,

resolved to modify the company's statutes to impede foreign
syndicates from acquiring

a

Davids claimed that the move

controlling vote.
v/as

Lord St.

taken not so much to en-

sure British ovmership of the railroads as to "facilitate

7lLa Prensa
72

.

13 Kay 1929, p. 12.

Sir Malcolm Robertson, "The Economic Relations Between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic," Interna tional Affairs IX (March 1930), p. 226.
.

.
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the exercise of the option of the
Argentine Governnient to
purchase the property. ""^^ Although not
stressed by St.
Davids, of equal importance was the
retention of British

control, because the railroads made large
c'^mual purchases
in England and had a vital effect on
British trade.

Fol-

lowing the Pacific's lead, the other coicpnnies
changed
their statutes in rapid succescion
Relative calm characterised the relations

be.tv;een

the companies and the Government until
5 November I929

when the Union Ferroviaria, without warning, called a serie
of "lightning strikes" lasting from fifteen minutes to a

half hour against the railroads.

The object of the sudden

walkouts during peak hours of traffic was to compel the
companies to accede to union demands for a minimum wage,

escalaf6n for administrative personnel and annual vacations for workshops and stores staff

— questions

v/hich had

vexed railroad-labor relations for several years.

"^^

Since the end of September the companies had been
73

The quote is from Max V/inkler, Investments of United States C apital in Argentina (Boston I928 /^tc^ pp.
5^55. See also La Kroca, 18 Llay I929, p. 1; The. Times 21
June 1929, p. 20; 2 Augxist 1929, p. 11.
Purchase of the
railroads by the Argentine Government v/as provided for in
article I6 of the Tvatre Law.
1

,

.

The Times

,

21 June I929,

p.

20.

"^^Report of Herbert Gibson, General Manager of the
Great Southern, 29 August 1930, in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railv/ay, Report and Accounts IQ30 RKF LXTII (8 November 1929), p. 11.
.

;

,
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aware of approaching trouble
on their lines,
a series
Of confidential exchaiiges
with union leadership the
railroads had attempted to
demonstrate the financial impossibility of meeting labor's demaiids.
To institute a minimum salary for all grades of
personnel would have cost the
comp^Ues an estimated $ 52,000,000
m/n per annum, because
all classified workers would have
to be given corresponfiing increases.
Moreover, the companies, borrowing
figures
from the usually reliable Revista
Economla Argentina pointed
to the significant salary increases
of the last ten years
while the real cost of living had been
'^^
decreasinf^.

m

,

The Junta of legal representatives
and directors,

meeting on l6 October, were agreed, however,
that the workmen's demands could not be ignored and
resolved
to investi-

gate the standard of living of non-escalaf6n
personnel.

They also agreed to inform the Government of the
discus-

sions then in progress with the union.

Iturbe

,

Lcguizam5n

and Ram<5n K^ndez, the latter the Pacific's chief lawyer,
spoke with both Jos^ Benjamin Abalos, the Minister of
Hiblic
Works, and Elpidio Gonzalez, the Iv:inister of the Interior

whom the failing Yrigoyen had charged with handling all
labor conflicts.

Both ministers indicated their disploa-

Stewart, President of the Railway Advisory
Committee, to Antonio Tramonti, President of the Uni6n Ferroviaria, 4 October 19?^9» copy in APAP/AJRG, Acta I58, 2 October 1929.
A Government study showed steady wa'-e increases
for railwayman throughout the 1920 's.
See Appendix II,
Graph V.
T.

B,
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sure with the pretensions of the Uni6n Ferroviaria with

respect to a minimum wage and annual vacation, although
they also agreed that the companies should consider some

revisions in the cscalafon to eliminate all possibility of
unequal or unjust treatment.'^''
On the same day on which the attornies had met with

Government officials to discuss the worsening labor situation,

the

work stoppages began.

During the afternoon of

6

November K^ndez spoke with Abalos and Director General Gastelle.

The Minister of Public V/orks expressed his surprise

with the "irregular attitude of the workers", which he in-

terpreted as either a show of force or
discipline.

To Mendez*

aji

example of union

relief, both Abalos and Castello

concurred that the railroad companies could not bear the bur
den which the implementation of the union's demands v/ould im

pose on the lines' resources.

Furthermore, Abalos stated

that the companies "had done everything possible to avoid
the present state of affairs; that they had never refused
to study the workers*

claims.,.."

Indeed, both Abalos and

Castello mentioned the "privileged position" which railroad

workers enjoyed within the labor sector,

78

M^ndez, doing yeoman service for the Junta, also in-

terviewed GonzSlez,
'''^ABAP/AJRG,
5

wiio

apprised him of a meeting which had

Acta 159, l6 October 1929; Acta l60,

November 1929.
"^^Ibid.

,

Acta 160, 5 November 1929.
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just been concluded between a workmen's delegation

President.

In Gonzalez' words,

the

ajid

there was "reason to believe

that Yrigoyen had not promised to aid them, as the
workers

appeared uncomfortable."

In closing his remarks,

Gonzalez

offered to act as intermediary to solve the dispute,
out the companies having to promise anything,

During the evening of

6

"with-

""^^

November the Junta reviewed

the day's developments, which had included more work stop-

pages and some scattered violence.

Atanasio Iturbe repor-

ted that he had been summoned to Gonzalez' office where
he was told that the men would halt their strikes only if

the railroads would listen to them.

Iturbe remarked that

the companies were willing to negotiate at any time, as

long as the Union Ferroviaria ended its harassment.

The

Minister smiled and, just as Iturbe had risen to leave,
told him that the companies need not worry about the union's

demand with respect to a minimum v/age--"it was nothing more
80

than rhetoric.

Beginning on

7

November and continuing for the next

week, company officials and union leaders debated the positive and negative aspects of the workers' demands.

The

railroads were careful to keep the Government abreast of
the negotiations and constantly reminded Gonzalez and Abalos
"^^ABAP/AJRG, From M^ndez' notes of the meeting,
Acta 160, 5 November 1929.

in

^^AEAl/AJRG, Acta l6l, 6 November 1929.

i
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that any concessions would have
to balanced by correspondmg rate increases.
On 18 November President
Yrigoyen. who had remained in

the shadows throughout the
controversy, summoned Ram.on Ll^nde
to his office to discuss the
companies' point of view with

respect to the labor crisis.

Yrigoyen also asked the Pa-

cific's attorney if the railroads
could possibly agree to
the union's insistence for a
minimum wage. M^ndez, choosing
his words carefully, explained that
beneath the surface of
the Union Ferroviaria 's plan to fix
minimum wages lay the
intent to force an increase of all wages
and salaries,
v/hich the companies could not support.

M^ndez complained that the Union Ferroviaria

cessant requests for improvements had not given the
parlies a moment's rest.

in-

's

com.-

The railroads could grant no more.

Operating costs were again rising and traffic had fallen
off disastrously because of widespread crop failures.

He

also explained that if the companies were to keep their

promises to Yrigoyen with respect to expansion of their networks, they had to keep their stock quotations high, so as
to attract the needed capital.

81

Any major addition to costs

APAP/AJRG, Acta I62, 1^ Novem.ber I929.

82

Once the lowest v/ages were augmented, a corresponding increase would have to be implemented at all levels to
protect classified personnel from receiving less pay than
some unclassified workers.
From I.:^ndez' memorandum of 18
November I929, ABAP/AJRG. Acta
20 November I929,
,

z

324

could halt the railroads' pro,-ress.

Yrigoyen thanked

K:6n-

dez and told him tliat he v/ould call the
union's leaders to
the Casa Rosada to the end of bringing their
demands within

reasonable limits, ^-^
With agonizing slowness Yrigoyen consulted several
times both with Tramonti

aj-id

the compajiy lawyers.

Finally,

on 1? December he issued a decree which implemented his
'

decree of 10 March 1922, thus re-establishing for workshops

and stores personnel the right to an ajinual vacation of
seven days with base pay. 84
The companies accepted the settlement.

Tramonti also

acceded to the decree, but with the uiiderstanding that

tlie

remaining demands would again be considered at a time to be
chosen by the Union Ferroviaria,

Tliree

months later, in

March 1930, labor again besieged the companies.
The new wave of unrest among the railwaymicn was but a

part of a more general ground swell of discontent with the

Government of Hip6lito Yrigoyen.
been clear to
and infirm,
^-^From

m.ost

v/as

By early 1930 it must have

Argentines that the President, senile

no longer capable of performing his Execu-

r.'.^ndez'

memorandum of 18 November 1929

»

in

ABAI/AJRG, Acta l64, 20 Novem.ber 1929.
Oh

For the full text of the decree see AI'T/MOP/DG,
Circular ;/33, 18 December 1929.

^^From the minutes of the meeting of 18 December' 1929
betv/een the Railway Advisory Council and tlie Union Ferroviaria, in ABAl'/AJRG, Acta l66, 18 December 1929.
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tive duties.

The results of the national elections in

March reflected Argentine dissatisfaction with
the UCR; the
Radical Party's majority in Congress was reduced.
Change

was in the air.
The British-ov/ned railroads had little v/arning of

the Uni6n Ferroviaria

s

'

decision to renew pressure to force

a decision on its unrealized demands.

discovered only on the morning of 11

Company management
P.^arch

that the union

was intent on calling a general rail strike on the

12t}i

and

then "go slow" until their demands for higher salaries, a

minimum

v/age

,

had been met.

and escalafon for administrative personnul

Assembling in extraordinary session on the

day before the threatened action, the Junta resolved to con-

sult the Government in an effort to discern the probable

direction of its policy in the impending crisis.
dentally,

Coinci-

the assempled lav/yers and directors also agreed

to advise' the Casa Rosada that the companies could not, at

the present time, agree to the union's ultimatum, and to ask

Yrigoyen to invoke the law against the Union Ferroviaria and
those men who might abandon tJieir tasks.
That afternoon
ter Gonzalez, who

v/as

I\l€ndez

86

conferred with Interior Mnis-

of the opinion that the attitude of

the workers reflected turmoil within the Uni6n Ferroviaria

^^ABAP/AJRG, Acta I69, 11 Llarch I930.
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precipitated by peouenos
throw Tramonti.

caudii:i.os who were

seeking to over-

When queried as to the Government's role

in solving the crisis,

Gonzalez would admit only that Yrigo-

yen would speak with the v/orkers and attempt to convince

them to bargain with the companies.

The Government was in-

tent, however, on maintaining regular rail service, a task

made easier by the refusal of La Fraternidad to support the
Or;

Uni6n Ferroviaria,

To g^ard against possible violence,

the companies had been provided with ample police protec-

tion by 13 March and some stations were being watclied by

cavalry.

88

.

.

Nevertheless there were incidents of property destruction which La Epoca. in the tradition of the strikes of
1917» 1918 and the semana tragica, blamed on sinister ele-

ments foreign to the v;orking class.

The paper also expressed

the view that the unrest was probably a product of the con-

tinuous process of "accomodation to the cost of living."
But,

the official organ cautioned, railroad workers had had

their fundamental demands resolved by Yrigoyen's decree of
17 December, which had been "a satisfactory reply to a reaThe Uni6n Ferro
^^ABAF/AJRG, Acta I70, 12 March I930.
viaria had broken relations with La Fraternidad on 4 July
1929 after a long quarrel as to which society should have
jurisdiction over locomotive shed personnel. See Chiti, La
Fraternidad pp. ^1-08-^15; La Fraternidad, Memoria y; Balance
la Comision D irectiva pcri6do 1929 1930 (Buenos Aires
I930T; Union Ferroviaria, t.lemoria }i Balance correspondientes
al ano 1Q22. (Buenos Aires 1930), p. 23.

^

,

--

1

i

^^ABAF/AJRG, Acta 171, 13

Iviarch

1930.
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sonable aspiration, "^^

For

raost

of the week following the implementation of

the work slowdown little was accomplished by the
Government.

Indeed, while company officials and union leaders met
in

repeated rounds of fruitless debate, Abalos

arid

GonzSlez,

the latter supposedly responsible for finding a solution to
the dispute, did nothing.

Finally, the railroads decided to

approach Yrigoyen, whom Gonzalez had kept in the dark as to
the course of the labor crisis.

Ramon M^ndez, who had com-

pleted plajis for a European voyage, gained an audience with
the aged President on 20 March under the pretext of "saying

goodbye."

Once having been admitted to Yrigoyen's office,

M^ndez proceeded to give what the Junta later called "a very

convincing exposition" as to the state of affairs vis a vis
the work slov/down.

According to the attorney, the Presi-

dent was both grateful for the news and impressed with the

interview.

He promised to treat the matter v;ith Gonzalez

90
at once,'^
4.

That same evening, after 8i00, Yrigoyen published a

decree ordering the regulari zation of service witliin

^i-S

hours and. the formation of a joint com.mittee of company of-

ficials and union leaders under the chairmanship of the

Director General de Ferrocarriles

,

The committee,

once

Epoca, editorial, 1^ Karch 1930, p. 1.

9^AEAI/AJRG, Acta 176, 18 VArch 1930; Acta 177, 19
Karch 1930; Acta 178, 21 Ivarch 1930.
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constituted, was to study possible revisions
of existing
escalaf5nes on the basis of the economic
conditions of the
Republic, the finaiicial situation of the
companies and the
condition of the railway staff with respect
to wages and
prices. 91
In accordance with the decree, all parties
to the dis-

pute returned once again to the bargaining table

After

.

nine inconclusive sessions, the last taking place on
I9 May,
the meetings were suspended pending the final report
and

recommendations of Director General Cas telle.
moment peace returned to the railroads.

For the

But before Cas-

tello's informe' could be published a greater event, trans-

cending the labor dispute, forced itself on Argentina.
6

On

September General Jos^ Felix Uriburu led a column of

troops and military cadets into Buenos Aires and overthrew
the Yrigoyen Government in a bloodless revolution.

A new

era had opened for the Bri tisli-owned railroads in Argentina,
*

<^

In reviewing the period from 192? to Hipolito Yri-

9lFor the text see AMT/MOF/DG, Circular #12, 21 March
1930.
op

Report of Herbert Gibson, General Manager of tlie
Great Southern, 29 August 1930, in Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway, Rerort and Accounts ].930 ABAP/AJRG, Acta 102,
'i'he
21 May 1930,
report, v/hen published, represented a victory for the companies and eventually resulted in renewed
agitation by the Union Ferroviaria during Uriburu 's adtainistration. See Comisi5n Especial de Representantes de Empresas
Revis i6 n de Escalaf6ncs
Convon ios
y Gbreros Ferroviarios
X Re Xiamen to (Buenos Aires. 193oT7
^

.

,

;

,

1

i

I
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goyen's fall, it is clejir thnt politics played a
cornmandinc
role in railroad-Government relations.

exposed position, they

v/ere

Because of their

easily exploited for political

ends by both Alvear and Minister of lublic Works Ortiz,
the national elections of I928 approaclied,

As

the Governraent

almost without question threv; its support to a{';ricultural
or cattle interests while forcing the companies to bow before the incessant demands of railway labor.

stance the Government promised

t?ie

In each in-

companies that in return

for concessions with respect to tariff reductions or rail-

waymen's escalafones, the Casa Rosada would revise

trou-

t}ie

blesome reglamentaci6n del trabajo, virtually unchanged
since I917.

As it was,

the work rules remained unaltered.

Even after the election had passed, Alvear pursued a

policy of tariff revision with almost reckless haste.

Ad-

mittedly, the Government had built a reasonable legal case
for intC2rvenin(:^ the rates of the Great Southern and the Central Argentine, but it can also be argued that the under-

lying reason for interference was political,
cuff the in-cotiiing administration.

i..e.

,

to hand-

Had the Government suc-

ceeded in forcing all the companios to lower their rates before Yrigoyen's accession to pov/er, the new President would

have found it nearly impossible to satisfy the

higher wages without again raising
failed,

rates.,

denicinds

Alvear

's

for

policy

for the Central Argentine was able to stall on tech-

nicalities and managed to keep the rates question open until
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Yrigoyen took office

,

at which j^oint the coi.ipany was allowed

to keep its elevated rate.s.

Ivioreove^r,

Castello's plans to

examine the tariffs of the remaining companies were
shelved.
Only the Great Southern had suffered.
In striking contrast to the repeated set-backs in-

curred during the Alvear administration, the railroads'

relations with Yrigoyen during his second term were friendly.
For the first time since Conservative rule ended, in I916,
the railroad companies were able to make their influence

felt in official circles.

Basically, there were two rea-

sons for the railroads' success.

It was fortunate for the

companies that Yrigoyen intended to launch a vast program
of public works, the success of which was contingent upon
the railroads being able to expand their networks.

This

gave the companies a v/eapon against the demands of labor

and the complaints of economic interest groups for lov;er
rates.

Of prime importance to the railroads' success was

the influence wielded in the Casa Rosada by men like Atana-

sio Iturbe and Ram5n Ll^ndez.

Iturbe, who was close friends

with Yrigoyen, and K^ndez, an articulate and convincing
attorney who v/ould rise to the Supreme Court bench, did not
hesitate to go above Yrigoyen

's

subordinates, incompetent

men like Abalos or Gonzalez, and treat directly with the
President.

Yrigoyen

's

rapidly failing mental powers may

have rendered the task of the railwayman easier, but the

fact remains that they were able spokesmen for company in-
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teres ts.

With the September Revolution they
would have to
"begin anew.

CONCLUSION
Fourteen years of Radical political power and party
maiieuvering had left their mark on the British-owned rail-

roads in Argentina,

The corapanies,

foreign-controlled and

standing exposed between the producer and his markets,
easy targets for UCR politiciajis

anti-personalista.

,

v/ere

be they pro~Yrigoyen or

From I916 to 1930 virtually every phase

of railroad operation suffered from the entangling web of

Argentine politics.

Always vulnerable were the companies'

freight charges and passenger fares, especially at election
time.
In 1921 the railroads,

war depression,

v/ere

deep in the throes of the post-

in desperate need of increased reven-

ues.

But the Yrigoyen Government" refused to come to their

aid.

It was more concerned with assuring a Radical victory

in the C6rdoban gubernatorial campaign and, a few months

later, in winning the national elections.

Only after Al-

vear's election in 1922 did the lame-duck administration
sanction an increase in rates.

In the meemtime

ise

had

nearly dealt the smaller lines a death blow,
Alvear, too, despite his reputation as a friend of

foreign capital, did not hesitate to intervene in rail
rates if the political climate so dem.anded.

This was true

in 1926, when he pressed for rebates on the transportation

of cereal crops, and in 1928, when his raison d'etre for
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lowering tariffs may

^vell have

been to force the incoming

Yrigoyen administration into a politically
awkward situation vis a vis possible wage hikes for railway
workers.

Railroad labor was also highly susceptible to

tlie

machinations of the UCR, particularly that wing of
the
party controlled by Yrigoyen.
During his first

adminis-

tration when faced with serious rail strikes, Yrigoyen
initially attempted to

v/in

the men's loyalty away from their

Socialist or syndicalist unions by intervening in the disputes and forcing the companies to make concessions as to
wages, work rules and reinstatement of dismissed personnel.

When these tactics failed and the strikes continued, he
then played the moderate La Fraternidad against the militant FOF and shattered union solidarity.

Once the unions

were divided he had few qualms about crushing the movement.

Yrigoyen continued his efforts to build up a constituency among railroad workers while Alvear was in office.
By 1927 the efforts of hundreds of personalista committees

among railwaymen in all parts of the country began to pay
dividends.

Althougli the unions were still Socialist in

their upper echelons, Yrigoyen had succeeded in infiltra-

ting the lower ranks,

V<'hen

Alvear forced the companies to

knuckle under to union demands in 192?

,

he did so to offset

personalista influence in the unions and aided beleaguered
union leadership in gaining a needed victory.

334

What general conclusions can be
drawn from the often
stormy relations of the British-owned
railroads with
the

Radicals?
th-->

Perhaps most importmitly

,

an investigation of

milieu in wluich the compaiiies operated
sheds

the w]iole Radical period,

ligJrt on

clears away some of the cobwebs

and demands that certain assumptions about
the UCR be reevaluated.
It has been arrued by pro-Radical
liistorians that

Yrigoyen was the workin^man's friend.

secured certain benefits.

Admittedly, labor

?ut Yrif^oycn did not shrink from

employing-; troops against strikers if they seemed
to tlireaten

social revolution.

Nor did he hesitate to destroy unions if

he could not control tliem.

In several instances Yrip;oyen

ordered the railroad to hire scabs to break strikes.

T]\e

Radicals were middle class in their beliefs, and, although
for political reasons they hoped to forge an alliance with
labor,

they also feared the workingman.

As a result the

UCR's romnnce was more a "carrot and stick" affair.
It is commonly believed that Yrigoyen

nationalist.
roads,

v/hicli

v/as

Bn economic

His relationship with the British-owned rail-

controlled the nation's economic lifeline, de-

mands that this conception bo revised, if not discarded.

Yrigoyen was highly criticpl of the railronds when the occasion suited him, usually during elections or periods of

domestic crisis.

If one exai lines his speeches or reads the

editorial columns of La

Ejnojca,

the personal ista orgfn,

it
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becomes evident that he was not hostile to
railroad capital.
That Yrigoyen had a personal aversion to many of
the com-

panies' Buenos Aires chairmen cannot be denied..
Nor can it
be contested that both Yrigoyen and Alvear Wfmted
tighter

controls over the operation of the railroads in Argentina.
But there

capital

v/as

v/as

no attempt to nationalize the lines.

welcome in Argentina.

were an integral part of Yrigoyen

British

Indeed, the railroads

vast plan of public

's

works, unveiled at the beginning of his second administra-

Moreover, from I928 until the September Revolution in

tion.

1930 the British-owned railroads were able to command an influence in the Casa Rosada coiaparable to the period of Con-

servative hegemony, prior to I9I6.

The econoinic nationalism

of the Radicals, at least v/ith respect to the railroads, was

determined by political expediency.
These conclusions, adr-ittedly
drav/n

,

are based on evidence

from a small portion of a much broader spectrum.

Be~

fore the British-owned railroads in Argentina can take their

proper place in the history of the Radical Party era much
v/ork

needs to be done on other key issues

— petroleum,

the

sugar industry, labor organization, the v/heat industry and
the great exporting houses, anong others.

well-roujided view of

tlie

Only then will a

UCR in power emerge.
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APPENDIX
.

Ardigo

I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF OFFICIALS
INTERVIEWED

Dante
Served in the statistical
Direccion General de Ferrocarriles section of the
from lQ2l!l936? bv
1939 promoted to important position of control
de'
i|£iifi£; supervised publication of the uxiiciai
^lifa-l^sta
i.siaMstica Ferrovia rin until 193^^.

^

,

Castello

L.anuel

Named Inspector General de

Ferrocarriles
in 192,.. by 1926 he had become
Vice-director
General
de Ferrocarriles and in I928
named Director General
de Ferrocarriles.
Author of several mportcnt
important artiarti
cles on railroad tariffs.

Jared

John M
Joined the Buenos Aires Great Southern
Rail,
way
1929 at a^e 15 eventually promoted to traffic
^^<^^iic
manager for the entire system.

m

•

.

Ramoni

Steven

Oliver.
Hired by the Central ArP:entine Railway
in
1920 and assi^ried to the statistical section of
the
traffic department.
By 19/1-8 he had become Stores
Superintendent.

Ormond.
Joined the Central Arrentine Railway in
1910 as a mechanical engineer.
In 1921, after service witn British army, hired by Great Southern
as
assistant to chief engineer.
Promoted to chief operating engineer in 1932,

Taylor, William Henry.
Began service with Buenos Aires and
Pacific Railway in 1915.
Quickly promoted to chief
of the labor section, a position lield until 1924 when
named general secretary of the General iVanagers
Meetings.
Remained in tliis capacity until retirement in 19^7.

APPENDIX II

The following Graphs were taken from Estadlstica
Grgf lea de los Ferrocarril es en Explotacion 1857~ 1935
official publication of the Direcci6n General de Ferrot

carriles,
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Unpublished Materials.

Archives,
1.

Archive of the Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway
CoiTipany,

Liinited (Buenos Aires),

Departamento Adr.iinistrativo

,

files, I916-

1930.

These files, nunbered consecutively and arranged in chronological
order, largely concern the everyday
operations of the Pacific, although
several folders contain important corresj:!ondenco between the Buenos Aires
Board of Directors and the London ofMany papers are missing and,
fice,
attached to some empty carpetas is
the intriguing note "destruido por decreto." Unfortunately, the records
relative to the 1917-191^ labor unrest are among the missing files.
There is no index.
,

Actas del Directorio Local,
The minutes of the Buenos Aires
Only
Board of the Pacific Railway,
one volume, beginning with Acta 883
(30 June 192l)"and ending with Acta
970 (18 May 1928), survives.

Actas de la Junta Consultiva de Abogados de
los Ferrocarriles

Because of their brevity, these
minutes were useful only as a guide.
Two volumes exist, the first containing Actas from l^- August I908 to 11
March 1925, and the second Actas from
16 April 1925 to 12 April 193^t-. There
is an index.
Actas de la Junta de Representantes Le gales
y Gg rentes de los Ferrocarriles.
These minutes constitute the

.
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single most valuable source
relative
to the relationship of the
Britishov.ned railroads with the
Argentine
GoverniTient.
The Actas, numbered
secutively from the first meetingcon(3
March 1921), are complete
through
Actas Reuniones Mensuales de
Gerentes.
The minutes of the monthly
tings of the chairmen of the Buenos Aires Boards of the Britishowned railroads.
One volume survives.
It contains the Actas from
the first session (15 March
]9?1) to
the meeting of 2? November I928.
m.ee

Actas de las Sesiones de la Oficina
de Ajustes Frecus'ora de la Junta de Representantes Legales y Gerentes de los Ferrocarriles.
Complete from the first session
1886 until the last in I92I, these
Actas are little, more than an outline
of the proceedings and are of limited
usefulness.

m

Ordinary Monthly Meetings of General
of British Railways.

ftena/rers

Occasionally provide insights not
found in the other minutes.
Complete
from 1918 to 1931.
2.

Archive, Ministerio de Transporte

(Buenos Aires).

Contains the expedientes of the Ministerio de Obras P-ublicas treating railroad
questions as well as thowse of the Direccion
General de Ferrocarriles
The documents are
arranged in chronological order, althouph
many are out of place.
Some may be found in
other Government archives while others are
missing.
There is a complete collection of
the printed Circ ulares of the Direccion General,
There is no index available in the
archive
.

I

3^7

3.

United States, National Archives.
United States, Department of State. Records
Relating to the Internal Affairs of
Argentina, I9IO-I929.
Microcopy 5l4
of the National Archives,

Occasional enlightening analyses
of the Argentine Government's policy
vis a vis the British-owned railroads.

United States, Department of State. Records
Relating to Political Relations Between Argentina and Other States,
1910-1929.
Microcopy 516 of the National Archives.
United States, Department of State,
Records
Relating to Political Relations Between the United States and Argentina,
1910-1929.
Microcopy 515 of the National Archives,
B,

Interviews,
The following men, who were kind enough to allow me to speak with them about their experiences
with the British-owned railroads and the Argentine
Government during the Radical era, provided me v/ith
a rich fund of information,

Ardigo, Dr. Dante
Castello, Dr. Manuel F,
Jared, Mr. John M,
Ramoni, Mr. Oliver
Steven, Mr, Ormond
Taylor, Mr. William Henry
Thomson, Mr. Alexander
C,

Letters,
Personal letter to the
Castello, Dr. Manuel F.
author, Buenos Aires, 12 April 1971«
Personal letter to
Taylor, Mr. V/illiam Henry.
the author, Acasusso, 19 December 1970.

II,

Primary Sources
A,

Lav/s

j

Published Documents^

and Decrees.

c

,

—

s

3^8

Repiiblica Argentina.

Buenos Aires

i

Bolettn Oficial

~

19l5ri9'3o,

.

1916-1930

*

Contains the full texts of virtuallv
every law and decree for the years.
noted.

Jornada de

horps rara enrcle.
.2^: Z obiZeXos, de to do el Pais; Deere t"Rt"^.
lairientario
Buenos Aires 1930.'
.

8
t

Minis terio de Obras FublicaSo
Lev 5315 sobre
concesiones de, f errocarriles y su~d^creto Fi^T^.
IBentari_o del J024/1908; le^^ 570~sobr~con'c^-"
2nes de raiiiales; ley 626p sobre expr orr
Tn'^T^Fs
la
£^ $m:fJlos y
]j_y 10.^57 sobre exo7i77a cT'on
impuestos es table ci da £or e^l art. 8o d'e"]!^iill; ley 6220; ley: 6757 y"'Z100'.
Buen'os"
Aires 1922o

„.

—

>

•

li^y; y:

carr il-

neral de los ferroBuenos 'Aires 19327

Iiejclajnento

carriles. nacionalss.

p-e

j

Rev ision de los tsrifas del Ferro
Sud.
Buenos Aires j'l928.

Text of the Executive decree ordering the
Great Southern to lower its rates, dated 13
June 1928.

Revisio n d^e las tarifas del Ferrocarr il d_el Sud Dictamenes de los senores' Procura dor General de la Maci6n Irocurador de_l
Tesoro d^ecr:e_tos_ del Pode r E.jecut vo y nota de
p resenta cion de la Empresa.
Buenos ~A]'res 192'8.
;

,

.

i.

i

These imrortant documents supplement the
decree of 13 June I928 relative to the reduction of tariffs on the Great Southern.
Tra ba.io del_ personal de l^_s Emp resa
Fer roviarias
D isposicione s re?lam entarias
Buenos Aires I920,
.

<

,

i

Contains all decrees relative to the rail
strike settlement of I9I7-I9I8.

Direccion General de Ferrocarriles
Ley OS
contra tos y resoluciones ref erentes a
los Ferr ocarrile s y trsnvf as a t r a c i o"n ni'-C^n
ica de" la Republica Ar.q-e nti n a
Buenos Aires
•

.

,

.

19^^5.

1

349

ii^

Regj^amentaci6ri del Traba.jq en las Empresa s de
^^iI2:o_car riles de Juri sd iccio n Nacio nal? DecreNotas de Tas Eint^Fesas';
^' N.
Buenos Aires
I917.
i

Valuable in that it prints the company
notes to the Government.
Remorino, Jeronimo, et al
eds. Ana^l^s de 1 e P2slacion ar^ejrtina, 1812-19^4. 5 vols. Buenos
Aires 1953-1957.
.

,

I

Legislative Debates.
Republica^ Argentina.
Congreso Nacional. Diario de
ses iones de la c a mar a de diput?_dps, 1216- 1£10.
Buenos Aires: I916-I930,"
The Chamber of Deputies devoted much attention to the British-ov/ned railroads.
The
debates help to clarify party positions relative to railroad capital and"' demonstrate the
political uses of a foreign-controlled enter-

prise

,

Diar io de sesiones de la c^mara de
senadores IQ 1^^1930
BH^no's Aires: 1915-1930,
.

.

";

.

The Senate,

dominated by Conservatives,
generally supported the railroad compajiies.
Great Britain,
Parliament,
House of Commons,
Parliamentary Debates: Official Report. 5th series.
1922, 1928.
Londoni 1922, I928.

During the tariff controversies of I92I1922 and 1928 several M.P. 's spoke out against
the Argentine Government.
Reports of Executive and Legislative Bodies.

Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional. Cr5mara de Diputados. Los impuestos muni ci pales y_ las empresas ferrovia ria.
Buenos Aires: 191?)7~
Congressional investigation v/ith respect
to Article 8 of the Mitre Law and the right of
the railroads to be exempt from municipal taxation.

.

.
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Republica Argentina. Congreso Nacional.
C^^mara de Di
putados,
Informe de la Comisi6n de Invest^P-a']^t_s, Setiilnbre

IoTq/

.

T^u^nn<.

Part of this investigation of trusts in
Argentina treats railroad tariffs and their
re.
lation to the formation of monopolies.

Comisi6n Especial de Asuntos
Antece dentes sobre cumT)lim i ento
l.g y e g. ferrovi arias
£§.
y_ r6p:imen de
tariTa"
de
lljmsLQorite
pasa.i'eros ^^ d_e merca derfasT"
Buenos Aires: 1930.
__.

•

.

,

Ferroviarios.

IM

.

Minis terio del Interior.
M^riioria del Minis.terio del Interior p resen tada al Honorable Cong^eso de la Naci_on, ]^18- 1919
Buenos "Aire"
1919.
.

•

Subs^ecretarla de Inf ormaciones

•

,

Las

fu_erzas^armad;:ns restitu yen' el imperiq de la
so be rani* a po pular
Las el ccc.ione s "generalos de
>

19^^

vols,

2

Buenos Aires

1

194"6.

Extremely helpful in determining the
party affiliations of congressional deputies,
J^linisterio de Obras Fublicas.
Ante cedentes
discu sion e in formes de la com isi on t^cnica de
estudios y_ revision de tarifas
Buenos Aires
1922.
.

.

j

The final report of the committee called
by Yrigoyen to study the feasibility of tariff
increases.
An invaluable source.

Direcci6n General de Ferrocarriles
E stadi stica Graf ica de los Ferrocarri] es en Ex plotacion "1857-1935
Buenos Aires 193?.
.

,

i

Tarifas Ferroviar as Kstudio
de la Direccion Gene ral d_e Fer rocarriles sobre
su rev is 1 6n
Buenos Aires I928.
t

i

.

.

1

1

An exhaustive study of the Great Southern's
The Government collected an
tariffs in I928.
impressive array of legal arguments to order
rate cuts.
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Re].ub.Uca Arr;entina, Ministerio do
Obrnn Fublican
D,irocoi6n Gcncrcil do Ferrocarr.iles
Tar j fas
|iIiJ:xiyj_Rri_a, EstucUo do la DireccT6n
SonF?^ dP
.

OLericoR.

^-^

Buenos Airoui 19287""

A statistical supploinont to
the Direcci6n
study of the Great Southern \n rates

rn^^r.^
General's

in

.L)j/,Ot

•

.

.

SIP. de la

^

^<^^
1920

Tari fa^ Fcrrov i nriafj
Coi^nrjil

]2.'J::£CilIcln

reviF.i6n',

do

pt^ fi os.

t

Kntu-

l-'orr ocarrrie^

i:!ul^Tli7^-f"

A collection of praphB and chfirts
supplementary to the Direcci6n General's investigation of t\\v C,roi^\l Southern's tariffs.

Ferrovj arias Estul£I i2ir^_cci_6n Gen eral do h'orro_carr'n on
^9.
«ohro su re visi on on el Ferr-o oaff i j ^Cpntrja~
Ardent no.
Bug no n AiresT 19"?! 0,

^

^[iinli'iiP.

t

3

The GoverniTK^nt report on tJio rates of
the Central Arf;ent5ne.
The Direcci6n General's
arp^urnonts are similar to those used acainst
the Groat Southern in' I928,

Tarifas F erro viarins Estu
Pirecci6n GoiTe ra]. de"
" Il^r rqc'ar r "'
i

^ISIIL

12:

re lat ivns a

Fcrroc nrril

2j\

do]^ Su_d,

SLIPii £fl!l^ilIL^_c!.g_^

2

6e_

mayo

d_e

rovisi"6n do
erji

1928.

an:^!! i

Iris

anrTo

U

tarl.f as" do]

observaci-

J.gs

la Npta de la Einpresa,
Buono's Aires
1923".

cUn

1

The Government's refutation of the Great
Southern's arr;umonts vis ^a vis rate cuts.

Great Britain. Department of Overseas Trade.
Kconomi c Co ndi t ionn in the A rgentin e Republic
London I919-I930."
.

I

An excellent ani.ual reviev/ coiiipi]ed by
the comrr.orcial counselor to the British Em-'
bassy in Buenos Aires,

United States. Department of Conmcrce. Bureau of
Fo re i f';n an d Dome s t i c Co
e rce
of Tj
port ? t ion nnd Man dlir u' of Ar;^rntJ n . ,.'}ic rit7
harold R. Brown ynd Brine Kl. T^iace ,""Jr. "Trade
Information Bulletin No. '1-39. V/ashinptont I926.
tfui

.

'

'

'

,

—

^

«
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Unixed states. Department of Commerce.
Bureau of
foreign and Domestic Commerce.
Railways of
Soulh America.
Part I, Ar freniAn^Tl^n^ n^p.
Brady.

S.

Trade From.o ti^TTsi?!^
Vrashmgton, D.C.
1926.

No.

32

i

Authored by the United States Trade
Cominissioner in Buenos Aires, this
vides a valuable overview of allpublication proArgentine rail.

.

i

_

O B. 0 S

«

Railroad Company Publications.
Argentine North Eastern Railway Co.. Ltd.
Report of
i§e Directors to th.e_ Proprietors and St^neFt
21 Ihl Revenue and Cajjital Acnounts. lolT-Topp
London I916-I928.

—

t

RerjqrJ:._^ Proceedinf^s at the 28th /through
the fK).th/ Ordinary Gen eral lieel^np- of the
ProMl^tor_Q, 19167::i9287.
London «~19r^- 192 87
«

Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway Co. Ltd.
Annual
Eejort and Accounts. I916- I931
London j~T91^"
1931.
.

of

Pr:o ceo

dings aj the_ Ordin ary Gen£1^1 Meeting of Propr ietors. 191^^93l7' London
191^-1931.
•

R§Il!?.ll

Ferrocarril del Sud.

Ferroca.rrj.l^ Sudt

tar if as de trans porte
Aires 191?".

§.US

."

1

917.

Auirento de

Buenos

I

Contains the texts of the notes exchanged^between the Great Southern and the
Direccion General de Ferrocarriles
Not a dirixrida a S. E. el Senor F.^inistro de
Obre s Fubli cas de la Nacion
Dr. Roberto
Cr-tiz con moti vo del Informe de_ l_a Di rec ci on
Gener al de Ferrocarr 3 es refe'rente a tari f?^s
Buenos Aires I928.
.

.

ivi.

j

j

The Great Southern's defense of its rates
in the face of the Government report which urged

tariff reductions.
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FerrocarrU del Sud.

Tarif_as, Nota diri^id-,
.1 s F
el Sen or Ii!im^r^^ri)brai~f?ib-fT?^^
|*
fjde la Nacion. Dr. RTvh^TT: JT~ TT-r^

Buen^-AlFo57"i9il7^-

^

^

Ji'i?i°

dc 1928.

Buenos Ayre^ and Pacific
Railway Co., Ltd Annnn
R|£0£t and Moounts:.
1916-1221.
loAdS^llifi.

Perrocarril de Buenos Aires
al Paclfico.
Tprif,=JMor^e
de
la
ffff2Xi|-|s
a_dEinistFlSl~del
,

ctui.i^nxo

cie_i

22^„

Buenos Aires

j

I917.

jompany's case for a 2?:^,, increase
in
Its rates
its
ratP^ to rr.eet the rising
fuel
and
inateri?^!
in^^^terial
costs generated by World War
I.

5^^.il§£ f ejn^oyiari as

Aires

J

Tnforine

de la adiaini^

I918.

J

Corr.pany

It

aitei
a?Ie'r

tlie

T^
I917

argument to raise rates

^^^^'^^

lO^o to

^^^^^

'''''^^'^

rail strike.

Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway Co..
Ltd. Oficina
de Asuntos Legales.
Tarif as fe.rrovi
arias
"~
-J-V^o
Buenos Aires I928.
.

.

1

Defense of the railroad's rate schedule.

Buenos Ayres Western Railway. Ltd.
Annua] R eport and
Ac_counts. I^6-.l£21o
LondonT I91ST93I7
Pi:2ceeditigs at the IVenty- seventh
/through
the Porty-first7 Ordinary GePieriFFeeTtin,of
:

the ConvDsny:.

1916 (-1931).

Lon don7~l 9X^1931.

Ferrocarril Oeste de Buenos Aires. Interrret aci on
la. ley no. 5311* La Em presa del
FerrocT rril
Oesle le Buenos Aires L initad a versus la iuTFnT

^

cipaUdad

puestos

la Capit al ror devol uci6n"d"e~i"^
Buenos Aires: 191?,

_de

'

.

The V/estern's defense of its asserted
right to be exempt from municipal taxation, as
provided for in the Mitre Law.

i

.

35^

^i^rivenips

2^

Reg]^mentos,

Buenos Airi¥r"i93or"

^"^P^^"^
with•tho^T''•'^^^''^'
with
the Union Ferroviaria held

strike of March I930.

meetings
uaj.owing tno
fol]owin/the

—

Cordoba Central Railway Co.,
Ltd.
Ac^or^_t.s,

Annual Rerort and
London. Tplfrifflf-'^-

19l6-lo^.

R§£orl 2j; Froce.edln£S at the Thirtieth
/Through the Forty-f il-th7^oFdTnar~GeniT:p]
M|£-tin|^pj:

Cp^^n^,

tJie

MTTTiqIi TT-IB^on

Entre RXos Railways Co., Ltdo
Froceedinirs at the OrGeneral
Meeting,
l^rj.
12B:il5ir~LondHi7r lfl6
de Sue_ldos para el .personal de
conduccion

°£ locomq t oras

Interpretaci ones de~las~dl~
£2^2_ciones re£lsn-tent_arias del t rab^.j
6n
l^iaiii^££-iica.
Buenos Aires 1920"r~'^
I

~V^i

»'

*

The stenographic account of the
negotiations between the companies and La
Fraternidad
with respect to fixed wage and work
scales.
y^^I^l2IL jMlliErilica de las

Di^^cusJ ones del Escala-

de Sueldos
Reglarnento Interno para~"el~
Personal de Conduccion de Locoir.otoras An^
1221. 5 vols. Buenos Aires I923.

£211

.

«

This is the mimeographed copy of the I923
escalafon negotiations between the companies and
La Fraternidado

Other Reports.
Banco de la Nacion Argentina.
Memoria v Balance
^^nersl del E.jercicio 1918^ 1931 .'" Bueno~Aires
I9I8-I93I.
.

This is an excellent annual survey of
Argentina's economic health.

1
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Cefensa ante, la Corte

BuiT^,"

AiriirifSf

collection of
^^'^
material
reT^tivrr'y'-'^'''\'''
relative to Yri^-oyen's years ^^^^^
in control of the
^^^^"^-1

^Lj;'''^^^''^"^'^^

Confederaci6n Argentina del Co^ercio,
de la Industria
ae
IR
Produccion.
y
Uemorj^ del Conse.jo Di£e ctD^ Corre sjx)^
al QuITn^o^TijJFcTcio
^iTjmailo el 31 de Octub?? d^TlQir.
Bliinos
ucuuiD
Aires 1921.
'

I

Conferencia. Economics Nacional. Julio de 1928.
Buenos Aires ri928";

-•. ^S^^^-^era

Contains some useful information vis
"a
VIS the 1928 rail rates controversy.
^

^ X balanc e

de_

£il-|ctiva, £eriodo 1929-1930.

1930

1a

Com

i

s

i

on

BuenBFTi?^,

•

Valuable account of the rift between La
Fraternidad and the Union Ferroviaria.
Uni6n.Ferroviaria.
I2ire_ctiya,

Memoria

y_

192^-19,30.

Title varies.

ba;^c_e de la Corijsi5n
Buenos Aires: 192fcl93l

An excellent summary of union activity

on Argentina's railroads.
IIIo

Prim.ary Sources

j

Memoirs,

Messages

Col]ections of Speeches and

Wipert von.
Am Rartd e der V/eltgeschi chte
Marokko. Schweden. Arge ntinien.
Wiesbaden
19580

Blilicher,

i

Memoirs of a German diplomat who served in
Argentina from I926 to I929.
Carcano, Miguel Angel.
nos -^iresi 193s.

Realidad~ de
'

•

.un a

pol ttica .

Bue-
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Memoirs of a Socialist deputy.
Coleman,

Arturo^H.
Mi vi_da de ferroviario
inPl^q
la Argentina,
l88Z-19^ir -mirBl'lL^^}M97^

one-time traffic manager
Fer on
on^i^n'^'^M
r^^^r'"^"^'
the Bahra
Blnnca section of the Great
Soutaorn, had an intimate knowledge
of the Eri
Argentina: these'memol;s
piovLd
P^ov^nhnll
Bhnllow and disappointing^,
Del Mazo,

Gabriel, compo El p.ensamiento escrito
de YriF.OYen
Buenos Aires 19437
.

~

i

Dickm^mn, Enrique.
Re^cMoerdos de un militnnto socialista
^sLL^^'i
Buenos Aires: 19^9.
An interestinf?; ?vnd informative
account of
the inner^ workings of the Socialist
Party from'
Its foundinr; in Arp;entina until the
1940's
Dick
mann was also editor of La Vaiifiuiirdia' for
several
years as well as a congressional "dejE^ty.
^

^

Gonzalez, Joaquin V.
ObrFi s completas. 25 vols.
Aires 1935-1937.

Buenos

I

A valuable source of inform?ition

for the

period 1890-1920 when Gonzalez was prominent as
a statesmaj-i, educator, author and lawyer.
Ibarguren, Carlos.
Aires I955.

La historia cue' he vivido.
~

Buenos

I

Mejaoirs of a Conservative,

Land a, Jos^.
Hipolito Yrip-pyen Vistq ^or_ unp de sus
m;^di cos
e studio car a c t e r 0 3 6 P:i"co de""su pers onali'
dad.
Buenos Aires I95O.
t

,

t

An attempt to

Written by one of

fathom Yripoyen's personality.

Yri,q:oyeii

Pinedo, Federico.
En tiempos
Aires I9460

de.

'

s

doctorr;.

la repu blica.

Buenos

I

Pinedo, a political moderate, was strongly antiYrigoyen.
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Ramos Mexfa, Ezequiel.
Mi^ memorias, 1-833-1935
^22*
ed. Buenos ^iresi 1936'^

Unfortunately,

the.re

pr^d
^nd

is little material
^^^^^ r-lexia was a Min-

fsL^
ister of
n/?^fn-'^'.^"-'^^^'
P\,blic Works and later
Buenos Aires Board of the Entre Chairman of the
RIos RaUways.
Repetto Nicolas.
Ml £aso £or la polltica. 2 vols.
vuj.o.
Buenos ^iresj I956-I957,

—

Political memoirs of

a

Mis np_venta anosj Escritos
parlamentar ias.
Buenos Aires

respected Socialist.

.

Stimson

Frederic Jesup.

e
j

intervcnci on-s
19^Y.

United States.

Mew York.

Memoirs of the United States Ambassador
to
Argentina during Yrigoyen's first administration.
His remarks are often misleading and
the book
must be used with care,
Torre, Lisandro de la.

^1^.

Las dos campanas presidenci~
Buenos Aires T939;;
1

On both occasions de la Torre was the candidate of the Progressive Democratic Party.

Obras de Lisgndro de la Torre
Aires. 1952,
.

vols.

6

.

Buenos

A useful collection of speeches, articDes
and documents.
De la Torre was always critical

of Yrigoyeno

Yrigoyen, Hipolito.
Pueblo y_ .p-obi erno
vols.
Buenos Aires
195^0

.

2nd ed. 12

1'

Published by the Radical press, these volumes are a storehouse of documents relative to
Yrigoyen's tv/o administrations.
Primary Sources. Articles and Pamphlets.
Castello, Manuel F.
"Vfas de comunicacion El concepto
de justicia y ra zonabilidad de las Tarifas, en las
Leyes Ferroviarias de la Nacion." La_ Ingenierfa
Nos. 567-569 (January-March 1922).
.

.

,
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^When Castello wrote the article he held a
position in Commercial Department of the Direccio
_

General de Ferrocarriles

"VXas de comunicaclon Lar> tarifas p-enerales
y
especiales en la legislacion argentina; Los transportes bficiales." La In.g:en.i eria Nos. 570-571
(April-May 1922).
.

»

.

Corti,

Celestino E.
"Aumento de 27f/-^ de ]as tarifas
ferroviarias. " Revista de Ciencias Economicas.
Ano XIII, Serie II, N0.T8 (j^ITy 1925")"^
Corti, Inspector General de Ferrocarriles
until 1918, was expert on railroad rates and accounting.
This article is a copy of his informe
to Pablo Nogu^s in November I917.

"Tarifas ferroviarias." Re vista de Cienc ias
_Eco n6mic as
Ano XIII, Serie II, No's, ^^-^5'
(March- April 1925).
.

,

Based on an official report dated 26 October 1915.
"Tarifas ferroviarias: Sobre los "justo y razonable" de los precios de transporte." Revis ta
de Cienc ias E conomicas
Ano XIII, Serie II, No,
55 iMiy I925T.
.

.

Based on an informe of the Direccion General
de Ferrocarriles dated 26 October 1915.

D'Abemon, Viscount.

"The Economic Mission to South

Am.erica." International Affairs

,

VIII (November

1929).

Atanasio, "Algunas leyendas sobre los ferrocarriles." Revista de Economf a Arp-e ntina XXII,
No. 127 (January 1929).

Iturbe,

,

An important article by the General Manager of the Central Argentine Railwayo

Leguizamon, Guillermo Eo "An Argentine View of the Problem of JCxchange Restrictions," International Affairs, XII (July 1933).

Leguizamon served as President of the local
boards of the V/estern, Gre?t Southern and North
Eastern Argentine Railroads,
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Nogu^s

Pablo
"Capital y tarifas en la ley
531s "
Boletln de Obras Publicas, XV
(DeoeMber I916).
An indispensable study showir/r
the rel

Director oln^r-.?^
CW wis wrUten'

O'Farrell

Santiago

G.

^ey Kitre.
Nogu^s was
^-I-^b when the arti-

^

"Railways in Arp-entina

"

The

erally critical of the Yrigoyen
Governinento

Ta^i?fs^''f
''ii
lariLts.
Pamphlet.

a

"

Zroblems. Salaries and
Buenos Aires 1928^
j

A short study of the relationship
between
rising salaries and the need for increased
re
venues for the railroads. Ramos Mexla
was President of the local board of the Entre Rfos
Railways when he authored the pamphlet.

Robertson. Sir Malcolmo
"The Economic Relations Between Great Britain and the Argentine
Republic."
In ternational A ffairs
IX (March I930),
.

An informative article written by a
British
Ambassador to Argentina. f.!uch of the study is devoted to the British- ov-Tied railroads.

Zeballos, Estanislao S. "Gobierno Radical." Revis-ta
de
Derechq, His tori a v Letras LVIII (October~T917T.
.

Valuable material on the rail strikes of
An interpretation by a Conservative obser1917.
voro
•

2L

"Gobierno Radical." Revista de Derec ho. ffistoria
Letr as. LX (June 19187^

The rail strikes of 1917-191S as seen through
the eyes of a Conservative.

Secondary V/orks.
A,

General V/orks,

l

.

I
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Academia Nacional de Historia.
tern^oranea,

186.2-1^_0.

Buenos Aires
Levene, Gustavo
nos Aires

J

t

Historia Argentina ConVol.

I

iir2~i^5tT^s

I963-I964,

G. ^Histori^
196^1.

ar^entina.

3

vols.

Palacio, Ernesto.
Historia de la Argentin ~
a.
2 vols,
Buenos Alres}19?5,
Pen die,

George.

.

Argentin a.

2nd ed.

Hh

Bue-

ed.

London? I96I.

Ramos, Jorge Abelardo.
R evo uc ion y_ contrarevolu^l^R §Ik Argentina Las masas en nuestra
his"
toria,
Buenos Aires 1957."
t

j

Rennie, Ys£ible Fisk.
York 19^5.

—

The Ar gentine Rcj)ublic.
:

New

I

[

Rennie 's information relative to the British-owned railroads is drawi from Raul Scslabrini-Ortiz* work and must be used with cautiono
Romero, Jose Luis.
A History of Argentine Foli tica l
Thoup-ht.
Translated by Thomas F, McGann,'
Stanford: I963,
Scobie, James R.
Argen tina
New York 19^^,

.

A City and a nation.

I

Whitaker, Arthur
N.

J.

I

P.

Argentina

.

Englewood Cliffs,

196^.

Publications Relating to the Railroads.
Araya, Rogelio.
Tarl fas Ferroviaria s
Contra to de
trans porte
derecho f errov nri o
2nd ed. 2
vols.
Buenos Aires I923,
t

.

j

Arays, a Radical Deputy, v/as an outspoken
critic of what he considered the high rates collected by the British-owned railroads,
Dante,
"Los f errocaiTiles y la econom^a argOiitina en el perfodo l895-19''f-5' "
Ingeniorfa No.
851 (Se ptem.be r 19^.'-5 )

Ardi^^o,

M

.

Ardigo, a lor:g-time chief str/ 1 sti cian In
defends.;
the Direccion General de Ferrocarri].es
the companies' tariff schedules.
j

,
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Bag>vell
Philip s.
The Railway Clearing. Hoi-Je in
the British EconomZTTO

1^68.

Useful background material vis^a
vis
practices on the English railroads.

Balay

Esteban

"Estudio sobre gastos do explotaci5n
Cien^ias Ec^no.icas?
A^^XXTf
Ano
XXII, Serie II, No. I3?
Deceinb^l933

^

•

(

)

Harris, Francisco.
Resena de los Forroc?rri les Ar
£§Iltinoss Frjn ci pales antecedentes le£-^5les~V
estadfsticas, 1857-19^.I}~
Bui^K^i-Aif^^o/^^^

A general, superficial study,
Beltrame, Jos^.
La c risis de los ferrooarriles argentine s de propriedad prfvada
^uenos AiresT~19^6.
.

Traces the roots of the financial crisis
which overtook the Bri tish-owied railroads in
the 1930 's and 19^0 's.
The author had been an
attorney for both the Great Southern and Western
Railways.

Bramugiia, Juan Mtonio,
Jubi la ci ones f rrovi arias
inlluencia de la accion sindic?! de los. traba.i adores en la forn.acion de las Isyes.
Buenos
Aires 1941.

M

>

—

J

Praises the role of the Union Ferroviaria
in securing pensions for railroadraen,

Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway Co., Ltd.
H istory
and Characteristics 1882- 1933
Buenos* Aires
.

.

The official history of the company,

Bunge, Alejandro.
Ferrccarr i les Argentinos Contri bucio n al estudio del patrlmonio nacional
Buenos Aires I918,
i

.

j

Excellent, although dated.

Castiglione, Antonio.
El derecho ferroviario fren te
al derecho vial y ante la teorta de la iriprevi"si6n.
Buenos Aires 1935.
1

c

i
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Ferrocarril Central Argentino.

Resena historica del

^''^
cixion
ation of^fifKnih^""^-"'
Oi Its both anniversary,"""P^'^y

Chiti.

Juan

commem.or-

and Agnelli. Francisco.
Cincuenteae
I| F^ternid^
0|r^, 1882-20 de 2unio de F^m^^oieETME^^
Buenos Aires.
l^JZ.
B.

,

'

A comprehensive history of La
Fraternidad
based on union files. A^ invaluable
study.

Cuccorese, Juan Koracio.
His tori a de Iop Ferrocarriles
en la Argentina.
Buenos Aires 19^9';
j

General in scope.
Contains some thoup-htprovoking questions with regard to the railroads and Argentine economic development.
Duncan, Julian S. "British Railways in Argentina."
Political Science Quarterly. LIT (December!
Eddy,

John Montague. "Fresente y future de los ferrocarriles argentinos'''.
Direccion de infor maciones y_ pjjbli aciones ferroviarias No. k-,
Buenos Aires 19^5"
.

1

A brief article written by the General
Manager of the Great Southern.
He defends the
British railroads in the 1920's.

Etchegula, Gregorio.
y.-'^stos

Los Ferroc a rriles Argentines
per 0,1 OS Argentines'." Buenos Aires I938.
i

Defends the Bri tish-ev/ned companies
against nationalistic attacks.

Fernandez,

La Union Ferreviar ia a trav^_s
tiemT? e
Ve ntic nee aHos a s e rv i c 0 de un
ideal 1922 -19^7.
Euencs Aires 19^77
^^^^anuel
»

.

F.

1

i

j

A general history of the Uni6n Ferreviaria,
Abundant in biographical data.
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First National Bank of Boston.
Buonon Aires Branch.
Ar£ent.inc R^Itop.^, Somo Comiv^r
cons vn th
North American Systems
VAxeno^TAi^ r~r<^j2y
i

.

Jonks, Lcla.nd H,

"Britain and American Rnj]woy Dc.
velopment." Journal of Economic History.
XJ
(Fall 1951).
'

tina,

Lewis,

Treats both the United Stqtes and Argen-

Colin.
Ar,o;entina

A l fairs

.

"Problems of Railway Development in
1857-1890." Inl^r- Amorlcmi Kcononi
XXII (Autumn l^b'o).

c

Excellent background material,
Malifaie,

E.

(?) "Reforma de tyrifas f erroviari as
^i^Xi^'ta de Ci one las E conomica s. Ano XVI. Sov-ie
II, No. 72 Tj^ly 19"27J7"^
.

Ortiz, Ricardo M.

E]_

ar^enj^ina.

?nd~

ferrocarri] en la oconomTa
ed.
Buenos Aires T95"8;
i

The first edition ar^rued for nationali7.ation of the lines, the argument being tliat a
nation's lifeline must be in the hands^'of its
own peoj-le.

Ramallo, Carlos M. "La demora en el transporte ferroviarios." Revista de Ci encias Econ6m icas. Ano
XVII, Serie II, No. 8^ (September 1928y;"'
An analysis of transportation delays on

Argentine railroads.

"Las ^ecuaciones f undamentalec de la tarificacion ferroviaria. " Rev sta de Cie ncia s Economicas Ano XIV, Serie" II, No. 12"'TJuno 1Q23T,
.

j

.

A technical article relative to tariff
f ormulat on
j

Ratti,

Luis P.
El Tran s r.orte yor Forrocarril
Los
Derecho s del Publi~co
la Res y^ons bill dad de
las Em pre s as
2 vo]"s.
Buenos Aires 192^1-1936,
\

ii_

.

i"

t

Ratti builds a legal case for Government
control over railro^.d tariff formulation.
He
relies on Supreme Court decisions.

7
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Rdgind

William.
HlFttoria del Ferrocarril Sud, 1861-1-9 36.
Buonos Aires ]937.
j

The Great Southern
official history.
Knp.lete W].th maps, photographs and
graphs.

Ronald

Juan.

Los FerrocarxUP^ F articiaarcs cn la
ArJILIlliJiaj Irg blnnas do oxdonlTdTanisJ^^
2:^.1-?-^^ ones con el
persona.! ""Buenos TTrTs

m

.

P ro bio ma do los
^
Buenos Aires 19^5,

Ferrocarri l es Arp-enti no
'

i

Saavedra Lamas, Carlos.
Los ferrocarri les ante ]a
legrislaci6n rosit iva ar^enUna.
Buenos Aires
'

i

1918.

The author focuses hjs attention on
Mitre Law,

tlie

Sanchez Alonso, Angela.
CotiKa ci ones de las a_cci^ncs
ordinnrias d^el Ferrocarril Pes to
Buenos'
Aires 1935.
.

J

S^inchez^de Bustamante, Teodoro.
La liber tad dc tarif 'icar en la ] epi s ] acl(^n f errov laria arr-ent.i n a.
de 2115. 2J1X^ Z^Ll Z
( R<5p- imen
Kstudio t^o-.
nico econ6mic o.
Buenos AiresT 1922.
..

Scalabrini Ortiz, Raul, hi stor a
argent inos
Buenos Ai rers
l

.

i

dp_

]_o£

ferrocarri

3.cs

19'4o".

A bitter polemic against the Britishowned railroads.
Reveals an extreme form of

Argentine nationalism.

Ernesto E.
Fe rroc nrr] los ar.o:o n tvno G
rinon nnto c^odento? lj2£^lL^» ley or quo

So fir on,

,

IL

rosonas^

er>

tndfp

ti

cac

.

Buenoc; Aironi

Suf;

x

]

os r

orli

1937,

Soares v/an Jefc do Estad.Ojtica dc la Dire cci6n CrOne ral do Forrocarril en when he wrote
tho book
Little arialysin,
•

Taylor,

and Rank-in,
For rocMrri 1
de Bueno s Aires pi lacf f j co
R osena hi ntori ca ^
caracterrntT cas de la errpresa I88?j - 1933
Buenos
Aj ro.^:
1933.
V/i

lliain .Monry,

i

.

I

.

>
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Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Institute de econonfa de
los transportes.
Los ferrocarriles ar^en?inos
su !iacj^njmzac_i^

Buenos Aires?" 19^ib~

Conclusions favorable to nationalization.

Vasallo Rojas. Emilio, and Gutierrez,
Carlos Matus.
los
gi^^^^IiS:
ferrocarrilps ar.Tentino ~
s.
Santiago de Chile I94?,
j

Wainer, Jacono. "Un problema de contaMiidadE]
contralos de la contabiiidad' de ] os Ferrocarriles," H evista de_ Ciencias Economi cas
Ano XVIII, Serie II, No. 101 ("DecembeFT9H9
)
.

Calls for a uniform system of accounting
^
on all railroads,
.

Wilmart, R.
"Politica Ferroviaria de la Legislacion
Argentina." Revista Ar/yentina d^ Ciencias
Poll ticas
XXIX ("November 192^1").
.

Wilson, John. "Los Ferrocarriles brit^nicos en la
Argentina. " Revista de Ciencias Econ6m cas
Ano XXII, Serie II, No. 156 (July 1934).
j

.

Wright, Winthrop R. "Argentine Railways and the
Growth of Nationalism." Unpublished FhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1964,

Economics, Labor and Political Parties.

Abad de_ Santillan, Diego.
La Z- 9.*
Idodlo AEi^ Z Trayectoria d_e_l Movimisnto Obroro Revo lucionario en la Argentina
Buenos' Aires
1933.
«

.

1

ovimiento anarouis ta en la Argentina
De^de s_us comienzos hasta I910
Buenos Aires
rn

.•

t

,

1930.

Written by one close to the movement,
Baily,

Samuel.

Labo r, Nationalism and Pol tics in
Argentina
New Brunswick, N. J.
I967.
i

,

.

j

1

——
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Belloni, Alberto.

Del anarcnasmo al pei^on^smo.

M

Bianco, ^Jos^.

doct^lna rMical.

^enos Aires,

A succinct synthesis of
UCR ideoJo^-y.

Bunge

Alejaj^dro E.

Buenos Aires

Del Mazo

Gabriel.

M|±2ria y

—

EconoMa Argentina
'

i

1928-193oT^

Una Nueva Argentina.

.

.

La

L'r

vo±o.
vol.

Buenos Aires., I940.

El RMi_calisj^^

dq_c_trina.

.

TT^:

"

Ensayo sobre su

BlI^rAFrTs 7

A history of the UCR written
by a Radical.
Del r.!azo's work is an excellent
b.io,o-raphical source, i.e., it contains mmxy
lists
01 names associated with the movement.

Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F.
Essays on the Economic
Hi|lory of the Argentine Republ ic. ~¥^n^en
Di Telia

1

Guide,

and Zymelman, Manuel.
Las etapas
£§i ^.l^^ollo economic o arp-entino
Buenos
Aires, 1967.
.

Etkin, Alberto M.

tena

Bosoue.io do unn. Histori a y Docde la Union" Civi ca Rad'ical
Buenos
.

Aires: 1928.

Fernandez, Julio A. "The Nationalism Syndrome in Argentina." Journal of Inter - American Studies
~'
VIII (October 196677
_

'

Ferrer,

Aldo.

Marjory
Fuchs,

The Argentine Economy.
F.l.

Urquidi.

Translated

b^^

Berkeley, I967.

Jaime.
Ar^-ent ina, Su desarrollo
Buenos Aires, I965.

Suffers from an intransigent
point of viev/.

c apita].is

r.larxict

Galletti, Alfredo.
La po lltic a y los parti Hps
Buenos Aires, IQ61.

.

ta .

36?

Goldstraj, Manuel
Ano_s
err ores, Un cuarto de
de
|A£iO
jjoLftica ar£_e,ntiTia.
BueiTSTTir^,
Good conrnentary on Ar^-entine
politics
during the period of Radical control.
Gold'^'^ jefatura de la
secretarla polltica ""^l^
of Ivlarcelo T. de Alvear for 10 years,
^

•

Haring

Clarence H. "Depression and Recovery in
Argentina." IWjjm AfTairs, XIV (April
1936).

A few remarks on the railroads'

_

inter-

locking equipment companies in England,
Irazusta,

Julio.
InjOjJj3ric2_a economica brit^ni ca en
el Rio de la Plata
Buenos Aires'i 19oy,
.

Harsh criticism of British capital, diplomats and the Argentines who worked for British interests.
Sketchy documentation.

Marotta^

Pedro.

F.

^'^on^ico

El verdadero nacionalismo ecoargent in 0
Buenos Aires 1922,
.

j

Marotta, Sebastian,
El movimicnto sindica l argentirroj Su genesis ^l desarroll o. 3 vols. Buenos
Aires 1- I96O-I970.
An indispensable history of the syndicalist movement in Argentina through I930.

Anonymous.
La Obra de la Revo luc ion Resena Sinte tica de ]_q Labor Desarrollada 6 de S optiem bre 1930-1931.
Buenos Aires, I931,
>

.

Oddone, Jacinto.
Gremialis mo Prolet'-ivrio A rgentine
Su orig-in
sv desarrollo
sus r^rroros
Buenos
Aires, 19^9.
t

.

,

,

A labor history v/ritten by a Socialist.

Ortiz, Ricardo M,
I850 -IQ30.

His tori a economi ca de la Arr:cr. tina
2 vols.
Baenos Aires, 196'^~^

Phelps, Vernon Love 11,
The Internati onal Economic
Positio n of A r^^entina
Philadelphia, 3'938,
.

.

—

.
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Finedo

Federico.
Siglo
medio de economla arron-tma.
Mexico CityrioSI^

Stresses monetary and fiscal poUcv and
Government actions affecting .f^rovvth,

Poblete^Tronccso, Moists, and Burnett, Ben G.
The
9.L .tjje. Latin Ameri can Labor Movement"^
"
Now York I960T
J

A

c;oori

Portnoy, Leopoldo.
ar.f<entina .

chapter on Argentina.
An£3.j_s_is crjtico de
r/Iexico Cityj 19§T".'

la ecorom^a
'

Investigates the failure of Argentine
development and indicts foreign capita] and
foreign capitalists,
Puiggros, Rodolfo.
Hi s to ri a
ollticos
argent inos
p
.

tica d_e l os parti do s
vols. "Buenos Aires:

cri:

b

One of the best analyses of the UCR.

Rodrfguez Tarditi, Jos6.
La c risis ar p -entin a> Ptora l.
po3 f tica
social economica
Buenos Aires:
.

,

.

1962.

Pessimistic evaluation of Argentine politics since I916.
Underscores the weaknesses of
the UCR.

Ruiz Moreno, Isidoro.
Economi!a y f inanzas contempo r|neas.
-f^uenos Aires: I938.
Analyzes the period 191^-1937.
Salera, Virgil.
Exchang e C ontrol and the Arp-enti ne
Market.
New York: 19^J-1.
Simon,

Fanny, "Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndi calisn
in South America. " Hi span ic American }{istorical
Revi ew
XXVI (Februaryl9^)
S.

.

Most of the article is devoted to the development of the movements in Argentina,
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Smith

Politics and Beef in Ar^xentina.
mtt^rns of Conflict md'~(^n7^ .--t^YK^l

Snow.

Peter.

Peter H.

Soares

ArsentiiTe Radicalism

Carlos F.

EconomTa

Arp-ent3j2a.

Solberg,

^

Carl.

lill^

3

vols.

Iowa City: I955.

.

finanzas de la Mac16n
Buen^Al7?sT~19l6:o:93-27

Immigrration and N.^ t.i nn.i op Ar^p-onChile
18£0-1Q1V.
Airitl^7ri970r^
^

,

,

"Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in
Argentina, 1912-1930." Journal o;f Inter- Ann
-i can
Studies, and World Affairs, XIII
rJaiTTIi77rr97i
.

Strasser, ^Carlos, ed.
politico argentine

)

la erdas en el
AvelJ.anodaj 1959."^
ij^n

.

.excellent collection of essays by
authors to the left of the political center.
/ji

-

Tornquist, Ernesto & Co., Ltd.
Th_e Econonic D_evojopioent of the Argentine Republic in theTast
Fifty Years
Buenos Aires: I919.
.

Williams, John H, "Argentine Foreign Exchange and
Trade Since the Armistice." Review of Ec onomi c?
and Statistics
Ill (March 1921)
.

"Latin American Foreign Exchanges During the
War." Quarterly Journal "^of Econ omics. XXXIII
(Kay 1919).

..

D.

Biographical Studies and Reference Works,
Abad de Santillan. Diego.
Gran encyclopedia argcntina.
8 vols,
Buenos Aires I956-I963.
:

Amizor, Rene,
Irip-oyen
a postol de la don o cracia
americ ana.
^ucnos Aires: I929.
.

As the title suggests,

this work is little
more than a panegyric for Yrigoyen,

Anuario Kraft

Buenos Aires: I885 to date.

.

Directory of commerce, industry, agriculture, stock raising, the professions and government
.
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Diaz,

Alfonso.
El Pre si den te Yrif^oyen v su inisjon
"
historica
Buenos 'Aires I929.
**"

.

A

i

eulo^, hardly differing from other

such v/orks about Yrigoytn,

Echevarrieta, Marcelo.
Argentina
Buenos Aires 193^+,

sus hombres

,

.

»

GSlvez,

Vida de Hipolito Yrip-pyen
misterio
2nd ed. Buenos Aires

i'^anuel.

.

1

.

hombre

e]

19^^5^;

Although a strong nationalist, G^lvez,
for the most part, treats his subject in a
reasonably objective fashion.
It is by far
the best biography to date on Yrigoyen.
Garcia Ledesnia, H.
Lisandr o de la Torre
gringa
Buenos Aires 195^,
.

y;

la panipa

j

Gonzalez Arrili, Bernardo.
Torre
Buenos Aires
.

Vida de Lisandro de la
1962"."

t

A 'good biography of one of Yrigoyen
most outspoken critics.

's

Killik, Sir Stephen H. M. I.^anual of Argentine Rail ways for 1916 (-1930)
London 19lS3Y93b.
.

1

An annual review of the Bri tish-ov/ned
railroads in Argentina.

Larra,

Raul.
Lisandro de la Torre El soli tario
de Pin as
Buenos Aires 1956,
t

.

j

Lazarte, Juan.
Lisandro de la Torre Ref ormado r
social arnericano
2nd ed. Buenos Aires
1955*
t

.

Luna,

Felix.

Alvear

.

Buenos Aires

t

i

1958.

Points out the differences in outlook,
temperament and policy betv/een the Yrigoyen
He faults Aland Alvear administrations.
vear for a lack of creative energy while President,
.

Yri p-pyen

nos Aires

J

,

el temT:)lari o de la libertad

195^-.

Excessively pro- Yrigoyen.

.

Bue-
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Oyhanarte

Koracio.
El Hombre
M2£tol de 2^ democracia

,

.

KiT-5lito Yri ^^oyen

Buenos

Ai?i^r945.

Another eulogy, written by one of
goyen's faithful followers.

Yr^i-

Parker, William Belmont, ed.
Argentines of ^o~6^y
2 vols,
Buenos Aires I92O.
i

Piccirilli.^Ricardo; Romny, Francisco; and
Gianello.
Leoncio.
i2ic.^ioTiaiJ_o lllstorico argenti ono.
6 vols. Buenos Aires
1953-195?.""^
t

^Mi^

£s qui en en la Argen tina!
£oraneas.
eds. for 1939,
Aires 1939, 19^1,

Biogr aftas con tern-

19^"l9^."~B^os

I

Scienz- Hayes, Ricardo.
Ramon J. Care an 0 |. En las
Ietra_s, el £obiej:'no y la diplomacia
1&^-.
.

uenos Aires

19^4 6.

19^0.

t

Sociedad Inteligancia Sudamericana. Hornbre s del
diccionario blof-rafico arpentino
1211
Buenos Aires I917.
f

.

'

'

j

Solari,^Juan
tinos

tonic.
lerf iles parlanentari os
Buenos Aires 19^5.

/ji

.

Torres,

ar.pjeji-

1

Arturo.

conducta

.

Elpidio Gonzal ezt Biograf fa de una
Buenos Aires I951.
j

Udaondo, Enrique.
Diccionario biograf 1 co arp-entjno
Buenos Aires) I938.
The Universal Bi rectory of Railway Officials
London 1920, I93O.
1930
.

,

.

1£20,

»

Villafane, Benjamfn.
Irigoyen
Buenos Aires 1922,

.

el

ill

ti-no

dictador.

1

The title is revealing,
terly attacks Yrigoyen.
E.

V.i.llafaHe bit-

Other Works Consulted,
Gonzalez Calderon, Juan A,
Buenos Aires 1928.

Doctrina con s t i tu c i onal

,

j

An excellent chapter on railroad tariffs.
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Haring

Clarence

H.
19'^1.

-Dostoni

Argo ntina and the United States
"
—
'

"

Germani's contribution is noteworthy.
Irazusta, Julio.

Ensa:^ hj^t5ri_c^^

Buenos Airest

The viev/s of an economic nationalist.

Irazusta,

Roberto, and Irazusta, Julio.
b rit^ni co
Z el iiriP.e. rialism~o "~"
Aires 19^1.
.

La Ar^en^'
~
Buenos

J

The brothers Irazusta sought an extreme
nationalist and pro- clerical Government v/hich
would destroy British influence in Argentina.

Peterson, Harold
I8IO - I960
.

Arge ntina £ind the United States.
New York! 19?4.

F.

Romulo Fern-^ndez, Juan.
Historia del periodismo argen tino
Buenos Aires T 194'3,
.

Scalabrini Ortiz, Raul.
PoTftica bri tunica en el
2nd ed. Buenos Aires
MP- Is. la.
19^0.
1

Violently anti-British.
Scobie, James

Revolution on th£_ Pampas A SocjpJ
History of Argentine Wheat 1860-1910, AusTlni
R,

t

.

19^f.

Whi taker, Arthur P.
The Un ited State's and Argentin a.
Cambridge, Mass.
195^^.
t

Zalduendo, Eduardo.
C-eograf fa e] ectoral de la Argen tina
Buenos Aires 1958,
.

i

Nev/spapers and Periodicals.
1.

Nev/s papers,

La Ac c i on (Buenos Aires

)h

1922-1928.

The semi-official organ of the Alvefir ad^

ministration.
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II

Pj-^^io

(Buenos Aires), 191?-19i8.

IP££§. (Buenos Aires),

I916-I930.

The semi-official press for
Yrigoyen's
administrations and spokesman for the
personalista wing of the UCR.
_

t^.o
two

M l^cion

(Buenos Aires), 1916^.1930.

Conservative.
Generally supported
position of the British-owned railroads. the

M IrensB.

(Euenos Aires), I916-I930.

Conservative and nationalist] c.
The
paper was often critical of the foreigncontrolled railways in Argentina.

M

(Buenos Aires),

fiazon

I916-I930.

Affiliated with no particular political party, La Razon was oftentimes used as
a sounding board by all.
The paner had excellent sources in official circles
-The

Time s

(London), I916-I930.

La Vanf^uardia (Buenos Aires), I916-I930.
The paper of the Socialist Party.
2.

Railroad-oriented Periodicals,
El Ferrov iario_ (Buenos Aires),

I92O-I923.

Official organ of the Asociaci6n
Fcrroviaria Macional,
La Fra ternidad (Buenos ^ires)

,

"

I916-I930.

The official journal of the Engineers
and Firemen's union.
The Railway Gazet te

(London), I917-IQ30.

This weekly had its own correspondent
in Buenos A.ires.

37^

Rev 3 St a del Ferrovi ario (Buenos Aires),
I92/-J-I928.

Began publication in February 192k,
Socialist in orientation, the review tried
to win railwayinen to the Socialist Farty.
3.

Other Periodicals,
Angles de la Sociedad Rural

Ar,o:en

^oletln de Obras Pu blicas

Indus trias

e

tina

I917..1930.

.

.

I92I-I922,

Bole tin de la Union Industrial Argentina, 1919"
1935. Title vaFi^,

Cronica Itistorica Ar^rentina
The Revi_ew of
1930.

tjie

,

River Plate (Buenos Aires). 1916.

Published weekly, this periodical defended British economic interests in Argentina.

Revista Economica (Buenos Aires), I928.-I929,

Published monthly by the Banco de la
Naci6n Argentina.
A va].uable source for
economic conditions in Argentina,

Revista

de_ Obri3_£

Publicas

e

Indus tri as

(Buenos

TAiresT; 1933.

Of special interest is its study
entitled "La Crisis Ferroviaria Argentina."
Published as a monograph in 1933.
"The Situation in Argentina."

Monthly Bulle tin
(Buenos Aires), 1922-1930.

Published by the First National Bank
of Boston, Buenos Aires Branch,
S outh

American Joumnl (London), I916-I93O,
Defended British interests in Argentina.
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VI,

Bibliographic Aides,
Repiiblica Argentina.
Empresa Nacional de Transportes.
Servicio de Bibliotecas y Fublicaciones de Trans-

portes.
1935.

Bibliografta Ferroviaria

^uenos Aires

.

Indispensable,

Bureau of Railway Economics.
Railway E conomi cs
Colle ctive Catalop-ue of Books in Fourteen
Crin Libraries
Chicago I912",

>

A
Arr.eri -

.

Dated, but useful.
Chi Ids,

James B.
ed,
A Guide to th^ O ff c r1' lublications of the Other Arneri can Re r ub 1 ics 'l9'~vols.
,

i

.i

.

in 2.

V/ashington,

B,

C.

j

19^4-5^19^87

Daverio,

Carlos E.
Revista de Ciencias Economi cas 1912
122o_! Clasificacion General
Au t o r c s
te r i a1e
Buenos Aires I930.
.

I'.:a

»

.

1

Galvan Moreno, C,
El periodismo argentine
Aires 19^1-4.

,

Buenos

J

Listings of journals published in Argentina,

Handboo k of Latin American Studi es 1935 to date. Cambridge, Kass.j 193^1947. Gainesville, Fla.
19^8,

j

Harvard University.
Bureau for Economic Research in
Latin America.
The Economic J, 5 terature of Latin
America A Tentat i.ve Bibliography
2 vols, Cambridge, Kass.i 1935-193^7
i

.

outdated, although still valuable for
literature published in the 1920's,
Nov/

Harvard University Library, V/idener Library Shelf lis t
Num.be r ^\ Latin America and Latin Amieri can I eri odicals
Cambridge, fess,
I966,
.

Internat i onal
date.

j

I ndex

to Peri odicals

,

New Yorki 1915

"to

.

a
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Junta Consultiva de AbogadoK de Ferrocarriles
Indi ce
alfabgtico analftico
cronolorico de Job asuntos
tratados desde agcsto l4 de I908 hpsta abril 12
'
de 193^1.
Duenos Aires 103k.
.

.

i

Metcalf, Kenneth, ed.
Transportation
Sources
Detroit} I965,

1

Information

.

An annotated guide to publications, agencies
and other data sources concerning air, rail, water,
road and pipeline transportation.

New York (City) Public Library.
Die t onary C,?talo /^ue
of the History of the Americas
28 vols.
BosTon
3

.

1961.

Pan American Union,
Inde x to L atin American Periodic al
Li terature
Boston I962.
19 29- 19 oO.
j

.

P.ebuelto,

Emilio.

Indi

ce^

cronol6.q:i ca do

las leyes

nacionales sobre ferrocarriles argentinos
Buenos Aires 1933.

,

j

The

Of f ci al Index to The Timies
(London) Tim.es,
London I916-I93O.
Microfilm."
i

J

Torre Revello, Jos^. "El Archive General de la Nacion
Argentina," Revista de historic de America I
(March 193S).
-

,

"Biblioteca Nacional." Revista de histo ri
America II (June 1939).
,

de

,

Union C.ivica Radicr?l. Comit^ de la Provincia de Buenos
Biblio^^raf fa para
Aires, Comision de Cultura,
Buenos Aires 1952.
el Estudio del Radicolismo,
»

j

